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Abstract 
 
Given the complexities of our time, it is not surprising that criminological models, 
theories and perspectives often fall short of providing complete and satisfactory 
explanations of complex phenomena.  Organised crime and terrorism, and the 
emerging crime-terror nexus, are examples of such phenomena.  If they were 
simple, they would be easy to understand and prevent, but they are not.  
Complexity science (‘complexity’) studies complex phenomena.  Given the nature 
of organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus, one would expect that 
the family of complexity, including chaos theory, might lend itself to furthering 
our understanding and knowledge of these phenomena.  Drawing on the natural 
and social sciences, this thesis explores the notion.  In doing so, a new complexity 
model, using borrowed science, is developed to apply complexity in a 
criminological context, and to critically examine organised crime, terrorism and 
the crime-terror nexus through a complexity lens.  The new complexity model is 
tested using the case study method and considers whether the new model furthers 
our understanding and knowledge of these complex phenomena, together with 
practical and policy implications.  The thesis also considers whether the new 
complexity model adds a new tool to the criminologist’s toolbox to provide fresh 
and novel insights into complex problems.  
Key words 
Organised crime, terrorism, crime-terror nexus, criminological theory, complexity 
science, chaos theory 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction  
 
‘If you change the way you look at things, the things you look at change’  
Wayne Dyer, philosopher (1940-2015) 
 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the research problem, key definitions, 
objectives, outcomes and implications, together with the context and structure of 
the thesis, including the role of theory.  
  
 
1.1       Research problem  
Over the past two decades, the Millennium Project, an international think tank set 
up in part by the Smithsonian Institute, has studied global challenges facing 
humanity (Millennium Project 2017).  Of note is that two of the fifteen global 
challenges updated annually relate to organised crime and terrorism.  To put this 
into perspective, the other twelve include climate change, natural resource 
scarcity, health and food crises.  Moreover, in today’s changing world, there is a 
growing discourse on the nexus between these two global challenges.  Supporting 
this nexus, in opening the thirteenth United Nations Congress on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice, the Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon (2015) 
stated: 
We must adapt to changing times…we must address the growing links 
between organised crime and terrorism.  Like never before, terrorists and 
criminals around the world are coming together and feeding off each 
other...we must take a comprehensive approach…there will always be 
crime and there will always be extremists.  But we must work to stop crime 
and extremism being seen as attractive or necessary options.  
In studying these phenomena, Levi (2007:800) notes, ‘areas of criminological 
explanation are difficult’ enough, ‘but accounting for changes in how and why 
people get together to commit a large range of serious crimes for profit and (by 
violence and the threat of violence) for political/religious change is indeed 
challenging’.  Furthermore, according to von Lampe (1999), there is ‘no 
comprehensive theory that can reconcile the confusing and at times conflicting 
	 13	
understanding of the term organised crime’.  Based on the literature, the same can 
be said about terrorism and criminological phenomena in general.  In theories of 
crime, Agnew (2011:193) argues: 
In brief, we live in a complex and variable world.  The assumptions that 
underlie particular crime theories and perspectives are overly simplistic, 
each reflecting only a part of this world.  As a result, each theory or 
perspective typically has some support, but falls far short of providing a 
complete explanation of crime.  
Originating from the natural sciences, complexity science (‘complexity’) studies 
complex phenomena and uses a holistic approach, where the unit of study is a 
complex system (Kauffman 1995; Mitchell 2009).   It is a set of theoretical concepts 
and principles, rather than a unified body of theory, and hence the singular word 
‘complexity’ is used as an umbrella term throughout this thesis (Lewin 1992; 
Waldrop 1992; Kauffman 1995; Cilliers 1998; Byrne & Callaghan 2014).  
Complexity may also be described as ‘an ontological frame of reference’ (Byrne & 
Callaghan 2014:57);  where ontology is defined as ‘the branch of metaphysics that 
investigates the nature of being’ (Macquarie dictionary).  Essentially, in the social 
world, complexity ‘engages with the philosophical foundations of social science, 
both in terms of the construction of theories…and methodological foundations’ 
(Byrne & Callaghan 2014:57).  It also aims to improve our understanding of a 
complex phenomenon, including why and how it evolved or evolves, and in doing 
so, may help practically to influence and/or achieve desired outcomes of the 
phenomenon under study.  More importantly, complexity offers the ability to 
reflect and learn from the past, interpret and respond to the present and predict 
and prepare for the future.   
Given the serious and complex nature of organised crime and terrorism, and the 
emerging crime-terror nexus, one would expect that the family of complexity, 
including chaos theory, might lend itself to furthering our understanding and 
knowledge of these complex phenomena.  In turn, perhaps complexity may offer 
a more comprehensive picture and address some of the short comings of particular 
crime theories and perspectives raised by Agnew (2011).  Furthermore, complexity 
may also contribute to a new way of knowing and sense of reality in criminological 
study.   
This thesis attempts to explore these notions and to essentially relocate a 
criminological study of the complex phenomena of organised crime, terrorism and 
	 14	
the crime-terror nexus into a new conceptual space using complexity.  It aims to 
reframe the way we think about these complex phenomena and in doing so further 
our understanding and knowledge.  The thesis comprises an over-arching yet 
simple hypothesis relating to complex phenomena:   
• Thesis hypothesis:  complexity can be successfully applied with 
criminological frames of reference to analyse organised crime, terrorism 
and the crime-terror nexus.   
As will be discussed in Part 1 of the literature review, there are a number of 
approaches that have been developed in the natural and social sciences to apply 
complexity to social phenomena. However, there are few approaches, if any, 
developed within criminology to study criminological problems. There is also 
limited application to date of complexity within criminology and more specifically 
to the study of organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus, with some 
notable exceptions in terrorism studies.  To address this balance, the development 
of a new approach is central to this thesis.  The new approach will include the 
design, development and testing of a new complexity model with criminological 
frames of reference and a set of steps using the case study method.  The 
criminological frames of reference will form an integral part of the new design, 
with certain concepts being framed within complexity and other concepts being 
synthesised with complexity.  Ultimately, this thesis argues that the phenomena 
of organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus may be described as 
complex systems and as a result will offer new definitions of these phenomena.  
Supporting this approach,  Byrne and Callaghan (2014:8) argue that complexity is: 
An ontologically founded framework of understanding…which asserts the 
ontological position that much of the world and most of the social world 
consists of complex systems and if we want to understand it we have to 
understand it in those terms.   
Accordingly, the thesis aims to offer a new complexity model, with ontological 
and epistemological knowledge, to apply complexity in a criminological context, 
and to critically examine organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus 
through a complexity lens.  Ultimately, this thesis aims to further our 
understanding and knowledge of these complex phenomena and change some of 
the practical ways we deal with them.   
 
	 15	
The thesis is inter-disciplinary and draws from the social sciences (criminology 
and political science) and the natural sciences (complexity science).  As most 
would agree, different disciplines have different perspectives, and may all be 
useful, at different times, for different purposes.  When Einstein was asked what 
helped him the most in developing his theory of relativity, he replied, ‘figuring out 
how to think about the problem’ (cited in Sanders 2003).  Theoretical work often 
leads us to break-up a problem into parts, study and theorise the parts 
individually, add them back together again and then theorise as a whole 
(Kauffman 1995; Mitchell 2009). Complexity leads us to do the opposite.  With 
complexity, a problem can only be understood as an integrated whole; in breaking 
up a problem, we destroy what we seek to understand – it is more than a sum of 
its parts (Kauffman 1995; Cilliers 1998; Mitchell 2009).  Moreover, complexity is 
‘good at extending our knowledge from the known to the unknown’ (Leary & 
Thomas 2011:68).  Simply put, complexity helps us to think differently, leading us 
to new ideas and understanding. 
Given organised crime, terrorism and the emerging nexus are complex 
phenomena, local and global in nature, constantly changing and evolving, it is not 
surprising that they are difficult to analyse and account for (Hoffman 2006; Levi 
2007; Holmes 2007; Grabosky & Stohl 2010; ed. Paoli 2014; von Lampe 2016).  In 
the latest research, approaches and models favour the differentiation between the 
various levels of complexity and multi-dimensionality of the problem, including 
links between organised crime and terrorism, and the licit-illicit worlds (Grabosky 
& Stohl 2010; von Lampe 2016). At a macro-level, organised crime, terrorism and 
the crime-terror nexus may be observed from the whole ‘eco-system’ in which 
crime occurs, including society, the economy, geo-politics and the media.  At a 
micro-level, these phenomena may be observed from individual actors, deals or 
events.  The closer one focuses on individual actors, the harder it is to see the bigger 
picture (Madsen 2007).  As aptly expressed by a journalist (cited in Hoffman 
2006:295), ‘countering terrorism is akin to taking a series of time-lapse 
photographs.  The image captured today is not the same as the image yesterday, 
nor will it be the same tomorrow’.  
As noted earlier, complexity studies complex phenomena and may be described 
as a body of interdisciplinary knowledge that studies the structure, behaviour and 
dynamics of change in non-linear dynamic systems (Kauffman 1995; Cilliers 1998; 
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Mitchell 2009).  Some systems are chaotic, i.e. appear random due to their complex 
behaviour, but in essence are deterministic, although difficult to predict, due to 
their sensitivity to initial conditions (popularly referred to as the ‘butterfly effect’ 
or ‘chaos theory’).  Other systems, known as complex adaptive systems, have 
emergent properties, where the behaviour is not deterministic (often labelled 
‘complexity theory’), but due to emergent patterns of underlying order, certain 
predictions may be made (Kauffman 1995; Cilliers 1998).  Essentially, complexity 
may be summed up as ‘searching for order in the complexity of evolving worlds’ 
(Santa Fe Institute 2017).  As such, a complexity approach promotes a patterned 
style of thinking and ‘holds out the promise of identifying underlying patterns that 
give rise to order from the multiple individual interactions of diverse actors’ 
(Bousquet & Curtis 2011:51).  Moreover, as Kuhn (2009:16) argues, ‘utilising 
complexity habits of thought is radically different from just adding a few new 
words and concepts to old ways of thinking’.  Instead, ‘it offers a means of 
discerning and identifying underlying patterns of order, thus providing a richer 
understanding and appreciation of situations, as well as indicators’ (Kuhn 
2009:12).   In simple terms, ‘the new lens of complexity opens a whole new realm 
of possibilities’ in furthering our understanding and knowledge of a complex 
phenomenon (Frei & Ramalingham 2011:7).  
To date, according to Milovanovic (2015:50), criminologists have had ‘minimal 
engagement’ in applying complexity within criminology.  In the wider social 
sciences, while there has been more engagement and hence more influence, this 
influence has not been dramatic (Byrne & Callaghan 2014).  Of note, despite their 
complex nature, is the limited application to organised crime, terrorism and the 
crime-terror nexus, with a few notable exceptions in terrorism studies.  In contrast, 
within criminology, the study of organised crime and more recently terrorism and 
the crime-terror nexus, is a growing area of activity and one of much concern and 
debate (Grabosky & Stohl 2010; von Lampe 2016).  In particular, research at a local, 
regional and global level continues as evidenced by the influential Millennium 
Project (2017).  The more we understand organised crime and terrorism, and the 
emerging crime-terror nexus, the better we are equipped to detecting and 
preventing it.  With the knowledge that the application of complexity within 
criminology is marginal and the application to organised crime, terrorism and the 
crime-terror nexus is limited, this reveals an academic gap which this thesis 
attempts to address. 
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1.2 Key definitions  
As will be discussed in Part 1 of the literature review, there are no universally 
agreed definitions for key terms used in this thesis: namely, organised crime, 
terrorism, crime-terror nexus and complexity.  Moreover, the terms such as global, 
international, transnational, domestic and local all have different meanings for 
different people when used in conjunction with these terms.  Nonetheless, it is 
recognised that ‘definitions are necessary and important…in order to explain the 
topic of discussion and the parameters of analysis’ (Allum & Gilmour 2011:6).  As 
will be explained in Chapter 3, complexity may be defined as the study of ‘how a 
complex system of elements organise themselves, without the benefit of any 
central controller, into a collective whole that creates patterns, uses information, 
and, in some cases, evolves and learns’ (Mitchell 2009:4).  As will also be explained 
in Chapter 4, the phenomena of organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror 
nexus may be described as complex systems;  hence, for the purposes of this thesis, 
new definitions will be constructed.  For ease of reference, comparison and to 
foreshadow the parameters of analysis, two sets of definitions are offered for the 
phenomena under study and summarised together in Table 1.1 below: i) 
traditional definitions as defined by criminologists; and ii) the new complexity 
informed definitions as constructed by the author in this thesis.   
Table	1.1:		Summary	of	traditional	v	complexity	definitions	of	key	terms		
	 Key	term	 Traditional	definitions															
(see	Chapter	2,	section	2.2)	
New	complexity	definitions																			
(see	Chapter	4,	section	4.3)	
1.	 Organised	
crime	
‘The	ongoing	activities	of	those	
collectively	engaged	in	
production,	supply	and	financing	
for	illegal	markets	in	goods	and	
services’	(Gill	2013:300).	
	
A	complex	system	(i.e.	a	criminal	
group)	comprising	a	number	of	
interacting,	self-organising,	
dynamic	and	emergent	properties,	
including	individuals,	and	also	
interacts	with	other	groups,	
individuals	and	its	environment,	all	
of	which	are	mutually	influencing.	
2.	 Terrorism	 ‘An	essentially	premeditated	
political	act.		The	intention	is	to	
inflict	serious	injury	on	the	
civilian	population	and	to	
influence	government	policy	by	
creating	an	atmosphere	of	fear	
and	threat,	generally	for	a	
political,	religious	or	ideological	
cause’	(McLaughlin	2013:461).	
A	complex	system	(i.e.	a	criminal	or	
criminalised	group)	comprising	a	
number	of	interacting,	self-
organising,	dynamic	and	emergent	
properties,	including	individuals,	
and	also	interacts	with	other	
groups,	individuals	and	its	
environment,	all	of	which	are	
mutually	influencing.	
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	 Key	term	 Traditional	definitions															
(see	Chapter	2,	section	2.2)	
New	complexity	definitions																			
(see	Chapter	4,	section	4.3)	
3.	 Crime-terror	
nexus	
‘The	degree	of	overlap’	between	
organised	crime	and	terrorism	
(Grabosky	&	Stohl	2010:2).	
A	complex	system	(i.e.	a	criminal	or	
criminalised	group)	which	evolves,	
or	two	or	more	complex	systems	
which	evolve	and	reciprocally	
affect	each	other’s	evolution	and	
co-evolve	to	form	a	different	or	
new	complex	system	or	systems	
(i.e.	groups).		
	
Source:	Traditional	definitions	(sources	in	text)	and	complexity	definitions	(author	Chapter	4)	
 
Furthermore, as seen in Table 1.1 above, while the complexity definitions of 
organised crime and terrorism are almost identical, as will be demonstrated in this 
thesis, the new definitions are also within the context of specific variables and 
conditions pertinent to the ‘environment’ of either organised crime and/or 
terrorism.  Moreover, the definitions offered in Table 1.1 above are all from a global 
perspective, i.e. the phenomena are world-wide. 
1.3 Research objectives, outcomes and implications  
The primary objective of this thesis is to provide a meaningful contribution to our 
understanding and knowledge of organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror 
nexus.  The research is significant as it not only advances our understanding of 
complex real-world challenges (Millennium Project 2017), but also uses borrowed 
science to open-up new ways of thinking within the broader area of criminological 
research.   
Key outcomes of the research are major original contributions to: 
i) furthering our understanding and knowledge of organised crime, 
terrorism and the crime-terror nexus; and  
ii) developing a new complexity model and knowledge with criminological 
frames of reference to apply complexity in criminology.   
As will be discussed and concluded in Chapter 9, the primary objective of this 
thesis and the key outcomes will be achieved.  The value and significance of these 
contributions are based on the difficulties in combating organised crime and 
terrorism to date, including their increasing nexus, and the ongoing challenges in 
understanding complex phenomena in criminology.   
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Of note, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, while it is acknowledged that a key 
focus of the case study surrounds organised crime, as this thesis will demonstrate, 
the case study also offers a rich source of material in terrorism and the crime-terror 
nexus to test and apply the new complexity model, given i) the presence of 
terrorism and the crime-terror nexus in the criminal structures and activities of the 
criminal group under study; and ii) the formation of a number of allegiances and 
alliances, including a terrorist group and two vigilante groups, all of which play a 
central role in the rise and fall of the criminal group.   
Importantly, the new complexity model may also offer an additional tool in the 
criminologist’s toolbox to provide fresh and novel insights into complex problems, 
and in doing so, perhaps shine light on old ones.  Moreover, the new complexity 
model does not aim to overthrow existing theories, perspectives or knowledge, it 
merely aims to supplement and/or complement.  Furthermore, the value and 
significance of the new complexity model, may stimulate a much-needed interest, 
discussion and debate by criminologists, on how to better conceptualise complex 
problems using the new science of complexity.  
1.4       The role of theory  
Theory can be seen as a tool for thinking.  As noted by Garland (1990:277), 
‘theoretical work seeks to change the way we think about an issue and ultimately 
to change the practical ways we deal with it’.  In criminology, ‘theory occupies a 
central place’ and provides a critical foundation for understanding crime and 
criminal behaviour (Mazerolle 2007:166).  It represents the building blocks for 
organising knowledge (Tierney 2006; Mazerolle 2007).  In essence, theory helps us 
advance our knowledge, by explaining what is already known, generating 
discovery of what is currently unknown and predicting what will happen in the 
future.  Dantzker and Hunter (2006:22) define theory as ‘an explanation that offers 
to classify, organise, explain, predict, and/or understand the occurrence of specific 
phenomena’.  Similarly, Maxfield and Babbie (2014:40) define theory as ‘a 
systematic explanation for observed facts and laws that describe and predict’.  
Dantzker and Hunter (2006:23) further offer a much simpler, but particularly 
useful, definition of theory, where theory is ‘a statement that attempts to make 
sense of reality’, and where reality is phenomena that can be identified, recognised 
and observed.  Essentially, theory helps us understand, explain, represent or 
model something about the world around us, with the most important task being 
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explanation or prediction.   
There is a multitude of theories used in criminological analysis, each with a 
different perspective or approach (Tierney 2006; eds Maguire et al 2007; Mazerolle 
2007; Rock 2007; White & Perrone 2015; Tittle 2016).  Each theory may be 
categorised as locating its key explanation for criminal behaviour or criminality at 
one of three broad levels of analysis: the individual, the situational and the social 
structural (White et al 2012).  The individual level focuses on the personal or 
individual characteristics of the offender or victim; the situational focuses on the 
interaction and environment of the actors/activity taking place; and the social 
structural focuses on the broad social relationships and social institutions of 
society as a whole (White et al 2012).  On occasion, a theory may combine more 
than one of these levels to provide a more comprehensive and perhaps a more 
sophisticated perspective of crime and criminal behaviour.  Moreover, in 
criminology, we are dealing with human behaviour and theories tend to be in 
probabilities rather than absolutes (Maxfield & Babbie 2007).  For example, a 
criminologist would say “an adult with a deprived childhood will probably be 
more at risk of committing delinquent acts than an adult without a deprived 
childhood”.  There is no absolute with human behaviour.  
The literature reveals that as criminology has developed, different theories and 
theorists have moved in and out of fashion.  At the end of the nineteenth century, 
for example, in the early days of Lombroso, phrenological measurement of 
‘criminal’ skull types was originally accepted, then later dismissed in the mid-
twentieth century (Lombroso-Ferrero 1911).  Today, however, more fashionable 
neurologists are still studying the ‘criminal’ brain (Jeffery 1993; Eagleman 2011).  
Since Lombroso, there have been scores of major theoretical models to explain the 
various causes of criminal behaviour.  According to Mazerolle (2007), 
criminological theory has progressed through a number of phases over the past 
125 years, including four key phases: single factor reductionism, multiple factor 
approaches, systemic reductionism and integrated and inter-disciplinary 
approaches.  The first phase, single factor reductionism and lasting some 50 years 
focused on single factors or characteristics of the individual’s make-up to explain 
criminal behaviour and commenced with the work of Lombroso.  The next phase, 
multiple factors approach, lasting some 20 years during the 1940s to 1960s, focused 
on multiple influences and tended to be more predictive rather than explanatory.  
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The third phase, systemic reductionism, commenced in the 1950s and continues 
today.  It attempts to reduce explanations of criminal behaviour to one system or 
discipline of knowledge – such as psychological or economic.  And finally, the 
fourth phase, integrated or inter-disciplinary, commenced in the 1980s and also 
continues today.  This phase attempts to bring together and integrate different 
theories to provide a more complete and comprehensive explanation or 
understanding.  As Agnew (2011:193) argues, ‘most theories appear to have some 
merit, explaining a portion of the variation in some crime’ but invariably fall short 
of a complete explanation.  In particular, a more complete picture may involve 
theories drawn from diverse disciplines of knowledge, where all the diverse 
strands can fit together, with the goal of producing an integrated theory that is 
superior to any individual theory.  As noted by Tierney (2006:352), ‘whatever their 
particular merits, each [theory] at least for a period capture[d] the imagination of 
some academic criminologists…then something else came along’.  As 
criminological phases and perspectives evolve, theoretical viewpoints continue to 
counter or complement existing theories and inspire debate and argument – an 
essential ingredient of today’s criminology (eds Maguire et al 2007; ed. Piquero 
2016).  As in most disciplines, ‘the fact that different theories provide competing 
interpretations…is actually a sign that criminology, as a field of knowledge, is a 
healthy and robust discipline’ (Mazerolle 2007:166).  Moreover, given crime itself 
is essentially a social construct, competing interpretations and perspectives are not 
surprising. 
From its early days, criminology’s history ‘can be tracked against the waxing and 
waning of different disciplinary influences’, notably psychology, sociology, 
history, law, economics and politics, and hence the wide range of techniques and 
methodologies used by criminologists (Zedner 2007:268).  Criminological theory 
has also been synthesised from these interdisciplinary viewpoints; for example, 
psychological, economic, ecological, gender and social factors (Akers & Sellers 
2004; Lainer & Henry 2004; Tierney 2006).  However, as noted by Maxfield and 
Babbie (2014), although theory in criminology is frequently adapted from other 
disciplines in the social sciences, it is less often adapted from the natural sciences.  
Today, given the changing world we live in, interdisciplinary thinking and 
theories born out of the natural sciences are becoming more prevalent.  As pointed 
out by Klein (1990), interdisciplinary is a means of solving problems that cannot 
be satisfactorily addressed in one’s own discipline.  Of particular note, the 2004 US 
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National Academies report, Facilitating Interdisciplinary Research, proposed that 
there are four powerful factors driving interdisciplinary thinking: i) the inherent 
complexity of nature and society; ii) the desire to explore problems across 
discipline boundaries; iii) the need to solve societal problems; and iv) the power of 
new technologies (cited in Bammer 2013:3).  According to popular consensus, 
including academic scholars, ‘there appears to be a widely held view that in the 
twenty-first century the world is changing faster than ever before’ and that ‘many 
of these changes are considered to be associated with globilisation’ (Muncie 
2013:201).  As Muncie (2013:201-202) further defines, ‘put simply, goods, money 
and information, as well as crime, pollution, drugs and disease, now routinely 
travel the world, and that world appears to be more interconnected’; he further 
notes that ‘events and decisions made in one part will have repercussions through 
the rest.’ 
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, globalisation, enabled through the 
advances of technology and in particular the Internet, has created an ‘information 
age’ where information is expansive, instant and easily accessible.  It has 
fundamentally changed our lives and affects the way we live, work, socialise and 
organise ourselves (Gleick 2011; Leary & Thomas 2011).  More information means 
more data and more data means more complexity.  To make sense of our 
increasingly complex world, Elsum (2013:432) argues that: 
Managing the tension between the traditional approach to the quest for 
fundamental understanding (reductionism and increasingly specialised 
disciplines) and the needs of complex real-world problems (integration of 
knowledge from multiple areas at a system level) is critical to success. 
As Kauffman (1995:298) suggests in the context of globalisation and complexity, 
‘we are at that particular time in history when population, technology, economics, 
and knowledge spin us together’.  White and Perrone (2015:52) argue that 
‘criminology theory can be presented in abstract fashion as discrete perspectives 
or approaches’.  Most notably, postmodern criminology, arising in the early 1990s 
and still evolving today embraces complexity (Milovanovic 2013b).  According to 
Madfis (2014:634), ‘the ultimate postmodern goal is to understand new ways of 
knowing’.  Postmodernists dismiss Newtonian physics of space and time and 
Euclidean geometry where ‘linearity, stasis, determinism and stability are 
privileged’ (Milovanovic 2013b:330).  Instead, ‘the nature of postmodernism is 
complex, abstract, interdisciplinary, and expansive…’ (Madfis 2014:633) where 
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‘quantum and chaos theories indicate the centrality of chance and indeterminacy 
as well as disproportionate effects’ (Milovanovic 2013b:330).  For postmodernists, 
freewill and determinism co-exist.  In postmodern criminology, complexity finds 
a home, even though it has had minimal engagement by criminologists to date 
(Milovanovic 2015).  
Another recent influence in both criminological study and the world at large is the 
use of technology and advanced computer modelling to analyse data (Chan & 
Bennett Moses 2016).  The ability to take a data set and subject it to numerous lines 
of inquiry to look for relationships and patterns is a powerful tool in 
understanding crime and criminal behaviour, especially where non-linearities 
exist.  Computer models allow us to develop new, visual, geometric mathematical 
techniques and is certainly helpful for any theory involving complex mathematics 
and patterns (Kiel & Elliott 1997).  In recent years, there has been a plethora of 
popular science books around the theme of data sets, prediction and thinking 
differently – from Super Crunchers: How Anything Can Be Predicted (2007), by Ian 
Ayres, to the series of books by Malcolm Gladwell, notably The Tipping Point (2001) 
and Outliers (2008). In Super Crunchers, thinking by numbers is the overriding 
theme, but as Ayres points out ‘Super Crunching is not a substitute for intuition, 
but a complement.  Our intuitions, our experiences, and yes, statistics, should 
work together’ (Ayres 2007:217).  While the emergence of Big Data (Chan & 
Bennett Moses 2016) is certainly a consideration for criminologists, as Lee (1997:28) 
suggests, ‘perhaps mathematics is not a very good language to use in describing 
the ideas, values, and ideologies that are transmitted during interpersonal 
interchange’.  Moreover, ‘perhaps narrative explanation is the best description of 
the interpersonal signalling and interpreting that takes place as humans interact in 
micro-contexts’ (Lee 1997:28).  Essentially, we should seek to understand social 
dynamics in the languages best suited to describe them.  Lee (1997:29) further notes 
that we can ultimately make use of ‘both narrative prose and mathematics to 
describe a world in which individual human and non-human interaction events 
culminate through linear and non-linear, local, global, probabilistic and 
deterministic processes’.    
In the words of Bernard Cohen, a historian of science (cited in Kellert 2008:103), 
the inventional use of borrowed knowledge is not a direct transference or exact 
copying, but a ‘creative transformation – an intellectual leap forward that often 
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happens when a concept, a method, a principle, or even a theory is transferred 
from one domain to another’.  As globalisation and new technology continue to 
influence our everyday lives, concepts under the language of complexity, such as 
tipping points, feedback loops and the butterfly effect have found a place in our 
everyday vocabulary.  In turn, the language of complexity is also finding its way 
into interdisciplinary study through borrowed knowledge.  As one of today’s 
popular thinkers points out ‘we favour the visible, the embedded, the personal, 
the narrated, and the tangible; we scorn the abstract’ (Taleb 2007:262).  Put simply, 
as human beings, we are not conditioned to understand the abstract and non-
linearities of this world;  our emotional apparatus is designed for linear causality.  
Moreover, it is important to recognise that ‘the preconceived ideas that we hold 
about social phenomena, shape the things we see’ and ‘no perception is possible 
without a theory behind it’ (Klerks 2001:55).  More importantly, ‘reliance on theory 
commits us to believe in a certain kind of reality.  In this respect, theory becomes 
a prism through which we interpret and make sense of people, situations, and 
behaviour’ (Arrigo 2006:44).  In the nature of reality or ontology as highlighted by 
Maxfield and Babbie (2014:271), ‘some people believe that a real world exists 
beyond our perceptions and constructions’ and others ‘think that reality is a 
construction based on what we perceive reality to be’.   In criminology, as new and 
innovative ways of thinking are introduced, such as Milovanovic’s ‘quantum 
holographic criminology’, in the words of Milovanovic (2015:49) himself, ‘it 
remains to be seen how receptive contemporary scholars are to revisiting their 
underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions’.  Essentially, whatever 
one’s perspective of reality, as further highlighted by Maxfield and Babbie 
(2007:14), ‘ultimately, social science aims to find patterns of regularity in social life.  
This assumes, of course, that life is regular, not chaotic or random’.  As we are well 
aware, life is far from regular or even random.  At heart, we are ‘pattern makers’– 
all puzzles need to fit a pattern (Brooks 2010:66).   
In summary, criminologists have been working on the same puzzles for decades, 
and in today’s changing world, some of those puzzles are becoming more complex 
to understand or explain and why new theories and models are being developed 
and old ones being thought about in different ways.  Where there is more than one 
approach, theory or model that can be adopted, inevitably one is more successful 
than the others.  In complexity research, as Mitchell (2009:300) notes, the most 
important contribution to date is ‘the development of novel ways of 
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conceptualising complex problems’.  In this thesis, it is the thinking in different 
ways to conceptualise complex problems that it ultimately aims to achieve.  
1.5       Thesis structure  
The thesis is grouped into four parts and contains nine chapters.  Chapters 1 and 
9 respectively provide the introduction and conclusion to the thesis.  Part 1 lays 
the foundation with a literature review (Chapters 2-3) and Part 2 sets out the 
methodology (Chapter 4).  Part 3 comprises the core thesis, including the new 
model (Chapter 5), application and case study findings (Chapters 6-7), and Part 4 
(Chapter 8) discusses the outcomes.  The contents of each chapter are summarised 
below:  
Introduction  
• Chapter 1:  sets out a brief overview of the research problem, key 
definitions, objectives, outcomes and implications, together with the 
context and structure of the thesis, including the role of theory.  
Part 1:  Literature review 
• Chapter 2:  comprises a literature review of organised crime, terrorism and 
the crime-terror nexus.  In each section, the three areas of study are 
considered in turn, followed by a short summary.  It begins with a 
historical overview of the origin of these terms and how the terms have 
developed over time, followed by what is meant by these terms in relation 
to definitions and characteristics.  Next, an examination of how organised 
crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus have been studied in 
criminology and in other disciplines follows.  
 
• Chapter 3:  provides a literature review of the science of complexity and its 
core concepts and principles, together with a brief history of its discovery 
and development in the natural and social sciences.  An examination and 
overview of the development and application of complexity in 
criminology, organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus 
follows, together with some illustrative examples of how complexity has 
or may be applied.  
 
	 26	
Part 2:  Methodology 
• Chapter 4:  sets out the research approach, assumptions and limitations in 
applying complexity in a criminological context, and to the study of 
organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus.  It begins by 
considering research questions, followed by the availability of data and the 
conceptual language of complexity.  It next considers key design principles 
in developing a new complexity model with criminological frames of 
reference, together with the approach to testing and applying the new 
model using the case study method.  It also sets out the rationale for the 
case study selection, design and source data.  
Part 3:  New model & application 
• Chapter 5:  contains the design of the new complexity model to apply 
complexity in a criminological context and to the study of organised crime, 
terrorism and the crime-terror nexus.  It draws upon the literature review 
in Chapters 2 and 3 using the approach described in Chapter 4.     
 
• Chapter 6:  sets out the macro-level findings of the application of the new 
complexity model as described in Chapter 5 to the in-depth case study of 
Escobar and the Medellín Cartel.  It begins with an overview of the case 
study and complex system under study, the Medellín Cartel, together with 
the compilation of the macro-level data sets.  An analysis of the macro-level 
contextual variables, together with the construction of the Medellín 
Cartel’s fitness landscape follows.  Based on the data sets, contextual 
variables and resulting fitness landscape, using complexity prompts, 
insights are drawn to better understand the nature and strength of the 
Medellín Cartel, including its rise and fall, and why and how it evolved. 
 
• Chapter 7:  sets out the micro-level findings of the application of the new 
complexity model as described in Chapter 5 to the in-depth case study of 
Escobar and the Medellín Cartel.  It begins with an overview and 
compilation of Escobar’s micro-level data sets.  An analysis of Escobar’s 
micro-level contextual variables, together with the construction of 
Escobar’s attractor set and the Medellín Cartel’s follows.  Based on the data 
sets, contextual variables and resulting attractor sets, using complexity 
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prompts, insights are drawn to better understand Escobar’s behaviours, 
and ultimately his drivers and vulnerabilities, all of which influenced and 
shaped the behaviours of the Medellín Cartel.  A summary of the overall 
new complexity model comprising the macro and micro-level case study 
findings is also presented.  
Part 4:  Discussion 
• Chapter 8:  discusses the findings and considers the thesis question:  can 
complexity be successfully applied with criminological frames of reference 
to analyse organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus?  It 
considers whether the findings shed light on furthering our understanding 
and knowledge of these complex phenomena, including practical and 
policy implications.  It also considers the contribution of the new 
complexity model and whether this adds a new tool to the criminologist’s 
toolbox.  
Conclusion 
• Chapter 9:  sets out the conclusion to the thesis and resultant contribution, 
including key outcomes of the research in i) furthering our understanding 
and knowledge of organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus; 
and ii) developing a new complexity model and knowledge with 
criminological frames of reference to apply complexity in criminology.   
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PART 1:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter 2:  Organised crime, terrorism and the crime-
terror nexus 
 
‘Despite their differences, organised crime and terrorism have much in common’  
Grabosky & Stohl (2010:27), criminologists  
 
Chapter 2 comprises a literature review of organised crime, terrorism and the 
crime-terror nexus.  In each section, the three areas of study are considered in turn, 
followed by a short summary.  It begins with a historical overview of the origin of 
these terms and how the terms have developed over time, followed by what is 
meant by these terms in relation to definitions and characteristics.  Next, an 
examination of how organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus have 
been studied in criminology and in other disciplines follows. 
 
 
2.1      Historical overview  
2.1.1    Organised crime (history) 
The origin of the term organised crime can be traced to the 1920s when the Chicago 
Crime Commission coined the term ‘organised crime’ in relation to what was 
perceived as a Chicago only phenomenon (von Lampe 2016).  At this time, the term 
did not refer to criminal organisations and/or groups; instead, it referred to a 
much broader sense of the ‘orderly fashion in which the so-called criminal class of 
an estimated 10,000 professional criminals in Chicago’ allegedly pursued ‘crime as 
a business’ (von Lampe 2001:104).  By the mid-1920s, the term organised crime had 
evolved to refer to criminal organisations and/or groups more widely across the 
United States (‘US’) (von Lampe 2001).  In the 1930s, some of these individuals 
gained celebrity status such as Al Capone.  It was not until the 1950s, that a US 
Senate Committee decided to investigate.  According to the Senate inquiry, 
numerous criminal groups and syndicates were tied together interstate by a 
criminal organisation known as ‘the Mafia’ (von Lampe 2001).  Moreover, the 
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notion of an Italian-American Mafia also added ethnicity to the concept (Cressey 
1969; von Lampe 2016).  During the 1960s, the novel The Godfather was published 
and shortly thereafter a movie made.  Up until the 1970s, the term organised crime 
had been used almost exclusively by the US (Fijnaut 2014).  It was not until the late 
1970s and 1980s that the Mafia concept started to spread across Europe and the 
rest of the world (Fijnaut 2014).  Before the 1980s ‘virtually all European countries 
aside from Italy considered themselves largely unaffected by organised crime’ 
(Paoli & Fijnaut 2004a:23).  This change in perception coincided with, or ‘in fact 
[was] caused by’, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the growth of capitalism in 
China and the lifting of restrictions of migrants entering Europe (Richards 1999:4).  
There was also a growing recognition of the concept of transnational crime and the 
fact that globalisation had ‘accelerated the interconnection between previously 
separate domestic illegal markets and increased the mobility of criminals across 
national borders’ (Paoli & Fijnaut 2004a:3).  In Europe, the 1987 book Der Mob, by 
journalist Dagobert Lindlau, became an immediate best seller and brought 
organised crime to the public’s attention.  According to Paoli and Fijnaut 
(2004b:23), it is ‘almost a paradox’ that discourse on organised crime started to 
decline rapidly in the US while at the same time rise rapidly in Europe and the rest 
of the world.  It was following the 11 September 2001 terror attacks on the US 
(‘9/11’), that another major shift in the concept occurred.  As expressed by 
Baumann (cited in Paoli & Fijnaut 2004a:5), the term organised crime ‘has become 
a convenient tool to express the anxieties of the general population at living in the 
ever more uncertain and insecure world of the later or post-modern stage of 
modernity’.  Perhaps it was this convenience in the wake of 9/11 that the term 
organised crime was extended to include terrorist groups (Holmes 2007; 
Bovenkerk & Abou Chakra 2007).  More recently, policymakers are shifting their 
emphasis from just ‘organised crime’ to ‘serious and organised crime’ (Paoli & 
Vander Beken 2014:24).  Whatever the latest developments, as Paoli and Vander 
Beken (2014:26) point out, ‘organised crime remains a catchy label to signify 
popular anxieties and foster legislative and institutional changes’, even in today’s 
rapidly changing world.  In terms of criminal organisations and/or groups, 
traditionally, organised crime and terrorist groups may be categorised into one of 
four genres (Richards 1999; ed. Paoli 2014):  
i) the traditional Big Six comprising the Italian Mafia (including Sicilian and 
American), the Russian Mafia, the Japanese Yakuza, the Chinese Triads, 
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the Columbian Cartels and the Mexican Cartels;  
ii) the second tier of smaller groups with certain criminal specialities that 
often work with and for the Big Six;  
iii) domestic criminal organisations, such as outlaw motorcycle gangs; and  
iv) terrorist groups.   
In reality, while some criminal groups may still be categorised into one of the four 
genres, in today’s globalised world, there are thousands of actors that cannot be 
neatly categorised and who work together, either on an ongoing or ad-hoc basis, 
regardless of nationality, ethnicity or even language barrier.  Moreover, 
government agencies suggest that criminal organisations and/or groups are 
increasingly working together, realising that at certain times it is better to work in 
cooperation rather than in competition with each other (Australian Crime 
Commission 2015; UK National Crime Agency 2015).  As Levi and Maguire 
(2004:398) note ‘although small organisations and even individuals may be socially 
dangerous…larger criminal organisations develop reputational benefits as well as 
economies of scale…creating a cumulatively greater social threat’.   In the study of 
organised crime today, it is often the nexus between these four genres, including 
terrorist groups, that presents the greatest challenge and threat.    
2.1.2    Terrorism (history) 
Terrorism is not new and has been around ‘since the dawn of recorded history’, 
stretching far back to ancient biblical times through to today’s twenty-first century 
(Martin 2016:3).  Yet the word ‘terrorism’ in its modern form was only coined some 
200 years ago, during the French Revolution to describe the Reign of Terror, when 
the Jacobin revolutionary government ruthlessly executed anyone suspected of 
being its enemy (Hoffman 2006; Schmid 2013b; Martin 2016).  As noted by 
Hoffmann (2006:4), the Reign of Terror ‘was neither random nor 
indiscriminate…but was organised, deliberate, and systematic’.  Moreover, it was 
the ‘ferocity’ of the Reign of Terror that defined its history (Hoffman 2006).  Not 
surprisingly, the word ‘terrorism’ is derived from the Latin word ‘terrere’ meaning 
to terrify or to frighten (Hoffman 2006; Schmid 2013c).  Essentially, a key 
ingredient of terrorism and/or a terrorist act is that it often terrifies and creates 
fear.  Since the French Revolution, the word terrorism has been used by numerous 
governments against ‘others’ and by numerous ‘others’ against governments 
(Hoffman 2006; Aly 2015; Martin 2016).  In the 1860s, the word was used to 
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describe the Russian revolutionary group, the Nihilists and in the 1930s and 1940s, 
it was used to describe the rise of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia (Schmid 
2013b; Aly 2015; Martin 2016).  After the First and Second World Wars, during the 
era of decolonisation, the word was used by colonial governments to ‘negatively 
label groups fighting for national liberation’ (Aly 2015:86).  To counter this, the 
groups labelled themselves ‘freedom fighters against a colonial oppressor’ as 
opposed to a terrorist group (Martin 2016:23).  It is this truism of ‘one person’s 
terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter’ that still plays a significant factor in 
the terrorism debate today (Martin 2016:23).    
During the era from 1967 to 1990, the term ‘modern’ terrorism is mostly used, 
marked by the upsurge of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (Hoffman 2006; 
Keene 2012).  This era also denotes other notorious terrorist organisations such as 
the Irish Republican Army, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (‘ETA’) in Spain 
and Red Brigades in Italy (Hoffman 2006; Keene 2012; Martin 2016).  Since 1990 
and in particularly since the 9/11 attacks and subsequent ‘war on terror’, a new 
era of terrorism labelled as ‘new’ terrorism has arisen and refers to ‘Islamic 
extremism’ (Keene 2012:16).  As Keene (2012:16) points out, new terrorism differs 
from modern terrorism in that these ‘new’ Islamic terrorists ‘would be insulted if 
their actions were described as “political” violence’.  Moreover, ‘rather than 
focusing on conventional goals of political movements, today’s religiously 
motivated terrorists seek destruction and chaos as ends in themselves’ with their 
ultimate aim of ‘global domination’ as a single Muslim caliphate (Keene 2012:17).  
As Aly (2015:85) observes, the rise of violence by non-state actors ‘has shifted the 
focus from state-on-state warfare to warfare carried out by dissident groups and 
individuals operating both within and across borders’ and terrorism has become 
front and centre-stage in world politics.   
Since this new era, policymakers are shifting their emphasis from the word 
‘terrorism’ to ‘violent extremism’ in an attempt to avoid the ‘historical legacy and 
political labelling’ of terrorism (Aly 2015:86).  For example, on 15 January 2016, the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations presented a ‘Plan of Action to Prevent 
Violent Extremism’ as an action to counter terrorism to the United Nations General 
Assembly to ‘address the drivers of violent extremism at the local, national, 
regional, and global levels’ (United Nations 2016).  While both terms include the 
fundamental characteristic of violence, ‘violent extremism acknowledges that 
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extremism in and of itself is not necessarily harmful’ (Aly 2015:86), yet ‘extremism’ 
in and of itself is a ‘primary feature of all terrorist behaviour’, including Islamic 
(Martin 2016:24).   Despite this shift in emphasis, the word terrorism is still more 
commonly used by scholars and practitioners, and more importantly, by the 
media, and also used in this thesis.  Furthermore, despite the choice of words, in 
today’s information age, rather than words, ‘graphic images of terrorist incidents 
are broadcast instantaneously into the homes of hundreds of millions of people’ 
(Martin 2016:3).  This phenomenon is not lost on the terrorists themselves, and 
many ‘try to control the “spin” on reports of their behaviour’ (Martin 2016:3).  
Something that ‘new’ terrorism, such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria (‘ISIS’) have used to their full advantage (Hoffman 2006; Aly 2015; Martin 
2016).  As noted by Franks (2006:1), ‘few places on the globe are now unaffected 
by the hysteria caused by [the word] “terrorism”’.  Moreover, as many scholars 
observe, in many respects, the twenty-first century is an era of ‘globalised’ 
terrorism.   
2.1.3    Crime-terror nexus (history) 
The crime-terror nexus is a fairly recent phenomenon.  It began with the ‘discovery 
of narco-terrorism’ when it became clear in the 1980s that the organised criminal 
activity of drug trafficking was being used to support political objectives of 
terrorist organisations (Bovenkerk & Chakra 2007:29).   Equally, the term narco-
terrorism was also used to describe the attempts of drug traffickers to influence 
government policies or society, and to hinder law enforcement, through 
intimidation and violence, essentially for their own cause (Martin 2016).  In 
essence, ‘narco-terrorism’ was the first time a link between organised crime and 
terrorism had been identified.  Building on the term ‘narco-terrorism’, the term 
‘crime-terror nexus’ was coined in the early 1990s, not long after the end of the 
Cold War and the subsequent decline of state sponsorship of terrorism 
(Makarenko 2004; Grabosky & Stohl 2010; Gendron 2011).  According to 
Makerenko (2004), following this decline, the use of organised criminal activities 
became a major revenue source for terrorist groups and important in the evolution 
of terrorism.  As such, the 1990s can be described as the decade in which the crime-
terror nexus was established (Makarenko 2004).  Since this decade, the nexus has 
evolved, primarily due to the advancement in technology and communications, 
including the Internet.  As Bovenkerk and Chakra (2007:32) note, ‘the borders have 
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faded or are no longer as well guarded…and have provided new opportunities’ 
for criminals and terrorists alike.  Globalisation is a paradox, as many scholars 
note.  The very opportunities it offers are also harnessed by criminals and terrorists 
to enhance their operations (Grabosky & Stohl 2010; Gendron 2011; Makarenko 
2011).   Furthermore, ‘there are strong indications that terror groups and 
[organised crime groups] have already found common purpose in which to 
operate and collaborate’ (Joint Forces Staff College 2015:2).  According to a US 
Congressional Research Service report (2013:3), in 2003, the US Drug Enforcement 
Administration (‘DEA’) ‘reported that 14 of 36 (39%) foreign terrorist organisations 
were involved “to some degree” in illicit narcotics activity’.   Conversely, in 2010, 
the US Department of Justice identified  ‘29 of the top 63 [46%] international drug 
syndicates’ with links to terrorist organisations (US Congressional Research 
Service report 2013:3).  Today, with organised crime and terrorism, ‘there is a 
blurring of distinctions between them and the scale and complexity of the threats 
they now pose’ which ‘has required an integrated response’ and ‘the various 
departments and agencies to forge their own “nexus”’ (Gendron 2011:404).  
Moreover, as pointed out by the Australian Federal Justice Minister Michael 
Keenan, ‘the links between terrorism and organised crime are emerging and 
complex problems’ (interview in Box 2015).   Yet, many prominent scholars still 
fail to recognise the importance of this growing nexus and even the nexus itself.   
2.1.4    Summary of historical overview 
Since its coinage some 100 years ago, the concept of organised crime has changed 
significantly, including a shift to the usage of the term ‘serious and organised 
crime’, and also, in some definitions, the inclusion of terrorism, which in part adds 
to the challenge of defining it today.  Moreover, in today’s globalised world, there 
are thousands of actors that cannot be neatly categorised into the more traditional 
organised crime genres and who work together, either on an ongoing or ad-hoc 
basis, regardless of nationality, ethnicity or even language barrier.  Similarly, 
terrorism means different things to different people, and since its coinage in the 
modern form some 200 years ago, its meaning since 9/11 has irreversibly changed, 
together with a shift in emphasis to the usage of the term ‘violent extremism’.  
Despite this shift, in an attempt to avoid the historical legacy and political labelling 
of the word terrorism, the word terrorism is still more commonly used.  The 
relatively new concept of the crime-terror nexus, since its coinage some 25 years 
	 34	
ago, is still emerging and complex, as are the emerging threats and opportunities 
in today’s globalised world.  Despite an acknowledgment by practitioners, notably 
law enforcement agencies, of the increasing links between organised crime and 
terrorism, many prominent scholars still fail to recognise its importance, or even 
the nexus itself.  
 
2.2        Definitions and characteristics  
2.2.1  Organised crime (definitions) 
Not surprisingly, there is no universal agreement on how to define organised 
crime (van Duyne & van Dijck 2007; ed. Holmes 2007; von Lampe 1999; 2002; 2016; 
Levi & Maguire 2004; Levi 2007; Paoli & Fijnaut 2004a, van Duyne & Nelemans 
2011; eds Allum & Gilmour 2011; Paoli & Vander Beken 2014).  Van Duyne and 
van Dijck (2007:101) offer that organised crime is still ‘something we know so little 
about that we are still struggling with its very definition’.  According to Beare 
(2003:xxiv), organised crime ‘has become stretched and mythologised to the point 
of total distortion’.  Similarly, Levi and Maguire (2004:397) note that ‘organised 
crime is a notoriously difficult concept to define and measure, and relative to the 
confident claims that are made about it, little is known about its operation in 
practice’.  As Allum and Gilmour (2011:10) point out, ‘we can feel it and have some 
evidence of its existence, but we are not sure where it is hiding, where it is located, 
what shape it has and what exactly it looks like’.  Furthermore, von Lampe 
(2016:12) offers a compelling argument that organised crime is simply a ‘social 
construct’ in ‘an attempt to make sense of a complex social reality’.  As such, von 
Lampe (2016:29) notes it ‘should not come as a surprise’ that there is a ‘lack of 
consensus in the definition of organised crime’ as this is a ‘reflection of the 
different ways in which reality can be constructed and the different factors that 
influence the social construction of reality’.  Similarly, von Lampe (2016) points 
out that this conceptual confusion also surrounds related issues such as terrorism, 
as well as more general sociological concepts, such as society itself.  A pertinent 
question posed by Paoli and Fijnaut (2004a:7) is ‘where exactly does organised 
crime begin?’.  According to Cohen (1977 cited in Levi 2007:777) ‘the term 
organised crime denotes not just a set of criminal actors, but also a set of criminal 
activities’, although in general usage, the term ‘organised crime’ primarily denotes 
‘criminal organisations’ (Paoli 2014:2).  As von Lampe (2016:3) argues, ‘much of 
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what is commonly associated with the term organised crime has to do with the 
provision of illegal goods and services’, where some are prohibited (e.g. human 
trafficking), some strictly regulated (e.g. drugs) and others highly taxed (e.g. 
alcohol).  
In Australia, there are few statutes that explicitly define organised crime 
(Australian Institute of Criminology 2004).  At the federal government level, the 
Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (including latest amendments as registered 
4 July 2016) includes in its definition (Part I, 4 (1)) of ‘serious and organised crime’ 
an offence ‘that involves two or more offenders and substantial planning and 
organisation’ and ‘involves, or is of a kind that ordinarily involves, the use of 
sophisticated methods and techniques’ and ‘that is a serious offence…of the 
Criminal Code’.  In contrast, the international instrument in the fight against 
organised crime – the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime – defines an ‘organised criminal group’ as ‘a structured group of three or 
more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of 
committing one or more serious crimes or offences…in order to obtain, directly or 
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit’ (United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime 2004: Annex 1, Art 2).  While the essence of these two definitions is the 
same, there are slight but important differences, such as the minimum number of 
persons and what constitutes a serious crime or offence.  As pointed out by the 
Australian Institute of Criminology (2004:66), ‘organised crime is not addressed 
systemically in all parts of the world for a number of political, financial and 
cultural reasons’ and what constitutes a serious crime or offence is a key difference.  
Despite the difficulty in defining organised crime, several scholars and 
organisations have attempted to define organised crime by identifying a set of 
common characteristics shared by criminal groups (Holmes 2007; Ransley & 
Prenzler 2007; Allum & Gilmour 2011).  Sheptycki (2008:26) argues, ‘when it comes 
to a criminological theorising about organised or professional crime, what remains 
constant is the deployment of organised violence and the pursuit of illicit wealth’.  
Even in today’s modern society, violence in gangs remains constant.  According to 
Napoleoni (2008:225) ‘modern gangs fight fear with violence, and violence has 
become a way of life’.  A particularly useful set of characteristics of criminal 
groups, including terrorist groups, was developed by Canada’s Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police’s Criminal Intelligence Directorate, whereby 14 characteristics 
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were identified (Richards 1999:4): corruption, discipline, infiltration, insulation, 
monopoly, motivation, subversion, history, violence, sophistication, continuity, 
diversity, bonding and mobility.  While these characteristics do not set out a 
specific list of criminal activities (such as drugs, money laundering etc.), they do 
set out a useful framework of how these criminal actors operate and carry out their 
criminal activities.  For example, the characteristics of ‘continuity’ and ‘diversity’ 
are found in Vander Beken’s (2004:476) description of an organised crime group – 
‘predominately dynamic and fluid’ suggesting ‘adaptable and flexible networks 
capable of responding to both market requirements’ and changes in ‘the external 
environment’.  Another example is Sheptycki’s (2008:24) description – organised 
crime ‘thrives in the interstices of power that exist in the grey area between licit 
and illicit markets’ – the characteristics of ‘corruption’ and ‘infiltration’ are found 
here. According to a 2015 report on organised crime in Australia, the ‘three key 
capabilities’ of the ‘increasingly complex nature’ of organised crime include: i) the 
ability to conceal criminal activity by integrating into legitimate markets; ii) the 
uptake and ability to exploit new and emerging technologies to facilitate their 
crime; and iii) the global nature of organised crime with the ability to adapt to 
market requirements and demands (Australia Crime Commission 2015:7-10).  
Similarly, according to the United Kingdom (‘UK’) National Crime Agency 2015 
report on the national strategic assessment of serious and organised crime, the 
‘changing risk’ profile of the ‘wide-ranging and complex’ threat of organised crime 
includes: i) a range of new opportunities for criminals due to more sophisticated 
technology; ii) a presence in multiple jurisdictions through the global 
communications infrastructure; and iii) a risk of extremists seeking to exploit 
criminal contacts, e.g. for financial and logistical support (UK National Crime 
Agency 2015:1-3).  Of note, is that these key capabilities and changing risks are all 
present in the 14 characteristics identified above.  
Despite the definitional debate, for the purposes of this thesis as summarised in 
Chapter 1, a traditional definition of organised crime is offered by the Sage 
Dictionary of Criminology as ‘the ongoing activities of those collectively engaged 
in production, supply and financing for illegal markets in goods and services’ (Gill 
2013:300).  
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2.2.2  Terrorism (definitions) 
Similar to the term organised crime, there is no universal agreement on how to 
define terrorism (Hoffman 2006; Schmid 2013b; McLaughlin 2013; Ally 2015; 
Institute for Economics & Peace 2015; Martin 2016). As pointed out by Saul 
(2006:1), ‘few words are plagued by so much indeterminacy, subjectivity and 
political disagreement as “terror”, “terrorise”, “terrorism” and terrorist”’.  To 
illustrate this point, Schmid (2013b) compiled an exhaustive list of over 250 
terrorism definitions in use and even proposed one himself that runs to 570 words.  
As Martin (2016:32) notes, ‘defining terrorism can be an exercise in semantics and 
context, driven by one’s perspective and worldview’, including perspectives of the 
terrorists themselves, supporters, victims, targets, onlookers and analysts, such as 
political leaders, the media and scholars.  Similar to organised crime, one’s 
perspective, or in other words one’s sense of reality, is inevitably selective, which 
means different people focus on different aspects of terrorism while neglecting 
others.  Martin (2016:31-32) further notes the different ‘types of terrorism’, which 
also add to the definitional debate as summarised below: 
i) state terrorism: ‘from above’ and committed by governments;  
ii) dissident terrorism: ‘from below’ and committed by non-state actors 
against governments and other perceived enemies;  
iii) religious terrorism: motivated by an ‘absolute belief’ and ‘in defence of’ 
what believers consider to be the true faith; 
iv) criminal terrorism: motivated by ‘sheer profit or some-amalgam of profit 
and politics’ such as profits from drug trafficking (labelled narco-
terrorism) to fund and sustain political objectives of terrorist groups or to 
influence government policies to advance the trafficker’s own cause; 
v) international terrorism: impacts ‘state boundaries’.  
According to Ally (2015:86), ‘official and unofficial definitions of terrorism today 
serve the political, legal, social or defence purpose of the particular government or 
organisation that defines it’.  Moreover, ‘terrorism is recognised as a criminal act 
by most legal codes, and those groups who are defined by the state as ‘terrorists’ 
will have to negotiate an extreme form of criminalisation’ (McLaughlin 2013:461).  
Despite this definitional debate, as some would say, we tend to know it when we 
see it.   
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In Australia, at the federal government level, the Criminal Code Act 1995 (including 
latest amendments as registered 19 December 2016) contains the legal definitions 
of terrorism.  In the Criminal Code Act 1995, Chapter 5, Part 5.3, Division 100.1, a 
terrorist act is essentially defined as ‘an action or threat of action where the action 
is done or the threat is made with the intention of advancing a political, religious 
or ideological cause’ and ‘coercing, or influencing by intimidation’ the government 
or public.  In addition, in Chapter 5, Part 5.3, Division 102.1, ‘a terrorist 
organisation means an organisation that is directly or indirectly engaged in, 
preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act.’  More 
importantly, the Australian Attorney-General’s Department helps to explain 
Australia’s federal government’s counter-terrorism laws in a published document 
entitled ‘Australia’s counter-terrorism laws’ (Australian Attorney-General’s 
Department 2016).  In this document, Australia’s federal government clarifies that 
‘a terrorist act does not cover engaging in advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial 
action where a person does not have the intention to urge force or violence or cause 
harm to others’ (Australian Attorney-General’s Department 2016:5).  In contrast, 
the United Nations has yet to agree a definition of terrorism or terrorist act.  
Similar to organised crime, despite the definitional difficulties, a number of 
scholars and organisations have attempted to define terrorism by identifying a set 
of common characteristics.  In an analysis of frequencies of definitional elements 
of terrorism, the most common characteristics were violence, political, fear and 
threat (Schmid & Jongman 1988 cited in Hoffman 2006:34).  Not surprisingly, 
Hoffman’s (2006:40) own definition of terrorism includes these four characteristics: 
‘the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of 
violence in the pursuit of political change [emphasis added]’.  With the most 
common characteristic of violence, it is important to distinguish the difference 
between terrorism and organised crime.  While ordinary criminals also use 
violence, the purpose or motivation is different (i.e. for material gain, rather than 
political, religious or ideology) and the victim of violence is usually the target (e.g. 
gang member turned informant or rival gang members) in organised crime 
(Hoffman 2006; Aly 2015; Martin 2016).  In contrast, the victims are not usually the 
target in terrorism.  The target is usually symbolic (e.g. a building) to change ‘the 
system’ and the victims are usually innocent bystanders, mostly civilians 
(Hoffman 2006; Martin 2016).  Despite the fundamental differences between 
organised crime and terrorism, as described earlier, the 14 characteristics of 
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criminal groups are relevant to both.  According to a report on Australia’s counter-
terrorism machinery, there is ‘a new generation of increasingly capable, mobile, 
and digitally-connected terrorists with the ability to disseminate their extreme 
ideology around the world’ (Australian Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet 2015:10).  Moreover, the rapidly growing scale of the threat, is becoming 
‘increasingly complex’ in nature (Australian Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet 2015:18). As Keene (2012:13) notes, ‘terrorism is a complex, multi-
causal problem where many of its components are interrelated’. 
Similar to organised crime, for the purposes of this thesis as summarised in 
Chapter 1, a traditional definition of terrorism is offered by the Sage Dictionary of 
Criminology as ‘an essentially premeditated political act.  The intention is to inflict 
serious injury on the civilian population and to influence government policy by 
creating an atmosphere of fear and threat, generally for a political, religious or 
ideological cause’ (McLaughlin 2013:461). 
2.2.3  Crime-terror nexus (definitions) 
The term ‘crime-terror nexus’ is essentially an interconnection (nexus) between 
organised crime (crime) and terrorist (terror) groups (Makarenko 2004; 2011; 
Bovenkerk & Chakra 2007; Levi 2007; Grabosky & Stohl 2010; Gendron 2011; von 
Lampe 2016).  While most scholars would agree on this simple definition, the exact 
nature and extent of the nexus is not agreed upon and is still being debated 
(Grabosky & Stohl 2010; Makarenko 2011).  Seminal works seeking to understand 
and define the nexus include Williams (1998), Makarenko (2001; 2003; 2004; 2011) 
and Shelley et al (2005).  Other notable contributions focus on certain aspects of 
the nexus, including how some groups are political by day, but criminal by night 
(Dishman 2001).  Moreover, operational freedom is a key consideration, especially 
where certain groups control specific regions or territories.  Since both organised 
crime and terrorist groups seek similar operational environments, ‘it is natural that 
their paths converge’ (Joint Forces Staff College 2015:17).   Essentially, this growing 
trend of illicit partnership is fuelled by ‘ungoverned spaces’, where both groups 
prosper, leading to ‘a pattern [that] is self-perpetuating’, as both groups ‘often 
provide the fuel for destabilisation, in order to create operational spaces’ (Joint 
Forces Staff College 2015:17).  
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Moreover, as noted earlier, the nexus is not without its controversy, with 
prominent scholars on each side of the organised crime and terrorism literature 
referring to words such as ‘alleged’ nexus.  One such controversy surrounds the 
concept of convergence and whether terrorists take on criminal traits for the 
purposes of terrorism or actually become criminals and vice-versa (Grabosky & 
Stohl 2010). Despite this lack of agreement, Makarenko (2011) offers a useful 
‘crime-terror continuum’ model between an organised crime group and terrorist 
group by categorising the nexus on three planes which may be summarised as 
follows:  
• Operational: the nexus is where one group adopts the tactics of the other or 
where the ‘functional merging’ of each group in terms of an ‘ad hoc 
alliance’ or ‘integration’ occurs between the groups.  
• Evolutionary: the nexus is where ‘the tactics and motivation’ of one type of 
group turns into the other, i.e. a terrorist group may evolve into an 
organised crime group or vice-versa.  
• Conceptual: the nexus is where a ‘hybrid group emerges’ and 
‘simultaneously displays ideological and economic motivations’ by 
engaging in acts of both terrorism and organised crime. 
For the purposes of this thesis as summarised in Chapter 1, a traditional definition 
of the crime-terror nexus is offered by Grobosky and Stohl (2010:2) as ‘the degree 
of overlap’ between organised crime and terrorism.  Of note, as will be discussed 
in the next section, is that the study of the crime-terror nexus is relatively new 
within criminology; as such, a definition is not yet offered by the Sage Dictionary 
of Criminology (eds McLaughlin & Muncie 2013).  
2.2.4 Summary of definitions and characteristics 
While definitional debates continue, traditional definitions, together with  
common characteristics of organised crime and/or terrorist groups are still 
offered, including a particularly useful set of characteristics developed by 
Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s Criminal Intelligence Directorate 
(Richards 1999).  While these characteristics do not set out a specific list of criminal 
and/or criminalised activities (such as drugs, money laundering etc.), they do set 
out a useful framework of how these criminal actors operate and carry out their 
criminal and/or criminalised activities.  Moreover, despite the lack of agreement 
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of what constitutes a crime-terror nexus, Makarenko (2011) offers a useful ‘crime-
terror continuum’ model between an organised crime group and terrorist group 
by categorising the nexus on three planes, being operational, evolutionary and 
conceptual. 
2.3 Studies in criminology  
2.3.1 Organised crime (in criminology) 
Following on from the difficulties in defining organised crime, it is not surprising 
to note the challenges in studying and theorising organised crime.  Of note, while 
von Lampe (2016:12) argues ‘organised crime is not something that exists clearly 
discernible in the real world’, he further argues that ‘this does not mean that…[it] 
is a figment of someone’s imagination without any link to reality’.   In other words, 
organised crime may be studied in the context of how one perceives reality.  
Nonetheless, as pointed out by Kleemans (2014:32), despite one’s perception of 
reality, ‘a basic problem in organised crime research is that theories and theoretical 
perspectives are underdeveloped’.  
Mainstream criminological theories 
In criminology, mainstream influential theories such as routine activity theory 
(Cohen & Felson 1979), differential association theory (Sutherland 1934) and strain 
theory (Merton 1938) have all been applied to explain organised crime.  However, 
as argued by Grabosky and Stohl (2010), they do not explain all aspects.  As von 
Lampe (1999) argues, while there is a ‘variety of alternative, definitional 
approaches to organised crime’, there is ‘no comprehensive theory’.  Furthermore, 
as Grabosky and Stohl (2010:9) point out, ‘life is complex, and individuals are 
rarely driven by a single objective’.  For example, critics of situational crime 
prevention inspired by routine activity theory and rational choice theory have 
noted the absence of cultural, economic, and political contingencies of crime 
situations (Edwards & Levi 2008).  In terms of organised crime, it is ‘not commonly 
associated with one-off crime events in a specific location but with continuous 
activity’ (von Lampe 2016:392).  More importantly, ‘it has been argued that 
organised criminals, through cooperation, tend to be more resourceful than 
ordinary criminals’ and ‘do not necessarily encounter lucrative crime situations in 
the course of routine activities’ (von Lampe 2016:393).  Instead, organised 
criminals mostly do the opposite and ‘methodically seek out or even engineer 
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opportunities’ (von Lampe 2016:393).  Likewise, in terms of ‘guardians’ who are in 
a position to intervene with the criminal event, Edwards and Levi (2008:375-77) 
argue that ‘the opposite can be true in areas dominated by criminal groups’ as ‘in 
an atmosphere marked by fear and intimidation…bystanders are unlikely to 
intervene with criminal activity’.  Of particular note, when applying criminological 
theories to organised crime, is that a key difference between ‘normal’ crime and 
‘organised’ crime is the relevance of ‘offender networking relative to the mere 
commission of criminal acts’ (von Lampe 2016:393).  In other words, illegal 
activities involving organised criminals are not only dependent on opportunities 
for crime, but also on opportunities within their network.  
Factors to consider  
Based on these shortcomings, von Lampe (1999) argues the obvious – that a 
‘framework which distinguishes various levels of complexity and accounts for the 
fact that the issue of organised crime has social, economic and political 
dimensions’ is a more useful way of theorising organised crime.  As Lilley 
(2006:18) notes, ‘organised crime does not somehow operate in glorious isolation’.  
Furthermore, von Lampe (2016:xiii) suggests that ‘placing the main analysis on 
underlying patterns and dynamics’ of organised crime may better address its 
‘increasing level of sophistication’ in today’s modern world.  According to Levi 
(2007:795), organised crime is ‘a dynamic process that evolves as offenders adapt 
(or fail to adapt) to their changing environment’, thus any theory of organised 
crime needs to be dynamic.  Moreover, van Duyne and van Dijck (2007:101) argue 
that ‘empirical research repeatedly demonstrates that “organised crime” is 
plagued by much disorganisation’.  Of note, Findlay (2008:68) argues that 
organised crime ‘requires comparative analysis from the local to the global if the 
complex nature of criminal enterprise is to be understood at all the vital phases of 
its organisation’.  To sum up in a few words by van Duyne and van Dijck 
(2007:101), organised crime is perhaps ‘a subject of art?’, i.e. you need to go beyond 
the scientific facts to really behold the ‘seriousness of organised crime’.   
Models of organised crime 
Over the past 30 years, a number of models of organised crime have emerged.  
Most of these models sit in one of three categories as proposed by Jay Albanese 
(1989): i) hierarchical model; ii) patron-client model; or iii) enterprise model.  The 
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hierarchical model suggests a nationwide bureaucratic organisation (also referred 
to as bureaucracy theory) and ties in with the work performed by Cressey (1969) 
on explaining the Italian-American Cosa Nostra Mafia Group (von Lampe 2003).  
Much of Cressey’s work, however, relies on evidence supplied by law 
enforcement, which critics suggest may have been structured in a similar way to 
their own hierarchy in terms of ranks and divisions thus tainting the information 
(Gill 2013).  At the time, the US policymakers also referred to Cressey’s work as 
the ‘alien conspiracy theory’ suggesting that organised crime in the US was 
imported by immigrants rather than shaped by society itself (Kleemans 2014).  The 
central idea in this theory, is that organised crime ‘is the problem of “outsiders” 
that threaten society’ (Kleemans 2014:33).  Next, the patron-client model suggests 
a web of asymmetric ties embedded in local or ethnic networks and reflects the 
work of Joe Albini (von Lampe 2003).  These networks, for example, are based on 
families, friends and business associates (Gill 2013).  Finally, the enterprise or 
market model suggests a focus on the market and economic activities regardless 
of the organisation style.  The enterprise model reflects the work of Dwight Smith 
where ‘the dynamics of the market operating past the point of legitimacy establish 
the primary context for the illicit entrepreneur’ (Smith 1980:375 cited in Vander 
Beken 2004:473).  In other words, the point at where legitimacy and illegitimacy 
meet is crucial.  Smith looks at the economy as a whole, instead of two distinct and 
disconnected parallel economies (i.e. an upper and underworld), enabling a more 
sophisticated organised crime system where the nexus of the two legitimate and 
illegitimate worlds are ‘grey’ economies (Vander Beken 2004).  According to Smith, 
the focus of organised crime research is in the interdependencies between 
economies.  Edwards, amongst a plethora of others have further developed 
Smith’s work (Vander Beken 2004).  Edwards has attempted to conceptualise the 
shape, form and dynamics of organised crime by focussing on Smith’s 
interdependencies.  To make the point, Edwards argues (1999:80): 
Illicit firearms trafficking is not conducted in parallel to licit firearms 
trafficking but is enabled by the complex network of relationships between 
firearms producers, distributors, wholesalers and users.  The structure of 
relationships provides opportunities for the establishment and 
reproduction of criminal enterprise.  Through a focus on such structures of 
interdependent relations it is also possible to discern both the opportunities 
for organised crime and the opportunities for disturbing its reproduction. 
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More recently over the last decade, several other models and theories of organised 
crime have developed which may be categorised under social, political or 
environmental models.  A useful way of looking at these models is by applying 
Turner’s classification of either a causal or analytical model (Turner 1991 cited in 
von Lampe 2003:4).  A causal model is one where a dependent variable is 
explained by the interaction of one or more independent variables in a simple 
linear view.  An analytical model is one where a complex array of variables interact 
in a non-linear way.  Causal models of organised crime tend to conceptualise one 
aspect or one-dimension of organised crime such as Cressey’s hierarchical model. 
In contrast, analytical models correspond to the complexity and multi-
dimensionality of organised crime such as Smith’s enterprise model and the latest 
trends in social network analysis (Beesley 2000; Klerks 2001; Williams 2001; 
Morselli 2009).   
Analytical model 
Based on an analytical model, von Lampe (2003) argues that any meaningful 
model of organised crime should include three core elements: i) actors who 
cooperate in rational non-impulsive criminal activities; ii) structures that connect 
these actors; and iii) criminal activities these actors are involved in.  Moreover, von 
Lampe (2003) argues that environmental factors should also be included, such as 
society, the government and the media.  Based on this model, a variety of 
connections can be made; for instance, there is no organised crime without 
organised criminals, and these criminals are, in part, a product of their 
environment.  Moreover, the types of crime the actors are engaged in will depend 
on their individual skill sets and structures.  The structures formed are also 
influenced by the type of activities carried out and ‘the notion that criminals 
organise themselves to respond to specific needs’ (von Lampe 2016:101).  For 
example, an extortion gang will require a different type of structure to say that of 
running an illegal casino.  More importantly, environmental factors also play a role 
in the emergence of a particular group.  Of significance, since 9/11, the world has 
changed and a ‘whole raft of new arrangements and legislation has been 
implemented’ (McCulloch 2003:284).  An increase in legislation has not only led to 
an increase in surveillance by law enforcement and the military, but also an 
increase in surveillance by the private sector, such as financial institutions, and 
society itself (McCulloch 2003; Mythen & Walklate 2006; Olding 2015).  As a feature 
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of the modern world, the media also plays a crucial role in raising or shifting 
attention to certain criminal groups or areas of crime, although at times, the media, 
especially social media, tends to blur fact with fiction (Tierney 2006; Chambliss & 
Williams 2011).  As noted by Passerini and Bahr (1997:219), in the context of 
collective behaviour, ‘opinions are influenced by the mood of the community, the 
media, the state of the economy, and so on’.  In other words, the general mood is 
measured as a property of a group and not individuals.   
Procedural model   
Another way to look at and understand organised crime is by considering the tasks 
that need to be performed to commit organised crime.  As such, Levi (2007:781) 
offers a useful six step approach of ‘tasks that need to be performed to commit 
serious crimes over a long period, most of these tasks being as easily accomplished 
at a local level as transnationally’ as follows:  
i) obtain finance for crime; 
ii) find people willing and technically/socially competent to commit 
crimes (though this may not always be necessary); 
iii) obtain equipment and transportation necessary to commit the 
crimes; 
iv) convert, where necessary, products of crime into money or other 
usable assets; 
v) find people and places willing to store proceeds (and perhaps 
transmit and conceal their origin); and 
vi) neutralise law enforcement by technical skill, by corruption, 
and/or by legal arbitrage, using legal obstacles to enforcement 
operations and prosecutions which wary between states. 
 
Levi (2007:781) argues that these procedural steps may be further broken down 
‘when analysing the dynamics of particular crimes and/or criminal careers’ and 
that ‘some similarities exist with the process of terrorism’.   
Licit-illicit environment   
Of importance, as mentioned earlier, is the licit-illicit environment of organised 
crime.  In the European Commission’s 2000 Falcon organised crime research 
programme, a key finding was that criminal networks ‘always require the 
cooperation or services of the licit environment’ and that these necessary contact 
points form “bridges” between the two worlds (van de Bunt & van der Schoot 
2003b:21).  The interfaces were categorised into three areas: i) the demand for 
illegal products and services from the licit environment; ii) the abuse of facilitators 
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in the licit environment; and iii) the availability of ‘tools’ in the licit environment.  
Another European Project comprising 13 European countries and 33 scholars 
involved a ‘systematic comparison of organised crime patterns and control policies 
in Europe’ (Paoli & Fijnaut 2004a:9).  The findings are presented in a lengthy and 
comprehensive 2004 book Organised Crime in Europe with the interface between the 
licit-illicit environment being a key finding (Paoli & Fijnaut 2004a).  As pointed out 
by van de Bunt et al (2014:321), while ‘organised crime groups are often portrayed 
as entities that derive their strength from strong internal cohesion and an ability 
to conceal their illegal activities from the outside world’, at the same time 
‘organised crime is a thoroughly social phenomenon’.  In other words, ‘instead of 
operating in a social vacuum, organised crime has a habit of interacting with its 
social environment’ and ‘the relationships between legality and illegality are by no 
means necessarily antagonistic or aimed at avoiding one another’ (van de Bunt et 
al 2014:321).  Moreover, Allum and Gilmour (2011:1) argue, ‘if anything, 
[organised crime] is the product of a country’s history, its social conditions, its 
economic system, its political elite and its law enforcement regime’.  Furthermore, 
for organised crime to flourish, ‘it needs accomplices’ from the outside world, 
meaning network analysis is key (Allum & Gilmour 2011:1).   
Criminally exploitable ties 
In relation to network analysis, in a seminal paper, Granovetter (1973:1360) argues 
the strength and importance of weak ties in interpersonal networks and that 
‘small-scale interaction becomes translated into large-scale patterns, and that 
these, in turn, feed back into small groups’.   More recently, von Lampe (2016:107) 
argues that most analysis is based on tangible links between criminals and hence 
is likely to produce an ‘incomplete picture of the patterns of relations that matter 
for understanding the organisation of crime, namely those webs of relations that 
enable or facilitate criminal conduct’.  Similarly, Hobbs (2013:5) notes, ‘criminal 
collaborations generate chaotic sets of personal and commercial affiliations 
featuring fluid and often unpredictable interchanges that are ill suited to the 
sociometric analysis [form of network analysis] favoured by police and police 
science’.  Von Lampe (2016:123) proposes ‘a more complete picture is obtained 
when one looks at the underlying networks of criminally exploitable ties, of which 
manifest criminal structures tend to represent only a smaller part’.  Essentially, it 
can be argued that an understanding of how these exploitable ties are formed 
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underpins the ‘level of resilience of criminal structures’ (von Lampe 2016:123).  
Furthermore, von Lampe offers a continuum of criminally exploitable ties from 
manifest (actual co-offenders and facilitators), to latent (available co-offenders and 
facilitators) to potential (based on convergence setting and matching dispositions).  
Von Lampe (2016:110) defines: i) manifest ties as relationships that are active; ii) 
latent ties as dormant, but at any given time would be available to lend their 
support; and iii) potential ties as conceivable based on convenience or similar 
disposition.  Von Lampe (2016:110) also notes that some scholars have referred to 
these manifest and latent ties as ‘criminal social capital’.  Moreover, von Lampe 
goes one step further and considers those individuals who contribute to the 
outcome of a criminal endeavour by passively standing by without interfering or 
are unwitting accomplices (von Lampe 2016:109).  Von Lampe (2016:5) further 
suggests, ‘one of the main challenges in the study of organised crime is to sort 
through the myriad social relations of criminals and to understand how these 
relations influence and shape criminal behaviour’.  Furthermore, von Lampe 
(2016:336) surmises, ‘the big picture of organised crime has to be analytical rather 
than descriptive and abstract rather than concrete’, something that this thesis aims 
to embrace.      
Reduction and prevention  
In reducing and preventing organised crime, Levi and Maguire (2004) offer a 
useful list of 16 non-traditional approaches (i.e. outside of law enforcement and 
the justice system) adapted and extended from the work of Schneider.  The list is 
categorised into three buckets: i) community approaches; ii) regulatory, disruption 
and non-justice system approaches; and iii) private sector involvement.  Of note, 
while most prevention focuses on repressing ‘dangerous people and groups’, in 
some areas, ‘the supply and distribution of goods and services that are in popular 
demand’ are not always seen as preventable in the same way, especially by the 
communities who are the end-buyers (Levi & Maguire 2004:424).  Nonetheless, 
Levi and Maguire (2004:410) propose that while these approaches ‘are at present 
diverse and scattered, they may point cumulatively to a “way forward” that will 
eventually be followed more consistently on a wider scale’. 
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2.3.2 Terrorism (in criminology) 
Similar to organised crime, the difficulties in defining terrorism also present 
challenges in studying and theorising it.  Unlike organised crime, however, 
criminology is not the ‘home’ discipline of terrorism studies.  According to Schmid 
(2013c:458), ‘terrorism literature can be found mostly in the social sciences, 
especially political science, international relations…but, strangely, hardly at all 
from criminology until recently’.  It is also ‘one of the most multidisciplinary 
subjects in the social sciences’ (Martin 2016:xix).  As White and Perrone (2015:296) 
point out, terrorism ‘certainly has layers of complexity that need to be drawn out’.  
In criminology, ‘explanations generally hold that terrorism is a product of the same 
socialisation process that cause individuals to engage in criminal behaviour’ and 
that the ‘criminological approach argues that terrorism and crime are explainable 
within the framework of established theoretical perspectives used to explain 
criminal deviance’ (Martin 2016:54-56).  Moreover, in criminology, a key 
perspective is ‘about constructing the “other”’ (White & Perrone 2015:296).  White 
and Perrone (2015:296) note, that from the point of view of terrorists, ‘it means 
seeing people as the “other” in a particular way’.  Conversely, from the point of 
view of governments, terrorists are constructed as the ‘other’, although this has 
unfortunately resulted in ‘a whole category of people as the “other”’, particularly 
since 9/11 (White & Perrone 2015:296).  In the new era of terrorism, an ‘outpouring 
of racist sentiment directed at people of Arabic or Muslim backgrounds in Western 
nations on a global scale’ has certainly become problematic (White & Perrone 
2015:296).  Of note is one’s choice of words, as Lakoff and Frisch (2006) argue, 
‘language matters, because it can determine how we think and act’.  Post 9/11, a 
war metaphor rather than a crime metaphor was chosen by the Bush 
administration, not dissimilar to the ‘war on drugs’ metaphor during the rise of 
organised crime and drug trafficking.  As Fairweather (2012) argues, war is one of 
choice and not one of necessity, and so is the choice of one’s words.     
Similar to criminological research in organised crime, routine activity theory, 
differential association theory and strain theory have all been applied to certain 
aspects of terrorism studies (eds Freilich & LaFree 2016).  Moreover, during the 
1960s and 1970s, radical criminology and critical theories reflecting the ‘political 
and social discord of the period’ were also applied including Marxist perspectives 
(Martin 2016:58).  In their recent book, Criminology Theory and Terrorism, editors 
	 49	
Freilich and LaFree (2016:i) note,  ‘although there has been an increase in terrorism 
research across the social and behavioural sciences in the past few decades, until 
recently most of this work has originated from political science, psychology or 
economics’.  Freilich and LaFree (2015:2) further note that ‘most criminological 
terrorism studies to date have focused on neoclassical models like routine 
activities, rational choice and situational crime prevention’ and call on 
‘criminologists to broaden their inquiry to include criminology’s other major 
frameworks like social learning, classic strain theories, social control, life course, 
and psychological and biologic perspectives’.  Recent studies using anomie/strain 
(e.g. Pisoiu 2015), social disorganisation (e.g. Fahey & LaFree 2015), and routine 
activities frameworks (e.g. Parkin & Freilich 2015) provide valuable insights.  Yet 
similar to organised crime, these studies still lack a comprehensive theory of 
terrorism.  Of particular note, is that the topic of ‘terrorism’ only made it into the 
2nd edition of the Sage Dictionary of Criminology in 2006 (McLauglin 2013; eds 
McLaughlin & Muncie 2013).  Nevertheless, Freilich and LaFree (2015:6) argue that 
‘both terrorism studies and criminology [would] benefit from a closer association 
between the two’.  They also argue ‘by focusing on the obvious connections 
between terrorism and crime, we may be able not only to contribute to a better 
understanding of terrorism, but also to help formulate more rational policies for 
combating it’.   
2.3.3 Crime-terror nexus (in criminology) 
The study of the crime-terror nexus in criminology is relatively new.  As Grabosky 
and Stohl (2010:1) point out, in criminology, ‘it is surprising, yet understandable, 
that the explicit comparison of crime (especially organised crime) and terrorism 
has received relatively little scholarly attention’, with notable exceptions being 
Levi (2007) and Morselli (2009).  In their seminal book Crime and Terrorism, 
Grabosky and Stohl (2010) draw upon four criminological perspectives using 
routine activity theory, differential association theory, strain theory and resource 
dependency theory to explore the crime-terror nexus.  Moreover, they offer two 
levels of analysis (organisational and the individual) and in doing so, provide 
notable and valuable contributions.  Of particular note, is that ‘unlike terrorist 
organisations…conventional criminal groups may have competition’ (Grabosky & 
Stohl 2010:111).  This often involves ‘aggressive efforts to maintain “market share” 
and so called “gang wars”’ (Grabosky & Stohl 2010:111).  Despite their differences, 
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they also suggest that organised crime and terrorism have much in common and 
in the globalised era, ‘the fluid environment within which terrorist and organised 
crime groups operate provides both threats and opportunities’ (Grabosky & Stohl 
2010:71).  Of concern are the increasing networks arising between criminals and 
terrorists which may be described as ‘temporary, dynamic, emergent, adaptive, 
entrepreneurial and flexible structures’ (Grabosky & Stohl 2010:79).  Also of 
concern, is that ‘both types of organisation tend to recruit their members from the 
same reservoir of marginal segments of the population, which are subject to social, 
cultural or political frustration (strain theory)’ (Bovenkerk & Chakra 2007:36).  Of 
significance by Bovenkerk and Chakra (2007:36) is the observation that ‘terrorist 
groups may bring forth leaders’ but ‘the criminal underworld may produce people 
with the necessary operational and survival skills’.  In conclusion, Grabosky and 
Stohl (2010:127) recognise that ‘the problems of organised crime and terrorism 
have long histories and deep roots within the communities in which they have 
arisen’ and that any approach to understanding these problems must recognise 
‘the history and context in which the problems and the organisations have 
emerged’.  
2.3.4 Summary of studies in criminology 
In the study of organised crime, a number of mainstream criminological theories 
have been applied, together with various models;  however, prominent scholars 
argue that they do not explain all aspects of organised crime.  Furthermore, the 
latest research favours the differentiation between the multi-dimensionality of the 
problem, including links between organised crime and terrorism, and the licit-
illicit worlds.  Relative to the study of organised crime, until recently, terrorism 
appears to have received scant attention by criminologists, despite its obvious 
criminal connections.  In criminology, explanations generally hold that individuals 
engage in terrorism as a product of the same socialisation process that cause 
individuals to engage in criminal behaviour.  In contrast, research on the crime-
terror nexus is still in its infancy, despite the commonalities between organised 
crime and terrorism.  Notwithstanding data challenges, as the literature review 
reveals, studying and theorising organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror 
nexus is not a simple undertaking – it is difficult and complex – and likely due to 
the nature of what constitutes these complex phenomena in the first place.  
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2.4  Studies in other disciplines 
2.4.1 Organised crime (in other disciplines) 
Outside its ‘home’ discipline of criminology, organised crime has not been widely 
studied in other disciplines (von Lampe 2006).  As von Lampe (2006:5) notes, it can 
only be beneficial ‘when organised crime is viewed through the lens of, or rather 
within the paradigms of, another discipline’.  Notwithstanding, there are notable 
studies in economics, political science, psychology and neurobiology, where each 
have either drawn metaphors or analogies to the concept of organised crime or 
applied their own theories.  It is usually the former.  On the individual ‘organised’ 
criminal level, while psychology and neurobiology study the criminal psychopath 
and the like, the study of the ‘organised’ criminal has only been marginal.  One 
such example is Richard Dawkin’s work on the ‘selfish gene’ which draws 
analogies between genes and the ‘successful Chicago gangsters’ (Dawkins 1989:2).  
On the organisational level, the ongoing question of how ‘organised’ organised 
criminals really are still exists.  Areas such as economics have addressed two major 
lines of research into organisational theory and network analysis (von Lampe 
2006).  Notable work includes Phil Williams.  As Williams (2001:93) himself points 
out, ‘understanding network structures and operations makes it easier to identify 
vulnerabilities against which concentrated attacks should be directed’.  Moreover, 
‘in attacking networks, it is also critical to target the boundaries, either from one 
network to another, or from the criminal world to the upper world’ (Williams 
2001:94).  As von Lampe (2016:138) argues, ‘it is not uncommon to see individuals 
being involved in two or more illegal firms at the same time’.  Another noteworthy 
contribution is by Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1995) who have used a game theory 
model to explain the emergence of criminal groups specialising in the 
monopolistic use of violence; this model rests on an analogy between power 
syndicates and primitive states.   
In summary, given the lack of study of organised crime in other disciplines, 
perhaps the criminological difficulties in defining organised crime, yet alone 
theorising, provides an unattractive framework for other disciplines to tap into.   
2.4.2 Terrorism (in other disciplines) 
In other disciplines, there is a plethora of literature on terrorism studies evaluating 
the events, ideas, motivations, theories, and histories that result in terrorist 
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activities (Hoffman 2012; Schmid 2013c).  Since 9/11, the literature has expanded 
‘exponentially’ with scholars now focussing their attention on terrorism (Hoffman 
2012; Schmid 2013c).  Most studies sit within political science and international 
relations, with some in law, psychology and economics (Hoffman 2012; Schmid 
2013c).  Of note, as Martin, (2016:xix) argues, ‘at the outset, it is important to 
understand that the study of terrorism, is first and foremost, a study of human 
behaviour’ and none of the factors that make terrorism ‘can be discussed in 
isolation from one another’.  Schmid (2013a:7) also argues that terrorism, clearly, 
‘should not be studied in isolation’.   
In Schmid’s (ed. 2013) comprehensive handbook on terrorism research, Schmid 
draws on responses from some 90 terrorism experts (scholars and counter-
terrorism agencies).  In response to a question on which theory the respondents 
use to study terrorism, ‘more than half of the researchers has their own theory’ 
(Schmid 2013a:11) – that is at least 45 different theories of terrorism in this pool of 
experts.  As Schmid (2013a:12) points out, in the underlying responses, there were 
even ‘different views as to what constitutes a “theory” as opposed to a 
“framework” or a “perspective”’.  McAllister and Schmid (2013:261) conclude ‘if 
we look at the theories…one cannot fail to see (and deplore) the lack of common 
ground’.  Moreover, ‘there were also a number of respondents who felt that there 
are no well-established theories’ and ‘one prominent researcher wrote “there 
really is no theory of terrorism, which is the biggest conceptual problem in the 
field”’ (Schmid 2013a:12).  Addressing this point, Schmid (2013a:2) suggests that 
there are five conceptual lenses through which we can look at terrorism; acts of 
terrorism as/and: i) crime; ii) politics; iii) warfare; iv) communications; and v) 
religious crusade/jihad.  Schmid (2013:2) further suggests that all ‘are useful to 
understand better some aspects of some forms of terrorism’, yet ‘it would be 
wrong to single out any one’ as none are mutually exclusive.  
Of particular note, Franks (2006:1), a scholar in peace and conflicts studies, argues, 
‘the study of terrorism has become preoccupied with the constant debate that 
revolves around explaining what actually constitutes terrorism and how to counter 
it.  Instead of perhaps concentrating on why it actually occurs’.  In Franks 2006 book 
Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism, Franks seeks to explain why terrorism occurs 
drawing on conflict theory and argues that terrorism cannot be adequately 
explained without considering its social, political and economic situation, 
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including ideology and culture.  As Franks (2006:34) argues, ‘societies can be 
sensitised to accept different levels of violence depending on their history and 
experience’.  For example, in South America, Africa and the Middle East, a culture 
of violence has developed that ‘tends to perpetuate itself’ (Franks 2006:34). 
A recent novel approach in media and literature studies is offered by the 2016 book 
Re-Visioning Terrorism: A Humanistic Perspective where the concept of ‘rack focus’ 
is borrowed from cinema to create an interpretative approach to terrorism (eds 
Coda & Lawton 2016).   The concept ‘rack focus’ can be defined as (eds Coda & 
Lawton 2016:333): 
The change of focus of a lens so that one image can come into focus while 
another moves out of focus.  Though the focal distance changes, the reality 
has not changed.  Both items and events coexist, but given the nature of 
optics we can only see clearly one or the other.   
Furthermore, it is argued that a rack focus response in human perceptions can lead 
to a ‘more nuanced, non-dogmatic, and flexible’ response to terrorism (eds Coda 
& Lawton 2016:333).  For example, ‘the response of a typical American to the 
events of 9/11 will be vastly different from that of a follower of bin Laden’ (Code 
& Lawton 2016:8).  We see each other ‘reciprocally as “evil” and ourselves as 
“good”’, yet ‘between these two extremes there are myriad other possible 
responses, which can only be seen by shifting the focus of our gaze’ (Code & 
Lawton 2016:8).  Following a reaction to an event, one should move to reflection 
which ‘requires us to focus on the depth of field that is absolutely clear to the 
“other”.  Although we don’t have to arrive at the same conclusions’ (Code & 
Lawton 2016:9).  
In a 2015 report on global terrorism by the Institute for Economics & Peace (‘IEP’), 
‘statistical analysis has identified two factors which are very closely associated 
with terrorist activity:  political violence committed by the state and the existence 
of a broader armed conflict’ (IEP 2015:3).  Furthermore, ‘the link between these two 
factors is so strong that less than 0.6 per cent of all terrorist attacks have occurred 
in countries without any ongoing conflict and any form of political terror’ (IEP 
2015:3).  The report also notes that ‘terrorism is driven by a variety of country-
specific factors’ based on ‘a country’s level of development and history’ (IEP 
2015:68).  For example, ‘reasons that people join FARC will be different to those 
who join ISIS’ (IEP 2015:68).  As Franks (2006:36) points out, ‘the role of the 
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individual in the root causes of terrorism should not be underestimated.  
Ultimately it is the individual who carries out a lethal act by detonating a bomb or 
pulling a trigger’.  This risk is clear in Hoffman’s (2006:xv) personal observations: 
I am still always struck by how disturbingly “normal” most terrorists seem 
when one actually sits down and talks to them.  Rather than the wild-eyed 
fanatics or crazed killers that we have been conditioned to expect, many 
are in fact highly articulate and extremely thoughtful individuals. 
In a recent study by psychologist Anne Speckhard (2016), Speckard notes ‘after 
interviewing almost five hundred militant jihadi terrorists, their family members, 
close associates, and even their hostages’ from places ranging from the Middle East 
to Russia, Canada and Western Europe, ‘I think I have a pretty good idea of how 
and why some people get onto the terrorist trajectory’.  Speckhard (2016) 
concludes that there are ‘four necessary ingredients that go into making a terrorist’ 
and ‘fifty individual vulnerabilities/motivations that may also play a role’.  The 
four key factors may be summarised as (Speckhard 2016): 
i) A terrorist group: ‘there is always nearly a group…purporting to represent 
some faction of society and offering terrorism as an answer’.  
ii) An ideology: ‘one that always wrongly attempts to justify terrorism and the 
attacking of innocent civilians for the cause’ – including political and 
religious causes. 
iii) Social support: always ‘some level…that can vary widely by context’.  For 
example, ‘a youth thinking about joining a terrorist group in Gaza…is 
likely to have friends who are also part of Hamas or Fatah and may choose 
his group the way other youth in other countries chose a football team’.  In 
comparison, ‘a youth growing up in Boston…will have to dig deeper in 
his community to find other like-minded individuals’.  However, today’s 
Internet ‘means that one can quickly and easily tap into social networks 
supportive to terrorist groups’ such as ISIS which ‘currently maintains a 
24/7 presence on the Internet’.  
iv) Individual vulnerabilities that resonate with the first three factors: i.e. ‘the 
group, its ideology and the social support provided’ by the terrorist group.  
Speckhard identifies 50 individual vulnerabilities which can be further 
divided by whether or not the individual lives ‘inside or outside a conflict 
zone’. 
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According to Speckhard (2016), ‘those who reside in conflict zones are most often 
primarily motivated by trauma and revenge as well as frustrated aspirations’.  In 
non-conflict zones, ‘unemployment, underemployment and frustrated aspirations 
can all lead to feelings of alienation and a longing for personal significance that a 
terrorist group may offer’ (Speckhard 2016).  With ISIS having declared a caliphate, 
‘this draw is even more powerful to the socially alienated, the person falling off 
his [or her] tracks or unable to succeed in the society in which he [or she] lives’ 
(Speckard 2016).  Based on this analyses, ideology is a fundamental factor, as 
without an ideology, as simple as it sounds, there would be no terrorist group.  As 
Franks (2006:37) puts it, ‘ideology provides the individual terrorist with the 
cognitive reasoning with which to justify the use of violence’.  As most scholars 
are now advocating, ‘there is a growing consensus that tools to counter the 
ideology that drives violent extremism are needed since military force alone 
cannot defeat violent extremism’ (Liang 2015).  Of note, is a point made by Lakoff 
and Frish (2006) – ‘terror is an emotional state.  It is in us.  It is not an army.  And 
you can’t defeat it militarily and you can’t sign a peace treaty with it’.  As Bennis 
(2016:223) puts it, ‘terrorism survives wars; people don’t’.  Moreover, in 
preventing and combating terrorism, Schmid (2013a) offers a list of 12 useful rules, 
including addressing underlying conflict issues and work towards peaceful 
solutions.  As a final point, English (2015:20), a political scholar, argues, ‘it is 
emphatically terrorisms and counter-terrorisms in the plural that we are [now] 
considering, and the emergent picture will necessarily therefore be complex’.  
2.4.3 Crime-terror nexus (in other disciplines) 
As in criminology, the study of the crime-terror nexus is also relatively new in 
other disciplines and largely in the area of political science and international 
relations.  As Shelley et al (2005:4) argue, the ‘interaction between terrorism and 
organised crime is growing deeper and more complex all the time’.  A pertinent 
point made by Gendron (2011:404), is that despite differing motivations, both 
groups ‘are incompatible with the principles and values of civil society’.  This in 
itself, creates common ground, although ‘organised criminals, in most cases, will 
not want to be associated with extremists for fear of coming under additional 
scrutiny’ (UK National Crime Agency 2015:3).  In addition, international relations 
theorists have provided a range of scholarly work, although most focus on 
‘environmental or behavioural aspects of the interaction’ (Shelley et al 2005).  
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Others have theorised ‘crime-terror cooperation as an example of a changed world 
order’ with most arguing the ‘forces of globalisation have empowered both 
organised crime and terrorism, which some call the “dark side of globalisation”’ 
(Shelley et al 2015:17).  Another way to look at the nexus is provided by Mandrick 
(2015), a military scholar, who offers an ontological perspective.  Mandrick 
(2015:157) proposes an ‘ontological framework’ based on a taxonomy of 
predefined terms,  which facilitates ‘the creation of nodes and links (relationships) 
in a graph-like structure’ for a better understanding of the nexus.  Furthermore, in 
Shelley et al’s (2005) seminal work, an analysis of links between organised crime 
and terrorist groups resulted in a list of 12 watch points to help identify specific 
indicators of the crime-terror nexus.  The watch points are categorised into:  i) 
behavioural and environmental; and ii) organisational.  To sum up, as Makarenko 
(2011:238) argues, ‘the better an organisation learns and adapts to its environment 
in the context of the crime-terror nexus, the greater the threat it is likely to pose on 
a multiple of levels’.   Hence the greater need to study and better understand this 
nexus.   
2.4.4 Summary of studies in other disciplines 
Outside its ‘home’ discipline of criminology, despite some notable contributions 
in applying organisational theory and network analysis, the study of organised 
crime appears to be a marginal area of interest and not widely studied in other 
disciplines.  With terrorism studies, the opposite is true.  In other disciplines, 
notably political science and international relations, there is a multitude of new 
theories and observations where various theories and models have been applied 
in today’s era of globalised terrorism.  However, similar to criminological studies, 
prominent scholars in other disciplines argue that there are no comprehensive 
theories or models that explain all aspects of organised crime, terrorism or the 
crime-terror nexus.  Furthermore, similar to criminological studies, the latest 
research favours the differentiation between the multi-dimensionality of the 
problem, including links between organised crime and terrorism.  In the study of 
the crime-terror nexus, while still in its early days of research, work by Shelly et al 
(2005) highlights the growing need to study and better understand this nexus.  In 
summary, whether in criminology or another discipline, one thing remains the 
same, the growing complexity of these real-world problems, which in turn reveals 
an academic gap in how best to address them.  
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Chapter 3:  Complexity science 
 
‘The next century will be the century of complexity’  
Stephen Hawking (cited in Chui 2000), theoretical physicist 
 
Chapter 3 provides a literature review of the science of complexity and its core 
concepts and principles, together with a brief history of its discovery and 
development in the natural and social sciences.  An examination and overview of 
the development and application of complexity in criminology, organised crime, 
terrorism and the crime-terror nexus follows, together with some illustrative 
examples of how complexity has or may be applied.  
 
 
3.1       Understanding complexity  
As Sanders (2003) aptly points out: 
We hear the words ‘chaos’ and ‘complexity’ used daily to describe 
everything…yet very few people, the news media and policy-makers 
included, have stopped to ask what the words really mean and what the 
new science of complex systems might contribute.  
As noted earlier, the science of complexity may be described as a set of theoretical 
concepts and principles, rather than a unified body of theory, and hence the 
singular word ‘complexity’ as an umbrella term is used throughout this thesis 
(Lewin 1992; Waldrop 1992; Kauffman 1995; Cilliers 1998; Byrne & Callaghan 
2014).  Importantly, it may also be described as ‘an ontological frame of reference’ 
(Byrne & Callaghan 2014:57).  In short, complexity is a body of interdisciplinary 
knowledge that studies the structure, behaviour and dynamics of change in non-
linear dynamic systems, where the whole is more than the sum of its parts and the 
unit of study is a complex system (Kauffman 1995; Cilliers 1998).  In simple terms, 
a system can be described as ‘a set of inter-related elements’ and a complex system 
as ‘the whole is greater than the sum of its parts’ (Byrne & Callaghan 2014:4).  A 
dynamic system is one that simply moves or changes over time and the term non-
linear is best defined by what is not linear (Mitchell 2009).  Basically, linear systems 
always respond proportionately between cause and effect, while non-linear 
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systems respond disproportionately, and may appear random and are often 
difficult to discern (Smith 2007).  
In literature, one often sees the terms ‘chaos’ and ‘complexity’ used 
interchangeably; while both fall under the science of complexity and have 
overlapping properties, prediction is different in both (Lewin 1992; Kauffman 
1995; Cilliers 1998; Johnson 2007; Wolf-Branigin 2013; Byrne & Callaghan 2014).  In 
everyday use, the term ‘chaos’ means ‘utter confusion or disorder, wholly without 
organisation or order’ (Macquarie dictionary).  However, mathematical chaos, 
known as ‘chaos theory’ is not about disorder or randomness, which is misleading 
given the everyday use of the word (Gleick 1987).  In a chaotic system, the system 
appears random due to its complex behaviour, but in essence is deterministic, 
although difficult to predict due to its sensitivity to initial conditions (popularly 
referred to as the ‘butterfly effect’ or ‘chaos theory’) (Cilliers 1998; Gleick 2008; 
Mitchell 2009).  In a random system, the current state does not define its future 
state.  In chaotic systems, it does (Gleick 1987).  It is our limitations or simply our 
ignorance of knowing all initial conditions that make things appear random and 
long term prediction difficult (Saperstein 1997; Brooks 2010).  However, with 
chaos, difficulty in prediction ‘does not mean failure to understand or explain’ 
(Kauffman 1995:17).  Randomness is perfect unpredictability, mathematical chaos 
is not (Byrne & Callaghan 2014).  Nevertheless, whether anything is truly random 
or truly predictable, is still a question that lies at the centre of one of the most 
fundamental debates in science (Brooks 2010). 
In comparison, the everyday use of the term ‘complexity’ means ‘the state of 
quality of being complex; intricacy or something complex’ (Macquarie dictionary).  
In complexity science, complex does not mean complicated, otherwise the point is 
missed (Cilliers 1998).  If a system can be fully explained by its individual parts, 
even with a large number of parts, such as the mechanism of a clock, it is merely 
complicated (Cilliers 1998).  In contrast, if a system cannot be fully explained by 
analysing its individual parts, it is complex, such as living things, including the 
brain, social systems and even ourselves (Cilliers 1998).  These systems are also 
known as complex adaptive systems, with emergent properties, where the 
behaviour is not deterministic, but due to emergent patterns of underlying order, 
certain predictions may be made (Kauffman 1995; Cilliers 1998).  In Ball’s (2009a; 
2009b; 2009c) triology of books, Shapes, Flow and Branches, Ball demonstrates how 
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much of nature’s systems and patterns contain mathematical complexity and a 
sense of underlying order and structure.  Kauffman (1995:5) goes a step further 
and suggests complexity provides ‘evidence that it is not merely a human creation, 
but part of the natural order of things’.  Just to confuse things, complex systems 
may demonstrate both chaotic (inherently deterministic, but difficult to predict) 
and complex adaptive (inherently non-deterministic) behaviour, yet both still 
reconcile the unpredictability of non-linear dynamic systems with a sense of 
underlying order and structure (Gleick 1987; Lewin 1992; Mitchell 2009).  
In summary, put simply, complexity at its core is research on pattern formation 
(Gleick 2008).  Key to understanding complexity is the patterns of relationships 
and interactions amongst a system’s components.  Complexity offers a way of 
understanding patterns that are not predictable by traditional methods.  It is 
essentially the study of the changing relationship between order and disorder 
where ‘both order and disorder can coexist’ (Milovanovic 2003:55).  If you can tease 
out the changing patterns underlying complexity, you can unlock the hidden 
structures demonstrating predictability.  Essentially, complexity aims to improve 
our understanding of a phenomenon, including why and how it evolved or 
evolves.  It also provides insight and foresight of what guides behaviours of 
elements in the system and the system as a whole.  In turn, this may help to better 
determine strategies and measures to achieve desired outcomes of the complex 
system and phenomenon under study.   
3.2       Core concepts and principles 
The science of complexity has its own language.  For the purposes of this thesis, a 
technical understanding of the physics and mathematics behind complexity is not 
required, although a grasp of the core concepts and principles is.  Having the right 
conceptual vocabulary is essential in applying complexity in a criminological 
context to criminological problems.  As noted earlier, complexity may be described 
as a set of theoretical concepts and principles; however, given the diverse 
backgrounds of complexity researchers, in the words of one of the early pioneers, 
researchers ‘have adopted different vocabulary’ and even key terms have 
‘different meanings for different researchers’ (Gell-Mann 1994:17).  Essentially, 
scholars have not consistently used or adopted the same terms or expressions, yet 
alone agreed on standard definitions (Mitchell 2009; Byrne & Callaghan 2014).  
Over two decades later, little has changed.  For this thesis, concepts and principles 
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have been drawn from a broad range of literature with general consensus amongst 
scholars, and where possible, terms and expressions used that best suit 
criminology.  To begin, ‘complexity’ and a ‘complex system’ are defined, followed 
by ‘chaos theory’ and the concept ‘edge of chaos’: 
 
• Complexity:  studies how a complex system of elements ‘organise 
themselves, without the benefit of any central controller, into a collective 
whole that creates patterns, uses information, and, in some cases, evolves 
and learns’ (Mitchell 2009:4). 
 
• Complex system:  a set of ‘inter-related elements’ that change non-linearly 
over time, where ‘the whole is greater than the sum of its parts’ (Byrne & 
Callaghan 2014:4).  Elements are defined as components of a system.  In the 
natural sciences, elements are usually referred to as ‘agents’.  In the social 
sciences, elements may comprise individuals, groups of individuals, 
processes and activities (Cilliers 1998; Byrne & Callaghan 2014).  Complex 
systems have a history (also known mathematically as ‘path dependence’), 
and hence, their past is typically co-responsible for their present state 
(Cilliers 1998; Byrne & Callaghan 2014).    
 
• Chaos theory: occurrences where small effects can lead to major changes, 
otherwise known as ‘sensitivity to initial conditions’ (Gleick 1987; Cilliers 
1998; Wolf-Branigin 2013). 
  
• Edge of chaos: represented by a midpoint between order (determinism) 
and disorder (randomness), where you have enough structure and patterns 
in a complex system that it is not random, but also enough fluidity and 
emergent creativity that it’s not deterministic – this edge is emergent 
complexity and is a place where innovation occurs (Kauffman 1995).		The 
edge of chaos is also known as ‘far from equilibrium’ where the word 
equilibrium means steady state or static, or in other words, death of a 
complex system (Cilliers 1998).  
 
Next, ten core concepts and principles forming the building blocks of complexity 
are defined and characterised.  The concept of sensitivity to initial conditions 
arising from chaos theory is also further explained in this section.  
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1. Sensitivity to initial conditions 
As defined earlier, the concept ‘sensitivity to initial conditions’, otherwise known 
as chaos theory, may be defined as occurrences where small effects can lead to 
major changes (Gleick 1987; Cilliers 1998; Wolf-Branigin 2013).  In other words, a 
system’s future state is dependent on any slight change at any given time (Gleick 
1987; Lorenz 1993; Williams & Arrigo 2002; Milovanovic 2003).  This concept is 
also known as the ‘butterfly effect’; the analogy being that something as 
insignificant as a butterfly flapping its wings in one country can alter a weather 
system and cause a tornado on the other side of the world (Gleick 1987).  It has 
been popularised in films such as Sliding Doors (1998) and the Butterfly Effect (2004) 
where the characters take multiple paths.  This concept also draws attention to the 
history of a system and ‘calls into question the habit of ignoring small disturbances 
on a system’ (Kellert 2008:12).  
2. Bifurcation 
A bifurcation may be defined as the division of something into two branches or 
parts (Gleick 1987).  In a non-linear dynamic system, it is a point of destabilisation 
in the qualitative system from a state of order to a higher state of disorder (Gleick 
1987; Williams & Arrigo 2002).  Metaphorically, it is a choice of two paths in the 
evolution of a system where patterns emerge (an order within the disorder) 
following the bifurcations (Gleick 1987).  In other words, a ‘bifurcation is the cusp 
at which the system changes; things can go one way or another’ (Hassett & Stevens 
2014:101).   
3. Attractors  
An attractor may be defined as ‘a location to which a complex system tends to 
move’ (Milovanovic 2003:56).  It is like a magnet or gravity pit, pulling the system 
towards it.  The attractor attracts the behaviour of the system, thus producing an 
order within the disorder, and in doing so creates patterns and structures.  It is 
these patterns and structures in states of disorder that give a complex system its 
stability (Gleick 1987).  There are three types of attractors: fixed points, limit cycles 
and strange attractors (Gleick 1987).  The first two types of attractors are simple 
and stable.  It is the third type of attractor ‘strange’ that is complex and although 
unstable, is marked by an underlying order, and hence an overall complex level of 
stability.  It also has a fractal structure (i.e. exhibits self-similarity) and is often, but 
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not always, chaotic (i.e. exhibits sensitivity to initial conditions).  One of the strange 
attractors is known as the Lorenz attractor as it gives rise to a butterfly shape with 
two winged areas or ‘outcome basins’.  An example of a fixed point attractor is a 
swinging pendulum – without any further external forces, gravity will eventually 
attract all movement or behaviour of the pendulum to the point beneath it.  An 
example of a limit cycle attractor is where a system oscillates between consistent 
points such as a quartz crystal.  The third attractor ‘strange’ is where the motion 
never repeats itself yet forms an overall pattern.  An example would be a marble 
within the confines of a bowl.  In the absence of any external forces, including 
gravity, the marble would spin around the bowl indefinitely without ever 
retracing the exact same path.  The path would look random and disordered, but 
the overall shape of the system (the bowl) would remain ordered.  The behaviour 
‘is globally stable, but locally unstable’ (Elliott & Kiel 1997:7) and also ‘focuses on 
the intermingling of the two’ regions (Forker 1997:73).  It is this example where 
complexity is best explained; within a defined shape (the bowl) a stability exists 
even though within the system there appears to be disorder (Young 1997a; 
Williams & Arrigo 2002).  
4. Fractals 
A fractal may be defined as a fraction of a dimension which exhibits self-similarity 
(Milovanovic 2003).  There are two key features of fractals: i) it has infinite 
complexity due to self-similarity (i.e. a small portion of the system is representative 
of the whole); and ii) its measurement depends on scale.  Its complexity is due to 
the iterative (feedback) generation of its form which leads to self-similar geometry 
– this is best illustrated by nature, for example a snowflake or a fern (Gleick 1987).  
With regard to scale, the best example is a coastline – if you measure it in kilometre 
lengths, you will get one result; in centimetres, with all its twists and turns, you 
will get another result (Milovanovic 2003).  Practically, ‘fractional dimension 
becomes a way of measuring qualities that otherwise have no clear definition: the 
degree of roughness or brokenness or irregularity in an object’ (Gleick 1987:98).  It 
is also useful for identifying patterns that are easy to see at one scale, but not at 
another, i.e. micro and macro-levels, where a pattern easily identifiable at one level 
may demonstrate fractal tendencies and therefore be replicated at another level, 
albeit with a smaller or larger scale (Pepinsky 1997).  
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5. Interconnectivity  
Interconnectivity may be defined as the state or quality of connected elements in a 
complex system (Cilliers 1998).  In other words, it is a measure of the degree of 
interconnection.  Other terms used for interconnectivity are ‘coupling’ (Kauffman 
1995; Marion 1999).  In a complex system, elements interact and exchange 
information through relatively rich means creating connections among all 
elements in a system (Kauffman 1995; Cilliers 1998).  The interactions do not have 
to be physical; they can also transfer information (Cilliers 1998).  Any element may 
influence, and is influenced by another element or elements in the system.  An 
important point is that each element is ignorant of the system as a whole and only 
responds to its local interactions (Cilliers 1998).  Moreover, it is the local rich 
interconnectivity of elements in the system, that gives rise to the global structures 
and patterns of the system (Kauffman 1995; Cilliers 1998; Byrne & Callaghan 2014).   
6. Feedback 
Feedback may be defined as the ability of a system to refer back to itself, as it builds 
off and on itself (Williams & Arrigo 2002; Milovanovic 2003).  Other terms for 
feedback are iteration or recurrency where there are loops in the interactions 
between elements (Gelick 1987; Cillier 1998).  Feedback can be positive (enhancing, 
stimulating) or negative (detracting, inhibiting) (Cilliers 1998).  It can also be direct 
or indirect and gives the system its ability to learn (Pycroft 2014). With feedback 
in a system, both directions are important – top down and bottom up – as feedback 
helps to drive the system. 
7. Self-organisation 
Self-organisation may be defined as a process where elements mutually adjust 
without the benefit of any central controller to cope with changing internal and 
external environmental demands on the system and in doing so create new 
patterns and structures (Kauffman 1995; Cilliers 1998).  Self-organisation ‘allows 
the system to adapt, evolve and survive’ (Pycroft 2014:24).  It is a concept that 
promotes order out of disorder and can be described as a system self-organising 
into a more complex order when it reaches a certain state of disorder (Williams & 
Arrigo 2002).  Optimal self-organisation is at the ‘edge of chaos’ where the 
‘emergent order will be richer, more creative and adaptable, if there is a diversity 
of [elements] in the system, with different characteristics and different behaviours’ 
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(Lewin & Regine 1999:201).  With self-organisation, the emergent order is not 
imposed from above, but from ‘distributed influence’ through the interactions of 
the system’s elements (Lewin & Regine 1999:201).   
8. Dissipation 
Dissipation may be defined as structures that form momentarily in a complex 
system and appear stable, but are quick to collapse or dissipate at the slightest 
perturbation (Milovanovic 2003).  A system that demonstrates dissipation needs 
to persistently dissipate matter and energy to maintain its structures (Kauffman 
1995).  A dissipative system requires more energy than the simpler system it 
replaced.  When energy is no longer supplied the system dies (Kauffman 1995).  
This process promotes order out of disorder in that a stronger ‘more adaptive 
order’ is obtained (Williams & Arrigo 2002:75).  
9. Emergence 
Emergence is a key concept and often labelled ‘complexity theory’ in itself.  It may 
be defined as the whole is greater than the sum of its parts (Cillliers 1998; Wolf-
Branigin 2013).  It is an outcome when elements interact under the influence of 
feedback and something that was not there before is (Cilliers 1998; Johnson 2007).  
In complex systems, emergence breaks the idea of determinism because it means 
the outcome of some interaction can be inherently unpredictable.  In large systems, 
macro features can emerge that cannot be traced back to any particular element 
(Byrne & Callaghan 2014).  In everyday phenomena, it is like the beauty of a 
painting cannot be simply reduced to its individual brush strokes or a musical 
symphony to its notes (Pycroft 2014).  
10. Co-evolution 
Co-evolution may be defined as the outcome when two or more complex systems 
reciprocally affect each other’s evolution (Kauffman 1995).  Complex systems are 
usually open systems and thus elements can interact with their external 
environment.  Closed systems are usually merely complicated (Cilliers 1998).  
When systems interact, they co-evolve (Kauffman 1995).  Because of co-evolution, 
it is important to consider the impact of other systems over time in any given 
environment as current and future behaviour of a complex system is intrinsically 
linked to its history (Kauffman 1995).  More importantly, due to the nature of open 
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systems, it is often difficult to determine system boundaries.  Cilliers (1998) argues 
that ‘we have to decide what our “distance” from the system will be’ to frame the 
boundaries and level of detail we wish to study.  Another important phenomenon 
is allegiance and alliance formation in co-evolution.  According to Kauffman 
(1993;1995), complex systems must be sensitised to one another and feel some 
sense of common identity or common purpose to form allegiances and alliances, 
although this does not mean that all parts are reading from the same page.  Each 
complex system maintains its own identity and focuses on its own well-being, but 
certain parts will change to the extent needed to accommodate one another and 
compromises made (Kauffman 1993).  
In summary, the above ten core concepts and principles of complexity describe 
how a complex system begins to change, adjusts to change or appears after change.  
It is also important to recognise that the concepts are all interrelated and that 
complexity is a science of the whole and not of its parts. 
Fitness landscapes 
In addition to the ten core complexity concepts and principles, a borrowed concept 
called fitness landscapes is next considered.  First developed in the 1930s, by an 
evolutionary biologist, a fitness landscape originally visualised how different 
combinations of gene variants under different circumstances would be more 
successful (Gerrits & Marks 2014).  Since it was introduced to the field of 
complexity in 1987, by Kauffman and Levin, and subsequently refined in 1993 by 
Kauffman, the concept has been adopted and further developed by complexity 
researchers (Gerrits & Marks 2014).  Traditional imagery is one of peaks and 
valleys to represent fitness probabilities, where height measures the level of 
fitness. In complexity, Kauffman (1993) developed the model to show how a 
complex system within an environment can also be represented visually to help 
understand which of its components are fitter.  As depicted in Figure 3.1 below, 
individual components may sit at different heights on a traditional landscape 
(Kauffman 1993).   
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Figure	3.1:	Traditional	depiction	of	a	fitness	landscape	
Source:	Standard	imagery	(using	licensed	image)		 
Both Kauffman (1995) and Marion (1999) propose that optimal fitness exists on the 
‘edge of chaos’ where complex systems are moderately interconnected with some 
weak and strongly interconnected elements.  
3.3        Complexity in the natural and social sciences 
3.3.1 Natural sciences 
The genealogy of complexity can be traced to the natural sciences, notably physics, 
mathematics, cybernetics, systems science and biology (Kauffman 1995; Mitchell 
2009).  While complexity builds upon several strands of work, it was the earlier 
work of chaos theory, which provides a mathematical vocabulary for complexity 
researchers, that the new science of complexity began to emerge (Kauffman 1995; 
Mitchell 2009).   
Chaos theory first came to light in 1961 through the work of a meteorologist, 
Edward Lorenz (Gleick 1987).  Lorenz was trying to predict the weather by 
running a series of computations on his computer.  When he came to repeating his 
computations, he tried to save time by rounding some of his starting numbers and 
found that the difference produced an entirely different weather forecast.  This 
was the origin of the principle ‘sensitivity to initial conditions’ popularly referred 
to as the ‘butterfly effect’.  By the time of Lorenz’s discovery, non-linear equations 
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had been around for a long time, but no one was able to solve them (Gleick 1987).  
Traditional Newtonian science, largely based on linearity, order and stability, was 
being challenged by this new theory based on polar-opposites – non-linearity, 
disorder and instability (Elliott & Kiel 1997).  Some of the earlier work was so 
revolutionary that papers were often rejected for publication (Gleick 1987).  By the 
mid-1970s, chaos as a new science had emerged and has since been applied in areas 
such as medicine, to explain the beating of the heart and spread of diseases, and 
economics to explain the movements in the stock market (Gleick 1987).  Although 
Lorenz’s discovery was an accident, it became the catalyst to create a paradigm 
shift and create the new science of chaos theory that later provided a core building 
block to the broader science of complexity (Gleick 1987; Kauffman 1995; Mitchell 
2009).   
In 1984, the new science of complexity finally emerged following the creation of 
the Sante Fe Institute, a dedicated research centre to study complex systems, by a 
group of prominent scientists and mathematicians (Kauffman 1995; Mitchell 2009).  
Early pioneers of complexity research include Murray Gell-Mann (physicist), John 
Holland (physicist, mathematician, computer scientist and psychologist) and 
Stuart Kauffman (theoretical biologist) (Mitchell 2009).  Since then, other research 
centres have emerged, notably the New England Complex Systems Institute 
(‘NECSI’) in 1996.  Shortly thereafter, in 1997, NECSI’s founding President, Yanner 
Bar-Yam (physicist), published a comprehensive and technical book called 
Dynamics of Complex Systems and remains one of the leading experts in the field of 
complexity.  Bar-Yam largely uses mathematical models to study ‘how interactions 
lead to patterns of behaviour’ (NECSI 2017).  Today, these Institutes (Sante Fe 
Institute 2017; NECSI 2017) are at the forefront of complexity research and are 
attempting to solve some of the hardest, most fundamental and most challenging 
problems in today’s world of science and society.  
In summary, since the emergence of the science of complexity some thirty years 
ago, today, complexity researchers are leading the way in twenty-first century 
science.  
3.3.2  Social sciences 
Historically, the social sciences have a long history of borrowing theories, concepts 
and principles from the natural sciences (Maxfield & Babbie 2014).  It was 
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following the publication of James Gleick’s 1987 book Chaos, Making a New Science, 
that chaos theory first caught the attention of social scientists and the general 
public alike (Williams & Arrigo 2002).  This seminal book was followed five years 
later in close succession by Roger Lewin's 1992 book, Complexity: Life at the Edge of 
Chaos, Mitchell Waldrop's 1992 book, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge 
of Order and Chaos and Stuart Kauffman’s 1993 book, The Origins of Order: Self-
Organisation and Selection in Evolution.  These authors did the same for complexity 
as Gleick did for chaos.  In Gleick’s twentieth anniversary edition of his 1987 book, 
Gleick comments in an afterword section ‘what a difference twenty years make.  
The ideas of chaos have been adopted and internalised, not just by mainstream 
scientists, but also by the culture at large’ (Gleick 2008:319).  Likewise, in Lewin’s 
(1999) second edition of his 1992 book, Lewin comments in the preface that since 
the first edition, ‘complexity science has become firmly established as an important 
field’.    
Although complexity remains a relatively new science, its concepts have been 
borrowed and applied by social scientists since the early 1990s (ed. Milovanovic 
1997; Milovanovic 1997a; eds Elliott & Kiel 1997; Williams & Arrigo 2002).  TR 
Young emerged as an early leader in applying chaos theory to the social sciences 
(Milovanovic 1997a).  Her work significantly influenced the work of others 
through the 1990s, notably Bruce Arrigo, Dragan Milovanovic, Hal Pepinsky and 
Robert Schehr (Milovanovic 1997a).  In 1998, Paul Cilliers book, Complexity and 
Postmodernism, greatly influenced the application of complexity in the social 
sciences (Byrne & Callaghan 2014).  Since then, a number of disparate attempts 
have been made over the last two decades, notably in the study of organisations, 
business, management, health, social work and politics (eds Eve et al 2007; 
Bousquet & Curtis 2011; Byrne & Callaghan 2014; eds Pycroft & Bartollas 2014).  
While some of these efforts are more influential than others, most are insufficiently 
advanced.  Notably, where research is qualitative, the conceptual language is often 
developed to a ‘sophisticated degree within complexity’ but on application ‘a full 
appreciation of that underlying sophistication is absent or left unstated’ (Bousquet 
& Curtis 2011:44).  In the social sciences, the availability of suitable quantitative 
data remains a key challenge, however, as argued by social scientists, complexity 
concepts may still be applied metaphorically (Hayles 1990; Marion 1999; Kellert 
2008; Kuhn 2009; Wolf-Branigin 2013).  For example, Wolf-Branigin (2013), 
suggests a number of complexity qualitative research methods in social program 
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evaluations.  As Lee (1997:29) suggests, ‘a variety of languages and methods are 
actually necessary if we wish to produce an ongoing description of differing 
relationships that behave quite differently at differing levels’.  Just because social 
science lacks time-series data, does not mean that ‘social science ought to 
downplay mathematical [complexity] and its insights’ (Dendrinos 1997:242).  In 
modelling social processes, lack of adequate and suitable data is always a problem, 
but using complexity concepts to social dynamics is still ‘helpful’ (Lee 1997:29).  
For example, ‘the inherent non-linearity of many social phenomena’ demonstrates 
the value of the application of complexity to the social sciences (Elliott & Kiel 
1997:4).  While there are both pros and cons in using complexity to understand 
human and social phenomena, complexity ideas have certainly reconfigured social 
scientists’ understanding of what is ‘normal’ and what is not.  As Waldrop 
(1992:12) points out, ‘there is more here than just a series of nice analogies’.  
Notably, in Byrne and Callaghan’s (2014:213) recent book, Complexity Theory and 
the Social Sciences, they comment on ‘how complexity is becoming part of what 
might best be called the intellectual culture’ in today’s social sciences and new 
ways of thinking.  Williams and Arrigo (2002:3) sum up the application of 
complexity as directing ‘our attention to those previously disregarded factors of 
human social interaction, defined as anomalies, inconsistencies, or “noise” in a 
system’.  Bousquet and Curtis (2011:48) further note that ‘the turn towards 
complexity in the social sciences has been partly driven by the growing realisation 
that non-linear and networked social relationships characterise much of the 
contemporary world’.  As a dynamic theory, capturing movement and change, it 
can be argued that complexity is perhaps a more useful ally than more traditional 
theories of social phenomena (Eve et al 1997).  
In summary, upon a review of the available literature, applying complexity to 
problems in the social sciences has certainly been influential, but not dramatic, 
unlike the impact in the natural sciences.  
3.4        Complexity in criminology 
Within criminology, early attempts were made to apply complexity, notably chaos 
theory, but there has been little evidence since of criminologists building upon 
these contributions (Young 1991; Milovanovic 1997a; 2006; 2013a; Arrigo 1997).  
Young (1991) argues that complexity informed criminology explores the ‘varying 
connectedness of the whole eco-system in which crime occurs rather than a study 
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of the differences between those who commit crime and those who do not commit 
crime at a given slice of time’.  Young (1997a:44) also notes that it offers a ‘crime of 
alternatives in a changing mix of order and disorder.  In such a view, crime and its 
dynamics are relocated from the separate person to changes in constraints within 
the larger environment’.  In short, Young (1998a) sums up complexity as a world 
where there needs to be sufficient order to serve the human interest of conformity, 
regularity, dependability and planning, but also sufficient disorder to harness the 
human interest in change and renewal, through variability, creativity and 
innovation.   
According to Milovanovic (2003), one of the few authors on complexity and 
criminology, chaos theory has been applied in a number of areas such as rural 
crime, banditry, gender violence, racial violence, property crime, corporate crime, 
white collar crime, blue collar crime, organised crime and delinquency in general.  
However, it is noted that available research is sparse.  In law, chaos theory has 
been applied to better understand areas such as the American legal system 
(Simons & Stroup 1997), legal decision-making processes (Milovanovic 1997b) and 
mental illness within the court system (Williams & Arigo 2002).  It has also been 
used to develop notions of justice (Capeheart & Milovanovic 2007) and has been 
swept up and integrated into the latest criminological trends such as critical and 
constitutive criminology (Milovanovic 1997a; Schwendinger et al 2002; 
Milovanovic 2003).  Walters (1999) argues that the application of a theory which 
reconciles polar-opposites (order and disorder) provides criminologists with a 
useful tool to reconcile and integrate several long-standing opposites such as the 
classical-positivist view (free will versus determinism) and the micro-macro view 
(individuals versus wider social influences).  To illustrate this point, Walters (1999) 
provides a useful comparison of four criminological perspectives (positivist, 
classical, rehabilitative and chaologist) to a criminal’s set of circumstances.  Unlike 
other perspectives, Walters demonstrates that complexity copes with the diametric 
components of determinism and free will, stability and change, structure and 
transformation. 
Despite some notable efforts to build upon earlier contributions, complexity 
continues to receive little attention from criminologists and remains somewhat 
stubbornly on the margins (Robinson 2014; Milovanovic 2015).  Perhaps this is due 
to the fact that criminology textbooks, including dictionaries and theoretical 
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handbooks, either have i) no reference to complexity (or its subset chaos theory) 
whatsoever (recent examples: White & Perrone 2015; ed. Piquero 2016); ii) 
incorrect usage of the term complexity interchangeably with chaos theory (for 
example eds McLaughlin & Muncie 2013); or iii) limited reference to complexity 
with no real explanation or depth.  One can also argue that certain areas of social 
science, including criminology, still ‘lack the vocabulary and methodological 
toolkit to deal with it effectively’ (Gerrits & Verweij 2015:484).  Or as Gilstrap 
(2005) points out, ‘the mere knowledge of complexity science by students, teachers 
[and] faculties’ may serve as an attractor in actually using it.  As Robinson (2014:72) 
argues, ‘to better explain crime, criminological theory must, at the least, 
acknowledge and embrace the reality of the complexity of crime’.   
On review of the available literature, despite limited contributions within 
criminology, illustrative examples are provided below in criminological terms, by 
each of the ten core concepts and principles, to facilitate a deeper insight and 
understanding into how complexity is or might be applied to criminological 
problems.  In particular, insights into how complexity may be used have been 
drawn from the field of organisational studies, especially where examples in 
criminology are sparse.   
1. Sensitivity to initial conditions (criminological examples) 
This is perhaps the easiest concept to understand, but the hardest to detect.  As 
noted by Kaplan (The Science and Psychology of Chaos Theory 2004), ‘who is to say 
what is an insignificant event?’.  The fact that one small event can result in notable 
consequences does not mean that every small event will yield such an effect.  
According to Young (1997a), a slight change may impact an individual, a group of 
individuals, businesses or even societies; for example, someone speaking up in a 
situation, a slight change in the frequency of police brutality, a change in 
legislation, such as taxation or criminalisation levels.  With criminalisation levels, 
such as the chosen quantity of drugs to deem a dealing level, a slight change may 
have notable consequences to those who fall just under or over the new level.  
Moreover, in crime prevention by design or situation, a slight change in a train 
timetable or bus route might lead to two antagonistic groups being kept separate 
in time and space.  From a policy point of view, if these variables could be 
identified, a small low-cost policy change could have a notable impact on a society.  
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2. Bifurcation (criminological examples) 
According to Young (1997a:41), ‘the concept of bifurcation is most important to the 
criminologist in that it sensitises one to expect the emergence of alternative ways 
to do business, family, religion, or perchance, crime’.  In criminology, 
identification of the bifurcation point at which ‘murder, theft, malpractice, 
embezzlement or warfare emerge offer some of the greatest challenges’ (Young 
1997a:43).  For example, identification of such points could lead to a better 
understanding of exploding crime rates where critical social parameters bifurcate 
(Young 1997b).  Young (1997b:82) argues that in all complex systems, some people, 
even well regarded citizens, will ‘skirt the borders of criminal behaviour now and 
again’ as a way to accomplish their goals.  A useful example of bifurcation paths 
is provided by Young (1997b) in the area of white collar crime.  In the area of 
medical practice, suppose insurance companies triple their premiums to cover an 
increase in claims.  This would create a bifurcation point.  Four possible outcomes 
may emerge: i) doctors deciding to change their practice and move into lower-risk 
surgery where insurance premiums are lower; ii) doctors retaining their current 
practice but adjusting their outgoings to compensate for the increased premiums; 
iii) doctors retaining their current practice but adjusting their lifestyle ambition; 
and iv) doctors moving into illegal billing procedures by increasing the number of 
unnecessary operations or claiming for surgery not taking place.  As seen in this 
example, the concept of bifurcation helps to identify alternative outcomes and the 
new area of ‘illegal billings’ as an attractor.  
3. Attractors (criminological examples) 
The strange chaotic attractor may be used metaphorically for social phenomena 
(Young 1991; Marion 1999).  As Marion (1999:22) argues, ‘it is stable but its 
trajectory never repeats itself; likewise, social behaviour is stable but never quite 
repeats itself’.  As attractors gain momentum, they provide structure and 
coherence to a system and draw people into it and influence their behaviours (Uhl-
Bien & Marion 2009). Young (1997a:33) also notes, ‘why do ordinary people move 
from one way of behaving to another way; that is to say, when and why do new 
attractors arise’.   In criminology, if we can locate these attractors by looking for 
patterns, then we can ‘experiment to see how and when small changes produce 
such bifurcations in human behaviour since the size and shape of any strange 
attractor depend, sensitively, upon key parameters’ (Young 1997a:33).  In short, 
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‘systematic patterning’ is key to identifying attractors (Eve et al 1997:xxx).   
In particular, the butterfly attractor ‘is most interesting to criminologists’ as the 
shape of the two wings or outcome basins is twinned with a clear juncture in 
between (Young 1997a:38).  Using deviancy as an example, one wing may depict 
pro-social behaviour and the other anti-social behaviour.  Given a similar set of 
circumstances, an individual over time may fluctuate between the two wings.  The 
‘point of most uncertainty occurs just at the juncture between the two wings’ 
(Young 1997a:39).  From a criminological perspective, if we could identify such 
junctures, we could identify the ‘tipping point’ of where an individual chooses 
criminal over non-criminal behaviour.  For example, in banditry, the same 
individual or group will be kind and supportive of some persons, while stealing 
and robbing others.  Social histories also play a key role in ‘differing sets of 
attractors for differing sectors of a given society’ (Young 1997c).  As Young 
(1997a:40) points out ‘the geometry of good and evil is not simple’.  One needs to 
discern the specific points where individuals or groups transform from pro to anti-
social behaviour.  
Stroup (1997) also provides examples of the limit point, limit cycle and strange 
attractor in social interaction.  For example, most people eat lunch around noon, 
sometimes earlier or later – if we place bounds on how close behaviour must be to 
qualify as repetition, then a limit point is acceptable.  In the social sciences, social 
limit cycle patterns would fluctuate or cluster around a norm or average, for 
example, family size, matrimonial age, retirement age, solidarity or value 
consensus.   Other examples include grocery shopping, voting, three meals a day, 
sleeping patterns.  Again, bounds need to be placed on how close values must be 
to warrant repetition and an acceptable pattern.  In relation to the strange attractor, 
irregular behaviour or order mimicking randomness would be observed.  
Examples include addictive disorders coupled with irregular habits, dating 
behaviour, or social change via ‘incremental deviance’.  According to Kiel and 
Elliot (1997:28) ‘notions of periodicity have always been used in analyses of 
society’ such as fads and social movements.  
Given that complexity is a science of the whole, Young (1997a) reminds us that an 
individual’s criminal actions need to be taken into the wider social context.  For 
example, a burglar’s attractor may include a variety of parameters including needs 
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and desires, the types of goods that may be inside a house, the number of potential 
victims inside, and policing patterns of the neighbourhood (Young 1997a).  Whilst 
the individual burglar is responsible for his criminal actions, there are macro-
structures in society that he is not responsible for, but which he must adapt to.  For 
example, losing his job due to a downturn in the economy (Young 1997a).  Given 
this view, ‘recourse to violence, self-destructive behaviour, or hate crimes can be 
seen to be adjustments…[to] the larger structures in which a person or a group 
find themselves’ (Young 1997a:44).  Young (1997a:35) further argues that ‘it is these 
whole-system variables which must be found and altered if we want a more 
peaceable society’.   
According to Young (1997b:88), there are four types of attractors when considering 
society and crime in general:  social power, economic power, physical power and 
moral power.  Young’s (1998b) basic argument is that ‘when power inequalities 
increase beyond given limits, entirely new forms of social behaviour may emerge’. 
Young further argues that the life of any given individual or group could be 
mapped to each of these attractors and that each form of crime entails some 
combination of the four.  Young (1997b) suggests social power arises from social 
relationships, be it family, friends, colleagues, church, recreation or the 
community.  Economic power arises from one’s income and wealth.  Physical 
power arises from the use or threat of violence and moral power arises from shared 
values, such as religion or professional ethics. 
As a methodology to use attractors in research, Young (1997b:95) offers a five step 
approach that may be summarised as follows: 
i) locate the attractors hidden in complex data sets; 
ii) determine how many attractors exist in the data set; 
iii) find the change points(s) at which new attractors are produced; 
iv) identify the key parameters which drive the system into ever more 
uncertainty (for purposes of social control); and 
v) determine which setting of those key parameters is acceptable to the whole 
society (for purposes of social policy). 
Although Young does not offer any workable examples, the approach by Young 
appears promising.  As Jennings (2014:41) points out in organisational studies, 
attractors ‘can provide useful insights into organisational behaviour when trying 
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to understand why organisations behave in a particular way given particular 
inputs’ and more importantly, can be used to gain insights into ‘how to tailor 
interventions in order to achieve the required goals’.  Young (1991) further 
suggests ‘rather than analysis, interaction is the focus of attention’ and ‘rather than 
intention, adjustment to external conditions spark the patterns of crime’.  Recently, 
Byrne and Callaghan (2014:36) emphasise the importance of control parameters in 
applying complexity to social science as ‘we have to know something about what 
we change to make a difference’.  Byrne and Callaghan (2014:36) offer a definition 
of control parameters, as ‘elements in a complex system which are less than the 
system as a whole but where changes in these elements have an effect such that 
the nature of the system is changed in a qualitative fashion’.  Essentially, 
complexity suggests that as parameters in the external environment change, then 
individuals, organisations and/or societies ‘move to occupy differing 
regions/attractors in an outcome field’ (Young & Kiel 1994).  An example of 
control parameters is offered by Young and Kiel (1994) in the form of car parking 
regulations, where individuals change their behaviour, such as parking illegally, 
to accommodate changes in parking regulations and other external factors such as 
weather or traffic congestion on any particular day.        
4. Fractals (criminological examples) 
The fractal concept of self-similarity has been applied by the work of Pepinsky 
(1997) in understanding violence.  Pepinsky (1997:103) suggests that ‘small-time 
street crime is paralleled by big-time suite crime’ and that ‘the more power our 
social position confers on us in relation to others, the more numerous and serious 
crimes we will commit’.  There is a parallel and scaling in place.  Pepinsky 
(1997:103-104) further argues that ‘if violence works fractally…the more intense 
the large-scale violence around us, the more intense and prevalent violence should 
become at the interpersonal level through the social system’.  In applying fractional 
dimension, Arrigo (1997) has applied a fractal nature to truth values.  Meaning, 
‘rather than identifying a behaviour as right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust’ 
the fractal concept ‘takes the position that such determinations are matters of 
degree’ (Arrigo 1997:185).  In simple terms, there is not always a clear yes or no 
answer to everyday questions and ‘shades of grey’ might be more useful in 
criminological study.  
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5. Interconnectivity (criminological examples) 
In organisational studies, interconnectivity is associated with the concept of a 
‘shared need’ where individuals interact to ‘accomplish a task, goal, objective, [or] 
vision’ (Uhl-Bien & Marion 2009:642).  Simply put, a shared need starts with the 
‘what’s in it for me question’ (Uhl-Bien & Marion 2009:642).  If a shared need ‘is 
not felt’, then ‘individuals will not be motivated to engage’ (Uhl-Bien & Marion 
2009:642).  Lewin and Regine (1999) suggest that to promote the extent to which 
individuals interact in an organisation, leaders should create conditions to foster 
personal attachment with both the organisation and people within in.  Moreover, 
to promote greater creativity and adaptability, one needs to find whatever 
‘enriches the interactions’ or relationships amongst individuals (Lewin & Regine 
1999:203).  Although these examples are from organisational studies, these 
examples resonate with the ‘dark side’ of organisational life, such as criminal 
organisations and/or groups in criminology.  
6. Feedback (criminological examples) 
Feedback may be applied to how words or phrases obtain new meanings when the 
‘original intent’ becomes modified and reconstructed over time resulting in 
problematic definitions (Milovanovic 1997b; Schulman 1997).  For example, in law 
‘because legal precedent necessarily is preserved through language, there is 
opportunity at every new reading for its meaning to be perturbed’ to fit a new 
situation (Simons & Stroup 1997:117).  In the context of Murray Lee’s ‘fear of crime 
feedback loop’ the concept of feedback is clearly apparent (Lee 2007:77).  Lee’s 
feedback loop describes a process which breeds fear in today’s society using the 
media to inform the public of their fears based on research polls and the like, 
which, in turn, politicians use to justify tougher policies on crime, which, in turn, 
breeds more fear and accordingly more research.  In McBurnett’s (1997) 
complexity research in the evolution of public opinion, McBurnett argues 
compelling evidence that feedback is key.  As noted by Stroup (1997) the pre-
existing or historical character of social facts make them potential indicators for 
feedback.  In practice, it can be argued that any aspect of society is affected by its 
history where feedback loops either amplify or constrain crime.  In complexity, 
history matters.  
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7. Self-organisation (criminological examples) 
In criminology, a practical outcome of a system spontaneously self-organising to a 
stronger order, could be the result of no action or intervention.  In fact, this 
outcome was already put forward by labelling theorists in the 1960s in relation to 
juvenile delinquency where the theorists were advocating a ‘radical 
noninterventionist policy:  leave the kids alone wherever possible’ (Schur 1973 
cited in Milovanovic 2003:70).  More recently, Arrigo and Williams (2014) critically 
examine the relationship between substance abuse and spontaneous self-healing 
of drug addicts using complexity insights of self-organisation.  In organisational 
studies, the message for business leaders in fostering a stronger self-organised 
business is ‘encourage diversity if you want to achieve creativity and adaptability’ 
(Lewin & Regine 1999:201).  More importantly, ‘nurture distributed control’ rather 
than top-down control as this is ‘true empowerment’ of the people and they will 
‘self-organise around problems that need to be solved’ (Lewin & Regine 1999:202).  
8. Dissipation (criminological examples) 
In a complexity informed view of drug addiction and natural recovery, Arrigo and 
Williams (2014) note a variety of perturbations that serve as critical events on the 
individual that may cause dissipation.  For example, family, job or legal concerns 
or simply feelings of losing control.  While individuals can resist even the largest 
of these perturbations, given the right circumstances, the smallest of perturbations 
can produce an entire ‘melt down’ of an individual, but ‘be sufficient to instigate 
a process of reorganisation’ in the individual ‘to better able to withstand future 
perturbations’ (Arrigo & Williams 2014:250).  For example, rather than a complete 
abstinence from drugs, low-risk drug use may be a solution. Similarly, 
bureaucracies demonstrate dissipation where they are resistant to change and 
even large perturbations, however, in certain circumstances, a slight perturbation 
can produce an entire collapse, but give rise to a more adaptive and stronger order 
(Milovanovic 2003).  
9. Emergence (criminological examples) 
Numerous social scientists have argued the phenomenon of emergence in complex 
social systems, notably in organisational studies (Kauffman 1995, Cilliers 1998; 
Byrne & Callaghan 2014).  Emergent examples include innovation, learning, 
creativity and social, cultural, political or educational movements (Marion 1999; 
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Wolf-Branigin 2013).  As Marion (1999:127) puts it, the ‘interactions, 
interdependencies, and inter-commitments among the parts’ in socially complex 
systems are ‘not like a room full of furniture that can be rearranged, added to, or 
deleted from at will’.  In other words, in a complex room, a piece of furniture may 
appear suddenly and unexpectedly out of nowhere, although the arrangement or 
‘pattern’ of how the furniture is placed may leave traces as to its origin.  
10. Co-evolution (criminological examples) 
In the social world, there are numerous examples of co-evolution, involving 
allegiances and alliances, including the concept of the crime-terror nexus, in and 
of itself.  Industries, for example, ‘depend upon a network of suppliers, consumers, 
and related industries for fitness’ and co-evolution (Marion 1999:51).  Kauffman 
(1995:217) argues that ‘goods and services “live” in niches created by other goods 
and services’.   Kauffman (1995:240) offers a simple, but powerful, example of co-
evolution.  The horse as a means of transport, led to the cart, cart whip, blacksmith 
and saddlery trade.  However, the arrival of the car led to the extinction of the 
horse as everyday means of transport and with the horse went the cart, cart whip, 
blacksmith and saddlery trade.  He argues that ‘when one goes extinct, it alters the 
niche it helped create and may drive its neighbours extinct’ (Kauffman 1995:240).  
When considering co-evolution in the social world, determining system 
boundaries are important.  Boundaries may be constructed using limits, such as 
legislation or geographical boundaries, to ‘bracket’ a system (Pycroft 2014).  Other 
limits may be constructed and placed on the available choice of actors or activities 
in a system (Wolf-Branigin 2013).  Cilliers (1998:5) argues that framing a system 
involves the distance and level of detail we wish to study; for example, in the 
banking world ‘if we stand far away, we could only consider the activity of large 
financial institutions…if we are going to examine the system in microscopic detail, 
we may have to keep a track of the status of every individual penny’.  In 
criminology, framing an individual and their immediate social circumstances is 
paramount as they are also embedded in the wider social, political and cultural 
systems, which can greatly influence the outcomes (Pycroft 2014).  Of particular 
note, when framing using the case study method, ‘complexity suggests that 
important insights can be gleaned by studying behaviour that occurs at and across 
the boundaries that define the case’ unlike in traditional case studies where study 
of phenomenon is restricted to within the boundaries (Anderson et al 2005:674).  
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Fitness Landscapes (criminological examples) 
As mentioned earlier, both Kauffman (1995) and Marion (1999) argue that optimal 
fitness is at the ‘edge of chaos’ where a system is moderately interconnected, with 
some elements having a weak or strong interconnectivity within the system.  In 
organisational studies, Marion (1999) argues that an organisation’s fitness is at the 
‘edge of chaos’ when the organisation is sufficiently rigid to carry information 
about itself, co-ordinate activity, share resource and perform its core tasks 
adequately, but also sufficiently slack to allow it to use its information creatively, 
to explore new strategies for surviving and to change.  Marion (1999:163) further 
argues that organisations that are too slack, ‘cannot coordinate and differentiate’, 
while those that are too rigid are ‘either unstable or are frozen’.  As a consequence, 
a system can adjust its fitness landscape by adjusting its degree of 
interconnectivity.  Adjustments may be made by changing the number of linkages 
among parts or changing the nature of interactions among parts (Marion 1999).  In 
short, fitness landscapes can aid ‘sense-making’ as they can ‘represent a complex 
story about adaption and fitness in one coherent image’ and help us understand 
the many aspects of a complex system ‘in an accessible way’ (Gerrits & Marks 
2014:1). 
In summary, while existing research in the application of complexity within 
criminology is limited, broader available research as illustrated above provides 
useful building blocks for the development of a new complexity model in a 
criminological context to criminological problems.   
3.5        Complexity in organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus 
As in criminology, based on a literature review, the application of complexity to 
the study of organised crime appears limited and in the study of the crime-terror 
nexus non-existent.  In the study of terrorism, however, an area that has grown 
rapidly since 9/11, available research in the application of complexity, while still 
limited and mostly in the area of mathematical modelling, is growing (eds Fellman 
et al 2015).  Equally, research in applying complexity in organisational studies is 
also growing (Uhl-Bien & Marion 2009).  While research is primarily in relation to 
legitimate organisations and businesses, it is the recognition that criminal groups 
are also organisations and businesses that allows complexity learnings to be 
borrowed and applied from organisational studies.   
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Lewin and Regine (1999:198) argue that if complex systems, be it in the natural or 
business world, share fundamental properties and processes, then in business, 
complexity offers ‘a way to understand and work with the deep nature of 
organisations’.  They further note that in today’s competitive environment, 
‘companies will survive only if they are able constantly to adapt and evolve’ 
(Lewin & Regine 1999:198).  One of the key complexity findings offered by Lewin 
and Regine (1999:198) is that ‘managers and executives cannot control their 
organisations to the degree that the mechanistic perspective implies, but they can 
influence where their company is going, and how it evolves’.  In organisational 
studies, shortly after 9/11, Marion and Uhl-Bien (2003) examined the leadership 
of Al-Qaeda through an organisational and complexity lens, generating unique 
insights into Al-Qaeda’s leadership.  Marion and Uhl-Bien (2003) argue that Al-
Qaeda is a complex system and hence complexity helps to explain its 
organisational behaviour.  Using the concept of fitness landscapes, Marion and 
Uhl-Bien (2003:73) suggest that ‘complexity perspectives tell us that going after Al-
Qaeda’s top leadership would not be enough to take care of the problem, and 
might even create a catalyst to further energise the system’.  While bin Laden was 
a charismatic leader, ‘he did not make himself so central to the Al-Qaeda network 
that innovation is restricted to his vision or the movement would die with his 
demise’ (Marion and Uhl-Bien 2003:73).  As history tells us some eight years later 
in 2011, Al-Qaeda did not die with bin Laden’s demise.  Marion and Uhl-Bien 
(2003:74) conclude that ‘while there is obviously much that we don’t know about 
this organisation, or the leadership’ by ‘examining organisations through a new 
lens of complex leadership we may be able to generate insights for organisational 
leadership far beyond traditional views’.  
Elliott and Kiel (2004:63) also explore ways in which complexity can be 
‘successfully exploited to develop a better understanding of terrorist dynamics’.  
They consider the use of agent-based simulations as a means for modelling 
terrorism dynamics and how the results could be used to develop successful 
strategies of response to terrorism.  They conclude with some observations about 
the potential of agent-based modelling, although the discussion is largely 
exploratory.  A few years later, Johnson (2007) explores the use of complexity in 
understanding the nature of war and conflict.  Johnson suggests (2007:160), ‘that 
the way in which wars evolve has less to do with the original causes and more to 
do with the way in which humans act in groups’.  
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A notable contribution, containing some elements of complexity, is by Michael 
Kenney.  Kenney (2007) applies organisational learning theory and network 
analysis to trafficking and terrorist networks, and government bureaucracies.  
Kenney (2007:3) is one of the few scholars who has studied ‘the “dark” side of 
organisational life’.  Although Kenney does not offer any meaningful analysis or 
discussion on complexity, his narrow application of organisational learning theory 
does offer some novel insights.  Kenney (2007) argues and concludes that the 
resilience of Colombia’s drug trade and Al-Qaeda is the ability to learn, build skills 
and change practices that make it difficult for law enforcers to stop them.  
Moreover, Ayling (2009) draws on organisational and ecological literature, 
containing some elements of complexity, to consider the resilience of criminal 
organisations and their ability to change, survive and prosper.  Like Kenney, no 
analysis or discussion is offered on complexity.  
In organisational studies, Kuhn (2009) applies complexity concepts to create new 
approaches to understanding structure, processes, problems and practices within 
legitimate businesses.  Kuhn also provides concrete examples and concludes her 
findings with suggestions on how an organisation can enhance its opportunities.  
In Kuhn’s (2009) work, she introduces a concept called ‘fractal fragment’ on how 
she’s approached her data collection and analysis.  Kuhn (2009) defines a fractal 
fragment as short stories or narrative accounts that she has compiled from 
documents or through interviews with individuals about their experiences. As 
Kuhn (2009:14) puts it, ‘examining one fractal component at one scale enables you 
to thereby manage what would otherwise be overwhelming detail’.  In other 
words, fractal fragments allow you to better manage large amounts of data when 
studying organisations.   
In 2007, Madsen (2007) proposes the use of network theory to better understand 
‘transnational organised crime and terrorism’ and links certain elements under 
complexity.  He also uses a useful concept in managing his data collection and 
analysis by referring to the notion ‘packets of information’ to parcel up pieces of 
information about a case example of a terrorist.  Madsen (2007:18) breaks-up his 
case example of a terrorist into 16 ‘packets of information’ where each packet is 
useful individually (examples provided below), as well as collectively.  Examples 
include: i) pale skin and red hair (this packet of information conveys unusual 
features for a person born in Syria and would facilitate observation); ii) a member 
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of the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ (this packet of information would alert the 
intelligence and security communities); and iii) dual nationality that allowed him 
unfettered travel within the European Union (this packet of information would 
alert agencies to his freedom of movement).  Madsen also expresses his view on 
the unresolved problem of ‘packets of information’ being parcelled in different 
ways by different intelligence agencies and the problematic sharing of ‘packets of 
information’ between countries to paint a global picture of the terrorist (Madsen 
2007:12).   
In policing and intelligence, Leary and Thomas (2011) apply complexity concepts 
to organised crime and terrorism, although the attempt is largely illustrative.  
Leary and Thomas (2011:69) argue that ‘the hierarchical view of criminal 
networks…is based upon a linear view of the world’ and ‘ignores the inter-
relatedness of the elements of feedback loops operating within the network’.  They 
further argue that based on recent research, if ‘hierarchies are not as common a 
feature of crime networks as we once thought, we need to rethink our approach.  
We need to “complexify” our view of the world’ (Leary & Thomas 2011:69).  
Essentially, crime networks are more often than not ‘self-organising systems with 
no real top and no real bottom’ (Leary & Thomas 2011:69).  
More recently, Fellman et al (2015) demonstrate how the decision dynamics of 
terrorist networks can be understood using mathematical modelling of a fitness 
landscape.  Fellman et al (2015) also recently edited a new book called Conflict and 
Complexity: Countering Terrorism, Insurgency, Ethnic and Regional Violence which 
presents a complexity approach to analysing, modelling, understanding, and 
combating terrorism and conflict.  Examples include military operations in 
asymmetric warfare and global patterns of ethnic violence where patterns of 
population mixing and boundaries are being isolated.  It is noted that at the core 
of this research is pattern formation.  While much of the content explores 
mathematical models, there is a useful discussion offered by Mesjasz (2015) on 
terrorism studies and how complexity has been or may be applied.  
Finally, despite the limited application of complexity in criminology, one notable 
exception is by Young and her early consideration of attractors.  In organised 
crime, Young (1997b:88) proposes that economic power is the key attractor where 
‘organised crime offers several manageable alternates to open-up (bifurcate) a 
basin of economic attractors for young people’ – for example, the sale of drugs, 
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auto theft, property theft, arson or prostitution.  As young people move into 
adulthood, they undergo a lifestyle change and desire and want more: e.g. cars, 
fashion, separate accommodation and travel.  Allowances and part-time jobs may 
not be enough to cover their desire, and most are too young to access other income 
sources such as property or portfolio income.  Organised crime is the opening for 
some of these people with low incomes to experience higher incomes.  In 
complexity informed organised crime, the bifurcations between the ‘desire for 
consumer goods and services on one side, and legal sources of income on the other’ 
is the point where economic attractors such as property crime come into play 
(Young 1997b:87).  For some, the mismatch between income and desire might be 
resolved through another bifurcation, for example, the dropping out of school and 
working full-time.  For others, the foregoing of desirable goods and the 
participation in youth culture is a way out.  For those that are unable to do without, 
and organised crime is not an option, petty shoplifting or stealing from family and 
friends is another alternative.  Organised crime is also an attractive option for 
certain people, of all ages, where it offers a higher income and a certain status not 
otherwise attainable (Young 1997b).  Young (1998b) further argues that ‘it is not so 
much that poverty pushes great changes but rather that people innovate in order 
to cope with uncertainty’. As Young (1992) points out, attractor analysis is 
concerned with the ‘patterns, regularities and certainties found in the same 
outcome field in which disorder, uncertainty, and surprising transformations are 
found’.  Given Young’s early insights into attractor analysis, it is surprising that 
her work has not been built upon by other scholars, particularly in organised 
crime, except for this author’s earlier work (Beesley 2010; 2011).    
In summary, as demonstrated by the literature review of existing research in the 
application of complexity to organised crime and terrorism, and more specifically 
in the field of criminology, the limited research reveals an academic gap which this 
thesis attempts to address.  Notwithstanding, the limited research does provide 
some useful insights in developing the new model.  Of particular note, are insights 
using the concepts of fitness landscapes (Marion 1999; Marion & Uhl-Bien 2003; 
Uhl-Bien & Marion 2009) attractors (Young 1992; Young 1997b) and fractal 
fragments (Kuhn 2009).   
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PART 2:  METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 4:  Approach 
 
‘If we knew what it was we were doing, it would not be called research, would it?’  
Albert Einstein, physicist (1879-1955) 
 
Chapter 4 sets out the research approach, assumptions and limitations in applying 
complexity in a criminological context, and to the study of organised crime, 
terrorism and the crime-terror nexus.  It begins by considering research questions, 
followed by the availability of data and the conceptual language of complexity.  It 
next considers key design principles in developing a new complexity model with 
criminological frames of reference, together with the approach to testing and 
applying the new model using the case study method.  It also sets out the rationale 
for the case study selection, design and source data. 
 
 
4.1        Research questions 
As discussed in Chapter 3, there are a number of qualitative and quantitative 
approaches that have been developed in the natural and social sciences to apply 
complexity to social phenomena.  However, there are few approaches, if any, 
developed within criminology to study criminological problems.  There is also 
limited application to date of complexity within criminology and more specifically 
to the study of organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus, with some 
notable exceptions in terrorism studies.  Accordingly, a key question is how to 
operationalise the application of complexity in a criminological context to 
criminological problems.  To address this question, a new complexity approach to 
study criminological problems, and more specifically to the study of organised 
crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus, is central to this thesis.   
As explained in Chapter 1, this thesis comprises an over-arching yet simple 
hypothesis relating to complex phenomena:  that complexity can be successfully 
applied with criminological frames of reference to analyse organised crime, 
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terrorism and the crime-terror nexus.  As also explained in Chapter 1, the 
criminological frames of reference will form an integral part of the new design, 
with certain concepts being framed within complexity and other concepts being 
synthesised with complexity. In this hypothesis, success may be measured in two 
parts.  The first part refers to the success of developing a new model ‘to apply’ in 
the first place, complexity with criminological frames of reference to the 
phenomena under study – without this success, the second part of the hypothesis 
is redundant.  Success may be measured on the extent of the fit of the application.   
The second part refers to the success of using the new model ‘to analyse’ the 
phenomena under study and to improve our understanding, where success may 
be measured on the extent of the improvement of our knowledge.  To 
operationalise the hypothesis and subsequently measure its success, the following 
two research questions have been developed, where the phenomena under study 
are organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus:  
i) On application of the new model, are the themes arising from the analysis 
of the phenomena consistent with the concepts and constructs of 
complexity? 
ii) Can complexity help to improve our understanding of the phenomena, 
including their nature and strength, why and how they evolve, and what 
shapes actor behaviour?  
In short, the first research question measures the success of the fit of the new model 
and the second measures the success of the improvement of our knowledge of the 
phenomena under study.  Accordingly, the response to the first question needs to 
be yes, before the second question can be considered, and if the first question is 
satisfied, the second question may not be satisfied, i.e. there may not be an 
improvement to our knowledge. To address these research questions, the overall 
approach comprises the development of a new complexity model, with 
criminological frames of reference, using the case study method, to apply the new 
complexity model to organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus.   
This chapter sets out the methodology in designing, developing, testing and 
applying the new complexity model, with the resulting new model contained in 
Chapter 5.  Based on the testing and application of the new complexity model, 
using the case study method in Chapters 6 and 7, the case study findings will aim 
to address these research questions in Chapter 8.  
	 86	
4.2       Data consideration   
In developing any new approach, the consideration of data is fundamental 
(Dantzker & Hunter 2006; Maxfield & Babbie 2014).  The new model will need to 
consider four aspects: i) data availability: what is available and accessible; ii) data 
collection and sorting: how to collect and sort the data into a workable format to 
apply complexity; ii) data coding and analysis: how to code and analyse the data 
using complexity; and iv) data interpretation: how to interpret the complexity 
informed analysis to provide understanding and insights.  The first point is 
considered here; the other three points will be considered in Chatper 5.  
In considering data availability, the first point is key, but more importantly, the 
availability of ‘good’ data.  As Sheptycki (2008:15) argues, in the criminological 
study of organised crime, ‘good data [is] far rarer than bad data’.  Moreover, 
‘transnational criminologists try to squeeze meaning out of often very limited 
knowledge’ (Sheptycki 2008:15).  Paoli and Fijnaut (2004a:8) also note the data 
issues faced in the European research Project where ‘agencies [were] hardly 
willing to open their files to social scientists’ and when police and judicial bodies 
did open their files, the data collected was not for the purpose of ‘scholarly 
analysis’ and as such ‘neglect[ed] or los[t] most of the information that would be 
most interesting for researchers’.  As noted by von Lampe (2011:186), ‘surprisingly 
little empirical information is available about the day-to-day reality’ of organised 
crime and its offenders and ‘available information, including academic literature, 
journalistic and autobiographical is “rather fragmented”’.   
Similarly, in terrorism studies, availability of good data is rare.  As Freilich and 
LaFree (2015:4) note, ‘in criminology, data on illegal behaviour come traditionally 
from three sources’:  i) ‘official’ data collected by legal agents, especially police; ii) 
‘victimisation’ data collected from victims and non-victims; and iii) ‘self-report’ 
data collected from offenders.  With terrorism data, ‘all three of these sources are 
problematic’ (Freilich & LaFree 2015:4).  In police data, ‘terrorist acts often cut 
across several more common types of criminal categories’, for example, an 
assassination may be classified as homicide and destruction of a building as arson, 
rather than acts of terrorism (Freilich & LaFree 2015:4).  As noted in Chapter 2, 
victims are rarely targets and most are usually killed in the terrorist act such as in 
an explosion (Freilich & LaFree 2015).  With self-report data, ‘most active terrorists 
are unwilling to participate in interviews’ and even if willing, access and safety 
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issues raise obvious challenges (Freilich & LaFree 2015:4).  
Another area of data that is often inaccessible or overlooked by scholars is within 
the private sector such as financial institutions (Levi 2007; 2014).  As noted earlier, 
the financial services sector, including banks, is one of the ‘tools’ of organised 
crime and terrorism operations.  Global and national anti-money laundering and 
counter-terrorism financing legislation has forced the financial services sector to 
look more closely at its data to identify suspicions of money laundering and 
terrorism financing and report any suspicions to their local regulator (Levi 2014; 
AUSTRAC 2016).  Although this data (both qualitative and quantitative in nature) 
is accessible by a number of governmental agencies and law enforcement, it is 
rarely accessible by academic scholars (Levi 2014).  
Not surprisingly, based on the literature review, the lack of good data is a common 
theme, largely due to the covert and clandestine nature of organised crime and/or 
terrorist groups, and the data that is available is largely qualitative in nature, i.e.  
textual rather than numerical.  Notwithstanding data challenges, as noted earlier, 
when quantitative techniques cannot be applied, complexity may still be applied 
qualitatively and conceptually.  Based on data considerations, the new complexity 
model will be qualitative and conceptual in nature, rather than numerical and 
absolute.   
4.3        Conceptual language 
On reading the literature review in Chapters 2 and 3, the reader may have noticed 
traces of complexity language, both explicitly and implicitly, within the 
description of organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus. These traces 
appear as likenesses or similarities in the descriptions, that resonate with the core 
concepts of complexity, and therefore, may form a conceptual basis to develop the 
new model. As noted by Bousquet and Curtis (2011:59), ‘some of the conceptual 
language of complexity simply did not exist more than a few decades ago’.   
As a recap from Chapter 3, complexity is concerned with the behaviour of a 
system, meaning that any single part of a system can only be understood with 
reference to the entire system which requires a consideration at both the local and 
global level. The system comprises multiple elements that are interconnected 
through local interactions that tend to be non-linear, feedback on each other and 
do not have to be physical, i.e. can transfer information.  Fractals identify patterns 
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that are easy to see at one scale, but not at another.  Attractors produce an order 
within the disorder of the system, and in doing so create patterns and structures 
that give a complex system its stability and as such, both order and disorder can 
coexist.  The Lorenz attractor, also known as a butterfly attractor, has the shape of 
two wings or outcome basins with a clear nexus between the two; the point of most 
uncertainty is at this nexus.  The boundaries between the system and its 
environment are indistinct and dynamic and more importantly, the system can 
adapt to changes in its internal and external environment.  The system has a 
history, which largely determines its current structure, internal organisation and 
behaviour, and is often capable of learning and self-organisation, which allows the 
system to adapt, evolve and survive.  Finally, the system demonstrates emergent 
properties as the whole is more than a sum of its parts.  When two or more complex 
systems reciprocally affect each other’s evolution, they co-evolve and allegiances 
and alliances may form.  For allegiances and alliances to form, complex systems 
must be sensitised to one another and feel some sense of common identity or 
common purpose.  Each complex system maintains its own identity and focuses 
on its own well-being, but certain parts will change to the extent needed to 
accommodate one another and compromises made. 
In Chapter 2, in the descriptions of organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror 
nexus, the following traces of complexity language may be found with emphasis 
added that resonate with the core concepts of complexity and thus lend themselves 
to explanations through the new model.   
Organised crime 
In the description of organised crime by Levi (2007:795), organised crime may be 
considered as a ‘dynamic process that evolves as offenders adapt (or fail to adapt) to 
their changing environment’.  Moreover, according to a report from the Australian 
Crime Commission (2015:7-10), organised crime has an ‘increasingly complex 
nature’ and is global with the ability to adapt to market requirements and demands.  
More importantly, Findlay (2008:68) argues that organised crime ‘requires 
comparative analysis from the local to the global if the complex nature of criminal 
enterprise is to be understood at all the vital phases of its organisation’.  In relation 
to the two-tiered structure of criminal groups, Levi and Maguire (2004:398) argue 
the concept of a fractal, in that ‘although small organisations and even individuals 
may be socially dangerous…larger criminal organisations develop reputational 
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benefits as well as economies of scale…creating a cumulatively greater social threat’. 
Von Lampe (2016:5) also notes, ‘one of the main challenges in the study of 
organised crime is to sort through the myriad social relations of criminals and to 
understand how these relations influence and shape criminal behaviour’.  
Furthermore, the structures formed are also influenced by the type of criminal 
activities carried out and ‘the notion that criminals organise themselves to respond to 
specific needs’ (von Lampe 2016:101).  As pointed out by van de Bunt et al 
(2014:321), while ‘organised crime groups are often portrayed as entities that 
derive their strength from strong internal cohesion’, at the same time, ‘instead of 
operating in a social vacuum, organised crime has a habit of interacting with its 
social environment’.   
Terrorism 
In terrorism, English (2015:20) argues that ‘the emergent picture…will be complex’ 
and Hoffmann (2006:4) points out that the Reign of Terror where the word 
terrorism was first coined ‘was neither random nor indiscriminate…but was 
organised, deliberate, and systematic’.  As Franks (2006:34) argues, ‘societies can be 
sensitised to accept different levels of violence depending on their history and 
experience’.  For example, in South America, Africa and the Middle East, a culture 
of violence has developed that ‘tends to perpetuate itself’ (Franks 2006:34).  
Moreover, White and Perrone (2015:296) note that terrorism ‘has layers of 
complexity that need to be drawn out’.   
Crime-terror nexus 
In the statement by the United Nations Secretary-General, Ki-moon (2015), 
reference was made to ‘terrorists and criminals around the world are coming 
together and feeding off each other...we must take a comprehensive approach…we 
must work to stop crime and extremism being seen as attractive or necessary 
options’.  According to Shelley et al (2005:4), the ‘interaction between terrorism and 
organised crime is growing deeper and more complex all the time’.  Furthermore, 
the Australian Federal Justice Minister, Michael Keenan, observes that, ‘the links 
between terrorism and organised crime are [still] emerging and complex problems’ 
(interview in Box 2015).  Moreover, ‘the fluid environment within which terrorist 
and organised crime groups operate provides both threats and opportunities’ 
(Grabosky & Stohl 2010:71).  As Makarenko (2011:238) argues, ‘the better an 
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organisation learns and adapts to its environment in the context of the crime-terror 
nexus, the greater the threat it is likely to pose on a multiple of levels’.  Grabosky 
and Stohl (2010:79) also summarise the increasing networks arising between 
criminals and terrorists as ‘temporary, dynamic, emergent, adaptive, entrepreneurial 
and flexible structures’.  Of particular note, as organised crime and terrorist groups 
seek similar operational environments, ‘it is natural that their paths converge’ (Joint 
Forces Staff College 2015:17).   Essentially this growing trend of illicit partnership 
is fuelled by ‘ungoverned spaces’, where both groups prosper, leading to ‘a pattern 
[that] is self-perpetuating’ (Joint Forces Staff College 2015:17).  Moreover, in 
organisational studies (Uhl-Bien & Marion 1999), interconnectivity is associated 
with a shared need where individuals interact to accomplish a task, goal, objective, 
or vision.  If a shared need is not felt, then individuals will not be motivated to 
engage.  In interpersonal networks, Granovetter (1973:1360) argues that ‘small-scale 
interaction becomes translated into large-scale patterns, and that these, in turn, feed 
back into small groups’.  Finally, Grabosky and Stohl (2010:127) recognise that ‘the 
problems of organised crime and terrorism have long histories and deep roots 
within the communities in which they have arisen’ and that any approach to 
understanding these problems must recognise ‘the history and context in which the 
problems and the organisations have emerged’.    
Based on this analysis, the conceptual language of complexity lends itself well to 
organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus.  This conceptual resonance 
with complexity is expressed in the very language itself.  The common features are 
surprisingly many:  systems operating at both a local and global level, the co-
existence of order and disorder in a dynamic and non-linear fashion, the 
application of fractals, attractors and feedback loops, the ability to learn and adapt, 
the notion of a nexus between two worlds and systems reciprocally affecting each 
other’s evolution where allegiances and alliances may form.   
As such, in developing the new model through a complexity lens, as highlighted 
and summarised in Chapter 1, new definitions of organised crime, terrorism and 
the crime-terror nexus may be constructed as follows:  
• Organised crime: a complex system (i.e. a criminal group) comprising a 
number of interacting, self-organising, dynamic and emergent properties, 
including individuals, and also interacts with other groups, individuals 
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and its environment, all of which are mutually influencing. 
 
 
• Terrorism: a complex system (i.e. a criminal or criminalised group) 
comprising a number of interacting, self-organising, dynamic and 
emergent properties, including individuals, and also interacts with other 
groups, individuals and its environment, all of which are mutually 
influencing. 
 
• Crime-terror nexus: a complex system (i.e. a criminal or criminalised 
group) which evolves, or two or more complex systems which evolve and 
reciprocally affect each other’s evolution and co-evolve to form a different 
or new complex system or systems (i.e. groups). 
Supporting this approach, is the philosophical lens of epistemology and ontology 
(eds Arrigo & Williams 2006; Byrne & Callaghan 2014).  As highlighted in Chapter 
1 and subsequently discussed in Chapter 8, in developing a new model of 
complexity, reality is seen through a world of complex systems, and if we want to 
understand organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus through the 
new model, we need to understand it in those terms.   
4.4       Design principles   
The design and development of the new complexity model is considered 
analogous to having a computer (i.e. complexity), but to access it, you need a 
keyboard (i.e. interface or model) and the keyboard needs to have the right keys 
(i.e. a frame of reference).  As the complex system is a criminal group, the new keys 
need to have criminological frames of reference, and so the new model is 
analogous to building a new keyboard.  In considering the development of the new 
model, as contained in Chapter 5, to bring some sophistication of thought and 
understanding, three design principles are proposed: i) theory-driven; ii) 
analytical tool; and iii) visualisation.  
The first design principle is theory-driven, comprising a synthesis of 
criminological and complexity concepts.  As such, it will propose some 
criminological objects of study that are implicated by complexity and how 
studying these might provide new insights into organised crime, terrorism and the 
crime-terror nexus.  As pointed out by Kleemans (2014:32), ‘theory is not the 
opposite of empirical research.  On the contrary, theories and theoretical 
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perspectives shape the ways in which we are able to describe and analyse 
empirical realities’.  Furthermore, ‘theories are “spotlights” and all observation is 
theory-driven’ (Kleemans 2014:32).  
The second design principle is an analytical tool, to ensure its ability to organise, 
shape and structure information and make conceptual distinctions to capture 
something that is easy to understand.  In considering the new design, complexity 
suggests the key to understanding complex systems is contained in the patterns of 
relationships and interactions amongst a system’s elements.  Hence, the overall 
approach to applying complexity in a criminological context to criminological 
problems is to develop a model that emphasises patterned thinking.  As Maxfield 
and Babbie (2014:294) observe, an analytical tool ‘adds structure’ and aids the 
emergence of ‘patterns’.  Furthermore, as discussed earlier, one of the central 
concepts of complexity is that while it is difficult to predict the exact state and 
outcome of a complex system, it is generally possible to model the overall 
behaviour.  As such, complexity lays emphasis not on the disorder of the system, 
but on the order or patterns inherent in the system and offers a means of discerning 
and identifying these patterns.  The analytical tool will thus provide a way to 
discern such patterns and provide a richer understanding and appreciation, as 
well as indicators of events.   
The third and final design principle is visualisation.  Visual imagery will allow the 
reader to better visualise and grasp the complexity concepts being used to frame 
the new approach and complexity model in criminology.  As NECSI (2017), a 
leading Institute points out, ‘visualisation tools’ are important as ‘one of the 
biggest challenges of studying complex systems is how to represent their 
behaviour in a way that makes intuitive sense’.  Of particular note, is the 
‘increasing interest in the use of visual tools and techniques in criminology’ and 
‘the potential for visual criminology to better present complex research findings’ 
(Wheeldon & Harris 2015:141).  Moreover, as Tufte (2001:191) notes, ‘what is to be 
sought in designs for the display of information is the clear portrayal of 
complexity’.  In other words, ‘not the complications of the simple; rather the task 
of the designer is to give visual access to the subtle and difficult – this as, the 
revelation of the complex’ (Tufte 2001:191).  To date, as Wheeldon and Harris 
(2015:143) argue, ‘although data visualisation has thrived in many areas of social 
inquiry, criminology has been comparatively slow to adopt these techniques’.  In 
	 93	
complexity, a number of descriptive metaphors – the butterfly effect, attractors, 
fractal fragments, edge of chaos, landscapes – are offered which are easily 
accessible by criminologists as meaningful descriptors of patterns that emerge in 
criminological research.  Moreover, the use of infographics aids data visualisation.  
In short, visual imagery will aid sense-making.   
As will be seen in Chapter 5, each of the three design principles will be used in the 
development of the new model.   
4.5       Testing and application 
The testing and application of the new model, including the above design 
principles, will use the case study method.   It is important to note that the 
development, testing and application of the new model will be performed 
simultaneously and iteratively, through discovery and reflection, as each part of 
the process influences the other.   As Maxfield and Babbie (2014:40) point out, 
‘theory and observation go together in science, but sometimes theory precedes 
observation, and other times observation comes before theory’.  As such, the 
rationale for the development, testing and application of the new model is akin to 
grounded theory, where the discovery of theory is through the analysis of data 
(Grounded Theory Institute 2011; Maxfield & Babbie 2014).  In this thesis, 
however, while the theory has already been discovered (i.e. complexity), how to 
apply this theory using criminological frames of reference has not.  Rather than 
begin with the development of the new model in isolation, data will be collected, 
sorted, analysed and interpreted simultaneously using the case study method in 
developing the new model.  Accordingly, the development and refinement of the 
new model will be ‘grounded’ in data.  The rationale being the combined challenge 
of how to collect and sort organised crime and terrorism data in a workable format 
to apply complexity to, then how to analyse and interpret the data, in a complexity 
informed way, using the proposed design principles.  Similar to traditional 
grounded theory, it is an exploratory approach, in which ‘understanding is itself 
in large part an emergent from the research process and theory’ (Byrne & 
Callaghan 2014:199).   
4.5.1 Case study rationale 
According to Yin (1984:23), the case study research method is ‘an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when 
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the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in 
which multiple sources of evidence are used’.  Yin (1984:2) further notes that the 
case study method is suitable for ‘studying complex social phenomena’ as it 
‘allows investigators to retain holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life 
events’.  Researchers have often attempted to understand organisations by using 
case study designs.  However, ’these designs are only as good as the theoretical 
model driving the research’ (Anderson et al 2005:670).  It can be argued that 
traditional case study designs ‘have been driven by theoretical models that are not 
congruent with the nature’ of the organisations that we study (Anderson et al 
2005:670).  As pointed out by Hall (2011:179), rich in-depth case studies are able to 
‘embed its subject within the local social, cultural, economic and political context.  
In doing so, it is able to reveal the spatial and temporal contingency of organised 
crime’ and terrorism.  Moreover, Uhl-Bien and Marion (2009:647) encourage 
complexity researchers ‘to explore methodologies that allow us to gather rich, 
dynamic, contextual and longitudinal data’.   Robinson (2014:75) notes that tests of 
complexity should be conducted using ‘longitudinal data that are sensitive to 
trajectories’ and ‘reciprocal relationships and interactive effects’. Robinson 
(2014:75) also notes that a complexity approach is ‘probabilistic’ rather than 
‘deterministic’ as trying to identify all individual factors in the social world is 
impossible.  As Byrne & Callaghan (2014:199-202) puts it, in the social sciences, ‘a 
very carefully constructed history’ is required for complexity framing and the 
‘construction of very careful narratives’ is fundamental.  By studying ‘evidence 
about past and present events we can begin to draw a range of both linear and 
non-linear inferences about future events’ (Leary & Thomas 2011). Young (1992) 
also observes, ‘all social occasions are interactively rich beyond the capacity of the 
fastest computer, the largest data base, the most extensive library to record and 
retrieve’.  And within a single case study, ‘we can look at large numbers of 
intervening variables’ (George & Bennett 2005:21).  As suggested by Hobbs and 
Antonopoulos (2014:102), perhaps ‘historical/archival studies offer the [best] 
opportunity to analyse with the benefit of hindsight and with minimal personal 
risk’ in researching criminal organisations.   
Based on the literature, in this thesis, the case study method offers an approach 
that: 
i) is suitable for studying complex social phenomena based on real-life 
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events;  
ii) complements the development of a new model congruent with the nature 
of the phenomena under study;  
iii) allows the subject to be studied within context, including social, cultural, 
economic and political; and  
iv) provides the opportunity to perform an in-depth analysis of a large 
number of variables that are rich, dynamic and contextual in nature.  
Moreover, in the selected case study, as will be discussed next, while the 
availability of longitudinal data is limited, long-term historical data that is rich, 
dynamic and contextual in nature, and also sensitive to trajectories, is available.  
4.5.2 Case study selection 
Based on the literature review, there are few publicly available organised crime 
and/or terrorism case studies with an appropriate and suitable level of detail for 
the purposes of this research.  In general, for any particular organised crime 
and/or terrorist group, open source information is a high-level summary of the 
group and its activities with a significant lack of detail.  Where details are 
provided, it is usually with a focus on only one or two parts of the group or its 
activities, with limited information on any overlap or interconnections between 
organised crime and terrorism.  Moreover, research papers, such as those issued 
by the Australian Institute of Criminology under the topic ‘organised and 
transnational crime’, tend to be topical and thematic papers such as people 
trafficking or drugs trafficking rather than research on a particular group itself 
(Australian Institute of Criminology 2016).  The lack of detail is not surprising, 
given the covert and clandestine nature of these groups.  The media is also a source 
of information, however, the degree of reliability is questionable.  As Allum and 
Gilmour (2011:10) observe, ‘often, there exists very little data which could help 
form the basis of an in-depth analysis’ of a criminal group.  Moreover, ‘we must 
not forget that getting primary data is difficult and dangerous’ (Allum & Gilmour 
2011:10). Notwithstanding, there is a plethora of open source information on 
infamous organised crime and/or terrorist individuals and groups that have 
gained public notoriety over the years.  Examples of case studies considered, 
include specific groups and individuals within the infamous Italian Mafia, the 
Russian Mafia, the Japanese Yakuza, the Chinese Triads, the Mexican Cartels and 
Colombian Cartels. Moreover, two case studies, rather than one case study, was 
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also considered, with the second focussing on terrorism, such as Al-Qaeda and 
more recently ISIS. However, as carefully constructed histories and narratives is 
fundamental to complexity framing, as highlighted by George and Bennett (2005), 
within a single in-depth case study, a larger number of intervening variables may 
be studied.  As such, in this thesis, a single in-depth case study lends itself well to 
the development of a new model.   
Accordingly, the selected case study concerns a single in-depth study of one of the 
most infamous criminals in history – Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria (‘Escobar’) and 
the Colombian Medellín Cartel – and is selected over others for three reasons:  
i) the depth and breadth of open source information, including a recent 
resurgence of interest in the case, including primary and secondary source 
information in English, without the need for translation;  
ii) the historical nature of the case to leverage archival research and the 
opportunity to analyse with the benefit of hindsight; and 
iii) more importantly, the involvement of both organised crime and terrorism 
activities, involving the crime-terror nexus, and the formation of a number 
of allegiances and alliances central to the case study, including the terrorist 
group, Los Extraditables (The Extraditables).  
4.5.3 Case study design 
In this thesis, the concepts of construct validity, reliability and external validity are 
specifically considered in the light of the case study method. As Yin (1984) points 
out, a properly designed case study seeks to ensure construct validity, reliability 
and external validity.  According to Yin (1984), in case studies, construct validity 
is when the measure being utilised is appropriate for the concept being studied.  
To improve the construct validity, an attempt will be made to corroborate each 
piece of data collected with two other pieces of data to increase accuracy and 
reduce bias.  Furthermore, reliability in case studies refers to the ability of the study 
to be replicated with consistent results (Yin 1984).  Reliability can be improved by 
ensuring all procedures are carefully documented and by maintaining a complete 
and accurate record of all materials collected (Yin 1984).  To increase the reliability 
of this study, all procedures will be carefully documented and a complete and 
accurate record of all materials collected and analysed will be created.  Lastly, in  
case study design, external validity refers to the ability to generalise a study’s 
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findings to a larger population (Yin 1984).  External validity will be secured 
through ensuring the case study design supports the generalisation of the new 
model, both specifically to the study of organised crime, terrorism, and the crime-
terror nexus, and to criminological problems more generally.   
In the case study method, it is not practical to include everything, so boundaries 
must be set.  Boundaries define not only what is included and excluded, but also 
which issues are more central and which are marginal (Bammer 2013).  Due to the 
history and volume of information available for the selected case study, 
boundaries will be carefully constructed, placed and clearly documented, 
including a chronology of key events considered during the period.  As noted 
above, as complexity insights can be gleaned by studying behaviour at and across 
the case study boundary as well as within, the collection of source material will 
take this into account, i.e. source data will also be considered at and across the 
boundaries set.  It is important to note, however, that no attempt will be made to 
comprehensively and exhaustively cover and analyse all past and current events 
surrounding the case.  As complexity studies change in a complex system, the 
selected case study will be framed within a definitive time period, and also within 
key contextual variables, just before and during the case study period, comprising 
specific events and/or conditions, including historical, geographical, social, 
economic, political and media settings.  As will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, 
the complex system under study will be the Medellín Cartel and as the creator and 
ultimate boss of the Medellín Cartel, will be framed by Escobar’s life and the 
operational period of the Medellín Cartel.   
Cilliers (2000:28) suggests that because complex systems are open, it is difficult to 
determine boundaries and limits.  However, Cilliers (2000:28) clarifies that ‘this 
does not imply that there is no point in developing formal models of complex 
systems’, as we can still ‘develop models on the basis of certain assumptions and 
limitations, just as with any scientific model’.  After all, ‘complex systems have 
structure’ (Cilliers 2000:28).  Moreover, in developing the new model, 
consideration will also be placed on saturation points, at both a conceptual and 
descriptive level of qualitative data (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Maxfield & Babbie 
2014).  Specifically, in this thesis, an attempt will be made to ensure that each of 
the analytical categories and descriptive levels of data in the design of the new 
model are sufficiently dense to offer the most explanatory power and that new 
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data is not being uncovered to generate new leads (Glaser & Strauss 1967; Maxfield 
& Babbie 2014).  Ultimately, when using source data, this thesis will aim to 
critically assess the source material through the eyes of the writer when discerning 
the facts of an event, especially where family or associates of Escobar are 
concerned.  For example, when considering the facts of a specific terrorist incident, 
from the point of view of Escobar’s family, certain facts may become blurred in an 
attempt to weaken or soften the incident.  Conversely, from the point of view of 
the US or Colombian governments, certain facts may become embellished in an 
attempt to strengthen or toughen the incident.   
4.6 Source data 
A fundamental aspect of complexity is that it provides a holistic view, including 
points of view by ‘others’, and locates the subject of study within context.   
Moreover, by reshaping new and existing data using complexity informed 
thinking, this thesis aims to change the way we think about complex phenomena. 
In doing so, it aims to provide fresh and novel insights into the phenomena under 
study.  In other words, it is less about the data and more to do with how we see 
and interpret the data, from a variety of perspectives, through a complexity lens.  
Accordingly, while primary sources are used in this thesis, secondary sources are 
also used due to the i) difficulty and danger of obtaining information directly from 
former members of the Medellín Cartel and/or former associates and/or family 
members of Escobar; and ii) difficulties in gaining access and/or timely access to 
former/retired US and/or Colombian government and/or law enforcement 
officials from the time of the case study.  Furthermore, by accessing secondary 
sources, it allows the case study to benefit from a wide range of rich in-depth 
source material, with minimal personal risk or access barriers.  As will be 
described in the next chapter, in this thesis, ‘data’ primarily comprises ‘narrative’ 
accounts from a variety of perspectives, together with other information, such as 
demographic statistics. 
4.6.1 Primary sources 
Primary source information relevant to Escobar and the Medellín Cartel was 
identified and retrieved from archival research, government reports and 
presidential speeches.  
  
	 99	
Archival research  
Archival research based on original documents held by the US National Security 
Archive based at George Washington University proved to be a key and valuable 
source of information.  This archive includes declassified US government 
documents and is accessible online (US National Security Archive 2016).  Of 
particular note, is a lawsuit under the US Freedom of Information Act to declassify 
a collection of documents relevant to Escobar and the Medellín Cartel;  this lawsuit  
was ultimately successful and a range of documents were declassified and released 
to the archive in 2008 (US National Security Archive 2008).  As summarised in 
Table 4.1 below, based on key word searches, a total of 315 documents were 
identified and retrieved from the archive for examination.  It should be noted that 
the online search function only provides a simple word match; however, this did 
not impede the research based on the relatively small number of documents 
located, i.e. hundreds, not thousands.   
Table	4.1:		Summary	of	key	word	searches	in	archival	research	of	primary	sources			
	 Key	search	terms	(and	variations	thereof)	 No.	of	documents	
1.	 Pablo	Escobar	 110	
2.	 Medellín	Cartel	 60	
3.	 Cali	Cartel	 35	
4.	 Los	Pepes	 33	
5.	 Sicarios		 20	
6.	 Castaño	brothers	 17	
7.	 Jose	Gacha	Rodriguez	 17	
8.	 Ochoa	brothers	(Juan,	Jorge	&	Fabio)	 15	
9.	 Los	Extraditables		 5	
10.	 Death	to	kidnappers	(MAS)	 3	
	 Total	 315	
	
Source:	Author’s	summary	of	key	word	searches		
 
On review of these documents, while most were duplicates containing more than 
one search term, each document was reviewed to ensure it was not a new source.  
It was found that the majority of documents were released in 2008 as a result of 
the law suit and mostly dated between the period 1990 to 1994.  As will be seen in 
Chapters 6 and 7, this time period is not surprising given the period is towards the 
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end of the demise of Escobar and the Medellín Cartel.  As such, this was a period 
of escalated violence in Colombia, where the Colombian government, supported 
by the US, increased its activities to ultimately bring down Escobar and the 
Medellín Cartel.  On review of the 315 documents, nine documents (as detailed in 
Appendix 1) were selected to form part of the case study source data set as 
discussed in subsequent chapters.  These documents include declassified 
intelligence reports and assessments from various US agencies, including the US 
Central Intelligence Agency (‘CIA’) and the DEA, together with declassified cables 
between the US Embassy in Bogota to the US Secretary of State in Washington.   
Other sources 
Other primary source information, as also detailed in Appendix 1, was identified 
and collected from open sources containing unclassified government reports and 
transcripts of public presidential speeches.  
4.6.2 Secondary sources 
Secondary source information was primarily identified and collected from first-
hand personal accounts by a selection of actors from existing interviews and/or 
documentaries, together with accounts provided by investigative journalists. 
Moreover, investigative journalist accounts often included analysis of restricted 
access and/or classified information; for example, c. 350 interviews were 
conducted by Strong (1995) in his book Whitewash: Pablo Escobar and the Cocaine 
Wars and more than a thousand pages of classified cables from the US embassy in 
Bogota to Washington, court records and police files were analysed by Bowden 
(2002) in his book Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw.  As 
summarised in Table 4.2 below, based on detail contained in Appendix 1, sources 
comprised contemporary accounts from open source transcripts and/or video 
recordings of interviews given at the time, together with information contained in 
documentaries, books, journal papers, scholarly databases and media articles. 
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Table	4.2:		Summary	of	secondary	sources			
	 Source	 No.	of	
documents	
1.	 Interviews:	First-hand	accounts	(most	with	transcript)	 8	
2.	 Documentaries:	Televised	first-hand	accounts	(most	with	transcript)	 7	
3.	 Books:	First-hand	accounts	and/or	autobiographies		 8	
4.	 Books:	Investigative	journalists	based	on	extensive	research	and	accounts	 6	
5.	 Books:	Scholars	with	expertise	in	the	drug	trade	and/or	Colombia	 5	
6.	 Scholarly	databases	 5	
7.	 Media	articles,	mostly	containing	interview	extracts	 7	
	 Total	 46	
	
Source:	Author’s	summary	of	research	as	detailed	in	Appendix	1		
	
 
4.6.3 Spanish  
It is important to note Spanish in this thesis.  Where Spanish to English translations 
are relied upon, the source of the translation will be provided.  Furthermore, 
Spanish words used directly in the text of this thesis, will also be translated to 
English when first used, with the translation placed in parenthesis.  Where Spanish 
words are subsequently retained and used in the text due to their nuanced 
meaning, these words will also be included in the Spanish to English translation 
table at the beginning of this thesis.   
In Spanish name conventions, an individual usually has four names: a first and 
second name (similar to English) followed by two surnames – the first being the 
father’s and the second being the mother’s.  In Spanish, common practice is to use 
the first name and father’s surname only, with the full name being used in legal 
documents.  For example, Escobar’s full name is Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria.  In 
this thesis, the full name of an individual will be used when first introduced, and 
thereafter by just their father’s surname, for example, Escobar.  Where an 
individual shares the same surname as another individual, either their first name 
and father’s surname will be used or alternatively just their mother’s surname.  
Members of Escobar’s family with the same surname will be referred to by their 
relationship with Escobar and their first name, for example, Roberto, Escobar’s 
brother.   
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4.7        Limitations 
In data collection, limitations in triangulation techniques to improve accuracy and 
reduce bias are acknowledged given the limited use of this technique in this thesis.  
As von Lampe (2016:53) points out, ‘while the combination of different data 
sources promises a more complete and more accurate picture, it is not always easy 
to triangulate evidence’.  Furthermore, limitations in accessing primary source 
data due to personal risk and access barriers are also acknowledged, together with 
inherent limitations in using secondary sources, including filtered analysis of 
primary sources in investigative journalist accounts.   As Kenney (2007:17) points 
out,  the significant effort required to acquire organised crime and terrorism data, 
‘let alone analyse valid and reliable data’ is challenging.  In considering the 
limitations in the conceptual design using metaphors rather than mathematics, 
Byrne and Callaghan (2014:6) argue, ‘metaphors are what we live by’.  They further 
quote two mathematicians who propose ‘mathematical descriptions of nature are 
not fundamental truths about the world, but models’ (Cohen & Stewart 1995:410).  
They further note that ‘there are good models and bad models and indifferent 
models, and what model you use depends on the purposes for which you use it 
and the range of phenomena which you want to understand’ (Cohen & Stewart 
1995:410).  To this, Byrne and Callaghan (2014:6) argue that ‘a model is a metaphor’ 
and ‘any description of reality is metaphorical’.  According to Cilliers (2000:30), a 
limitation in modelling the social world is that it ‘will never be sufficient’, 
however, it does not mean it ‘is unnecessary’, as it will provide ‘vital information’, 
just not ‘all the information’.  Moreover, ‘as far as complex systems are concerned, 
our knowledge will always be contextually and historically framed’ and hence 
there will always be inherent limitations (Cilliers 2002:78).  As Leary and Thomas 
(2011:68) point out, although the world is a complex non-linear place, given static 
and deterministic values, linear systems still play an important role.  Essentially, 
‘neither complex nor linear systems provide the answer and neither should be 
treated as exclusive’ – we need both (Leary & Thomas 2011:68).  In summary, 
despite the acknowledged limitations, the potential and intrinsic value of the new 
research methodology and model is considered to be of value to both scholars and 
practitioners alike. 
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PART 3:  NEW MODEL & APPLICATION 
Chapter 5:  New complexity model 
 
‘Logic will get you from A to B.  Imagination will take you everywhere’  
Albert Einstein, physicist (1879-1955) 
 
Chapter 5 contains the design of the new complexity model to apply complexity 
in a criminological context and to the study of organised crime, terrorism and the 
crime-terror nexus.  It draws upon the literature review in Chapters 2 and 3 using 
the approach described in Chapter 4.     
 
 
5.1        Model overview  
As explained in Chapter 3, complexity aims to improve our understanding of a 
complex phenomenon, where the unit of study is a complex system.  As also 
described in Chapter 4, the new complexity model is ontological and conceptual 
in design and includes three design principles: i) theory-driven; ii) analytical tool; 
and iii) visualisation.  The new model also adopts a rack-focus approach.  As 
discussed in Chapter 3, a rack-focus approach allows the same phenomena to be 
considered at the same time from different focal lengths (Coda & Lawton 2016).  
While the reality has not changed, one image can come into focus while another 
moves out of focus allowing a shift in attention.  Adopting this approach, the new 
model comprises two distinct yet complementary components: one at the macro-
level and one at the micro-level.   
5.1.1 Macro-level: System dynamics  
The macro-level component studies the dynamics of a complex system and is 
called ‘system dynamics’.  As explained in Chapter 3, at a macro-level, applying 
complexity to criminological problems may be described as a theory of the varying 
degrees of interconnectedness of the whole ‘eco-system’ in which crime occurs, 
rather than the differences between those who commit crime and those who do 
not commit crime at any given point in time (Young 1991).  Moreover, in 
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complexity informed thinking, one should focus one’s attention on the varying 
degrees of interconnectedness of the system under study and the changing 
interactions and correlations.  In criminology, this component may help to better 
understand and identify the nature and strength of the system under study, 
including why and how the system evolved or evolves, together with co-evolution 
of surrounding complex systems.  In turn, this may help to better determine the 
drivers and vulnerabilities in the system and identify or design better strategies 
and measures impacting the outcomes or desired outcomes of the system under 
study.   
As explained in Chapter 4, a criminal group, such as an organised crime group 
and/or terrorist group may be described as a complex system.  A criminal group 
comprises a number of interacting, self-organising, dynamic and emergent 
properties, including individuals, and also interacts with other groups, 
individuals and its environment, all of which are mutually influencing.  As such, 
this component may help to better understand and identify the nature and 
strength of the criminal group and its members as a whole, including why and 
how the criminal group evolved or evolves, together with co-evolution of 
surrounding complex systems, such as allegiances and alliances.  In turn, this may 
help to better determine the drivers and vulnerabilities of the criminal group, and 
identify or design better strategies and measures impacting the outcomes or 
desired outcomes of the criminal group, such as disruption.  
5.1.2 Micro-level: Actor behaviour  
Shifting our attention to the micro-level, this component studies the behaviours of 
actors in a system and is called ‘actor behaviour’.  At a micro-level, applying 
complexity to criminological problems may help to provide insights about past 
and present behaviour, and foresight about future behaviour.  As noted in Chapter 
3, as human beings, we are also complex systems.  Understanding what guides the 
attitudes and behaviours of actors can also make inferences about the system as a 
whole and its self-organising and emergent behaviour. Moreover, paying attention 
to behaviours provides some sense of predictability associated with the actors in 
the system.  Depending on the context of the actors and system under study, 
strategies and measures may be identified or designed that changed or change 
desired outcomes of the behaviours of actors within a system.  In a criminal group, 
this component may help to better understand and identify actor behaviour, 
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including drivers and vulnerabilities, and the impact on the system itself.  In turn, 
this may help to identify or design better strategies and measures that achieved or 
achieve specific outcomes of the criminal group, such as disruption and removal 
of key actors.  
5.1.3 Set of four steps  
To operationalise the new model, a set of four steps has been developed using the 
case study method and are applicable at both levels.  As described in Chapter 4, 
the case study must be framed within a definitive time period, together with 
contextual variables comprising specific events and/or conditions.  In the 
following sections, each of the four steps is described in turn, together with 
illustrative examples, followed by a summary of the overall new complexity 
model. 
5.2        Step 1: Data sets    
Step one of the new model is to generate three data sets for the complex system 
under study: i) source data set; ii) actor data set; and iii) complex data set.  To 
begin, an overview of step one is provided, followed by illustrative examples of 
each of the three data sets in turn, together with explanations of the criminological 
and complexity concepts used in generating the data sets.  Of note, given the 
nature of the micro and macro-level components, the micro-level data sets are 
essentially a subset of the macro-level data sets, but at a more detailed scale of the 
individual actors involved. 
5.2.1 Overview  
In short, a source data set is first generated for the complex system under study 
using criminological frames of reference.  Next, an actor data set is identified and 
generated from the source data set, to help understand the variety of perspectives 
of the complex system under study.  Finally, a complex data set is generated from 
the source and actor data sets, using a complexity concept called ‘fractal fragments’ 
and complexity prompts.  Fractal fragments, wherever possible, are selected from 
a variety of perspectives based on the actor data set and will be used in steps three 
and four to inform the case study analysis.  
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5.2.2 Source data set    
Within a defined time period and contextual variables, a source data set is first 
generated for the complex system under study using criminological frames of 
reference.  In this thesis, the complex system under study is a criminal group.  As 
depicted in Figure 5.1 below, the source data set of a criminal group may be 
determined by reference to Levi’s (2007) six procedural steps and von Lampe’s 
(2003) three core elements of a criminal group as described in Chapter 2.  
As complex systems are dynamic, Levi’s (2007) procedural steps are important to 
generate a source data set over time, as these steps are repeated over time, but not 
necessarily in the same order as the criminal group evolves.  For example, at a 
point in time, a group may have enough equipment or transportation, but not 
enough people.  Moreover, each of von Lampe’s (2003) core elements may play a 
role in Levi’s (2007) six procedural steps.   
Figure	5.1:		Source	data	set	of	a	criminal	group 
	 	 Core	elements	of	a	criminal	group																			
(von	Lampe	2003)	
	 Procedural	steps	of	a	criminal	group	
(Levi	2007)	 1.	Actors	 2.	Activities	 3.	Structures	
1.	 Obtain	finance	for	crime																					 																									
	
	
Source	data	set		
of	a	criminal	group	
	
2.	 Find	people	willing	&	
technically/socially	competent	
3.	 Obtain	equipment	&	transportation	
4.	 Convert	crime	product	into	money	&	
useable	assets	
5.	 Find	people	&	places	to	transmit,	store	
&	conceal	proceeds	
6.	 Neutralise	law	enforcement	by	
technical	skill,	corruption	&	legal	action	
	
	
Source:	Author’s	synthesis	based	on	Levi	(2007)	and	von	Lampe	(2003)		
 
Taking the first procedural step, ‘to obtain finance for crime’, you will need actors 
to obtain the finance and you may need a criminal activity, such as car theft or 
kidnapping, to obtain the initial finance.  Furthermore, these initial steps may 
depend on existing structures and relationships in place within a defined time 
period and contextual variables in how the group operates.  For example, in the 
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locality of an intended car theft, the media may be running focus stories on recent 
car thefts, which in turn may provide the general public living in the area a 
heightened sense of awareness to secure their vehicles and/or report any 
suspicions.  Another example is the government’s implementation of a new 
neighbourhood watch scheme or surveillance cameras in the area.  All these factors 
may impact the operations of a criminal group.  Based on Levi’s (2007) procedures 
and von Lampe’s (2003) core elements, it is reasonable that a source data set of a 
criminal group may be generated using these elements as a component guide.   
As explained in Chapter 4, in this thesis, ‘data’ primarily comprises ‘narrative’ 
accounts, from both primary and secondary sources.  Using Levi’s (2007) 
procedures and von Lampe’s (2003) core elements as a component guide, based on 
this thesis’s case study, Appendix 1 provides a worked example of the sources 
generating the source data set of a criminal group (i.e. Medellín Cartel).  Based on 
criminological study more generally, a source data set is illustrated in Figure 5.2 
below. 
Figure	5.2:		Source	data	set	illustrative	example			
	 Criminological	frames	of	reference	
Criminological	frames			
of	reference	
	
	
Source	data	set		
using	primary	and	secondary	sources	‘narrative’	accounts	
	
	
Source:	Author’s	illustration		
 
5.2.3 Actor data set    
Next, an actor data set is identified and generated from the source data set, to help 
understand the variety of perspectives of the complex system under study.  An 
actor data set comprises groups of actors with types of actors in each group.  As 
illustrated in Table 5.1 below, an actor set may include a group of actors called 
‘state authorities’.  In this actor group, types of actors may include the government, 
politicians, law enforcement, the military, the judiciary and other state agencies.   
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Table	5.1:		Actor	group	within	an	actor	data	set	illustrative	example			
	 Actor	group:	state	authorities	
1.	 Actor	type	1:	Government		
2.	 Actor	type	2:	Politicians	
3.	 Actor	type	3:	Law	enforcement		
4.	 Actor	type	4:	Military		
5.	 Actor	type	5:	The	Judiciary	
6.	 Actor	type	6:	Other	state	agencies	
	
Source:	Author’s	illustration	
	
Based on this thesis’s case study, Appendix 2 provides a worked example of the 
actor data set at both the macro-level of a criminal group (i.e. Medellín Cartel) and 
at the micro-level of a key actor (i.e. Escobar). 	
5.2.4 Complex data set    
A complex data set is finally generated from the source data set and actor data set, 
using a complexity concept called ‘fractal fragments’ and complexity prompts.  
Fractal fragments, wherever possible, are selected from a variety of perspectives 
using the actor data set and in the words of the actors themselves; for example, 
from primary source documents and secondary source interview and 
documentary transcripts.  A fractal fragment is explained next, followed by 
complexity prompts, together with an illustrative example of a complex data set.  
Fractal Fragments 
As described in Chapter 3, the concept of a fractal is both mathematical and 
conceptual in nature.  It may be defined as a fraction of a dimension which exhibits 
self-similarity and is useful for identifying patterns and structures that are easy to 
see at one scale, but not at another;  for example micro and macro-levels, or in one 
portion of a study, but not in another.  In nature, for example, fractals may be seen 
in a snowflake or fern.  In Kuhn’s (2009) work, a concept called ‘fractal fragment’ 
is introduced in applying complexity in organisational studies.  Kuhn (2009) 
defines a fractal fragment as short stories or narrative accounts compiled from 
documents or through interviews with individuals about their experiences.  
Essentially, Kuhn (2009:87) argues that ‘through taking a fractal approach, we can 
study and make sense of small portions of the organisation without artificially 
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simplifying these’.  As Kuhn (2009:14) puts it, ‘examining one fractal component 
at one scale enables you to thereby manage what would otherwise be 
overwhelming detail’.  In other words, fractal fragments allow you to better 
manage large amounts of data, as they may contain information at all levels of the 
complex system under study, from the local to the global.  In turn, this allows the 
generalisation of the study of one fractal fragment about the complex system as a 
whole, or sectors across it, from which the fractal fragment is derived.  In this thesis 
for example, feelings and attitudes of individuals within a criminal group will be 
replicated throughout the group.  Equally, in the study of an individual actor 
within the criminal group, fractal fragments of self-similarity over the life and 
history of the individual, may allow the generalisation of certain events, feelings 
and attitudes in the group itself. Beyond the group, similarities may exist in similar 
industries or in this case, organised crime and terrorism. Fractal fragments also 
differentiate between the life experiences of individuals of a particular event, 
compared with the cold hard facts of the event.  To better explain the use of fractal 
fragments, Figure 5.3 below provides an illustrative example.	
Figure	5.3:		Fractal	fragments	illustrative	example	
	 Short	narratives:	descriptions,	stories	or	accounts	
text	text	text	text	text	text	text	text	
text	text	text	text	text	text	text	text	
	
Source:		Author’s	illustration	based	on	Kuhn’s	(2009)	fractal	fragment	
 
Essentially, fractal fragments may also be described as a ‘postmodern technique’, 
where the method of analysis is centred ‘on the nature and dynamics of language’ 
(White et al 2012:250).  
Complexity prompts   
Building on this technique and drawing on complexity literature, including the 
work of Wolf-Branigin (2013), to better enable a complexity mind-set, a set of 
complexity prompts is offered for use in criminology as summarised in Table 5.2 
below. 	 	
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Table	5.2:		Set	of	complexity	prompts	for	use	in	criminology		
	 Complexity	concept	 Prompt	for	social	(including	criminological)	
phenomena	
1.	 Sensitivity	to	initial	
conditions	
One	slight	change	in	a	
variable	can	give	rise	to	a	
significantly	different	
outcome.	
Prompt:	a	slight	change	has	resulted	in	a	significantly	
different	outcome.	
Interpretation:	this	may	provide	insights	into	how	to	
detect	and	either	encourage	or	prevent	these	changes	
depending	on	the	nature	of	the	system,	outcomes	and	
policy	implications.			It	is	also	useful	for	discerning	the	
background	of	actors.		
2.	 Bifurcation	
Considered	metaphorically	as	
a	choice	of	two	paths	or	a	
fork	in	the	evolution	of	a	
system.		
	
Prompt:	choices	have	been	made	that	has	resulted	in	
different	outcomes.		
Interpretation:	identification	of	such	points	may	lead	to	
insights	into	the	development	of	a	system	and	where	
critical	parameters	bifurcate.	In	turn,	this	may	provide	
useful	information	into	changes	or	parameter	settings	
in	a	system	to	influence	outcomes	and	policy	
implications.		
3.	 Attractors	
An	attractor	is	like	a	magnet	
influencing	and	shaping	actor	
behaviour.		
Prompt:	actors	exhibit	patterned	and	structured	
behaviour.		
Interpretation:	identification	of	such	patterns	and	
structures	may	lead	to	insights	into	the	nature,	
vulnerabilities	and	drivers	of	actor	behaviour.		
4.	 Fractals	
A	fraction	of	a	dimension	
which	exhibits	self-similarity.	
Prompt:	self-similarity	exists	in	the	data	set.		
Interpretation:	useful	for	identifying	patterns	and	
structures	in	the	data	set	that	are	easy	to	see	at	one	
scale,	but	not	at	another;	for	example	micro	and	macro-
levels,	or	in	one	portion	of	a	study,	but	not	in	another.	
5.	 Interconnectivity	
Measure	of	the	degree,	state	
or	quality	of	the	
interconnection	in	a	system.		
	
Prompt:	actors	interact	to	accomplish	a	shared	need	
such	as	a	task,	goal,	objective	or	vision.		
Interpretation:	identification	of	the	drivers	and	
conditions	that	promote	actors	to	interact	may	provide	
insights	on	what	enriches	these	interactions	and	thus	
information	on	how	to	change	these	depending	on	the	
system	under	study	and	desired	outcomes.	
6.	 Feedback	
Repetition	or	iteration,	that	
can	be	direct	or	indirect,	and	
positive	(enhancing,	
stimulating)	or	negative	
(detracting,	inhibiting).		
Prompt:	identified	feedback	loops	either	amplify	or	
constrain	criminal	behaviour.	
Interpretation:	this	may	provide	useful	insights	into	
where	and	how	to	break	the	cycles	and	provide	the	
basis	for	new	ways	of	thinking	about	policy	in	these	
areas.		It	also	helps	to	delineate	how	information	flows	
and	decisions	are	made.	
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	 Complexity	concept	 Prompt	for	social	(including	criminological)	
phenomena	
7.	 Self-organisation	
A	system	spontaneously	self-
organises	from	a	disordered	
to	an	ordered	and	much	
stronger	system,	to	cope	with	
changes	in	the	environment.	
Prompt:	organised	tendencies	occur	to	cope	with	
change.	
Interpretation:	this	may	provide	useful	insights	into	
how	to	prevent	or	encourage	a	stronger	system	
evolving	through	earlier	action	or	intervention.		
8.	 Dissipation	
Structures	that	form	
momentarily	and	appear	
stable,	but	are	quick	to	
dissipate	at	the	slightest	
perturbation.		
Prompt:	structures	in	the	data	quickly	collapse.		
Interpretation:	this	may	provide	useful	insights	into	
why	and	how	these	structures	dissipate,	together	with	
lessons	learned	from	such	phenomenon.	
9.	 Emergence	
The	whole	is	greater	than	the	
sum	of	its	parts.	
Prompt:	new	outcomes	emerge	in	the	data,	including	
unexpected	events,	innovation	and	learning.	
Interpretation:	this	may	provide	useful	insights	into	
how	and	why	a	system	evolves	and	the	outcomes	of	
certain	phenomenon.	
10.	 Co-evolution	
The	outcome	when	two	or	
more	complex	systems	
reciprocally	affect	each	
other’s	evolution.	
Prompt:	more	than	one	system	is	apparent	in	the	data.		
Interpretation:	this	may	be	useful	for	identifying	
dependencies	on	how	a	system	evolves	and	operates	
including	boundaries	at	a	nexus	point.		Co-evolution	
may	also	help	to	determine	allegiances	and	alliance	
formation.		
	
Source:	Author’s	prompts	based	on	complexity	literature			
 
As seen in Table 5.2 above, the complexity prompts aim to assist the criminologist, 
in a complexity informed criminology, in the consideration and interpretation of 
data. 
Complex data set  
Drawing on the complexity concepts of fractal fragments and complexity prompts, 
a complex data set is finally generated from the source and actor data sets.  An 
illustrative example of a complex data set is depicted in Figure 5.4 below.  In this 
example, fractal fragments are generated from the source data set based on an 
actor data set comprising five groups of actors labelled A to E.  
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Figure	5.4:		Complex	data	set	illustrative	example			
	 Criminological	frames	of	reference	
Criminological	frames			
of	reference	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Source:	Author’s	illustration		
 
Based on this thesis’s case study, Appendix 3 provides a worked example of the 
composition of a complex data set (i.e. Escobar and the Medellín Cartel) by fractal 
fragments and types of actors.  In identifying, extracting and storing fractal 
fragments by actor type from the source data set, several methods may be used 
depending on the format of the source material.  For example, if the format is 
electronic, extracts may be copied into the data store (e.g. a database or a simple 
file) under relevant analytical categories for the case study selected.  Alternatively, 
where the format is not electronic, such as a hard copy book or journal, extracts 
may be either scanned in or typed in manually into the data store.  As will be seen 
in Chapters 6 and 7, in this thesis, for clarity and ease of reference to inform the 
case study analysis, the fractal fragments will also be placed directly in the body 
of the text, indented and sequentially numbered, under relevant analytical 
headings.  
5.3        Step 2: Contextual variables  
Step two of the new model is to identify and analyse contextual variables from the 
data sets generated in step one, using complexity prompts.  A fundamental aspect 
of complexity is that it provides a holistic view and locates the subject of study 
within its contextual setting comprising specific events and/or conditions.  As 
Thoumi (2003:76) points out, ‘the evolutionary processes that generate an 
environment where crime can thrive take time to develop.  Conversely, reversing 
those processes is also likely to require time’.   In the new complexity model, six 
distinct categories of contextual variables are offered for use in criminology as 
summarised in Table 5.3 below.  Of note, von Lampe’s (2003) environmental 
factors, impacting a criminal group, of society (including the economy), the 
government and the media are all considered within these new categories.   
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Table	5.3:		Set	of	contextual	variables	for	use	in	criminology		
	 Variable	 Description	
1.	 Historical	 Specific	events	and/or	conditions	of	influence	at	a	given	time	and/or	
place	in	history.	
2.	 Geographical	 The	landscape	and	terrain	of	the	geographical	localities	and	countries	
involved.		
3.	 Society	 Society	and	culture.			
4.		 Economy		 The	impact	of	the	economy.		
5.	 Political	 Political	consideration,	including	the	government	and	state	actors,	such	
as	law	enforcement,	the	military,	the	judiciary	and	legislation.	
6.	 Media	 All	forms	of	media,	including	social	media,	both	local	and	global.		
	
	
Source:	Author’s	contextual	variables		
 
Furthermore, key historical factors impacting the context of ‘a time and place’, 
including specific events and/or conditions of influence and geographical factors 
are also considered.  As Hall (2011) points out in scholarly work, specifically in the 
study of organised crime, the geography of organised crime is largely overlooked.  
Moreover, since both organised crime and terrorist groups seek similar operational 
environments, geographical factors often play a key role in the formation of 
allegiances and alliances between these groups (Joint Forces Staff College 2015).   
Similar to step one, given the nature of the micro and macro-level components, the 
micro-level contextual variables are essentially a subset of the macro-level 
contextual variables, but at a more detailed scale of the individual actors involved. 
5.4        Step 3: Complexity tool – fitness landscape  
Step three of the new model applies a complexity tool to organise, shape and 
structure the information, together with criminological frames of reference and 
complexity prompts.  At the macro-level, the new model uses the complexity tool 
of fitness landscapes and at the micro-level, it uses attractor sets as will be 
discussed later in section 5.5 below. To begin, an overview of step three at the 
macro-level is provided, followed by detailed explanations of the concepts used, 
together with the new analytical tool and visual imagery using illustrative 
examples.   
  
	 114	
5.4.1 Overview   
In summary, from the analysis of the data sets and contextual variables generated 
in steps one and two, a fitness landscape is generated for the complex system 
under study, using the criminological concept of criminally exploitable ties and 
complexity prompts.  The fitness landscape is populated in three forms:  i) tabular 
and/or infographic; ii) graphic; and iii) visual. 
5.4.2 Fitness landscape    
As described in Chapter 3, complexity is a science of the whole and not of its parts.  
As also described earlier, Kauffman (1993) developed a fitness landscape tool to 
show how a complex system within its environment can be represented visually 
to help understand which of its elements are fitter; where fitness may be measured 
by the degree of interconnectivity.  In a traditional landscape, individual elements 
may sit at different heights on a landscape with peaks and valleys to represent 
fitness probabilities, where height measures the level of fitness (Kauffman 1993).   
In criminology, these elements may be defined as actors and may be an individual 
or group of individuals.  As argued by Gerrits and Marks (2014:1), fitness 
landscapes can aid ‘sense-making’ as they can ‘represent a complex story about 
adaption and fitness in one coherent image’ and help us understand aspects of a 
complex system ‘in an accessible way’.   
To understand how the fitness landscape concept is used in the new model, a recap 
from Chapter 3 on the terms interconnectivity and edge of chaos is first considered.  
For ease of reference and understanding in criminology, the words component, 
element or part, have been replaced with the word actor in recapping these terms 
and other terms used throughout the new model.  Interconnectivity may be 
defined as the state or quality of connected actors in a complex system (Cilliers 
1998).  In other words, it is a measure of the degree of interconnection.  In a 
complex system, actors interact and exchange information through relatively rich 
means creating connections among all actors in a system (Kauffman 1995; Cilliers 
1998).  The interactions do not have to be physical; they can also transfer 
information (Cilliers 1998).  Any actor may influence, and is influenced by another 
actor or actors in the system.  An important point is that each actor is ignorant of 
the system as a whole and only responds to its local interactions (Cilliers 1998).  
Complexity emerges as the result of local rich interconnectivity which give rise to 
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global structures and patterns of the system (Kauffman 1995; Cilliers 1998; Byrne 
& Callaghan 2014).  In organisational studies, interconnectivity is associated with 
the concept of a ‘shared need’ where individuals interact to ‘accomplish a task, 
goal, objective, [or] vision’ (Uhl-Bien & Marion 2009:642).  Simply put, a shared 
need starts with the ‘what’s in it for me question’ (Uhl-Bien & Marion 2009:642).  If 
a shared need ‘is not felt’, then ‘individuals will not be motivated to engage’ (Uhl-
Bien & Marion 2009:642).  Moreover, to promote greater creativity and 
adaptability, one needs to find whatever ‘enriches the interactions’ or relationships 
amongst individuals (Lewin & Regine 1999:203).  The edge of chaos may be 
represented by a midpoint between order (determinism) and disorder 
(randomness), where you have enough structure and patterns in a complex system 
that it is not random, but also enough fluidity and emergent creativity that it’s not 
deterministic – this edge is emergent complexity and is a place where innovation 
occurs (Kauffman 1995; Pycroft 2014).	 In the light of these terms, both Kauffman 
(1995) and Marion (1999) propose that optimal fitness in a system’s fitness 
landscape exists on the edge of chaos where complex systems are moderately 
interconnected with some weak and strongly interconnected actors.  Adapting 
Marion’s (1999) argument from organisational studies, it can be argued that a 
criminal group’s fitness is at the edge of chaos when the criminal group is 
sufficiently rigid to carry information about itself, co-ordinate activity, share 
resource and perform its core tasks adequately, but also sufficiently slack to allow 
it to use its information creatively, to explore new strategies for surviving and to 
change.  It can be further argued that criminal groups that are too slack, ‘cannot 
coordinate and differentiate’, while those that are too rigid are ‘either unstable or 
are frozen’ (Marion 1999:163).  As a consequence, a criminal group can adjust its 
fitness landscape or strength by adjusting its degree of interconnectivity.  
Adjustments may be made by changing the number of linkages or changing the 
nature of interactions among actors (Marion 1999).  Moreover, ‘for complex 
systems to survive, there must be a certain match between what the organisation 
does and how it functions and its wider environment or context’ (Kuhn 2009:40).  
In other words, understanding a complex system’s fitness landscape is critically 
important to how it survives and thrives.  For example, in a criminal group, if one 
of the leaders is injured, the rest of the group will compensate.  The injured leader 
affects all the others and this, in turn, allows the injured leader to recuperate.  So, 
not only is the injured leader influencing the rest of the group, the group’s 
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members’ actions influence the injured leader and each other as well.  It is this very 
knowledge of how a system, in this case a criminal group, can adjust its fitness 
landscape or strength to its environment, by adjusting its degree of 
interconnectivity, that may help to better understand and identify the nature and 
strength of a criminal group and its members as a whole.  In turn, this may help to 
better determine the drivers and vulnerabilities of the criminal group and its 
members and design strategies to disrupt them by varying the degrees of 
interconnectedness of its whole ‘eco-system’.  Strategies may include the targeting 
and removal of strong interconnections (e.g. group leaders), weakening of 
moderate interconnections as these provide a system its core strength (e.g. foreign 
terrorist fighters) and diminishing weak connections by breaking the ties to the 
system (e.g. sympathisers through community education and integration 
initiatives of marginalised populations). 
5.4.3 Criminally exploitable ties    
In criminology, the concept of criminally exploitable ties may be used to ensure a 
more holistic set of actors is considered when populating a fitness landscape of the 
complex system under study.   According to von Lampe (2016:10), as explained in 
Chapter 2, criminally exploitable ties provide a ‘more complete picture’.  Von 
Lampe (2016) offers a continuum of five categories of criminally exploitable ties as 
summarised in Table 5.4 below. Of note, in applying and testing the new model in 
Chapter 6, a new category 6 was identified by the author and is also included.  	
Table	5.4:		Continuum	of	criminally	exploitable	ties	of	a	criminal	group	
	
	 Category		 Status	 Actors	
1.	 Manifest		 Active	 • Actual	co-offenders	and	facilitators		
2.	 Latent		 Dormant	 • Available	co-offenders	and	facilitators	to	be	called	
upon	in	need	
3.	 Potential		 Possible		 • Possible	co-offenders	and	facilitators	based	on	
convergence	settings	and	matching	dispositions		
4.	 Contributory	
(unwitting)	
Active	 • Actual	unwitting	accomplices	who	are	not	aware	of	
the	illegality	of	their	role		
5.	 Contributory	
(passive)	
Passive	 • Passive	influential	bystanders	who	contribute	to	the	
outcome	of	a	criminal	endeavour	by	passively	
standing	by	without	interfering		
6.	 Contributory	
(consumers)	
Active	 • Actual	consumers	and	end-users	of	the	illicit	goods	
and	services		
Source:	Adapted	from	von	Lampe	(2016)	and	extended	by	the	author	
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As von Lampe (2016:123) further explains, an understanding of how these 
exploitable ties are formed underpins the ‘level of resilience of criminal structures’.  
With potential ties, examples of convergence settings include criminal haunts such 
as drinking and gambling clubs, and prisons, where criminals with similar 
dispositions may potentially meet.  Examples of those who passively stand by 
without interfering include those who are sympathetic due to some ‘subcultural 
value system’ or ‘personal allegiance’, to those who find it ‘inconvenient or 
burdensome or risky’ to intervene, and those who do ‘not realise the illegality of 
the activities they observe’ (von Lampe 2016:109).  In particular, in relation to 
terrorism, organised crime and corruption, Holmes (2007:17) argues: 
Unless an attempt is made to understand how and why various criminals 
are sometimes embedded in communities whose members are aware of 
their neighbours’ illegal activities but do not report them to the authorities, 
there will be less progress in combating these three types of behaviour than 
there could and should be. 
Although von Lampe (2016) created the concept of criminally exploitable ties to 
explain organised crime, it may also be adopted to explain terrorism, notably 
sympathetic bystanders of similar ideological, religious or political beliefs.  Other 
forms of crime, such as domestic violence, burglary or drugs may also be analysed 
using this concept to explain enablers or facilitators of criminal conduct, in 
particular individuals that fall into the ‘contributory’ category of other crimes, 
such as passive neighbours or bystanders who do not intervene or alert the police.  
The new category 6 represents an active contributory set of actors that are either 
consumers or end-users of the illicit goods and services offered, and in doing so, 
are themselves enabling or facilitating criminal conduct; for example, drug-users.  
In consideration of the crime-terror nexus, Makarenko’s (2011) crime-terror 
continuum categorised as three planes, could also be mapped to von Lampe’s 
criminally exploitable ties to better understand the actor ties between the two 
groups.  As described in Chapter 2, the three planes are i) operational nexus: where 
one group adopts the tactics of the other or where the functional merging of each 
group in terms of an ad-hoc alliance or integration occurs between the groups; ii) 
evolutionary nexus: where the tactics and motivation of one type of group turns 
into the other, i.e. a terrorist group may evolve into an organised crime group or 
vice-versa; and iii) conceptual nexus: where a hybrid group emerges and 
simultaneously displays ideological and economic motivations by engaging in acts 
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of both terrorism and organised crime.  Based on these descriptions, it appears that 
Makarenko’s operational nexus would appear in categories 1 to 6, the conceptual 
nexus in categories 1 and 2, and the evolutionary nexus in category 1 of Table 5.4 
above.  
5.4.4 Analytical tool    
As explained in Chapter 3, complexity promotes patterned thinking and suggests 
the key to understanding complex systems is contained in the patterns of 
relationships and interactions amongst a system’s actors.   While it is difficult to 
predict the exact state and outcome of a complex system, it is generally possible to 
model its overall behaviour.  As such, complexity lays emphasis not on the disorder 
of the system, but on the order or patterns inherent in the system.  As an analytical 
tool, step three will provide a way to discern such patterns and provide a richer 
understanding and appreciation, as well as indicators, of particular events.   
To begin, the concepts of fitness landscape and criminally exploitable ties are 
synthesised to generate the population of actors present in a fitness landscape of 
any given complex system.  For the avoidance of doubt, this population of actors 
is not the same as the actor data set generated in step one, although they may share 
common actors.  The actor data set in step one is to ensure a variety of perspectives 
are considered in the complex data set of which some will also form criminally 
exploitable ties.  To generate the actor population, the information is categorised 
and structured by actor type and estimated volume, together with a measure of 
the actor’s interconnectivity strength.  In other words, how attached the actors are 
to the system under study as measured by the degree, state or quality of the actor’s 
affinity.  For social phenomena, this may be measured by the degree of a common 
goal and shared needs of the actors.  In a criminal group, for example, their 
common goal may be illicit wealth and their shared needs operational.  For optimal 
fitness, complex systems are moderately interconnected, with some weak and 
strongly interconnected actors.  The resulting information may be populated in 
tabular and/or infographic form.  An illustrative example of an organised crime 
group’s fitness landscape, whose principal activity is car theft, is generated in 
tabular form in Table 5.5 below.   
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Table	5.5:		Tabular	representation	of	a	criminal	group’s	fitness	landscape		
	
Actor	category	 Actor	type	 Number	
actors	
Percentage	
of	total		
Interconnectivity	
band		
1. Manifest	 • Leader	
• Gang	members	
• Lawyer	
• Accountant	
• 1	
• 10	
• 1	
• 1	
• 1%	
• 10%	
• 1%	
• 1%	
• Strong	
• Strong	
• Moderate-strong	
• Moderate	
2. Latent	 • Lawyer	
• Drivers		
• Forgers	
• 1	
• 5	
• 2	
• 1%	
• 5%	
• 2%	
• Moderate	
• Moderate	
• Weak-moderate	
3. Potential	 • Perpetrators	 • 9	 • 9%	 • Weak	
4. Contributory	
(unwitting)	
• Transporters		 • 5	 • 5%	 • Weak	
5. Contributory	
(passive)	
• Neighbours	 • 30	 • 30%	 • Weak	
	
6. Contributory	
(consumers)	
• Buyers	of	stolen	
cars	and	parts	
• 35	 • 35%	 • Weak	
Total		 Population	 							100	 							100.0%	 	
	
Source:	Author’s	illustration		
 
Based on an analysis of Table 5.5 above, in this population of criminally exploitable 
ties, the organised crime group has 11% strong, 1% moderate-strong, 7% moderate, 
2% weak-moderate, and 79% weak interconnections in its fitness landscape.  To 
better discern the shape of the group’s fitness landscape, the information in Table 
5.5 may also be depicted graphically as in Figure 5.5 below, where the x-axis 
represents the interconnectivity strength and the y-axis represents the population 
of actors in a system.   The graphical representation helps to better visualise the 
percentage and types of actors contained in the fitness landscape. 	
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Figure	5.5:		Graphical	representation	of	a	criminal	group’s	fitness	landscape	
	
Source:	Illustrative	example	based	on	information	in	Table	5.5		
Moreover, on further analysis, the composition of each interconnectivity band 
(shaded from dark-light; strong-weak) by actor category, may also be depicted 
graphically as in Figure 5.6 below. 
 
Figure	5.6:	Interconnectivity	composition	of	a	criminal	group’s	fitness	landscape	
	
Source:	Illustrative	example	based	on	information	in	Table	5.5		 
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As depicted in Figure 5.6 above, the strong and moderate-strong interconnectivity 
bands of the criminal group are comprised solely from its manifest category of 
criminally exploitable ties.  This is not surprising given that the core criminal 
group, including its leader and gang members, sit in this category.  What is 
surprising however, is the significance of the contributory categories 5 and 6 of 
criminally exploitable ties, comprising a large proportion of the weak 
interconnectivity band.  For this criminal group, Figure 5.6 helps to better identify 
and understand key vulnerabilities in the group and individual members.   
5.4.5 Visual imagery    
To complement the graphical representations in Figures 5.5 and 5.6 above, a visual 
representation using a new fitness landscape metaphor, to better visualise and 
understand the diverse set of criminally exploitable ties is considered. As noted in 
Chapter 4, visual imagery allows the reader to better visualise and grasp the 
complexity concepts being used to frame the new approach and aid sense-making.  
As noted earlier, there are a number of descriptive metaphors in complexity and 
landscapes is one such metaphor.  As depicted earlier, a traditional fitness 
landscape may be represented by a terrain of peaks and valleys.  However, to 
better grasp some of the underlying concepts of complexity, a new fitness 
landscape metaphor is offered in the way of urban geographies with buildings, 
rather than terrains, and is included as a contrast in Figure 5.7 below.  
Figure	5.7:		Traditional	v	new	imagery	of	a	fitness	landscape		
																									 
												Traditional		 	 	 	 	 New	
Source:	Standard	and	author’s	new	imagery	(using	licensed	images)	
As seen in Figure 5.7 above, building imagery in urban geographies suggests 
buildings can be built at different heights, knocked down, weakened or simply 
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replaced as a city expands or contracts.  If you think about the fitness of an actor 
in a particular system, an actor can be represented by a simple building.  If the 
actor is fitter than the others, its building will be taller and the fittest actor will 
have the tallest building.  The landscape overall will represent an urban geography 
where a particular system can be thought of as a town or city of buildings within 
the landscape.  As this landscape represents fitness probabilities of where 
buildings may be located, and at what height, it also represents wider complexity 
concepts, such as feedback from neighbouring buildings, and co-evolution of new 
towns or cities across boundaries.  To provide a clear breakdown of the new 
metaphor, Figure 5.8 below depicts some of the key concepts and new imagery 
side-by-side for a criminal group.   
Figure	5.8:		Visual	imagery	of	a	criminal	group’s	fitness	landscape	 
	 	Complexity	concept		 Visual	imagery	
1.	 Actor	
An	actor	(an	individual	or	group	of	individuals)	is	
represented	by	a	single	building.	
	
2.	 Interconnectivity	
The	measure	of	the	degree,	state	or	quality	of	
interconnected	actors	correlaties	to	the	height	of	
the	building	(actor)	-		e.g.	a	gang	member’s	
building	will	be	taller	than	a	group	of	drivers.	
	
3.	 System	fitness	landscape		
A	system,	such	as	a	criminal	group,	is	represented	
by	a	collection	of	buildings	in	a	town	or	city.		The	
imagery	highlights	the	differing	heights	of	buildings	
(actors)	depicting	the	overall	fitness	landscape.		
The	tallest	building	would	be	the	leader.		
	
4.	 Global	fitness	landscape	
On	a	global	scale,	the	world	is	depicted	as	an	urban	
geography	where	there	are	a	multitude	of	
interconnecting	criminal	groups	(towns	and	cities)	
and	actors	(buildings),	although	in	reality,	
interconnections	are	not	geographically	bound.		
	
Source:	Author’s	new	imagery	(using	licensed	images)	
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Using this new imagery, information contained in Table 5.5 above may be 
visualised as a city skyline in an urban landscape as depicted in Figure 5.9 below.  
The square shaped buildings represent the interconnectivity strength of the actors 
in order of strength (shaded from dark-light; strong-weak) and the round shaped 
silos in front of each building represent the volume of actors in each building (also 
labelled numerically).  The tallest building represents the leader and the next 
tallest represents the gang members’ actor group, and so on, until the shortest 
buildings, which represent the contributory categories.  
Figure	5.9:		Visual	imagery	of	illustrative	criminal	group’s	fitness	landscape	
	
Source:	Illustrative	example	based	on	information	in	Table	5.5		
 
As seen in Figure 5.9 above, the visual imagery helps to promote a patterned style 
of thinking into how the criminal group is shaped and influenced, based on its 
extended criminally exploitable ties, and helps to better identify opportunities to 
change, influence and/or disrupt the criminal group as will be seen in step four. 
5.5        Step 3: Complexity tool – attractor set  
Similar to the macro-level, at the micro-level an overview of step three is provided, 
followed by detailed explanations of the concepts used, together with the new 
analytical tool and visual imagery using illustrative examples.   
  
1	 10	 1	 1	 1	 5	 2	 9	 5	 30	 35	
URBAN	LANDSCAPE	V	POPULATION
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5.5.1 Overview   
In summary, from the analysis of the data sets and contextual variables generated 
in steps one and two, attractor sets are generated for individual actors and the 
complex system itself, using a concept to map attractors to criminological study 
and complexity prompts.   
5.5.2 Attractors 
As explained in Chapter 3, an attractor is a mathematical principle and a location 
to where a complex system tends to move.  It can be best described as a magnet 
attracting behaviours, thus producing patterns and structures and creating an 
order within the disorder. If one can identify attractors in the complex data set, 
then one can better understand the behaviour of actors in the system and the 
system itself, including vulnerabilities, and hence its use in criminology.  
Moreover, as an analytical tool, it is important to note that attractors depend on 
the frequency, regularity, intensity and priority of an actor’s exposure.  In other 
words, in a criminal context, the more times an actor is exposed (frequency), the 
more consistently an actor is exposed (regularity), the earlier an actor is exposed 
(priority) and the stronger the factor (intensity), then the more likely antisocial or 
criminal behaviour will occur.   
5.5.3 Mapping 
In criminological study, as explained in Chapter 3, Young (1997b) suggests that the 
life of any individual or group may be mapped to four attractors and that each 
form of crime entails some combination of the four.   The four attractors are power 
attractors, and are economic, social, moral and physical.   In this thesis, for ease of 
reference, the four attractors are coined an ‘attractor set’.  Attractors can also shape 
the behaviour of others and a description of each is summarised in Table 5.6 below:  
Table	5.6:		Mapping	of	an	attractor	set	to	individual	characteristics		
	 Attractor			 Individual	power	characteristic		
1.	 Economic		 From	one’s	income	and	wealth	
2.	 Social	 From	social	relationships,	be	it	family,	friends,	colleagues,	recreation	or	
the	community	
3.	 Moral	 From	shared	values,	such	as	religion	or	ethics	
4.	 Physical	 From	the	use	or	threat	of	violence	
	
Source:		Summary	of	Young’s	(1997b)	descriptions		
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Moreover, in organised crime, Young (1997b) argues that economic power is the 
key attractor.  In contrast, one can argue that moral power is the key attractor in 
terrorism and in the crime-terror nexus, any one of the four attractors could be key.  
As a methodology to use attractors in research, Young (1997b:95) also offers a five 
step approach summarised as follows: 
i) locate the attractors hidden in complex data sets; 
ii) determine how many attractors exist in the data set; 
iii) find the change points(s) at which new attractors are produced; 
iv) identify the key parameters which drive the system into ever more 
uncertainty (for purposes of social control); and 
v) determine which setting of those key parameters is acceptable to the whole 
society (for purposes of social policy). 
Although Young does not offer any workable examples, the approach by Young 
appears promising.  In this new complexity model, Young’s first two steps are 
encompassed here in step three and Young’s last three steps are encompassed in 
step four.   
5.5.4 Analytical tool 
As an analytical tool, in locating attractors, the aim is to identify the values, 
motivators and issues of concern that guide and shape actor behaviours.  At the 
micro-level of an individual actor, in developing an analytical tool to better 
organise, shape and structure information, Table 5.6 above may be utilised.  
Furthermore, as an individual actor also influences and shapes those around them, 
as well as the system itself, it would also appear reasonable to map the 
characteristics of a criminal group to Young’s (1997b) attractors.  Drawing on 
Canada’s Criminal Intelligence Directorate’s set of 14 characteristics of a criminal 
group as described in Chapter 2, together with their descriptions, these 
characteristics may be mapped to the attractor set as depicted in Table 5.7 below 
(Richards 1999).  As argued by Young (1997b), Table 5.7 also confirms the 
economic attractor as being key in organised crime.   
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Table	5.7:		Mapping	of	an	attractor	set	to	criminal	group	characteristics		
	
Source:		Author’s	synthesis	and	mapping		
 
Attractor	 Ref	 Criminal	group	
Characteristic	 Description	
Economic	 1.	 Corruption	 The	use	of	illicit	influence,	exploitation	of	
weaknesses,	and	the	blackmail	of	public	and	
prominent	figures.	
2.	 Diversity	 In	illicit	activities,	to	further	insulate	the	
organisation	from	dependence	on	one	criminal	
activity.	
3.	 Infiltration	 Continued	effort	to	gain	a	foothold	in	legitimate	
institutions	to	further	profit	or	gain	a	level	of	
protection	from	detection.	
4.	 Insulation	 Protection	of	the	organisation’s	leaders	by	
separating	them	from	the	soldiers,	cell	from	cell,	
and	function	from	function.	
5.	 Monopoly	 Control	over	certain	criminal	activities	within	a	
geographic	area	with	no	tolerance	for	
competition.	
6.	 Sophistication	 In	the	use	of	advanced	communication	systems,	
financial	controls,	and	operations.	
7.	 Mobility	 A	disregard	for	national	and	jurisdictional	
boundaries.	
Economic,	
Social	&	Moral	
8.	 Motivation	 Organised	crime:	power	and	influence	resulting	
from	material	and	social	gains.			
Terrorists:		changes	in	society	resulting	from	
ideological,	political	or	religious	beliefs.	
Moral	 9.	 Continuity	 Like	a	corporation,	the	organisation	survives	the	
individuals	who	created	and	run	it.	
10.	 Subversion	 Of	society’s	institutions	and	legal	and	moral	
value	systems.	
Moral	&	Social	 11.	 History	 Has	allowed	entrenchment	and	refinement	of	
criminal	activities	and	practices.	
12.	 Bonding	 Individual	to	individual,	and	individual	to	
organisation,	for	solidarity	and	protection,	often	
through	complex	initiation	rites.	
Physical	 13.	 Violence	 Used	without	hesitation	to	further	the	criminal	
aims	of	the	organisation.	
14.	 Discipline	 The	enforcement	of	obedience	to	the	
organisation	through	fear	and	violence.	
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Based on the analyses of the data sets and contextual variables generated in steps 
one and two, together with complexity prompts, the attractor sets of individual 
actors and the system itself, may be located using the analytical mappings set out 
in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 above.  Throughout the process of locating the attractor sets, 
a change from ‘close’ reading to ‘broad picture’ reading and back again should be 
utilised to ensure all attractors are captured.  An illustrative example of the new 
analytical tool, mapping power characteristics to the attractor set, including 
reference to supporting fractal fragments, is depicted in Table 5.8 below.	
Table	5.8:		Attractor	sets:	individual	actor	and	criminal	group		
Power	characteristics	
	 Attractor		 Individual	actor	 Criminal	group		
1.	 Economic	 	 	
2.		 Social	 	 	
3.	 Moral	 	 	
4.	 Physical		 	 	
	
Source:		Author’s	illustration		
 
5.5.5 Illustrative worked example 
An illustrative worked example is drawn from the research of the European 
Falcone organised crime research programme as discussed in Chapter 2.  The 
research was based on questionnaires and interviews with members of key 
agencies in European states, including access to closed police investigation files 
(van de Bunt & van der Schoot 2003a; Levi & Maguire 2004).  In this example, the 
overarching criminal activity is car theft.  The facts of the case are sourced from 
Levi and Maguire (2004:430) and may be further summarised as follows: 
• A car theft was brought to the attention of the UK authorities by German 
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police officers, when a stolen Mercedes car (German owned) was located 
on a dockside on the English south coast using a satellite tracking device. 
• Upon investigation, the UK police located several additional vehicles 
inside shipping containers. 
• It transpired that these vehicles had been stolen by an organised crime 
group – using both UK and German offenders – and were all destined to 
be shipped out for sale in Nigeria. 
• The UK and German offenders each had specific roles to play. 
• The UK offenders committed identity theft and credit card fraud. They 
used the true names and addresses of innocent individuals to fraudulently 
apply for American Express credit cards and redirected the mailing of the 
credit cards to addresses accessible by the criminals. 
• Armed with the fraudulently obtained credit cards, and false passports to 
match the names on the cards, some of the UK criminals then presented 
themselves as tourists at a car rental organisation in Germany and hired 
the vehicles. 
• The UK criminals (‘the couriers’) passed the hired vehicles on to the 
German criminals (‘the drivers’) who delivered them to more German 
criminals (‘the fixers’). 
• The German fixers arranged for false number plates to be fixed to the cars 
and for another set of drivers (‘fixer drivers’) to take the cars to the docks 
and by ferry to England, delivering them eventually to a shipping 
company. 
• A corrupt shipping clerk provided the necessary documentation. 
• Innocent parties included the ferry, shipping company, container company 
and some truck drivers who were to deliver the cars in containers to the 
docks for the voyage to Nigeria. 
• The UK and German police were only able to arrest the shipping clerk and 
the drivers who worked for the German fixers. 
• These offenders refused to name (or else they genuinely did not know) any 
of the other members of the organised crime group.  
 
In this example, it is important to recognise that the facts form part of a much larger 
and complex organised crime group and operation.  The facts as presented may be 
reanalysed and shaped into fractal fragments based on the 11 actors involved. For 
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ease of reference, each actor has been assigned a letter A to K.  The new analytical 
tool to identify attractors in a data set, together with the fractal fragments 
supporting the analysis, is summarised in Table 5.9 below.  	
Table	5.9:		Illustrative	case	example:	attractor	set	and	fractal	fragment	analysis		
Attractor	 Actor	 Characteristic	 Fractal	fragment		
Economic	 A	 Corruption		
Sophistication	
UK	forgers:	corrupt,	committed	forgery	in	the	UK	
(counterfeited	UK	passports),	not	arrested,	contact	
with	UK	couriers,	ability	to	counterfeit	documents.	
Economic	 B	 Corruption	
Mobility	
Diversity		
UK	couriers:	corrupt,	committed	identify	theft	and	
credit	card	fraud	in	the	UK,	illegal	entry	into	the	UK	
with	a	false	passport,	received	and	couriered	stolen	
goods	in	Germany	(Mercedes	Benz/other	vehicles),	
not	arrested,	contact	with	forgers,	German	car	
rental	company	and	German	drivers,	ability	to	
obtain	credit	card	by	deception,	posed	as	tourists	
with	fraudulent	documentation	(passport	and	
AMEX	credit	card).	
Economic	 C	 Licit	world	 German	car	rental	company:	innocent	party,	
owner	of	stolen	goods	(Mercedes	Benz/other	
vehicles),	contact	with	UK	couriers.	
Economic	 D	 Corruption	
Mobility	
German	drivers:	corrupt,	couriered	stolen	goods	
(Mercedes	Benz/other	vehicles)	in	Germany,	not	
arrested,	contact	with	UK	couriers	and	German	
fixers.	
Economic	 E	 Corruption	 German	fixers:	corrupt,	handled	stolen	goods	
(Mercedes	Benz/other	vehicles)	in	Germany,	not	
arrested,	contact	with	German	drivers	and	German	
fixer	drivers,	access	to	false	number	plates.	
Economic	
Moral/	
Social	
Violence	
F	
	
Corruption	
Mobility	
Bonding	
Discipline	
German	fixer	drivers:	corrupt,	couriered	stolen	
goods	(Mercedes	Benz/other	vehicles)	in	Germany	
and	UK,	arrested	(known	to	the	UK	and	German	
police	forces),	contact	with	German	fixers,	ferry,	
shipping	clerk	and	shipping	company,	refused	to	
name	other	members	of	the	organised	crime	group	
(either	through	close	bonds,	obedience	to	the	
organisation	through	fear	and	violence	or	genuine	
ignorance).	
Economic	 G	 Licit	world	 UK	or	German	Ferry	company:	innocent	party,	
handled	stolen	goods	(Mercedes	Benz/other	
vehicles)	from	Germany	to	the	UK,	contact	through	
German	fixer	drivers	using	route/mode	of	
transport.		
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Economic	
Moral/	
Social	
Violence	
H	 Corruption	
Infiltration	
Bonding	
Discipline	
UK	shipping	clerk:	corrupt,	works	for	an	innocent	
party	(infiltration	of	shipping	company),	aided	and	
abetted	crime	of	stolen	goods	(Mercedes	
Benz/other	vehicles)	in	the	UK	(provided	necessary	
documentation),	arrested	(known	to	the	UK	and	
German	police	forces),	contact	with	German	fixer	
drivers,	refused	to	name	other	members	of	the	
organised	crime	group	(either	through	close	bonds,	
obedience	through	fear	and	violence	or	genuinely	
does	not	know).	
Economic	 I	 Licit	world	 UK	shipping	company:	innocent	party,	handled	
stolen	goods	(Mercedes	Benz/other	vehicles)	in	the	
UK	and	voyage	to	Nigeria,	contact	through	shipping	
clerk	in	the	UK.	
Economic	 J	 Licit	world	 UK	container	company:	innocent	party,	handled	
stolen	goods	(Mercedes	Benz/other	vehicles)	in	the	
UK	and	voyage	to	Nigeria,	contact	through	shipping	
company	and	shipping	clerk.	
Economic	 K	 Licit	world	 UK	truck	drivers:	innocent	party,	handled	stolen	
goods,	(Mercedes	Benz/other	vehicles)	in	the	UK,	
contact	through	container	company.	
	
Source:	Author’s	analysis	based	on	illustrative	example	case	facts	
 
Based on the partial analysis in Table 5.9 above, it is already apparent that a 
number of interconnected actors and crime events form this group’s overall 
criminal activity of car theft.  If there was more information in the case facts or 
more details surrounding the time of the case, and contextual variables, this would 
enable a fuller analysis of attractors and change points impacting on criminal 
motivation and opportunities.  For example, the current life circumstances of the 
criminal actors to offend and the environment in which they live in; the level of 
security and monitoring of imports and exports at the UK, German and Nigerian 
borders for criminal opportunities and ease of activities, including relevant 
European Union legislation and transnational agreements at the time of the case; 
and any relevant media ‘noise’ during the period (i.e. cross-border car theft and 
identity crime).  Nevertheless, based on the partial analysis available, a key 
observation is readily apparent – the nexus of the illicit and licit worlds.  As 
depicted in the fractal fragments, the licit world is a necessity for this organised 
crime group to operate and carry out its activity of car theft. 
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5.5.6 Visual imagery   
Using the design principle of visualisation and further developing the new 
landscape imagery introduced at the macro-level in section 5.4.5 above, Figure 5.10 
below depicts how a building or actor in a fitness landscape may be analysed using 
fractal fragments and attractors.  
Figure	5.10:		Visual	imagery	of	attractor	analysis	using	fractal	fragments		
	 Complexity	concept	 Visual	imagery	
1.	 Fractal	fragment	
A	fractal	fragment	is	a	short	narrative	account	
where	self-similarity	and	scaling	is	in	place.			
	
2.	 Fractal	fragment	analysis	
Analysis	of	the	source	data	set	using	complexity	
prompts	reveals	the	fractal	fragments.	
	
3.	 Attractor		
An	attractor		is	like	a	magnet	influencing	and	
shaping	actor	and	system	behaviour,	thus	
creating	patterns	and	structures	in	the	data.	
	
	
Source:	Author’s	new	imagery	(using	licensed	images)	
	
The new visual imagery depicts how a fractal fragment represents a much smaller 
piece of a larger data set with self-similarity and scaling in place and how these 
pieces may be further categorised and analysed.  Furthermore, it is important to 
recognise that each actor in the system, and the system itself, can also act as 
attractors in and of themselves, as there is a scaling in place.  As depicted in Figure 
5.10 above, the attractor imagery depicts the patterned and structured behaviour 
in each actor and the system itself, leading to opportunities in step four to change, 
influence and/or disrupt those behaviours and break or change the patterns.  
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5.6        Step 4: Insights   
Step four of the new model draws insights by essentially combining steps one to 
three of the model.  As Maxfield and Babbie (2014:294) point out, ‘interpretation is 
distinguished from analysis because analysis is more systematic and deliberate, 
whereas interpretation is more speculative and casual’.  In other words, 
interpretation ‘is trickier’ and is ‘where researchers connect their findings to the 
larger theoretical body of knowledge’ (Maxfield & Babbie 2014:294).  As 
complexity studies change in complex systems, insights are drawn based on 
chronological time periods.  Time periods should be selected dependent on the 
complex system under study; for example, in studying a complex system in 
hindsight, such as the demise of a criminal group, the time periods may be split 
between its rise, height, fall and demise as illustrated in Figure 5.11 below, together 
with key events during each time period.  
Figure	5.11:	Chronology	of	key	events	of	a	complex	system			
	 1. Rise	 2. Height	 3. Fall	 4. Demise	
Time	period	1	 Time	period	2	 Time	period	3	 Time	period	4	
Key	
events		
• Key	event	
• Key	event	
• Key	event	
• Key	event	
• Key	event	
• Key	event	
• Key	event	
• Key	event	
• Key	event	
• Key	event	
• Key	event	
• Key	event	
• Key	event		
• Key	event	
• Key	event	
• Key	event	
	
Source:	Author’s	illustration	
	
5.6.1 Macro-level  
At the macro-level, insights are drawn to better understand the nature and 
strength of the complex system under study, and why and how it evolved or 
evolves, including interconnections at and across its system boundaries with other 
complex systems, such as allegiances and alliances. As explained earlier, it is 
important to recognise that a complex system may adjust its level of fitness, by 
adjusting the degree of its interconnectivity, and adjustments may be made by 
changing the number and strength of actors in the system.  Using this knowledge, 
in hindsight, strategies and measures may be identified that influenced, changed 
and/or disrupted the fitness landscape of the system under study resulting in 
actual outcomes of the system.  Equally, in prediction, strategies and measures 
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may be designed to influence, change and/or disrupt the fitness landscape of a 
system to achieve future desired outcomes.   
To better understand and visualise insights, based on the illustrative example of a 
criminal group in step three, Figure 5.12 below uses the new visual imagery to 
draw insights into the strategies and measures that may be used to change, 
influence and/or disrupt the group.   
Figure	5.12:		Visual	imagery	of	strategies	to	change	a	criminal	group’s	fitness	landscape	
	 Complexity	fitness	strategy	 Visual	imagery	
1.	 Strong	interconnections		
Target	and	remove	strong	interconnections	to	
weaken	and	de-stabilise	the	system.		For	
example	leaders	may	be	imprisoned.		
In	the	city,	the	building	is	targeted	and	
permanently	removed.	 	
2.	 Moderate	interconnections	
Weaken	the	strength	of	moderate	
interconnections	as	these	provide	the	system	its	
core	strength.		For	example,	weakening	the	
affinity	of	a	lawyer	by	offering	them	immunity	if	
they	become	an	informant.	
The	building	is	weakened	and	the	height	of	the	
building	is	lowered.	
	
3.	 Weak	interconnections	
Break	and	diminish	weak	interconnections	to	
prevent	adaption	and	emergence	of	the	system.	
For	example,	engage	passive	neighbours	to	assist	
law	enforcement	or	focus	on	end-buyers	of	
stolen	cars.			
The	building	is	temporarily	removed	from	the	
city	but	could	be	rebuilt.		
	
	
Source:	Illustrative	example	using	author’s	new	imagery	(using	licensed	images)	
 
As depicted in Figure 5.12 above, based on the analysis of the fitness landscape in 
step three, one of the leaders from the manifest category 2, may be targeted for 
arrest and removed from the criminal group.  Next, the lawyer, also from category 
2, may be targeted as an informant to weaken their interconnectivity to the 
criminal group.  Furthermore, the passive neighbours from contributory passive 
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category 5 may have their ties diminished or even broken, by implementing 
neighbourhood watch schemes or surveillance cameras to assist law enforcement 
and perhaps collect evidence of the criminal group’s activities.  In most cases, it is 
evidence of the crime that often eludes law enforcement such as the infamous Al 
Capone who was finally charged for tax evasion rather than his underlying 
criminal activities.  Finally, in the contributory consumer category 6, law 
enforcement may focus on the end-buyers of the stolen cars.  With category 6, it is 
important to recognise, that without this category, the criminal group would not 
exist, or at least not be involved in the same activities. Moreover, depending on 
the complex system under study and desired outcomes, it is important to note that 
strategies and measures may change.  For example, in a criminal group, you would 
want to remove the strongest actors such as its leaders, but in the study of the 
criminal justice system for example, you may not want to remove the strongest 
actors, but you may want to change or influence their affinities to the system, 
depending on what you are trying to achieve.  Accordingly, instead of targeting 
and removing the strongest actors, you may wish to enhance or weaken their 
strength.   
5.6.2 Micro-level 
At the micro-level, using the same chronological time periods as at the macro-
level, insights are drawn to better understand what guided or guides actor 
behaviour, including drivers and vulnerabilities, and in turn make inferences 
about the system as a whole.  In hindsight, strategies and measures may be 
identified that changed, influenced and/or disrupted actor behaviours resulting 
in actual outcomes of the system.  Equally, in prediction, strategies and measures 
may also be designed to change, influence and/or disrupt actor behaviours to 
achieve future desired outcomes.  As explained in Chapter 3, when considering 
change points and key parameters to counteract certain behaviours, these will be 
more effective if exposure is frequent, regular and begins as early as possible.  
Similar to the macro-level, to better understand and visualise insights, Figure 5.13 
below uses the new visual imagery to depict strategies and measures to change, 
influence and/or disrupt actor behaviour.  
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Figure	5.13:		Visual	imagery	of	strategies	to	change	actor	behaviour		
	 Complexity	concept	 Visual	imagery	
1.	 Attractor	analysis	
Attractors	identified	in	the	data	set	may	be	
analysed	to	identify	opportunities	to	change	or	
break	the	patterns	of	behaviour.		
	
	
Source:	Author’s	new	imagery	(using	licensed	images)	
 
As depicted in Figure 5.13 above, the attractor analysis depicts opportunities to 
influence actor behaviours by either changing or breaking the patterns. 
5.7 Overall model 
To summarise the overall new complexity model, Figure 5.14 below depicts the 
new model diagrammatically.  
Figure	5.14:		Overview	of	the	new	complexity	model	
Source:	Author’s	diagram 
 
Overall, as a companion to the case study method, the new complexity model as 
depicted in Figure 5.14 above, offers the ability to explore the interconnectedness 
of the whole ‘eco-system’ in which crime occurs. By developing two 
complementary components, the new model also allows the study of a 
criminological phenomenon as an integrated whole. 
Step	2:	 
Contextual	 
variables 
Micro-level:	actor	behaviour 
(Complexity	tool	–	attractor	set) 
Macro-level:	system	dynamics 
(Complexity	tool	–	fitness	landscape) 
Steps	1	to	4 
Step	1:	 
Data	sets 
Step	3:	 
Complexity	tool 
Step	4:	 
Insights 
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Furthermore, Table 5.10 below sets out the four distinct steps, applicable and 
workable at each level.  
Table	5.10:		The	four	steps	of	the	new	complexity	model		
	 Macro-level	 Micro-level			
1. 	Data	sets	
	Generate	data	sets	(source	data	set,	actor	
data	set	and	complex	data	set)	for	the	
complex	system	under	study,	using	
criminological	frames	of	reference	and	
complexity	prompts,	including	fractal	
fragments.		
As	a	subset	of	the	macro-level	data	sets,	
generate	data	sets	for	individual	actors,	
using	criminological	frames	of	reference	
and	complexity	prompts,	including	fractal	
fragments.	
	
2. 	 Contextual	variables		
	 Identify	and	analyse	contextual	variables	
from	the	output	in	step	one	using	
complexity	prompts.			
As	a	subset	of	the	macro-level	contextual	
variables,	identify	and	analyse	contextual	
variables	for	individual	actors	from	the	
output	of	step	one,	using	complexity	
prompts.		
3. 	 Complexity	tool	 	
	Populate	the	complex	system’s	fitness	
landscape,	from	the	output	in	steps	one	and	
two,	together	with	criminological	frames	of	
reference	and	complexity	prompts.		
Populate	individual	actors	and	the	
complex	system’s	attractor	sets,	from	the	
output	in	steps	one	and	two,	together	
with	criminological	frames	of	reference	
and	complexity	prompts.	
4. 	 Insights	 	
	Draw	insights	from	steps	one	to	three	using	
a	timeline,	to	better	understand	the	nature	
and	strength	of	the	complex	system,	and	
why	and	how	it	evolved	or	evolves,	
including	interconnections	at	and	across	its	
system	boundaries	with	other	complex	
systems,	such	as	allegiances	and	alliances.		
Strategies	and	measures	may	be	identified	
or	designed,	that	changed	or	changes	the	
fitness	of	the	system,	resulting	in	actual	
outcomes	or	desired	outcomes	of	the	
system.	
Draw	insights	from	steps	one	to	three	
using	a	timeline,	to	better	understand	
what	guided	or	guides	actor	behaviour,	
including	drivers	and	vulnerabilities,	and	
in	turn	make	inferences	about	the	system	
as	a	whole.		Strategies	and	measures	may	
be	identified	or	designed,	that	changed	or	
changes	actor	behaviour,	resulting	in	
actual	outcomes	or	desired	outcomes	of	
the	system.	
	
	
Source:		Author’s	steps		
 
In applying the new model, the case study should be framed within a definitive 
time period, with contextual variables comprising specific events and/or 
conditions.  Criminological frames of reference relevant to the phenomena being 
studied should also be used.   For example, in this thesis, step one involves Levi’s 
(2007) six procedural steps and von Lampe’s (2003) three core elements to inform 
the construct of the source data set of a criminal group. In step three, at the macro-
level, the concept of criminally exploitable ties is used to ensure the identification 
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of a more complete set of actors.  Also in step three, at the micro-level, the 
characteristics of a criminal group as developed by Canada’s Criminal Intelligence 
Directorate (Richards 1999) are mapped using a concept (Young’s 1997b) to map 
attractors to criminological study. 
As a final point, as observed by Stroup (1997:140), like all ‘new, developing 
theoretical and methodological innovations, creativity and determination are 
needed’.  With innovation, there are usually two ingredients: the creation of new 
knowledge and the use of the new knowledge to create value.  The aim of this 
chapter was to create new knowledge.  The aim of the next two chapters is to create 
value by applying the new knowledge to the case study of Escobar and the 
Medellín Cartel. 
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 Chapter 6:  Case study macro-level: System dynamics 
 
‘Colombians say…that their history and relationships are complex’  
Kirk (2003:295), human rights advocate  
 
Chapter 6 sets out the macro-level findings of the application of the new 
complexity model as described in Chapter 5 to the in-depth case study of Escobar 
and the Medellín Cartel.  It begins with an overview of the case study and complex 
system under study, the Medellín Cartel, together with the compilation of the 
macro-level data sets.  An analysis of the macro-level contextual variables, 
together with the construction of the Medellín Cartel’s fitness landscape follows.  
Based on the data sets, contextual variables and resulting fitness landscape, using 
complexity prompts, insights are drawn to better understand the nature and 
strength of the Medellín Cartel, including its rise and fall, and why and how it 
evolved. 
 
 
6.1        Case study and macro-level overview  
6.1.1 Case study overview  
Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria (‘Escobar’) died in 1993, over two decades ago, yet 
in recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in him and events 
surrounding his life, including numerous movies, network series, documentaries 
and books (see Appendix 1).  Perhaps the rise and fall of Escobar and the so-called 
Medellín Cartel is perfect for a Hollywood script, or perhaps enough time has since 
passed for Colombia to simply reflect and remember.  It was during the cocaine 
boom, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, that Escobar rose from being a petty thief 
to the boss of the Medellín Cartel and became one of the most powerful and richest 
men in Colombia.  He came from virtually nothing to build an empire, albeit an 
illicit one, and control a country (Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Clawson & 
Lee 1998; Bowden 2002).  At the height of his empire, he was named in Forbes’ 
international billionaires list, with an average estimated net wealth of US $3 billion 
for seven years running, from 1987 to the year of his death (Forbes n.d.).  Unlike 
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most criminals, however, who like to remain in the shadows, Escobar not only 
desired illicit wealth, but he desired fame and power.  Above all, he desired 
political power and the adoration of the Colombian people (Gugliotta & Leen 1989; 
Strong 1995; Clawson & Lee 1998; Bowden 2002).  In 1982, Escobar ran for and won 
congressional office as an alternate, but shortly after, he was denounced by the 
Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla (‘Lara’) as a drug trafficker and dismissed 
from government a year later.  Escobar’s decisive action in 1984 to have Lara 
assassinated started an open and violent conflict with the state.  At this time, when 
terrorist tactics were not enough, some of the Medellín Cartel associates, together 
with other traffickers, created their own terrorist group Los Extraditables (The 
Extraditables) (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  Allegiances and alliances also formed 
between Escobar and/or the Medellín Cartel with local paramilitary groups, 
guerrilla groups and other local Colombian traffickers and cartels, including the 
Cali Cartel, together with other international criminal groups and individuals 
based locally and overseas (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  Escobar’s penchant for 
violence, however, increasingly over time, began to alienate and eventually erode 
some of these allegiances and alliances, notably the Cali Cartel (Gugliotta & Leen 
1989; Strong 1995; Clawson & Lee 1998; Bowden 2002).  Before his death, Escobar 
was responsible for numerous terrorist acts, assassinations and kidnappings, 
including the murder of thousands of innocent civilians.  In 1993, a decade of open 
cartel-state violence ended with Escobar’s death.  He was shot on a roof top in 
Medellín attempting to escape at the hands of state forces led by Colonel Hugo 
Martinez (‘Colonel Martinez’).  In the aftermath, the Medellín Cartel disbanded, 
with the Cali Cartel reaping the rewards, until its own demise a few years later.  
Following the demise of the two main cartels, criminals became less overt and the 
drug trade less organised and fractured, although the drug trade continued 
(Clawson & Lee 1998; Bowden 2002).  More importantly, it signalled the end to 
Escobar’s reign of terror and violence in Colombia, and the end to Medellín being 
the murder capital of the world (Bowden 2002).  
In studying Escobar and the Medellín Cartel, the literature reveals a tendency to 
focus on one or more aspects of the drug trade, or criminal structures and/or 
activities, rather than a holistic study of the conditions that allowed them to 
emerge in the first place.  One notable exception is by the economist Francisco 
Thoumi, who has studied the Andean drug trade in detail. While Thoumi (2003; 
2014) considers a more holistic and multi-disciplinary approach to the problem, 
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including a study of the conditions that gave rise to the cartels, Thoumi does not 
offer any discussion on complexity, which would lend itself to his work.   
Using the new complexity model as described in Chapter 5, this case study 
attempts to separate fact from Hollywood fiction and contribute to the answer on 
why and how Escobar and the Medellín Cartel evolved, including their nature and 
strength, and what shaped their behaviour.  In doing so, the model attempts to 
look at Escobar and the Medellín Cartel differently and provide novel insights, by 
exploring the whole ‘eco-system’ that allowed Escobar and the Medellín Cartel to 
flourish, including the formation of allegiances and alliances, all of which played 
a role in their rise and fall.   
6.1.2 Macro-level overview  
At a macro-level, the Medellín Cartel as an organised crime group, is the complex 
system under study.  Of note, as most authors agree, while the group is commonly 
referred to as the Medellín Cartel (and also referred to as such in this thesis for 
ease of reference), in reality, the group was not a cartel in the economic sense; it 
was more like a syndicate or collective of individuals and organisations, each with 
their own separate businesses and operations, that combined to promote a 
common interest and shared needs (Strong 1995; Clawson & Lee 1998; Bowden 
2002; Thoumi 2003; 2014; Reuter 2014).   
In this chapter, the macro-level steps will be applied to the Medellín Cartel to look 
at the dynamics of the system as a whole.  In the next chapter, the micro-level steps 
will be applied to the behaviour of Escobar, as an individual actor in the system, 
and the behaviour of the Medellín Cartel as the system itself, together with a 
summary of the overall complexity model case study findings.   
Of note, while it is acknowledged that a key focus of the case study surrounds 
organised crime, as will be seen later in this chapter, the case study also offers a 
rich source of material in terrorism and the crime-terror nexus to test and apply 
the new complexity model, given i) the presence of terrorism and the crime-terror 
nexus in the criminal structures and activities of Escobar and the Medellín Cartel; 
and ii) the formation of a number of allegiances and alliances, including a terrorist 
group and two vigilante groups, all of which play a central role in the rise and fall 
of the Medellín Cartel. To begin, the macro-level steps one to four are summarised 
and applied in sections 6.2 to 6.5 below: 
	 141	
1. Data sets: generate the macro-level data sets of the Medellín Cartel, using 
criminological frames of reference and complexity prompts, including fractal 
fragments.  
 
2. Contextual variables: identify and analyse the macro-level contextual 
variables of the Medellín Cartel from the data sets, using complexity prompts. 
 
3. Fitness landscape: populate the macro-level fitness landscape of the Medellín 
Cartel, from the analysis of the data sets and contextual variables, using the 
criminological concept of criminally exploitable ties and complexity prompts.  
Populate i) in tabular or infographic form; ii) graphically; and iii) visually as 
an urban landscape, to better visualise the shape and structure of the Medellín 
Cartel.  
 
4. Insights: based on the macro-level resulting fitness landscape, data sets and 
contextual variables, using complexity prompts: 
• draw insights to better understand the nature and strength of the Medellín 
Cartel and why and how it evolved, including interconnections at and 
across the Medellín Cartel’s system boundaries, comprising other complex 
systems, such as its allegiances and alliances; and 
• on reflection, identify the strategies and measures that changed, influenced 
and/or disrupted the weak, moderate and strong interconnections of the 
Medellín Cartel and its ultimate demise.  
6.2        Step 1: Data sets – macro 
Applying step one of the new complexity model, the source data set, actor data set 
and complex data set of the Medellín Cartel are generated using criminological 
frames of reference and complexity prompts, including fractal fragments. 
6.2.1 Source data set – macro 
As described in Chapter 4, as the creator and ultimate boss of the Medellín Cartel, 
the case study is framed by Escobar’s life (1949-1993) and the operational period 
of the Medellín Cartel (late 1970s-1993) from the time of its creation (specific year 
not obtainable) to its ultimate demise.  The case study is also framed within key 
contextual variables, just before and during the case study period, comprising 
specific events and/or conditions, including Colombia’s history as a weak state, 
armed conflict and undeclared civil war.  The source data set has been generated 
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using Levi’s (2007) procedures and von Lampe’s (2003) core elements of a criminal 
group as a component guide and complexity prompts.  As summarised in 
Appendix 1, the macro-level source data set comprises both primary and 
secondary sources.  Not surprisingly, the source data reveals a large number of 
variables and interconnected actor groups.  
6.2.2 Actor data set – macro 
From an analysis of the macro-level source data set, the source data reveals 20 actor 
groups within the macro-level actor data set as depicted in Table 6.1 below.  
Table	6.1:	Macro-level	actor	data	set:	Medellín	Cartel 
Actor	groups	
1. The	Boss	
2. The	Leaders		
3. The	Key	Associates		
4. The	Professionals	
5. The	Semi-Professionals	
6. The	Unskilled	
7. The	Growers	
8. The	Movers	
9. The	Dealers	
10. The	Consumers	
11. The	Locals	
12. The	Enablers	
13. The	Guerrillas	
14. The	Paramilitaries	
15. The	Terrorists	
16. The	International	Criminals	
17. The	Competitors	
18. The	Colombian	State	Authorities	
19. The	US	State	Authorities	
20. The	Media	
Source:	Source	data	in	Appendix	1	
 
As depicted in Table 6.1 above, the actor data set comprises a variety of ‘others’, 
from dealers to users, from traffickers to state officials, all with a variety of 
perspectives. As expected, and summarised in Appendix 2, each actor group 
contains multiple types of actors resulting in hundreds of perspectives to choose 
from.   
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6.2.3 Complex data set – macro 
Based on an analysis of the source data set, 150 fractal fragments (i.e. short 
narratives: either descriptions, stories or accounts) have been identified in 
generating the complex data set to inform the case study analysis.  Wherever 
possible, fractal fragments were selected in the words of the actors themselves; for 
example, from primary source documents and secondary source interview and 
documentary transcripts.  A summary of the composition of the complex data set 
is included in Appendix 3.  The composition highlights the number of fractal 
fragments selected across the types of actors in the actor data set and the selection 
is distributed across a variety of actors.  As noted in Chapter 5, for clarity and ease 
of reference to inform the case study analysis, each of the 150 fractal fragments has 
been extracted from its data store (simple file containing analytical categories) and 
placed directly in the body of the text of this thesis, indented and sequentially 
numbered, under relevant analytical headings.   
6.3        Step 2: Contextual variables – macro 
Applying step two of the new complexity model, contextual variables are 
identified and analysed within a historical, geographical, social, economic, 
political and media setting, using complexity prompts.    
6.3.1 A time and place – macro    
The Medellín Cartel leaders, including Escobar, were all born during the same era 
between the late 1940s and early 1950s, and lived in and around Medellín 
(Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  In Colombia, while its deep-
rooted problems go back to earlier colonial times, one of its contributing factors to 
the difficult conditions of state rule, even today, is its geography (Clawson & Lee 
1998; Thoumi 2003).  Colombia is dominated by the Andean mountain range, 
comprising three separate mountain chains and deep valleys, together with part 
of the Amazon rainforest, tropical grasslands and borders both the Caribbean and 
Pacific coastlines (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2016).  It also borders five countries 
(Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru and Ecuador) as depicted in Figure 6.1 below.  
Along these porous borders, Colombia has a long history of smuggling goods, 
largely due to Colombia’s high import taxes and import restrictions, but also due 
to its border setting (Mallory 2007; Roth 2010).  According to Thoumi (2014:178), 
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over time ‘contraband became an accepted business practice, and corruption was 
a common business instrument’.	
Figure	6.1:	Map	of	Colombia	and	surrounding	countries	
	
Source:	Author’s	licensed	image	
In contrast to its borders, Colombia’s main urban centres are located high up in the 
Andean highlands between its capital Bogota and the cities of Medellín and Cali.  
Although these three cities are only c. 300 kilometres apart, as depicted in Figure 
6.1 above, the mountainous terrain means all-day road trips or for those who can 
afford it, air travel to reach each place (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2016).  
Historically, Thoumi (2014:178) observes: 
The	country	was	formed	as	a	collection	of	regions	with	little	communication	and	trade	
exchanges	among	them.		These	isolated	regions	developed	strong	local	identities	and	for	
a	long	time	were	highly	self-sufficient…the	central	government	was	very	poor	and	unable	
to	 develop	 the	 infrastructure	 to	 integrate	 the	 country.	 	 Urbanisation	 concentrated	
government	 expenditure	 in	 urban	 areas,	 a	 trend	 that	 accentuated	 the	 weak	 or	 non-
existing	state	presence	in	large	parts	of	the	territory.			
Fragment	1:	Economics	scholar			
Today, Colombia’s divide between ‘a modern, mainly urban country and an 
archaic, poor, conflict-ridden mainly rural one’ still plays a deciding factor in its 
problems (Reid 2015).  
6.3.2 La Violencia – macro 
In 1948, a civil war broke out between Colombia’s political parties.  While sparked 
by the assassination of the leader of the Liberal Party, it was largely caused by the 
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failure of the state to address ongoing socio-economic inequalities (Bailey 1967).  
The civil war lasted ten years between 1948 and 1958, and was known as La 
Violencia (The Violence) due to the violent manner of the atrocities.  Some 
techniques were so common, that they were given names, such as picar para tamal 
(slowly cutting up a living person’s body), bocachiquiar (hundreds of small 
puncture wounds until the victim slowly bled to death) and corte de corbata (the 
Colombian necktie where the victim’s tongue was pulled through their sliced 
throat) (Bailey 1967).  In the words of Strong (1995:10-11): 
Bodies	were	quartered,	chopped	up	into	bits	and	decapitated,	the	heads	kicked	around	
like	footballs	in	village	squares.		Fingers	and	hands	were	cut	off	until	a	victim	“sang”	on	
his	peers.		Fathers	were	made	to	witness	the	multiple	rape	of	wives	and	daughters.		Men	
were	castrated	and	their	 testicles	stuffed	 in	 their	mouths.	 	Pregnant	women	had	 their	
foetuses	removed	and	replaced	by	cockerels…corpses	were	hideously	maimed	through	a	
variety	of	“cuts”.			
Fragment	2:	Investigative	journalist		
According to Bowden (2002:14), these forms of atrocities and ‘terror became art, a 
form of psychological warfare with a quasi-religious aesthetic.  In Colombia, it 
wasn’t enough to hurt or even kill your enemy; there was ritual to be observed’.  
Colombia’s rivers literally ran red with blood during this period, and up to 300,000 
people killed, up to 800,000 injured and another one million of Colombia’s 
population displaced (Bailey 1967).  Overall, some two million people were 
impacted by the decade-long violent conflict, with the majority of victims ‘almost 
exclusively rural’ (Thoumi 2014:178).  What is more shocking, is that ‘these were 
not crimes between strangers, but acts of astonishing violence between people who 
had known each other their whole lives’ (Kirk 2003:35).  As suggested by Strong 
(1995:11), it was ‘during these years that Colombia gave birth to a culture of 
violence’.  It was also during these years that many associates of the Medellín 
Cartel, including Escobar, were born and raised.  Moreover, Bowden (2002:10) 
argues that this was also the time where ‘the modern history of Colombia starts’.	
As discussed earlier (Passerini & Bahr 1997), a general mood and collective 
behaviour is measured as a property of a group, not individuals.  As a group, it 
can be argued that following La Violencia, Colombia’s collective consciousness of 
values, morals, customs and behaviours changed.  Moreover, the future of 
Colombia was left to some of the rural young men shaped by seeing their parents 
and loved ones tortured, their mothers and sisters raped and their homes 
destroyed.  This was set against the backdrop of a weak and mistrusted state led 
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by Colombia’s elite with the ‘outright lack of its presence’ in the form of police 
stations, courts, schools or hospitals in the rural poverty struck regions and 
widespread land expropriations (Thoumi 2014:179).  As a result, in many rural 
regions, ‘guerrilla organisations were welcome because they imposed order in the 
existing power vacuum’ (Thoumi 2014:179).  It was also a time where, ‘honesty 
meant keeping your word, it did not mean keeping the law’ (Strong 1995:14).  
6.3.3 Society and the economy – macro 
In the US, two social events significantly influenced the conditions that led to the 
rise of the Medellín Cartel.  The first being the influx of Colombian immigrants 
during the 1960s and 1970s and the second being the explosion in the demand for 
cocaine during the 1970s and 1980s.  A 1977 Newsweek magazine article best 
describes the early cocaine scene and social trend in the US (cited in MacQuarrie 
2015:27):   
Cocaine’s	popularity	has	spread	so	vastly	within	the	last	few	years	that	it	has	become	the	
recreational	drug	of	choice	for	countless	Americans…Among	hostesses	in	the	smart	sets	
of	Los	Angeles	and	New	York,	a	little	cocaine,	like	Dom	Perignon	and	beluga	caviar,	is	now	
de	rigueur	at	dinners.		Some	party-givers	pass	it	around	along	with	canapes	on	silver	trays.		
Fragment	3:	Consumers	(in	a	media	report)	
In the documentaries Cocaine Cowboys (2006) and Cocaine Cowboys Reloaded (2014), 
together with the movie Blow (2001) based on a biography of George Jung’s (‘Jung’) 
life, a key associate of the Medellín Cartel, the impact of the cocaine scene is not 
just read on a page, it comes to life in pictures vividly portraying the gravity of its 
excess.  Cocaine became glamourous – something to be followed like a fashion – 
which in turn increased its demand and popularity in the US.  In an interview, 
Jung comments on how society and the media had turned cocaine into a status 
drug and how initially the US government had turned a blind eye, due to it being 
used by the rich and famous (Frontline 2000c): 
I	 felt	 that	 there	was	 nothing	wrong	with	what	 I	was	 doing	 because	 I	was	 supplying	 a	
product	to	people	that	wanted	it	and	it	was	accepted…I	don’t	think	anybody	understood	
it	or	really	knew	what	the	hell	was	going	on…I	mean	Madison	Avenue	promoted	cocaine.		
The	movie	industry.		The	record	industry.		I	mean,	if	you	were	well	to	do	and	you	were	a	
jet-setter,	 it	was	okay	to	snort	cocaine.	 	 I	mean	Studio	54	in	New	York,	everybody	was	
snorting	cocaine…The	government	allowed	the	media	and	the	record	 industry	and	the	
movie	industry	to	promote	[cocaine]	and	nobody	ever	stood	up.		Nobody	ever	said	no	to	
this.		
Fragment	4:	Medellín	Cartel	associate			
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Similarly, in Colombia, in an interview with Juan David Ochoa Vásquez (‘Juan 
Ochoa’), one of the Medellín Cartel leaders, Juan Ochoa notes that at the beginning 
of the drug trade (Frontline 2000e): 
It	wasn’t	properly	accepted,	but	nobody	ever	said	anything	about	it.		And	since	nothing	
dangerous	or	grave	had	happened,	there	were	no	repercussions	in	getting	involved.		
Fragment	5:	Medellín	Cartel	leader			
Later on, however, the change from the expensive form of cocaine to the relatively 
inexpensive form called crack, soon became popular amongst the poorer classes in 
the US.  This not only impacted the addicts, but the people these addicts would 
steal from to sustain their addiction, causing an epidemic of violence and crime 
across the US cities linked to cocaine trafficking (Bowden 2002).  As demand grew 
over time, it was the Colombian immigrants in city hubs like Miami, New York 
and Los Angeles, that allowed the Colombian traffickers to quickly develop their 
trusted networks, including distribution and money laundering.  It was also the 
use of fellow nationals that reduced the risk of infiltration by US authorities 
(Thoumi 2014).  In Colombia, as demand grew, society, including state officials, 
saw drug trafficking as a US consumer problem, not a Colombian producer 
problem.  According to Lewis Tambs (‘Tambs’), US Ambassador to Colombia in 
1983-85 (‘The Godfather of Cocaine’ 1997): 
When	 I	 was	 ambassador	 down	 there,	 basically,	 the	 Colombians	 felt	 that	 it	 was	 not	 a	
Colombian	problem.		They	didn’t	use	it	and,	basically,	it	was	going	to	the	consumers	in	
the	US.			They	were	making	money.		And	it	was	a	US	problem,	not	a	Colombian	problem.		
Fragment	6:	US	government	official		
In simple terms, if there had been no consumers, there would have been no 
demand.  At the same time, socio-economic conditions in Colombia persisted and 
contributed to the rise of the Medellín Cartel.  Where the social fabric was already 
stretched thin, ‘these conditions furnish[ed] a ready recruitment pool for organised 
crime groups’ (Roth 2010:411).  Instead of focusing on the negatives, Colombian 
society focused on the positive economic benefits such as employment and 
business growth.  After all, cocaine was a highly profitable business, largely due 
to its illegal status, the risk of smuggling it and its steady US demand (Thoumi 
2003; Reuter 2014).  Unfortunately, Colombian society did not foresee the grave 
consequences of the drug trade, such as the perpetual cycles of corruption and 
violence (Thoumi 2003). From increased employment and businesses that 
laundered the money, including the unprecedented rise of the national and state-
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wide football teams from narco-dollars, to elite social clubs that opened their 
doors, and to corrupt state officials and officers who exchanged favours for cash, 
Colombian society had a comfortable relationship with the drug traffickers 
(Mallory 2007; The Two Escobars 2010).  There was not only a nexus, but a blurring 
of lines between the licit and illicit worlds.  Society had lost its moral compass.   
Essentially, at the beginning, at a social and economic level, both the US and 
Colombia turned a blind eye, and as a consequence, allowed the Medellín Cartel 
to emerge and flourish.   
6.3.4 Politics – macro 
In 1971, the US President Nixon first declared the US ‘war on drugs’, although at 
this time, his key concern was marijuana and the opium trade, not cocaine.  It was 
not until the mid-late 1970s that cocaine started to become a US problem.  It was 
also a time where counter-narcotics in cocaine was practically non-existent in 
Colombia and overseas, including the US (Kenney 2011; Porter 2015).  This initial 
lack of law enforcement certainly contributed to the conditions that allowed the 
Medellín Cartel to emerge with exponential growth.  It was not until 1980, to 
address its increasing cocaine problem, that the US Reagan administration 
overhauled the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act 1970 to strengthen its counter-
narcotics efforts both domestically and overseas (Kenney 2011).   In the words of 
US President Reagan at the time (‘The Godfather of Cocaine’ 1997): 
My	 very	 reason	 for	 being	 here	 this	 afternoon	 is	 not	 to	 announce	 another	 short-term	
government	offensive,	but	to	call	instead	for	a	national	crusade	against	drugs,	a	sustained,	
relentless	effort	to	rid	America	of	this	scourge	by	mobilising	every	segment	of	our	society	
against	drug	abuse.		
Fragment	7:	US	President	
The US also significantly increased its law enforcement, but at a cost to its drug 
rehabilitation programs (Kenney 2011).  Essentially, the Reagan administration 
had implemented a new strategy.  It had largely passed on the responsibility and 
blame of the drug problem onto producing countries, including Colombia, 
pressuring them into implementing tough counter-narcotic efforts, even though 
these countries had weak state rule, a lack of law enforcement and limited budget 
(Kenney 2011).  Although the US provided monetary aid, most of the cost still 
rested with the producing countries (Kenney 2011).  It was not until the election of 
US President Bush in 1988, that finally put the US on a collision course with the 
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Medellín Cartel.  In contrast, the Colombian government was well aware of the 
growing drug problem.  However, it’s key concern was widespread corruption, 
not the drug problem.  In an interview with Colonel Martinez, even in the early 
1970s (Streatfeild 2000): 
It	started	with	the	corruption,	especially	 in	the	northern	departments	up	by	the	coast.		
The	army	was	sent	in	to	fight	drugs,	but	the	corruption	was	so	bad	that	you	had	generals	
in	jail.	
Fragment	8:	Colombian	law	enforcement		
Increasingly, wealthy traffickers were able to bribe politicians, the judicial and law 
enforcement agencies to a point where arrested traffickers rarely did time in jail.  
They were either released on legal technicalities or simply escaped (Strong 1995; 
Bowden 2002).  For the handful of successful prosecutions, traffickers paid off 
other judges, together with the police, to release them or simply look the other way 
while they escaped (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  In terms of legislation, it can be 
argued that three legal issues greatly influenced the conditions that led to the rise 
and fall of the Medellín Cartel: i) legalisation of cocaine; ii) extradition laws 
between Colombia and the US; and iii) money laundering legislation.  Drawing on 
the complexity concept of sensitivity to initial conditions, otherwise known as 
chaos theory, a slight change in any one of these variables would greatly influence 
the conditions of the Medellín Cartel, and in the case of extradition laws, it did.  
Legalisation of cocaine   
Much has been written on legalising drugs such as cocaine and how this impacts 
the ‘war on drugs’.   In the words of Juan Ochoa, one of the Medellín Cartel leaders 
(interview in Frontline 2000e): 
They	should	also	punish	those	who	sell	liquor,	because	it’s	just	as	or	more	dangerous	than	
cocaine,	but	it’s	legal.		It’s	just	a	manner	of	seeing	things.		
Fragment	9:	Medellín	Cartel	leader			
As some would argue, drug use and addiction is a health problem, not a criminal 
one.  In turn, it should be treated as a health problem, not a police or military one.  
While the debate on legalisation continues, there is no doubt that cocaine’s illicit 
nature created and still creates the initial opportunity for traffickers, such as the 
Medellín Cartel, to do business (Clawson & Lee 1998; Thoumi 2003).   As Kauffman 
(1995:217) argues through a complexity lens, ‘goods and services “live” in niches 
created by other goods and services’ and it is the illicit nature of cocaine that 
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creates the niches of so many other illicit goods and services surrounding the drug 
trade.   
Extradition   
Throughout the operational period of the Medellín Cartel, the legal status of 
extradition was cyclically on and off Colombia’s negotiating table in response to 
popular public opinion and/or pressure from the US.   At any given point in time, 
the legal status of extradition played a pivotal role in the behaviour and actions of 
the Medellín Cartel and its leaders.  Extradition was the one thing that all 
traffickers feared the most.  A popular saying by the traffickers was ‘better a grave 
in Colombia than a prison cell in the US’ (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002; Escobar JP 
2016).  As put by Jorge Luis Ochoa Vásquez (‘Jorge Ochoa’) one of the Medellín 
Cartel leaders, extradition was feared (interview in Frontline 2000d):  
Because	justice	for	a	Colombian	 is	different	than	the	US	and	for	an	American…and	the	
natural	thing	is	that	one	should	be	judged	in	one’s	own	country,	not	in	a	country	that	is	
not	one’s	own.			
Fragment	10:	Medellín	Cartel	leader	
Or, in other words, in Colombia, traffickers could easily bribe their way out of jail 
or at least serve minimal prison time.  In the US, however, bribery was not an 
option and prison time usually meant life.   
Money laundering  
Money laundering is the process of converting ‘dirty’ money generated by a 
criminal activity to make it appear legitimate, in other words ‘clean’ money from 
a legitimate source (Lilley 2006; Levi 2014).  During the Medellín Cartel’s reign, 
authorities were initially unaware that millions of dollars were being laundered 
through the international banking system, including the US.  This was due to an 
initial focus on the physical movement of drugs, not the money trail (Mazur 2009).  
However, that all changed by the mid-1980s as depicted in the 2016 movie The 
Infiltrator based on the 2009 book by Robert Mazur (‘Mazur’), a US undercover 
special agent (Mazur 2009).  In 1984, Mazur began five years undercover to 
infiltrate the criminal hierarchy of the Medellín Cartel and befriend the bankers 
and businessmen behind the Medellín Cartel’s money laundering operation.  In 
1989, the operation culminated in one of the largest money laundering 
prosecutions at the time, eventually bringing down an entire global bank, the Bank 
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of Credit and Commerce International, which ceased operations in 1991, together 
with scores of Medellín Cartel associates (Mazur 2009).  While money laundering 
legislation and banking regulations existed at the time, robust legislation and 
stringent regulatory oversight did not (Lilley 2006; Mazur 2009).   Even today, 
despite the overhauling of legislation and regulatory oversight worldwide, 
bankers still provide unwittingly, or sometimes knowingly, a crucial role between 
the licit and illicit worlds.  In Mazur’s (2009:340-341) own words: 
The	greatest	weakness	the	drug	trade	has	 is	banking	relationships.	 	 	Each	dirty	banker	
serves	dozens	of	big-time	traffickers,	but	those	bankers	don’t	have	the	stomach	to	sit	in	
prison	for	life.		That’s	the	best	weakness	we	can	exploit	and	attack.		
	
Fragment	11:	US	law	enforcement		
Moreover, during the same period, Colombia’s own monetary policies, aimed at 
preventing flight capital overseas and strengthening its own international 
monetary reserves, unintentionally facilitated the laundering of illicit money 
(Thoumi 2003). Colombians overseas were allowed to deposit large amounts of 
money in Colombia with minimal control, and in turn, Colombian citizens were 
allowed to exchange large amounts of dollars in Colombia for pesos, no questions 
asked (Thoumi 2003).  The real winner here was not the Colombian government, 
but traffickers like the Medellín Cartel whose illicit cash was allowed to enter the 
financial system with relative ease.        
6.3.5 Media – macro 
As noted earlier, in the freedom of the US press, the US media played a key role in 
promoting cocaine as a status drug of the rich and famous.  In contrast, the US 
media also played a key role in promoting the subsequent discourse against drugs 
(Ronderos 2003:216): 
With	spectacular	and	endless	stories	about	drug	seizures,	drug	barons,	and	countries	with	
weak	democracies	where	drugs,	crime,	and	violence	are	the	rule,	the	media	persuade	the	
public	of	the	great	danger	posed	by	drugs	not	only	to	society	but	also	to	the	US	as	a	nation.	
Fragment	12:	Legal	scholar	 
It was also through the US media that the Reagan and Bush administrations 
promoted their ‘war on drugs’ policies, with the official US discourse describing 
‘drug trafficking as a threat to national security’ (Ronderos 2003:216).   
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In contrast, in Colombia (Encyclopedia Britannica 2016): 
The	degree	to	which	the	press	can	exercise	its	rights	has	been	somewhat	dependent	upon	
government	in	power,	as	well	as	the	danger	of	retaliation	from	drug	bands	and	guerrilla	
groups.		Newspapers	have	traditionally	been	the	most	widely	available	source	of	political	
information	and	have	been	least	controlled,	while	radio	and	television,	regarded	more	as	
entertainment	media,	have	received	stricter	government	control.			
	
Fragment	13:	Encyclopedic	document		
 
Of note, traffickers, including the Medellín Cartel, through direct and indirect 
ownership of news outlets, greatly influenced the Colombian media and public 
opinion by downplaying their role in the drug trade, promoting their generous 
social causes and upholding the drug problem as a US consumer one (Escobar JP 
2016).  
6.3.6 Summary of macro-level contextual variables 
In summary, it can be argued that in isolation each contextual variable provides 
favourable conditions for the emergence of the Medellín Cartel.  Taking each 
variable in turn: 
• Time and place:  Colombia’s geography of mountainous terrain and 
porous borders provided difficult conditions of state rule, even today, 
allowing the Medellín Cartel to take advantage of the lack of state 
governance and Colombia’s long history of smuggling goods and 
corruption.   
 
• Historical event:  During La Violencia, it can be said that Colombia’s culture 
of violence began, and it was also during these years, that many associates 
of the Medellín Cartel, including Escobar, were born and raised.  It can also 
be argued that following La Violencia, Colombia’s collective consciousness 
of values, morals, customs and behaviours changed, which greatly 
benefited the Medellín Cartel.   
 
• Society and the economy: In the US, the explosion in the demand for 
cocaine during the 1970s and 1980s and the earlier influx of Colombian 
immigrants to subsequently set-up local distribution and money 
laundering networks were fundamental in the type of criminal activities 
the Medellín Cartel became involved in.  At the same time, socio-economic 
conditions in Colombia persisted and instead of focusing on the negatives, 
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Colombian society initially focused on the positive economic benefits of 
cocaine, such as employment and business growth, which allowed the 
Medellín Cartel to flourish.   
 
• Politics:  In both Colombia and overseas, the initial lack of law enforcement 
over cocaine smuggling contributed to the exponential growth of the 
Medellín Cartel.  Moreover, in terms of legislation, the three legal issues 
surrounding: i) legalisation of cocaine; ii) extradition laws between 
Colombia and the US; and iii) money laundering legislation, greatly 
influenced the conditions surrounding the Medellín Cartel.   
 
• Media: The freedom of the US press, and in some respects, the lack of 
freedom of the Colombian press, dependant on who controlled the media 
outlets at the time, as well as the danger of retaliation from the traffickers, 
played a key role in either promoting, downplaying or vilifying the impact 
of cocaine and the role and activities of the drug traffickers, all of which 
influenced the initial conditions for the Medellín Cartel to emerge.  
However, it can also be argued, that the sum of all variables provides more 
compelling evidence to support a complexity model of interconnected conditions 
influencing the Medellín Cartel.  In short, prior to any in-depth analysis of Escobar 
and the Medellín Cartel, the above analysis demonstrates the perfect backdrop or 
‘perfect storm’ of key historical, geographical, social, economic, political and 
media settings that allowed the Medellín Cartel to emerge and flourish in the first 
place and leave a path of destruction in its wake.       
6.4        Step 3: Fitness landscape – macro 
Applying step three of the new complexity model, the Medellín Cartel’s fitness 
landscape is populated based on an analysis of the data sets and contextual 
variables, using the criminological concept of criminally exploitable ties, together 
with complexity prompts, to organise, shape and structure the information.   
6.4.1  Fitness landscape overview  
The ultimate aim of a fitness landscape is to better understand the nature and 
strength of the complex system under study, including its drivers and 
vulnerabilities.  As noted earlier, the Medellín Cartel was not a cartel in the 
traditional sense, but a collective of individuals and organisations, each with their 
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own separate businesses and operations.  Essentially, the Medellín Cartel came 
together geographically, in and around Medellín, to promote a common interest 
and shared needs based on the illicit drug trade (Thoumi 2003; Roth 2010; Kenney 
2011; Reuter 2014).  As such, the Medellín Cartel’s common interest and goal-
alignment was illicit wealth, and its shared needs, amongst others, were in the 
production and trafficking of cocaine.   
Interconnectivity strength   
As explained in Chapter 5, the interconnectivity strength of actors in a fitness 
landscape may be measured as a degree of goal alignment and shared needs. In 
determining interconnectivity strengths within the Medellín Cartel’s fitness 
landscape, the role of the actor, together with factors such as socio-economic 
backgrounds, needs and desires, have been synthesised to provide 
interconnectivity assessments.  Due to the degree of subjectivity involved, a sliding 
scale of five bands has been applied: weak – weak-moderate – moderate – 
moderate-strong – strong.   
Actor population  
In estimating the population and volume of actors in the Medellín Cartel, the exact 
size and structure of the Medellín Cartel remains uncertain.  However, based on 
government intelligence, a number of scholarly attempts have been made to 
estimate the size and structure of the Colombian cocaine industry.  One of the most 
notable and detailed attempts is by former CIA analyst, Sidney Zabludoff 
(Clawson & Lee 1998; Thoumi 2003; 2014).  Zabludoff’s 1994 report was based on 
extensive interviews with US law enforcement officials and intelligence experts, 
together with classified intelligence documents (Clawson & Lee 1998).  Although 
his estimates are based on the totality of the Colombian cocaine industry, the fact 
that his research was at the time of two significant cartels – the Medellín and Cali 
Cartels – for the purposes of this thesis, it appears reasonable to simply halve the 
estimates.  Of note, Zabludoff (cited in Clawson & Lee 1998:19) estimates that 10 
core organisations comprising 500 top-level entrepreneurs dominated the cocaine 
business at the time.  Given the fact that each of the Medellín and Cali Cartels 
comprised five leaders, each with their own distinct business operations, 
Zabludoff’s estimates appear consistent with the assumption of halving his 
estimates between the two cartels.  Based on Zabludoff’s work (cited in Clawson 
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& Lee 1998:19-20) a range of manifest (active) and latent (dormant) actor types and 
volumes may be estimated, although not all actor categories comprising the 
Medellín Cartel’s fitness landscape fall within his work. Actor types in the 
potential and contributory categories, together with certain actor types in the 
manifest category, have been estimated using other sources as indicated in the 
analysis below.  Also of note, is that in the Medellín Cartel, certain actor types, 
such as professionals, may be categorised as both manifest (active) and latent 
(dormant) ties, as some will be actively involved (either full or part-time) and 
others as and when the need arises (i.e. inactive).  As such, when the same actor 
type may be categorised in each category, a proportion is estimated in both. 
Criminally exploitable ties 
Based on an analysis of the complex data set using the six categories of criminally 
exploitable ties as described and explained in Chapter 5, Figure 6.2 below provides 
an infographic overview (one excluding and the other including category 6) of the 
composition of actor categories involved in the Medellín Cartel’s fitness landscape.	
Figure	6.2:		Infographic:	actor	composition	of	the	Medellín	Cartel		
	
																Excluding	category	6	 	 	 										Including	category	6	
	  
	
Source:	Summary	information	from	Figures	6.3	to	6.8	below	based	on	the	complex	data	set		
 
As clearly depicted in Figure 6.2 above, the contributory actor categories 4 to 6 
play an important role in the Medellín Cartel’s fitness landscape.   As noted in 
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Chapter 5, contributory actor categories are often overlooked in more traditional 
analysis of a criminal group.  As also clearly evident in Figure 6.2, the volume of 
actors in category 6 is significant and completely overshadows the other actor 
volumes.  As a result, two infographics, one excluding and the other including 
category 6, have been provided.  As described in Chapter 5, this new category 6 
represents an active contributory set of actors that are consumers of the illicit 
goods and services offered, and in doing so, are enabling or facilitating criminal 
conduct of the Medellín Cartel.  Detailed analysis and discussion of category 6, 
together with categories 1 to 5 are considered in sections 6.4.2 to 6.4.7 below, 
including types of actors and interconnectivity strengths.   
6.4.2 Category 1: Manifest (active) actors 
Manifest criminally exploitable ties comprise active actors involved in the day-to-
day running and operations of the Medellín Cartel.  Based on an analysis of the 
complex data set, Figure 6.3 below depicts 12 types of actors in this category, with 
interconnectivity strengths ranging from strong-weak (shaded from dark-light).  
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Figure	6.3:		Infographic	1:	Manifest	(active)	actors	of	the	Medellín	Cartel		
	
	 	
	
Source:	Information	based	on	the	complex	data	set	referenced	in-text	
	
1. Boss: Escobar  
Starting at the top of the Medellín Cartel, Escobar was the boss or kingpin who led 
the collective, or in other words, the cartel.  As pointed out by Clawson and Lee 
(1998:47), it was Escobar’s ‘vast sway over trafficking operations – that is, Escobar’s 
mantle of leadership, his access to the means of violence, and his ruthless 
domination of smaller exporters [that] held the coalition together and established 
its identity’.  Escobar was essentially ‘the heart’ of the Medellín Cartel and known 
as the ‘boss of bosses’ or simply El Patron (the Boss) (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002; 
Escobar JP 2016).  Although Escobar is analysed in the next chapter, an overview 
of Escobar’s background, goals and desires in forming the Medellín Cartel is also 
considered here for the purposes of establishing his role in the fitness landscape.  
Unlike the way he liked to portray himself from humble beginnings, especially in 
INTERCONNECTIVITY	
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	 158	
the media and later political spotlight, Escobar was raised in a lower to middle 
class family by Colombian standards, where his father was a farmer and his 
mother a school teacher (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  According to Escobar’s 
brother, Roberto de Jesús Escobar Gaviria (‘Roberto’), also a key associate of the 
Medellín Cartel, Escobar knew what he wanted from an early age (Escobar R 
2010:11): 
Even	as	a	very	young	boy	he	would	tell	our	mother,	“Wait	until	I	grow	up,	mommy.		I’m	
going	to	give	you	everything.		Just	wait	until	I	grow	up.”		And	as	he	got	older	he	decided,	
“When	I’m	twenty-two	years	old	I	want	to	have	a	million	dollars…”.		And	his	other	great	
ambition	was	equally	improbable.		He	intended	to	become	the	president	of	Colombia.			
Fragment	14:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother	
Although Escobar did not have a million dollars by the age of 22, he soon 
surpassed his goal and became a billionaire in his early 30s and one of the richest 
men in the world.  Unlike many Colombians, Escobar had the opportunity to 
attend school and college, but soon dropped out and preferred life as a petty thief 
and an accomplished car thief (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  Escobar soon ‘realised 
that he had created an even more lucrative market.  He started selling protection’ 
(Bowden 2002).  People paid him to prevent their vehicles from being stolen, so he 
began to make money on cars he stole as well as those he did not steal.   He soon 
graduated in the world of crime and diversified his criminal activities under the 
influence of a number of mentors.  Assassinations and kidnappings became his 
speciality, before he followed in his grandfather’s footsteps, who had been a 
bootlegger in his time (Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  In a 
culture where ‘risky and illicit business was the norm, and where police, customs 
and boat captains made a living out of bribery and extortion’ it was contraband, 
not drugs that initially attracted Escobar’s attention (Strong 1995:27).  However, 
before long, Escobar went into business with his cousin, Gustavo de Jesús Gaviria 
Rivero (‘Gustavo’) and began his cocaine business in the early-mid 1970s.  Escobar 
was the entrepreneur and Gustavo, his cousin, his right-hand man, the 
administrative brains behind the business (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002; Escobar R 
2010; Escobar JP 2016).  Eventually, Escobar wanted more and sought out the other 
Medellín entrepreneurs at the time.  It was Escobar’s vision of a bigger business, 
with shared risks, and bigger profits that attracted the attention of others (Strong 
1995; Bowden 2002).  In the beginning, Escobar’s solitary goal of the Medellín 
Cartel was to be rich and share the operational risks in producing and trafficking 
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the cocaine.  As the boss of the cartel, Escobar’s interconnectivity strength is 
assessed as the strongest.   
2. Leaders: The Ochoa bothers and Gacha 
The leaders of the Medellín Cartel were the Ochoa brothers (Juan, Jorge and Fabio) 
and José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha (‘Gacha’: as not to confuse him with the Cali 
Cartel Rodríguez bothers).  While each leader maintained their own personal 
trafficking businesses, including their own pilots, representatives abroad, cocaine 
packers and shipping routes, they ‘all revolved around Escobar’ (Clawson & Lee 
1998:47).  The Ochoa Brothers and Gacha were born during the same era as Escobar 
and all lived in and around Medellín.  While the Ochoa’s were an old and 
respected family from cattle and horse breeding, with an obsession for all things 
Spanish, the Ochoa brothers were ‘not gentry’ or rich (Gugliotta & Leen 1989:26).   
They were lower to middle class and in the mid-1960s, their father opened a family 
restaurant to make ends meet (Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995).  The whole 
family worked long hours and eventually Jorge Ochoa led his brothers into 
smuggling as he was tired of seeing his family work hard for little return and 
wanted a better life for his family.  It was their uncle, an established smuggler, that 
introduced them to the cocaine world and his established smuggling routes.  
Adopting routes influenced by family ties, it was Jorge Ochoa who led and 
‘dominated the “Ochoa clan” from the beginning’ (Gugliotta & Leen 1989:26).  
Although he dominated the clan, in the words of Gugliotta and Leen (1989:26): 
Yet	he	was	an	improbable	criminal,	quiet	to	the	point	of	reclusiveness,	mild-mannered,	
family-orientated,	and	temperate	in	his	personal	habits.		Except	for	an	occasional	glass	of	
white	wine,	he	did	not	drink.		He	did	not	smoke.		Cocaine	was	out	the	question.		He	did	
not	permit	the	word	to	be	uttered	in	his	presence.		
Fragment	15:	Investigative	journalists 
Jorge Ochoa was only two months older than Escobar and they knew each other 
from childhood.  Escobar also often dined in their family restaurant and knew the 
entire family (Gugliotta & Leen 1989).  As Escobar looked to expand his routes, the 
Ochoa brothers certainly held some key cards.  Together with the Ochoa brothers, 
Gacha was the other leader of the Medellín Cartel.  Little is known about his 
background, except that he was born to peasants and known as El Mexicano (the 
Mexican) for his love of all things Mexican (Gugliotta & Leen 1989).  At the 
beginning of his career, Gacha worked in the emerald business as a gunman for an 
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emerald smuggler.  According to Escobar’s brother, Roberto (2010:53): 
Most	people	don’t	know	that	in	Colombia	there	has	always	been	more	violence	for	the	
control	of	emeralds	than	there	was	for	drugs.		But	killing	in	that	business	is	very	casual.		
Gacha	became	known	in	that	business	for	having	no	fear	of	anyone	and	killing	people	to	
succeed.	 	 At	 one	 time	he	worked	 in	 a	 bar	 in	Medellín	 that	 some	members	 of	 Pablo’s	
organisation	like	to	go	to.		Even	these	people,	very	tough,	were	impressed	by	the	Mexican.			
Fragment	16:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother	
Not surprisingly, Gacha soon met Escobar and formed a ‘peasant’ bond.  Gacha 
also ran his own business, pioneering the cultivation and refinement of coca in 
Colombia itself, with the development of jungle plantations and large scale 
laboratories, adopting the Mexican trade routes used by the illegal emerald trade 
(Eddy et al 1988; Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  Similar to 
Escobar, the ultimate goal of the leaders was to be rich.  More importantly, they all 
brought something different and valuable to the table.  Collectively, their 
interconnectivity strength is assessed as strong.  
3. Key associates 
At the next level down, based on Zabludoff’s estimates (cited in Clawson & Lee 
1998:19), the Medellín Cartel had a small elite of c. 250 entrepreneurs or key 
associates who ‘supervise[d] every aspect of the cocaine business, including 
movement of cocaine from source countries to consumer markets, overseas 
distribution, and recycling of narcotics proceeds’.   The key associates were the 
most trusted of the Medellín Cartel and formed close bonds with the leaders – most 
were childhood friends.  According to Escobar’s brother, Roberto (Escobar R 
2010:10): 
Many	of	the	friends	we	made	as	children	would	end	up	in	the	business	with	us,	among	
them	Jorge	Ochoa,	who	with	his	brothers	built	his	own	organisation…Vaca,	the	cow,	my	
closest	friend…our	very	close	cousin	Gustavo	de	Jesús	Gaviria	was	the	one	who	eventually	
started	Pablo	in	the	business	and	became	his	closest	associate.		
Fragment	17:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother		
As well as their individual skill sets, most were hired based on trust, through a 
system where several people vouched for you and if you did not follow through, 
then you would not only pay with your own life, but with the lives of those who 
vouched for you (Eddy et al 1988; Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 
2002).  This system was particularly effective for those overseas, with no ready-
made family ties in place.  Some of the key associates that played a part in the 
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evolution of the cartel included Fernando Galeano (‘Galeano’) and Kiko Moncado 
(‘Moncado’), both Medellín based traffickers, and John Jairo Velásquez (also 
known as ‘Popeye’) who arranged security and was one of Escobar’s leading 
assassins (Eddy et al 1988; Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  
Others included family members, notably Gustavo, Escobar’s cousin as mentioned 
earlier and Roberto, Escobar’s brother, who was one of his accountants and also 
skilled in electronics.  Of the key associates located overseas, Carlos Enrique 
Lehder Rivas (‘Lehder’) and Jung were instrumental to the cartel’s success.  Lehder 
pioneered smuggling routes by private aircraft and even bought his own 
Bahamian island, Norman’s Cay, with a private landing strip for refuelling, only 
c. 300 kilometres from Miami (Eddy et al 1988; Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; 
Bowden 2002).  According to those who knew Lehder, he was described as highly 
intelligent, yet obsessive.  In an interview, Juan Ochoa describes him as ‘a very 
adventurous, curious man.  He was an adventurer’ (Frontline 2000e).  As for Jung, 
as well-documented in his biography turned into the 2001 movie Blow, he became 
a key distributor of cocaine in the US.  While some of the key associates came from 
different socio-economic backgrounds, ultimately, they all wanted to be rich, 
whether through desire or adventure, and they all brought something different, 
but important to the cartel.  As such their interconnectivity strength is assessed as 
strong.   
4. Professionals  
One of the most important actor types in any criminal organisation, including its 
fitness landscape, are the professionals.  They are often the key link between the 
licit and illicit worlds and many turn into informants or become key witnesses in 
criminal trials – often the accountants and lawyers.  Based on Zabludoff’s estimates 
(cited in Clawson & Lee 1998:20), the Medellín Cartel had a group of c. 500 
professionals, mostly freelancers.  Given the extent of the Medellín Cartel’s 
operations, it is reasonable to assume that c. 75% (375) of these freelancers were 
active full-time workers and the remaining 25% (125) dormant, as and when needs 
arise.  Included in this well-documented population were pilots (mainly 
Americans), chemists (including specialists from Germany), financial advisors, 
accountants, lawyers, brokers and realtors, both in Colombia and overseas (Eddy 
et al 1988; Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  As with most 
professionals, these actors were not your typical low-life criminals or thugs, they 
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were experts in their field, from higher socio-economic backgrounds with higher 
levels of educational and professional training.  They also often came across as 
personable, charming and articulate, which made it difficult to determine which 
side they were on.  One such expert, and later turned DEA informant, was Adler 
Berriman “Barry” Seal (‘Seal’), an American pilot.  Seal had been passionate about 
flying since childhood and at the age of 26 became the youngest 747 pilot in the 
US.  However, following a run-in with some federal agents, his career took a 
decisive change –  smuggling for the Medellín Cartel.  As a testament to his 
expertise (Eddy et al 1988:304-5): 
He	raised	 to	an	art	 form	the	so-called	“sea	spray	height”	 flying	 technique,	keeping	his	
aircraft	so	close	to	the	water	that	spray	from	the	waves	misted	the	windshield.		He	also	
pioneered	a	new	aerial	smuggling	route	that	avoided	both	the	Bahamas	and	Florida	by	
exploiting	what	he	called	the	“lax	radar	coverage”	over	the	Gulf	of	Mexico…since	most	of	
the	flights	were	at	night,	Seal	equipped	himself	and	his	pilots	with	powerful	night-vision	
goggles,	at	$5,000	a	pair,	that	magnified	available	light	50,000	times.		He	and	his	men	air-
dropped	duffle	bags	full	of	cocaine	at	predetermined	locations	in	Louisiana,	where	waiting	
helicopters	took	them	on	to	their	final	destination.		
Fragment	18:	Investigative	journalists		
Other less known professionals were military advisers and instructors, especially 
those linked to other criminal groups, mostly overseas.  Given the nature of some 
of the tactics employed by the Medellín Cartel, especially as the group evolved, a 
key military adviser was known to be Yair Klein (‘Klein’).  According to a 
declassified intelligence report (US Department of Defense 1991:10): 
Yair	(Klein)	–	retired	Israeli	Army	Colonel,	Mercenary	and	expert	in	Military	tactics.		Klein	
sent	advisors	to	the	Medellín	Cartel	to	train	the	cartel	paramilitary	forces	and	selected	
assassin	 team	 leaders	 on	 how	 to	 unleash	 waves	 of	 terrorism	 in	 Colombia…Klein	 also	
facilitated	the	transport	of	weapons	and	ammunition…which	eventually	surfaced	in	the	
possession	of	the	Colombian	cartels	and	Colombian	guerrilla	forces.		
Fragment	19:	US	declassified	government	document	
Given i) the freelance nature of these professionals; ii) the alternative means of 
illicit income from other hiring groups or even licit income from their own 
professions; and iii) their strong bargaining power if captured of turning 
informant or key witness for state authorities, their overall interconnectivity 
strength is assessed as moderate for manifest actors (given their often full or part-
time relationship) and weak to moderate for latent actors (given the periodicity as 
and when needs arise).  
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5. Assassins (sicarios) 
In Colombia, trained assassins or sicarios are best described in a US declassified 
government document (US Department of State 1993a):   
These	young,	lower-class	killers	can	be	hired	by	anyone	from	a	jealous	husband	to	Pablo	
Escobar	to	kill	anyone	from	his	wife’s	lover	to	a	presidential	candidate.		True	“hitmen”,	
they	are	cold	blooded	murderers	who	will	take	on	any	contract	if	the	price	is	right…The	
line	between	arch-enemy	narco	sicarios	and	guerrilla	militiamen	is	a	fine	one.		The	two	
grow	up	and	live	in	the	same	poor	Barrios,	and	the	acquisition	of	money	is	a	driving	force;	
both	 narco-traffickers	 and	 guerrilla	 groups	 pay	 a	 salary.	 	 Indeed,	 Colombian	 guerrilla	
groups	earn	a	 substantial	portion	of	 their	 livelihood	 from	drugs.	 	A	Bogota	newspaper	
columnist	 recently	 labelled	all	of	Colombia’s	violent	as	“sicarios”,	no	matter	 for	whom	
they	work.		“Their	profession	is	to	kill.		Their	compensation	is	the	money”.		
	
Fragment	20:	US	declassified	government	document	
 
Essentially, in Medellín, assassination became such a lucrative business that ‘an 
entire cottage industry’ sprung up and became a ‘sought-after skill’ (MacQuarrie 
2015:4).  While Zabludoff’s estimate of c. 500 Medellín Cartel professionals 
includes ‘assassins’, based on other sources, ‘some 3,000 hired killers reportedly 
worked on the cartel’s payroll’ as sicarios (Clawson & Lee 1998:53).  In Medellín’s 
city with an estimated population of c. 2 million in the 1980s, 3,000 appears to be a 
more realistic estimate than Zabludoff’s few hundred (Mongabay 2016).  
Moreover, in a US declassified intelligence report, individual sicario gangs 
comprised c. 100 criminals each and there were numerous gangs in Medellín (US 
Department of Defense 1991).  Based on this analysis, applying the same split 
between active and dormant actors as the professional freelancers, it is estimated 
that c. 75% (2,250) of sicarios were active with the remaining 25% (750) dormant.  
As for their interconnectivity strength, as pointed out by Strong (1995:155): 
The	adolescent	contract	killers	preferred	to	 live	one	minute	as	a	somebody	than	thirty	
years	as	a	nobody;	and	when	they	died,	to	be	wearing	Nike	running	shoes	[as	their	hero	
Pablo]	 astride	 a	 shiny	 Japanese	 motorbike,	 while	 their	 mothers	 cooed	 over	 a	 new	
refrigerator.		Killing	became	a	way	of	life,	however	short	that	life	might	be.			
Fragment	21:	Investigative	journalist		
Furthermore, most of them came from marginal sectors, with little to no education 
to enable viable alternatives and match the same pay as a sicario, and often started 
as minors.  They also joined to feel a sense of belonging and part of a community, 
and idolised Escobar, as their families had already benefitted from his generous 
provision of housing and facilities in and around Medellín that the state could not 
afford (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002; Escobar R 2010; Escobar JP 2016).  Due to the 
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lack of alternatives, their sense of belonging and devotion to Escobar, it is 
reasonable to assign a moderate to strong interconnectivity rating for manifest 
actors and a moderate rating for latent actors due to the periodicity of their 
relationship.  
6. Specialised employees  
Based on Zabludoff’s estimates (cited in Clawson & Lee 1998:20), the Medellín 
Cartel employed specialised functions employing c. 2,500 plus specialised 
employees.  Due to the need for secrecy and insulation, functions were kept 
separate from each other so that each function was unaware of the others business.  
As such, if one part of the business was discovered, the other parts would not be 
impacted.  They included laboratory operations, transport, distribution, dealers, 
enforcement, administrative, accounting and money laundering operations 
(Clawson & Lee 1998; Reuter 2014; Thoumi 2014).  Although these functions were 
specialised, not all employees were specialists.  Each function was often led by one 
of the Medellín Cartel’s key associates and also comprised professional operatives 
such as chemists, pilots and accountants.   For example, in accounting (Escobar R 
2010:80-81): 
To	keep	control	of	the	money,	we	had	ten	offices	all	around	Medellín	with	accountants	
working	in	each	of	them.		Again,	the	locations	were	known	only	to	Pablo	and	myself.		The	
offices	were	 in	buildings	and	private	homes.	 	 In	buildings,	 they	were	disguised	as	 real	
estate	offices	with	different	names	for	cover…Each	office	had	a	special	purpose.		At	one	
office	we	would	meet	the	people	who	hid	money,	in	another	we	would	meet	our	friends,	
and	another	was	for	the	banks…I	hired	the	ten	accountants.		Some	of	them	were	relatives;	
others	were	friends	or	strongly	recommended	professionals.		Two	of	them	were	young	
and	we	paid	their	costs	to	go	through	school	to	study	accounting	and	then	we	put	them	
to	work.	
Fragment	22:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother		
As most of the specialised employees were full-time, rather than freelancers, with 
socio-economic backgrounds lower than their professional counterparts and less 
opportunities for alternative high incomes, their interconnectivity strength is 
assessed as between moderate to strong.   
7. Semi-professionals and unskilled 
 
The next level estimated by Zabludoff (cited in Clawson & Lee 1998:20) are semi-
professionals and unskilled workers, many working part-time.  According to 
Zabludoff’s estimates, the Medellín Cartel employed c. 5,000 of these workers.  
Semi-professionals included security, surveillance, radio and heavy equipment 
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operators, together with bodyguards, guards and drivers. Unskilled workers 
comprised runners (messengers), couriers, mules (to transport drugs), smurfs (to 
deposit cash below certain banking limits), together with general labourers.  On 
analysing the Colombian class structure, the socio-economic drivers of some of 
these workers becomes apparent (Encyclopedia Britannica 2016): 
The	vast	majority	of	the	population	belongs	to	the	“marginal”	classes,	who	lack	steady	
employment	and	must	eke	out	a	living	by	any	possible	means,	and	the	lower	classes,	who	
are	mainly	physical	labourers…At	the	middle	and	upper	echelons	of	the	social	structure	
are	those	who	have	more	highly	skilled	work,	including	the	professions…Family	ties	are	
key	in	business	and	political	life,	and	it	is	common	to	find	young	men	or	women	following	
their	fathers’	footsteps.	
	
Fragment	23:		Encyclopedic	document		
 
Many of these workers had an elementary level of education and often worked out 
of necessity.  However, as Strong (1995:156) highlights: 
Yet	poverty	and	social	hardship	themselves	were	not	the	root	causes	of	the	problem.		In	
an	environment	whose	moral	values	had	caved	in	to	the	primacy	of	money	and	power,	
pleading	economic	necessity	was	merely	an	excuse	to	commit	a	crime:	a	convenient	lie	
arising	mainly	out	of	the	envy	generated	by	disparities	in	wealth	levels	which	the	cocaine	
trade	had	made	glaringly	apparent.	
Fragment	24:	Investigative	journalist		
 According to one priest (cited in Strong 1995:68): 
Social,	family,	religious	and	civil	values	were	simply	cashed	in…it	had	nothing	to	do	with	
economic	necessity,	although	there	arose	the	idea	that	it	was	better	to	be	rich	for	a	short	
time	than	poorish	forever.		The	mafia	was	fashionable.			
Fragment	25:		Colombian	priest			
In terms of interconnectivity strength, trust is a key currency of any criminal 
group, and largely implicit between family and friends, and those raised in the 
same poverty stricken neighbourhoods in and around Medellín.  The rationale 
being, if the workers knew each other, it would be harder to betray each other.  For 
the Medellín Cartel, recruitment at this level was primarily based on close family, 
friendship or neighbourhood ties, and not necessarily on a skill.  Moreover, as 
everyone knew your family and friends, and more importantly where they lived, 
the threat of harming your family if you stepped out of line, mostly kept everyone 
in order (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  Given that most of these employees were 
expendable, their interconnectivity strength is assessed as weak to moderate.  
  
	 166	
8. Coca farmers & workers 
One of the largest actor types contributing to the fitness landscape of the Medellín 
Cartel are the agricultural workers, including coca growers, coca paste refiners and 
processors.  Based on Zabludoff’s estimates (cited in Clawson & Lee 1998:20), the 
Medellín Cartel employed up to c. 67,500 agricultural workers.  Without coca, 
there was no cocaine, so the agricultural workers were vital to the Medellín 
Cartel’s success.  According to Escobar’s brother, Roberto (Escobar R 2010:57):	
Pablo	and	his	partners	in	Medellín	built	many	laboratories	hidden	in	the	primitive	areas	
of	the	Colombian	jungle…some	of	these	places	grew	to	become	small	cities…[with]	their	
own	dining	areas,	a	school	for	their	children,	medical	attention,	and	even	rooms	to	watch	
satellite	 television…as	many	 as	 two	 hundred	 people	 lived	 [in	 each	 location]…a	 few	 of	
them	farmers,	but	 the	others	worked	 in	 the	 laboratory	manufacturing,	packaging,	and	
transporting	 the	 cocaine…almost	 all	 of	 the	 workers	 were	 recruited	 from	 the	 poorest	
neighbourhoods	of	Medellín;	they	received	a	salary	as	well	as	shelter,	food,	and	medical	
care.		
Fragment	26:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother		
Despite receiving a salary, as well as food, shelter and medical care, as Clawson 
and Lee (1998:131) put it: 
The	 coca	 farmers	 present	 quite	 a	 different	 problem	 from	 the	 drug	 lords.	 	 The	major	
traffickers	are	a	murderous	lot	who	deserve	little	sympathy.		The	farmers	on	the	other	
hand,	are	simple	folks	eking	a	living;	they	do	not	see	and	do	not	fully	understand	the	evil	
effects	 of	 the	 drug	 produced	 from	 the	 crop…no	 one	 proposes	 jailing	 the	 farmers	 for	
growing	a	generally	illegal	crop.		
Fragment	27:	Economic	&	political	scholars	
Over the last two decades, there has been much debate and discussion on the 
viable licit alternatives open to farmers (Clawson & Lee 1998; Thoumi 2003; 2014).   
Given some of the alternatives, albeit less profitable, and the many actors involved, 
not just traffickers, but also guerrillas and paramilitaries, the interconnectivity 
strength to the Medellín Cartel is assessed as weak.   
9. State officials and/or officers 
As noted earlier, Colombia’s historical and widespread problem of bribery and 
corruption, including state officials and/or officers, law enforcement, the military, 
the judiciary and politicians, provides the perfect backdrop for wealthy traffickers 
such as the Medellín Cartel to improve its fitness landscape.  In an interview with 
Colonel Martinez, the extent of the problem in law enforcement is clearly depicted 
(Streatfeild 2000): 
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There	was	just	so	much	money.		No	one	could	even	conceive	of	a	$1	million	bribe.		At	that	
time,	 the	 police	 salary	 was	 $250	 a	 month.	 	 They	 would	 offer	 [an	 officer]	 $250,000,	
$300,000,	$500,000	and	of	course	he	would	turn	out	to	be	bribeable.		Especially	the	ones	
who	located	the	laboratories	so	that	they	wouldn’t	confiscate	the	drugs	–	or	the	police	
who	found	shipments.		A	lot	of	police	started	putting	up	their	own	roadblocks,	knowing	
when	the	shipments	would	pass	by.		But	they	didn’t	confiscate	anything	–	they	just	took	
the	bribes.			
Fragment	28:	Colombian	law	enforcement		
Another example involving the judiciary is provided in a declassified cable from 
the US Embassy in Bogota to the US Secretary of State in Washington (US 
Department of State 1990):   
Colombia’s	battered	and	decrepit	criminal	justice	system	suffered	additional	setbacks	in	
the	past	week,	with	the	escape	from	prison	of	a	leading	Medellín	Cartel	terrorist	and	the	
release	by	a	judge	of	15	persons	suspected	of	ties	to	the	drug	mafia.		Substantial	sums	of	
money	allegedly	changed	hands	in	both	incidents	reflecting	the	justice	system’s	extreme	
vulnerability	to	corruption	and	the	need	for	comprehensive	reforms.		
Fragment	29:	US	declassified	government	document	
In terms of the number of actors open to bribes, first, the number of actors within 
state agencies and officials needs to be estimated.  Based on population estimates, 
wherever possible during the 1980s, the size of these agencies are c. 100,000 
military, c. 50,000 law enforcement, c. 20,000 local government officials, c. 5,000 
judiciary and c. 500 key members of the Senate, House of Representatives and 
Supreme Court (Encyclopedia 2016; Encyclopedia Britannica 2016; Encyclopedia 
of the Nations 2016).   In total, the population size of state officials and/or officers 
may be estimated at c. 175,500.  Given the extent of corruption in Colombia at the 
time, it is reasonable to estimate that at least 20% of this population (i.e. 1 in 5 
people) accepted bribes and at least another 20% were open to bribes (i.e. potential 
actor category 3 below). This provides a manifest and potential actor population 
size of c. 35,100 in each category.  Moreover, despite the supplementary and 
sometimes substantial income influencing some of their choices, many faced a 
difficult choice, due to Escobar’s plata o plomo (silver or lead) policy, where the 
alternative was either a bullet in your head, or more commonly, the threat of a 
bullet in your loved ones, particularly close family members (Strong 1995; Bowden 
2002).   In the words of Tambs, US Ambassador to Colombia, 1983-85 intermixed 
with words of Jack Blum (‘Blum’), US Senate investigator, 1987-89 (‘The Godfather 
of Cocaine’ 1997): 
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When	I	was	ambassador	down	there,	a	judge	would	be	assigned	a	narcotics	case.		Within	
a	very,	very	short	time,	a	bright,	young,	well-dressed	lawyer	would	show	up	with	first	of	
all,	a	briefcase	in	which	he	would	lay	a	plain	brown	envelope	on	the	judge’s	desk,	right?		
They’d	tell	a	man,	“You	have	a	choice.		You	can	have	lead,	bullet	in	your	head,	or	silver,	
some	money	as	payoff.			And	it’s	your	call.		Then	the	bright	young	lawyer	would	reach	in	
his	briefcase	and	take	out	a	photograph	album.		There’d	be	a	photo	album	of	everybody	
in	their	lives	they	considered	to	be	near	and	dear.		Shots	of	their	children,	children	coming	
out	of	their	home	in	the	morning,	going	to	school,	playing	in	the	playground,	talking	to	
their	friends.		So	the	implication	was	very	clear.		
Fragment	30:	US	government	officials	
Furthermore, the fact that most of these individuals had chosen a ‘lawful’ path, in 
itself, suggests most were faced with the difficult plata o plomo policy.  As a result 
of these mixed motivations – supplementary income for some, and simply no 
choice for others – the interconnectivity strength is assessed as weak to moderate 
for the manifest active actor population and weak for the potential population.  
10. Paramilitaries 
On estimating the size of the cocaine industry in Colombia, the role played by the 
paramilitaries and guerrillas in supporting the cartels was overlooked in 
Zabludoff’s estimates.  At the time of the Medellín Cartel, a number of paramilitary 
groups existed (armed groups in opposition to the guerrillas) and played an 
important role in supporting the Medellín Cartel. In particular, the paramilitary 
brothers Fidel Antonio Castaño Gil (‘Fidel Castaño’) and his brother Carlos 
Castaño Gil (‘Carlos Castaño’), became pivotal actors in both the rise and fall of 
the Medellín Cartel (Bowden 2002).  Evidence supporting their role is provided in 
a US declassified intelligence document (US Department of State 1994): 
Sometime	 after	 the	 mid-1980s,	 Castaño	 began	 working	 with	 Medellín	 kingpin…	
[Gacha]…together,	 they	 formed	 a	 paramilitary	 force	 of	 approximately	 200-300	 well-
armed	men	 operating	 in	 the	Magdalena	Medio	 region.	 	 It	 is	 unclear	which	massacres	
Castaño	ordered	on	his	own	and	which	may	have	been	conducted	jointly	with	[Gacha].		
After	[Gacha]	was	killed	by	Colombian	police	in	December	1989,	Castaño	began	working	
closely	with	Pablo	Escobar	and	eventually	became	his	military	adviser.		
	
Fragment	31:	US	declassified	government	document	
According to Clawson and Lee (1998:53), ‘as of mid-1989, some 11,000 paramilitary 
commandos operated in Colombia, many, though not all, under the sponsorship 
of the Medellín Cartel’.  Assuming c. 50% of these paramilitaries were under the 
influence of the Medellín Cartel and a 50:50% split between active and dormant at 
any one time, c. 5,500 paramilitaries (2,725 active, 2,725 dormant) would have 
played a role in providing protection and security to the Medellín Cartel.  Given 
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the paramilitaries’ primary objective was fighting the guerrillas, it is reasonable to 
assign a weak interconnectivity rating to these actors.  
11. Guerrillas 
Similar to the paramilitaries, a number of guerrilla groups existed at the time, 
including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (‘FARC’), the National 
Liberation Army, the Popular Liberation Army and the 19th April Movement 
(‘M19’) (DEA 1994).  These guerrilla groups were also labelled (and continue to be 
labelled by a variety of scholars) as rebels, insurgents and terrorist groups, by 
various governments, at various times, including Europe and the US (Hoffman 
2006; Leech 2011; Martin 2016).  Notwithstanding nomenclature, despite the fact 
that for most of the time the guerrillas and drug traffickers were seen as arch 
enemies, the primary goal of all guerrillas is a rebellion, and the illegal nature of 
both a rebellion and the drug trade may be seen as complementary (Leech 2011).  
As noted earlier by Gendron (2011:404), despite differing motivations, both groups 
‘are incompatible with the principles and values of civil society’.  Moreover, it was 
natural that their paths converged as both guerrillas and traffickers sought similar 
operational environments and territories (Joint Forces Staff College 2015).  In a CIA 
declassified intelligence document, the role of the guerrilla groups in the drug 
trade was described as (CIA 1992): 
Seeking	 larger	 profits	 from	narcotics	 and	 diversifying	 their	 roles	 in	 the	 drug	 trade…by	
imposing	‘war	taxes’	on	coca	growers	and	traffickers	in	their	operational	areas…Guerrillas	
guard	coca	fields	and	processing	laboratories	and	protect	drug	transhipment	operations	
by	providing	security	at	clandestine	airstrips…In	addition	traffickers	occasionally	use	the	
insurgents	 to	attack	 their	enemies	–	both	government	and	rival	 traffickers…Colombian	
guerrillas	have	long	used	their	drug	ties	to	obtain	arms	and	ammunition,	either	buying	
them	directly	from	traffickers	–	who	have	extensive	ties	to	private	dealers	–	or	receiving	
them	in	payment	for	protection	of	coca	processing,	storage,	and	transhipment	sites.		
Fragment	32:	US	declassified	government	document		
As argued by Bibes (2001:255), ‘originally, the insurgent groups and organised 
criminals did not have any common interests, only a common enemy: the state’.  
Essentially guerrillas aim to undermine the state, whereas traffickers aim to exploit 
it.  Despite their common enemy, the relationship between traffickers and 
guerrillas continued to be volatile and in particular (CIA 1992): 
Characterised	by	cooperation	and	friction…Although	traffickers	occasionally	benefit	from	
guerrilla	protection,	they	resent	the	insurgents	and	sometimes	have	used	force	to	resist	
their	 encroachment…however,	 we	 do	 not	 believe	 that	 the	 drug	 industry	 would	 be	
substantially	disrupted	in	the	short	term	by	attacks	against	guerrillas	[by	the	government].			
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Indeed,	many	traffickers	would	probably	welcome,	and	even	assist,	increased	operations	
against	insurgents.		
Fragment	33:	US	declassified	government	document	
Similarly, in a DEA declassified intelligence document, the DEA came to the same 
conclusion.  The DEA concluded that the relationship was ‘formed most 
commonly through ad hoc “alliances of convenience”’ and is ‘one of 
accommodation between traffickers and insurgents’ where the insurgents will 
never be major players in Colombia’s drug trade (DEA 1994:iii).  Based on this 
analysis, given the scale of the Medellín Cartel’s operations, it is reasonable to 
estimate that at least 20% of all guerrillas in Colombia at the time were involved 
in protection and security of the Medellín Cartel with an estimate of a 50:50% split 
between active and dormant at any one time.  During the 1980s, it is estimated that 
c. 10,000 guerrillas were active in Colombia (DEA 1994:6).   Based on this estimate, 
c. 2,000 guerrillas (1,000 active, 1,000 dormant) would have played a role in 
providing protection and security to the Medellín Cartel.  In terms of 
interconnectivity strength, given i) the differing motivations and volatile 
relationship; and ii) the alternative, more traditional, revenue streams to fund 
ongoing insurgencies (i.e. kidnapping and extortion), it is reasonable to assign a 
weak interconnectivity rating to these actors.   
12. International criminals 
Although a number of overseas individuals, acting as professional freelancers as 
mentioned earlier, provided military advice to the Medellín Cartel, a number of 
primary and secondary sources mention allegiances and alliances with not just the 
individuals, but the criminal groups themselves, such as the well-known Spanish 
terrorist group ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty) (Clawson & Lee 1998; 
Bowden 2002).  According to a 1991 US declassified intelligence report depicting 
over 100 profiles of criminals and terrorists, mostly linked to the Medellín Cartel, 
the following two profiles relate to the nexus between ETA and the Medellín Cartel 
(US Department of Defense 1991:9): 
Juan	Maria	(Oyarbide)	–	an	ETA	(Basque	Fatherland	and	Liberty)	terrorist	who	operates	in	
Spain	and	presently	is	a	consultant	to	the	ELN	(Colombian	National	Liberation	Army)	and	
to	the	Medellín	Cartel…Manuel	(Urrionnabaechea)	–	a	Spanish	terrorist	belonging	to	the	
ETA	movement	who	has	collaborated	on	terrorist	attacks	carried	out	in	Colombia.		The	
ETA…advised	the	Medellín	Cartel	on	carrying	out	terrorist	actions.			
	 Fragment	34:	US	declassified	government	document		
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Moreover, giving the extent of the Medellín Cartel’s operations in Europe, as well 
as the US, it is not unreasonable to assume that a certain level of co-operation 
between the Medellín Cartel and other local international criminals and criminal 
groups occurred based on mutual alliances.  In terms of numbers and 
interconnectivity strength, an estimate of c. 100 actors (50 active and 50 dormant) 
with a weak interconnectivity strength is assessed given the fluid nature of these 
relationships.   
6.4.3 Category 2: Latent (dormant) actors 
Latent criminally exploitable ties comprise dormant actors that may be called upon 
as and when the needs arise of the Medellín Cartel.  Based on an analysis of the 
complex data set and estimates and discussion provided in section 6.4.2 above, 
Figure 6.4 below depicts five types of actors in this category, with interconnectivity 
strengths ranging from moderate-weak (shaded from dark-light).  
Figure	6.4:		Infographic	2:	Latent	(dormant)	actors	of	the	Medellín	Cartel	
	
	
Source:	Information	based	on	the	complex	data	set	referenced	in-text	
6.4.4 Category 3: Potential (possible) actors 
Potential criminally exploitable ties comprise possible actors that may become 
involved in the Medellín Cartel to enable or facilitate criminal conduct based on 
convergence settings and/or matching dispositions.  As such, while some of these 
actors may already play a role in the Medellín Cartel (and already be included in 
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other volumes), some may also be in a position of being ‘turned’ as and when the 
need arises, and so a portion of potential actors has been estimated in this category.  
Based on an analysis of the complex data set, Figure 6.5 below depicts four types 
of settings open to opportunities, all with weak (shaded light) interconnectivity 
strengths. 
	Figure	6.5:		Infographic	3:	Potential	(possible)	actors	of	the	Medellín	Cartel	
	
 
	
Source:	Information	based	on	the	complex	data	set	referenced	in-text		
 
The first setting, as described and estimated earlier in Section 6.4.2 above, are 
opportunities arising from bribery and corruption of state officials and/or officers 
with an estimate of 35,100 potential actors.     
Recruitment opportunities  
The next three settings are recruitment opportunities arising from close ties 
between family and friends and convergence settings. Convergence settings 
include criminal haunts, such as drinking and gambling clubs, and prisons, where 
like-minded criminals may meet.  As mentioned earlier, it was in a drinking haunt 
that Gacha became known to Escobar.  Moreover, it was in a prison that Jung first 
met Lehder.  In an interview about his experience in Danbury prison located in the 
US, Jung commented (Frontline 2000c): 
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I	 knew	a	 lot	of	 interesting	people	 in	Danbury.	 	 From	bankers	 to	 lawyers	 to	doctors	 to	
Indian	 chiefs.	 	 You	 could	more	 or	 less	 learn	 anything	 you	wanted	 to	 learn	 in	 there	 in	
reference	to	illicit	activities.		It	was	basically	a	school.			
Fragment	35:	Medellín	Cartel	associate			
As noted earlier, Lehder was critical to the Medellín Cartel’s initial success and he 
had learnt his trade in prison.  Ironically, it was in an American prison.  As Jung 
points out (interview in Frontline 2000c): 
Carlos	never	ceased,	never	stopped.		He	was	like	a	student	is,	constantly	pumping	people’s	
brains	 about	 money	 laundering,	 about	 this,	 about	 that.	 	 About	 automobiles,	 about	
airplanes,	about	boats.		In	fact	there	was	a	guy	in	there	for	smuggling	boats	and	he	spent	
hours	and	hours	with	him	learning	navigation,	and	there	was	a	president	of	a	bank	in	there	
and	he	pumped	him	constantly	about	the	banking	system	in	America	and	how	one	can	
launder	money,	and	he	kept	files	and	files	on	everything…He	was	obsessed	with	it.		
Fragment	36:	Medellín	Cartel	associate			
As well as criminal haunts, other convergence settings, include physical localities 
such as neighbourhoods and places of work.  More importantly, a physical locality 
is open to opportunities in the role of informants or look-outs.   For example, 
Escobar used a network of juvenile look-outs in Medellín to trace the whereabouts 
of the police at any given time (Bowden 2002).   In terms of population sizes for 
recruitment opportunities, three estimates may be made: i) close ties; ii) prison 
inmates; and iii) informants/look-outs.  Based on the total number of manifest 
actors (116,755) estimated in category 1 above, who may still have family and 
friends with similar dispositions that are not already involved in the Medellín 
Cartel, an estimate of 10% has been applied resulting in 11,675 potential actors 
with recruitment opportunities based on close ties.  During the 1980s, it is 
estimated that Colombian prisons held c. 30,000 inmates (Encyclopedia of the 
Nations 2016).   Based on a similar assumption of those not already involved, an 
estimate of 10% resulting in 3,000 potential actors with recruitment opportunities 
are based on prison ties.  In terms of informants/look-outs based on physical 
locality, given the population of Medellín in the 1980s is estimated at c. 2 million 
people (Mongabay 2016) and most of the informants/look-outs would have been 
based in and around Medellín, taking an estimate of just 1% of this population 
results in 20,000 potential actors.  Given that all these actors are potential, a weak 
interconnectivity rating has been applied.   
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6.4.5 Category 4: Contributory (unwitting) actors 
Contributory criminally exploitable ties fall into three categories:  i) unwitting 
accomplices (category 4); ii) passive bystanders (category 5); and iii) consumers 
(category 6).  The first category comprises actors that may contribute to the 
criminal activities and endeavours of the Medellín Cartel, but the contribution is 
made unwittingly.  Based on an analysis of the complex data set, Figure 6.6 below 
depicts three types of actors in this category, all with a weak (shaded light) 
interconnectivity strength.  
Figure	6.6:		Infographic	4:	Contributory	(unwitting)	actors	of	the	Medellín	Cartel	
	
 
	
Source:	Information	based	on	the	complex	data	set	referenced	in-text		
 
On reviewing the complex data set, while a range of these actors certainly fell 
under unwitting accomplices of the Medellín Cartel, just as many, if not more, fell 
under witting accomplices, otherwise known as wilful blindness.  However, for 
simplicity, numbers are estimated based on unwitting accomplices of illegal 
activities that are often difficult to detect.  The three actor types are transport and 
shipping companies, chemical suppliers and financial institutions, including 
banks.  Of the first, given some of the innovative methods used by the traffickers 
in concealing shipments, from the early basic false-bottomed containers to the 
more sophisticated concealments, it is not surprising that some of the transport 
and shipping companies were none the wiser.   For example (Strong 1995:128): 
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Cocaine	[was]	compressed	and	coloured	to	appear	like	coffee	beans;	mixed	with	cellulose	
in	 the	 manufacture	 of	 cardboard	 boxes;	 and	 combined	 with	 glass	 fibre	 and	 other	
substances	to	create	hard	material	that	can	be	moulded	into	any	shape	desired…agents	
seized	dog	kennels	each	of	which	could	be	ground	down	and	treated	with	chemicals	to	
extract	cocaine.		
Fragment	37:	Investigative	journalist		
With chemical suppliers, wilful blindness is more likely.  To process cocaine in its 
varying stages, a range of chemicals are needed.  Like most chemicals, some have 
dual purposes, for example, ether is also a paint thinner and certain fertilisers can 
make explosives.  According to the DEA (cited in Strong 1995:119): 
In	the	first	half	of	the	1990s	at	least	fifty	chemical	traders	who	had	flirted	with	the	cocaine	
business	 were	 murdered.	 	 However,	 some	 international	 companies	 lusted	 for	 the	
business,	throwing	ethics	to	the	wind…Most	of	the	cocaine	chemicals	came	from	the	US.		
The	 main	 providers	 and	 importers	 were	 Shell	 and	 Exxon.	 	 Thereafter,	 acetone	 was	
imported	 almost	 exclusively	 from	 the	 US	 by	 Shell,	 mostly	 for	 a	 Cali	 cigarette	 filter	
manufacturer.		Ether,	meanwhile	came	to	be	imported	to	Colombia	mainly	from	Germany	
and	Holland.			
Fragment	38:	Investigative	journalist		
And finally, with financial institutions, while many bankers were certainly witting 
and fully aware of their actions as Mazur’s 2009 The Infiltrator book suggests, many 
lower-level employees would not have been aware of the illicit source of the fund 
movements and transactions.   In terms of providing estimates for the number of 
companies and employees involved in this category, while actual numbers are not 
easy to determine and may be significantly more, for illustrative purposes, an 
estimate of c. 1,000 individual actors in each type of industry has been provided, 
each with a weak interconnectivity strength.   
6.4.6 Category 5: Contributory (passive) actors 
In the second category of contributory criminally exploitable ties, actors comprise 
those that contribute to the criminal activities and endeavours of the Medellín 
Cartel through passively standing by without interfering.  Based on an analysis of 
the complex data set, Figure 6.7 below depicts a single population of actors in this 
category, with a weak (shaded light) interconnectivity strength. 
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Figure	6.7:		Infographic	5:	Contributory	(passive)	actors	of	the	Medellín	Cartel	
	
 
	
Source:	Information	based	on	the	complex	data	set	referenced	in-text		
 
The fact that there was a population of actors that passively stood by without 
intervening is not surprising.  They were basically the people of Medellín, 
especially the poor.  The poor stood by due to a sense of loyalty and personal 
allegiance, largely based on Escobar’s generosity, despite some of his motives.  
According to many accounts, including his brother Roberto, as well as building an 
entire housing estate called Barrio Pablo Escobar, in and around Medellín (Escobar 
R 2010:84-85): 
Where	the	poor	were	involved,	Pablo	became	the	man	of	getting	things	done…Pablo	built	
hospitals	 and	 equipped	 them,	 he	 built	 roads	 for	 small	 towns	 that	 before	 had	 been	
unreachable	 by	 car.	 	 He	 built	 hundreds	 of	 soccer	 fields…He	 fed	 the	 hungry,	 provided	
medical	aid	for	the	poor,	he	gave	shelter	to	the	homeless,	jobs	to	the	unemployed,	and	
education	to	those	who	couldn’t	afford	it	and	they	loved	him	for	it.		
Fragment	39:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother	
Essentially, Escobar had the population of Medellín in his back pocket and he 
knew it.  Some in Medellín, however, did not realise or fully appreciate the 
illegality of his activities and the Medellín Cartel’s, while others, including the 
middle to upper class, simply found it inconvenient, burdensome or risky to 
intervene and prevent and/or report the activities to the police.  In the 1980s, the 
population of Medellín is estimated at c. 2 million people (Mongabay 2016).  While 
it is difficult to estimate how many stood by, even if it was just 10% of the 
population, the estimated contributory passive actor population is c. 200,000, with 
an assigned weak interconnectivity strength.  Of note, when considering the extent 
of the Medellín Cartel’s operations, including overseas, notably Miami, other 
populations of passive actors may be considered.  However, given the significance 
of the population of Medellín to the locality of the cartel itself and the challenge in 
determining estimates, other locations have not been considered.   
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6.4.7 Category 6: Contributory (consumers) actors 
The third and final category of contributory criminally exploitable ties comprises 
actors that contribute to the criminal activities and endeavours of the Medellín 
Cartel through being consumers of the illicit products and services offered.  Based 
on an analysis of the complex data set, Figure 6.8 below depicts two types of actors 
in this category, all with a weak (shaded light) interconnectivity strength.	
Figure	6.8:		Infographic	6:	Contributory	(consumers)	actors	of	the	Medellín	Cartel	
	
 
	
Source:	Information	based	on	the	complex	data	set	referenced	in-text		
 
As pointed out earlier, when it comes to appreciating the illegality of certain 
activities or services, certain communities do not see them in the same way, 
especially when the goods or services are in popular demand (Levi & Maguire 
2004).  As Strong (1995:56) notes, active business consumers of the Medellín 
Cartel’s ‘dirty money’ contributed to their success:  
Hard-pressed	 businessmen	 were	 soft	 targets	 for	 the	 dollar-rich	 traffickers;	 however,	
although	 their	 loans	 were	 welcomed,	 the	 traffickers	 preferred	 to	 invest	 in	 real	
estate…businesses	dealing	in	luxury	goods	and	services	thrived	on	the	traffickers’	custom	
and	investment.		Except	for	property,	the	mafia	were	most	interested	in	a	quick	return	on	
no-questions-asked	deposits.		
Fragment	40:	Investigative	journalist		
In Colombia, while the number of end-users of cocaine was relatively low, the 
recycling of dirty money through local businesses and the number of consumers 
of contraband supplied by the Medellín Cartel, given the state’s high restrictions 
on imports, including luxury items for the wealthy, certainly contributed to the 
cartel’s success.  Based on c. 2 million estimate of the population in Medellín in the 
1980s (Mongabay 2016), if just 10% of the population were consumers, the 
estimated contributory population is c. 200,000, with an interconnectivity rating 
assessed as weak.   In the US, however, the number of end-users of cocaine was off 
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the charts.  In 1985, at the height of the Medellín Cartel, the number of US cocaine 
users was estimated at c. 5.7 million users (US Office of National Drug Control 
Policy 1999).  Despite some of this cocaine being sourced elsewhere, many 
estimates suggest that the Medellín Cartel was producing c. 80% of the world’s 
supply (‘Killing Pablo’ 2003).  Moreover, the Medellín Cartel also supplied cocaine 
to other places such as Europe, but for illustrative purposes, estimates have been 
limited to 80% of the US end-users, being 4,560,000, with an interconnectivity 
rating assessed as weak. 
6.4.8 Graphical representation  
As explained in Chapter 5, a graphical representation of a group’s fitness 
landscape better discerns its overall shape, leading to a better understanding of 
the nature and strength of the criminal group, including its drivers and 
vulnerabilities.   
For the Medellín Cartel, as category 6 completely overshadows the other 
categories, for the purposes of a graphical representation, category 6 has been 
excluded, but not disregarded.  Based on the Medellín Cartel’s actor population of 
394,180, as depicted earlier in Figure 6.2 and its interconnectivity bands as 
analysed in Figures 6.3 to 6.7 above, Figure 6.9 below presents a graphical 
representation of the Medellín Cartel’s fitness landscape by volume of actors.  
	Figure	6.9:	Graphical	representation:	Medellín	Cartel’s	fitness	landscape	
Source:	Information	based	on	Figures	6.2	to	6.7		
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As clearly depicted in Figure 6.9 above, the Medellín Cartel derives a significant 
portion of its strength (98.4%) from its weak (88.2%) and weak-moderate (10.2%) 
interconnected actors. On further analysis, the composition of each 
interconnectivity band (shaded from dark-light; strong-weak) by actor category, 
excluding category 6, is depicted in Figure 6.10 below. 
	
Figure	6.10:	Interconnectivity	composition:	Medellín	Cartel’s	fitness	landscape	
	
 
Source:	Information	based	on	Figures	6.2	to	6.7		
 
As depicted in Figure 6.10 above, the moderate-strong and strong 
interconnectivity bands of the Medellín Cartel are comprised solely from its 
manifest category of criminally exploitable ties.  This is not surprising given that 
the core group of the Medellín Cartel, including its leaders and key associates, sit 
in this category.  What is surprising however, is the significance of the contributory 
categories 3 and 5 of criminally exploitable ties, comprising a large proportion of 
the weak interconnected actors of the Medellín Cartel, which would be even more 
significant if category 6 was included.  
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6.4.9 Visual representation  
To complement the graphical representations in Figures 6.9 and 6.10 above, a 
visual representation, using the new building metaphor, to better visualise and 
understand the diverse set of criminally exploitable ties representing the 
interconnected actors in the Medellín Cartel’s fitness landscape is considered and 
presented in Figure 6.11 below.   
	
Figure	6.11:		Visual	representation:	Medellín	Cartel’s	fitness	landscape	
Source:	Information	based	on	Figures	6.2	to	6.7	 
As seen in Figure 6.11 above, the visual imagery of a city skyline helps to promote 
a patterned style of thinking into how the Medellín Cartel was shaped and 
influenced based on its extended criminally exploitable ties.  The square shaped 
buildings represent the interconnectivity strength (shaded from dark-light; strong-
weak) of the different types of actors in order of strength and the round shaped 
silos in front of each building represent the volume of actors in each building (also 
labelled numerically).  Based on this analysis and resulting fitness landscape, the 
final step of the new complexity model is next applied.  
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6.5 Step 4: Insights – macro 
Applying step four of the new complexity model, using complexity prompts, 
insights are drawn from the data sets, contextual variables and fitness landscape 
of the Medellín Cartel to better understand its nature and strength and why and 
how it evolved, including interconnections at and across its system boundaries 
with other complex systems such as its allegiances and alliances.  On reflection, 
strategies and measures are also identified that changed, influenced and/or 
disrupted the weak, moderate and strong interconnections of the Medellín Cartel 
resulting in its ultimate demise.  
6.5.1 Insights macro-level overview 
As explained in Chapter 5, ‘for complex systems to survive, there must be a certain 
match between what the organisation does and how it functions and its wider 
environment or context’ (Kuhn 2009:40).  Moreover, understanding how 
criminally exploitable ties are formed and evolve underpins the ‘level of resilience 
of criminal structures’ (von Lampe 2016:123).  In other words, recognising the 
contextual variables out of which the Medellín Cartel emerged, is critically 
important to understanding its fitness landscape and why and how it emerged.   
In studying the emergence of the Medellín Cartel, together with its nature and 
strength, four chronological time periods will be considered as summarised in 
Figure 6.12 below:  
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Figure	6.12:	Chronology	of	key	events	of	the	Medellín	Cartel		
	 1. Rise	 2. Height	 3. Fall	 4. Demise	
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early	1990s	
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• 1984:	Los	
Extraditables	
terrorist	group		
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• 1989:	Search	Bloc	1		
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• 1992:	Escobar	
prison	escape	
• 1992:	Escobar	on	
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Source:	Author’s	summary	
In the macro-level case study analysis, while the central focus is the Medellín 
Cartel, Escobar, as the boss of the cartel, is also a key focal point due to his influence 
on the group.  As offered earlier by Lewin and Regine (1999:198), in a complexity 
informed world ‘managers and executives cannot control their organisations to the 
degree that the mechanistic perspective implies, but they can influence where their 
company is going, and how it evolves’.  As also mentioned earlier, a central 
concept of complexity is that while it is difficult to predict the exact state and 
outcome of a complex system, such as the Medellín Cartel, it is generally possible 
to model its overall behaviour, by placing emphasis not on the disorder of the 
system, but on the order or patterns inherent in the system itself.  
6.5.2 The rise of the Medellín Cartel – late 1970s to early 1980s 
As explained in Chapter 2, for organised crime to flourish, it needs accomplices 
from the outside world, including members of society who demand the illegal 
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products and services in the first place, and enablers, notably professionals, who 
provide or facilitate the services in the licit environment (van de Bunt & van der 
Schoot 2003b).  Based on the analysis of the Medellín Cartel’s contextual variables 
and fitness landscape, one cannot overlook the significance of the legalisation of 
drugs debate and contributory role of the US end-users and other consumers 
(category 6 in the fitness landscape) of the Medellín Cartel’s illicit goods and 
services.  Without either, the Medellín Cartel may still have emerged, but certainly 
not to the same degree or extent, and certainly not in the same shape or form.  
Moreover, the role of enablers, such as the accountants, lawyers, chemists and 
pilots also formed important criminal ties within the Medellín Cartel’s fitness 
landscape as will be discussed further below.   
Operating model  
The Medellín Cartel, as described earlier, comprised a collective of separate 
organisations and individuals, yet they all came together for a common purpose 
and shared needs creating a fitness landscape.  The common purpose was the 
pursuit of material gain through illicit wealth and shared needs were based on 
operational risks and economies of scale in the drug trade.  As Mallory (2007:52) 
puts it, ‘this loosely knit group of drug dealers joined forces for the purpose of 
achieving common goals with fewer liabilities than operating individually’.  The 
leaders of the Medellín Cartel, including its boss Escobar, were all contemporaries, 
learning their criminal trades at an early age, either through the family trade, with 
history repeating itself and amplifying criminal tendencies, or through mentors 
(Eddy et al 1988; Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  One notable 
difference, however, was the nature of their early trades.  Both Escobar and Gacha 
had been trained as gunmen and their use of violence had been regular.  In 
contrast, the Ochoa brothers had been trained in smuggling and had learnt the 
power of influence and discretion (Eddy et al 1988; Gugliotta & Leen 1989).   
Despite this difference, they were all entrepreneurs and more importantly, each 
had something different to offer.  According to Jung (interview in Frontline 2000c): 
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Basically	Pablo	was	there	for	supplying	[the	cocaine].		Carlos	and	I	were	in	the	transporting	
and	distribution	of	it.		The	Ochoas	I	think	mainly	were	in	the	political	aspect	of	it,	taking	
care	of	the	politicians	and	the	other	authorities	as	far	as	for	protection	or	what	have	you.		
So	that	was	basically	the	beginning	of	the	influx	of	cocaine	in	the	US…As	the	operation	
grew…I	think	Pablo	was	still	known	as	the	head	of	the	cartel	but	I	think	in	that	sense	he	
really	became	a	figurehead.		It	all	grew	beyond	his	comprehension.			
Fragment	41:	Medellín	Cartel	associate			
Together with its leaders, the key associates of the Medellín Cartel comprised like-
minded individuals, mostly family and friends, or ‘trusted’ acquaintances 
(Escobar R 2010; Escobar JP 2016).  As the business grew, the Medellín Cartel’s 
inner and outer circle grew, constantly changing the shape of its fitness landscape 
to encompass new functions, specialised employees, innovations and trade routes 
as they methodically sought out or even engineered opportunities.  As the 
Medellín Cartel always needed to stay one step ahead of the authorities, secrecy 
was a critical factor in its operations and success.  As noted earlier, it capitalised 
on fellow Colombian immigrants in US city hubs to quickly develop trusted 
distribution and money laundering networks, avoiding infiltration by US local 
authorities.  Moreover, as well as keeping certain parts of its business separate, it 
also used a range of methods, including outsourcing all, parts, or none of its 
business.  As such, it developed multiple paths to achieving the same outcome, 
including its own fully serviced end-to-end cocaine business (Kenney 2007; 
Thoumi 2014).  According to Juan Ochoa, one of the Medellín Cartel leaders, in 
response to how the business worked (interview in Frontline 2000e): 
 
I	had	several	ways	of	doing	this.	 	One	was	to	buy	the	cocaine	and	to	send	 it	 the	way	 I	
explained,	and	my	partner	would	sell	it	there.		The	other	way	would	be	to	have	your	own	
lab	where	you	would	process	it.		You’d	have	your	own	way	of	transporting	it,	a	plane	or	a	
boat	or	something	like	that.		You	send	it	at	your	own	cost.		Another	way,	you’d	end	up	
having	 to	 subcontract	 with	 other	 people	 to	 do	 the	 different	 stages,	 like	 processing,	
transport,	and	the	transfer	of	sales	to	the	person	that	you	had	contracted	in	the	US.			
	
Fragment	42:	Medellín	Cartel	leader	
 
Through a complexity lens, the flexibility of outsourcing different aspects of the 
business and keeping certain parts separate enabled the Medellín Cartel to prepare 
for change, and adapt its fitness landscape at short notice, keeping it one step 
ahead, at least for most of the time, of the authorities.  The business also grew 
exponentially against the exploitation of its contextual variables; for example, the 
Medellín Cartel exploited the growing popularity of the ‘drug of choice’ amongst 
the rich and famous as reported in the media.  Moreover, the lack of law 
enforcement, both in Colombia and overseas, as no one was looking at the time, 
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also contributed to their early success (Frontline 2000c; 2000e; Kenney 2011).  The 
Medellín Cartel also exploited the weak legal system, creating multiple shell 
companies and laundering of funds, making it difficult to track individual 
transactions and ownership of illicit funds and assets (Lilley 2006; Mazur 2009; 
Levi 2014).  Moreover, it took full advantage of its contributory actors, both 
unwitting and wilful blindness, notably financial institutions, chemical suppliers 
and transport and shipping companies (Strong 1995; Mazur 2009).  As the Medellín 
Cartel expanded, so did some of its shared goals and needs.  In an interview with 
Colonel Martinez, Escobar became important for two reasons (Streatfeild 2000).  
First, he offered Medellín traffickers insurance on their drug shipments, and 
second, he managed the protection of the Medellín people.  Essentially, Escobar 
was controlling and self-organising the security of the traffickers’ shipments and 
the Medellín people, through his protection rackets.  In relation to the first point, 
in the words of Colonel Martinez (interview in Streatfeild 2000):  
The	drug	traffic	in	Medellín	was	managed	by	so	many	people	who	would	end	up	turning	
to	 Pablo	 Escobar	 for	 security.	 	 They	 would	 give	 him	 a	 percentage	 of	 each	 shipment.		
People	who	had	no	structure,	who	were	not	part	of	an	organisation.		The	percentage	was	
like	a	guarantee.	 	 If	the	shipment	was	not	paid	for,	Escobar’s	organisation	would	make	
sure	that	it	was	paid.		He	would	send	over	collectors	to	get	the	payment.		All	they	had	to	
do	was	say	they	were	there	in	the	name	of	Pablo	Escobar	for	payment.		At	the	start,	no	
one	paid	much	attention	to	it.		These	people	soon	learned.		Their	security	was	managed	
by	Pablo	Escobar.				
Fragment	43:	Colombian	law	enforcement	
And to the second point:  
Not	all	 the	delinquents	of	Medellín	were	organised.	 	Many	groups	 in	 the	barrios	were	
small.		They	would	be	managed	by	Escobar.		One	group	would	be	in	charge	of	this,	another	
one	would	be	in	charge	of	that.		Each	group	in	the	barrio	would	select	who	it	was	best	for	
whichever	part	of	the	business.		People	would	go	to	Escobar	if	their	car	had	been	stolen	
or	to	try	and	get	back	kidnap	victims,	or	to	stop	extortion:	with	just	one	or	two	calls	he	
would	know	who	was	responsible,	would	order	the	car	or	the	person	to	be	returned	and	
would	call	the	people	who	had	asked	him	for	help	and	tell	them	that	he	was	now	in	charge	
of	the	situation	–	he	had	recovered	the	car	or	the	person	but	he	had	to	pay	a	fee	to	the	
bandits	–	so	the	victims	had	to	pay	him	instead.		Then	he	would	deliver	some	of	the	money	
to	the	criminals	responsible	and	keep	some	for	himself,	for	his	role.		
Fragment	44:	Colombian	law	enforcement	
Through a complexity lens, the more Escobar controlled and organised, the more 
he became an attractor himself.  He formed a sense of order, amongst the chaos, in 
both the trafficking world and society at large.  All roads or patterns led to Escobar.  
He essentially organised the local neighbourhoods and traffickers with his 
protection rackets and through Escobar they self-organised into much stronger 
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actors.  As will be discussed later, Escobar provided a repeating pattern, an order 
within the disorder, by providing protection rackets throughout his criminal 
career.   
Key exploitable ties 
Another key factor in the Medellín Cartel’s ascent came through its exploitation of 
Colombia’s past, another contextual variable.  Colombia’s long history of 
corruption enabled the Medellín Cartel to extend its criminally exploitable ties to 
corrupt state officials and/or officers, including law enforcement, the military, the 
judiciary and politicians.  As noted in its fitness landscape, the population of 
corrupt state officials and/or officers in both the manifest and potential categories 
of actors is extensive.  Early on in 1976, Escobar learnt the power of corruption, 
when he was arrested for a relatively small cocaine seizure.  Escobar tried to bribe 
the judiciary and officers involved, and when some of them did not take the bribe, 
he simply used his other power, violence, and had them killed (Eddy et al 1988; 
Gugliotta & Leen 1989).  As Bowden (2002:24) points out: 
Pablo	was	establishing	a	pattern	of	dealing	with	the	authorities	that	would	become	his	
trademark.		It	soon	became	known	simply	as	plata	o	plomo.		One	either	accepted	Pablo’s	
plata	(silver)	or	his	plomo	(lead).	
Fragment	45:	Investigative	journalist	
Essentially, Escobar was creating yet another pattern of behaviour, which the 
Medellín Cartel adopted.  As noted in Chapter 2, ‘although small organisations 
and even individuals may be socially dangerous…larger criminal organisations 
develop reputational benefits as well as economies of scale…creating a 
cumulatively greater social threat’ (Levi & Maguire 2004:398).  From Escobar’s 
small beginnings, the rapidly rising Medellín Cartel certainly posed a greater 
threat.  Moreover, due to the geographical expansion overseas, there were also 
‘more agencies interfacing with drugs’ over time ‘creating an increased potential 
for corruption’ (Harman 2006a cited in Mallory 2007:59).  This was certainly the 
case in Miami as depicted in the seminal book Kings of Cocaine (Gugliotta & Leen 
1989).  Police corruption relating to the Medellín Cartel, was no longer contained 
in Colombia, but also extended to the US.  
For the Medellín Cartel to flourish, as noted earlier, it also needed enablers from 
the outside world to provide or facilitate certain services in the licit environment.  
It also needed roles that were similar to the legitimate business world.  For 
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example, Carlos Toro (‘Toro’) worked for Lehder, one of the Medellín Cartel’s key 
associates, as a public relations officer.  As described in an interview (Frontline 
2000a): 
I	came	in	with	a	very	specific	job	description.		My	job	was	to	be	the	diplomat.		My	job	was	
to	be	the	public	relations	man.		He	knew	I	was	good	at	it.		He	knew	I	spoke	languages,	and	
he	knew	I	could	go	and	hold	the	prime	minister’s	hand	and	make	him	listen	to	us	that	we	
needed	more	cooperation…I	started	going	to	Nassau,	meeting	with	attorneys,	meeting	
with	bankers,	meeting	with	the	prime	minister’s	son…I	took	money	[bribes]	to	politicians,	
took	money	to	bankers,	to	attorneys	to	police.	
Fragment	46:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	
Moreover, as a former pilot of the Medellín Cartel, Fernando Arenas (‘Arenas’) 
highlights the lure of the criminal world to the professionals, and it is not just about 
the money (interview in Frontline 2000b): 
After	 a	 while,	 if	 you	 go	 back	 to	 your	 regular	 life,	 you	 miss	 that	 craziness…we	 feel	 a	
different	kind	of	excitement	during	that	kind	of	a	trip	flying	and	knowing	that	somebody	
could	be	down	there	and	they’re	going	to	catch	you…this	is	a	crazy	excitement	that	you	
look	for	after	a	while.	 	And	that’s	basically	what	happens.	 	 It’s	 like	an	addiction	to	this	
stuff.		I	have	seen	so	many	people	going	back	to	this,	not	because	of	the	money	and	not	
because	they	don’t	have	enough	money,	but	because	they	miss	that	part	of	life.			
Fragment	47:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	
Other examples include professional engineers (Escobar R 2010:60-68): 
Pablo	was	always	searching	for	new	methods	of	smuggling	drugs	into	the	U.S…the	primary	
method	 of	 transport	 was	 by	 airplane…[then]	 Pablo	 said	 we	 should	 transport	 by	
submarine…we	 couldn’t	 purchase	 a	 used	 submarine	without	 drawing	 attention	 so	we	
knew	we	had	to	manufacture	them…we	hired	a	Russian	and	English	engineer	to	design	
this	for	us.			
Fragment	48:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother		
Furthermore, within the Medellín Cartel’s fitness landscape, its increasing 
network of local informants, as well as its own private army of sicarios recruited 
from the streets of Medellín, certainly provided the cartel with a core strength.  
According to Colonel Martinez (interview in Streatfeild 2000), ‘people who were 
working in the drug trade were already delinquents, they were already criminals’.  
When you look at the profiles of the Medellín Cartel, this is certainly true.  
Moreover, the network of family and friends within the Medellín Cartel created 
interpersonal trust and loyalties, resulting in strong ties and less need for 
discipline.  Many of the barrios (neighbourhoods) resonated with the Medellín 
Cartel’s social support, motivated by frustrated socio-economic factors, not too 
dissimilar to Speckhard’s (2016) characteristics of a terrorist group, where 
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unemployment, underemployment and frustrated aspirations can all lead to 
feelings of alienation and a longing for personal significance that a group may 
offer, especially for the sicarios.  As noted earlier (Strong 1995:155), the sicarios or 
in other words, the ‘adolescent contract killers, preferred to live one minute as a 
somebody than thirty years as a nobody’.  They wanted to feel significant, and the 
Medellín Cartel provided that significance – it was not always about the money, 
although for most it was.  All of the Medellín Cartel workers, at each and every 
level, earned higher than average wages in the equivalent ‘legitimate’ job or 
profession.  Even the lowest paid workers earned more in one week than the 
equivalent monthly minimum wage (Clawson & Lee 1998; Thoumi 2003).  Illicit 
wealth was always a key incentive.  Through a complexity lens, the Medellín 
Cartel created ideal conditions to foster a personal criminal attachment to its 
fitness landscape, with both itself as a complex system, and the people within it.  
As a result, it provided the cartel with a core resilience with the already, and newly 
converted, delinquents and criminals of Medellín.  As will be discussed later, it 
was a change in the Medellín Cartel’s conditions, to foster personal criminal 
attachment, that contributed to the change in its fitness landscape, ultimately 
leading to its demise.  
MAS, guerrillas and paramilitaries  
As the wealth of the Medellín Cartel began to rise, the M-19 guerrilla movement 
soon adopted a new strategy of kidnapping wealthy traffickers to fund its cause.  
After a number of successful kidnappings, it was the kidnapping of the daughter 
of one of the Medellín Cartel leaders, Jorge Ochoa, that prompted a nation-wide 
meeting of all traffickers in November 1981 (Eddy et al 1988; Gugliotta & Leen 
1989).  As illegal non-state actors, the traffickers had no choice but to take matters 
into their own hands.  At this meeting, the traffickers, including the Medellín and 
Cali Cartels, amongst others, formed an alliance called Muerte A Secuestradores 
(‘MAS’) (Death to Kidnappers), where each of the traffickers would contribute on 
a voluntary basis either money, arms or soldiers through their paramilitary 
connections.  International criminals, some of them professionals, also played a 
role in either training or supporting the death squad (US Department of Defense 
1991; Clawson & Lee 1998; Strong 1995).  Shortly after, MAS waged a short-lived, 
but bloody and violent attack against M-19.   Following a meeting of MAS and M-
19 leaders, Ochoa’s daughter was freed, amongst others and M-19 abandoned its 
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strategy of kidnapping traffickers (Eddy et al 1988; Gugliotta & Leen 1989).  While 
the purpose of this group was short-lived, it brought together a range of 
autonomous complex actors, through their joint vulnerability to extortion, and 
shared need of ceasing the kidnappings and releasing the captives.  As explained 
earlier (Kauffman 1993), complex systems must be sensitised to one another and 
feel some sense of common identity or common focus to form allegiances and 
alliances, and that is exactly what had happened.  Although the goal of MAS was 
quickly achieved and the group soon dissipated, it also led to the co-evolution of 
broader co-operation between traffickers, realising that at certain times, it is better 
to work in cooperation rather than in competition with each other.  As Escobar’s 
brother, Roberto recounts (Escobar R 2010:54): 
Many	of	the	M-19	were	killed	in	the	Colombian	way	of	La	Violencia,	the	most	painful	way	
imaginable,	with	limbs	cut	off,	and	within	weeks	Martha	Ochoa	was	let	free	without	harm.		
The	success	of	this	effort	made	the	drug	traffickers	realise	how	much	stronger	they	were	
working	together	than	independently.		
Fragment	49:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother		
This co-operation, including an amicable division of US drug turfs, largely 
between the Medellín and Cali Cartels, held for a number of years (Eddy et al 1988; 
Gugliotta & Leen 1989).  Through a complexity lens, each group of traffickers, or 
complex system, continued to maintain its own identity and focus on its own well-
being, but certain parts changed to accommodate one another and compromises 
made.  Another important outcome of MAS was the elevation of Escobar amongst 
his peers, not just the Medellín Cartel, but other traffickers.  According to Morris 
Busby (‘Busby’), US Ambassador to Colombia, 1991-94 (‘The True Story of Killing 
Pablo’ 2009): 
[Escobar]	became	the	king	of	cocaine,	the	titular	head	of	the	Medellín	Cartel.	 	And	the	
Medellín	Cartel	had	the	reputation,	well-deserved	in	my	opinion,	of	being	one	of	the	most	
ruthless,	violent,	murderous,	criminal	organisations	in	the	world.	
Fragment	50:	US	government	official		
Escobar’s elevation was largely due to his insistence on the use of terrorist tactics 
and armed force against M-19 culminating in a quick success.  At the time, if you 
wanted to survive in the underworld, you needed to be more feared than your 
rivals.  In the case of Escobar, it was his intimidation and assumed leadership that 
cultivated his reputation of violence and influence amongst his peers (Bowden 
2002).  Of particular relevance, as noted earlier in Chapter 2, is that ‘terrorist 
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groups may bring forth leaders’ but ‘the criminal underworld may produce people 
with the necessary operational and survival skills’ (Bovenkerk & Chakra 2007:36).  
In Escobar’s case, he was both a leader and had the necessary skills.  While MAS 
in its original form soon dissipated, certain traffickers continued to contribute and 
form allegiances and alliances with paramilitaries to protect their lands and 
strengthen their own fitness landscapes, especially in guerrilla strongholds (Eddy 
et al 1988; Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Bowden 2002).  It was during this time that the 
paramilitary brothers, Fidel and Carlos Castaño, became close allies of the 
Medellín Cartel and Escobar himself (Bowden 2002).  As pointed out by General 
Miguel Maza Márquez (‘General Maza’), former Chief of Colombia’s Intelligence 
Agency, 1984-1991 (‘The True Story of Killing Pablo’ 2009): 
The	paramilitaries	were	[essentially]	an	armed	branch	of	the	drug	traffickers.		
Fragment	51:	Colombian	law	enforcement			
Through a complexity lens, Escobar was simply outsourcing his own pattern of 
success – his protection rackets.  As Colonel Martinez notes (interview in 
Streatfeild 2000): 
[Escobar]	had	always	done	this,	and	he	kept	on	doing	 it…protection	and	that	stuff…up	
until	the	end.			
Fragment	52:	Colombian	law	enforcement			
Finally, another important outcome of MAS was Escobar’s direct negotiations with 
the leaders of the guerrilla movement M-19.  To Escobar, M-19 was resourceful 
and clever, and perhaps a useful ally one day, in strengthening the Medellín 
Cartel’s fitness landscape.   According to several accounts, there was a kind of 
mutual respect between Escobar and the M-19 leaders (Eddy et al 1988; Gugliotta 
& Leen 1989).  This connection also perhaps planted a seed for Escobar’s later logic 
– if M-19 could stand-up to the state, and MAS (i.e. the traffickers led by Escobar) 
could stand-up to M-19, then why should not the traffickers led by Escobar stand-
up to the state itself?  As history tells us below, the M-19 did become a useful ally 
and the traffickers led by Escobar did stand-up to the state.  
6.5.3 The height of the Medellín Cartel – 1980s  
At the height of the Medellín Cartel, its leaders, associates and of course Escobar, 
enjoyed a life of luxury and extravagance.  They were fulfilling the Medellín 
Cartel’s ultimate goal – illicit wealth beyond their wildest dreams.  By now, 
	 191	
Escobar himself owned numerous properties, land, cars, planes, helicopters, price-
less artwork and even built himself a zoo full of exotic animals (Eddy et al 1988; 
Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 2002; Escobar JP 2016).  The Medellín 
Cartel’s operations were extensive, with multiple methods and channels for 
completing the same activity or task, allowing it to absorb operational shocks and 
setbacks, and more importantly, always staying one step ahead of the authorities 
(Kenney 2007).  At this time, the Medellín Cartel was continually looking for new 
business and smuggling routes, including new deals, allegiances and alliances 
with the governments of Panama, Cuba and Nicaragua (‘The Godfather of 
Cocaine’ 1997).   At the height of its success, the organisation became less directed 
and more enabled, allowing it to adjust the nature of its fitness landscape and 
interconnected actors to promote greater creativity and adaptability.  Essentially, 
the Medellín Cartel was at its optimal fitness, at the ‘edge of chaos’, where its 
emergent order was richer, more creative and adaptable, with its diverse set of 
actors and core strength.  Moreover, the emergent order was not imposed from 
above, but from the distributed influence throughout the Medellín Cartel.  The 
ongoing alignment of the Medellín Cartel’s core goal, combined with the lack of 
alternatives for most of its actors, contributed to its ongoing resilience.  Its fitness 
landscape comprised a variety of strong and moderate, but primarily weak 
interconnections, reflecting the fluidity of its strength.  As identified earlier, some 
of its core groups of actors, in terms of high volumes, participated in non-violent 
activities, such as agricultural workers and contributory passive assistance from 
local communities, including informants and operatives.  These high volume actor 
groups, while weakly interconnected, greatly enabled the cartel’s operational and 
logistical support, including the provision of sanctuary when operatives were on 
the run.  
Escobar’s political ambition  
Despite the success and wealth of the Medellín Cartel, Escobar wanted something 
that money could not buy, and certainly did not align with the goals or shared 
needs of the Medellín Cartel.  On reflection of many, including Escobar’s own 
family, former traffickers and state actors, what Escobar wanted certainly 
contributed to the beginning of the end of the Medellín Cartel (Eddy et al 1988; 
Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 2002; Escobar R 2010; Escobar JP 
2016).  As noted earlier, through a complexity lens, if a shared need is not felt, then 
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individuals will not be as motivated to engage with the group.  What Escobar 
wanted was political power and social legitimacy through the respect of the people 
(Eddy et al 1988; Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).   What this 
meant, was placing himself in the spotlight which ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ criminals 
avoid – they prefer to remain in the shadows – but not Escobar.  Although money 
does not buy respect, he certainly tried.  In the early 1980s, Escobar began engaging 
in social causes in the poor barrios of Medellín, including the building of housing, 
infrastructure and facilities, but also a deep and personal engagement with the 
people through organising scores of neighbourhood committees and events (Eddy 
et al 1988; Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  Whatever his 
motives, he certainly helped the people and they loved him for it.  Having built a 
power base for himself in the barrios of Medellín, Escobar decided to run as an 
alternate candidate in the congressional elections.  At the centre of his campaign 
was the people, the marginalised, but his key political objective was a cause to 
himself, changing extradition laws (Bowden 2002).  In one sense, the Medellín 
Cartel and Escobar were no strangers to politics or politicians, as most had been in 
their pockets for some time.  In the words of a former Medellín Cartel trafficker 
(‘The Godfather of Cocaine’ 1997): 
There	was	a	basic	competitive	nature	amongst	all	of	the	heads	of	the	cartel,	not	only	in	
how	much	coke	they	could	ship,	but	it	was	a	game	between	them	as	to	who	could	buy	the	
most	and	the	heaviest-duty	politicians.		
Fragment	53:	Medellín	Cartel	associate			
In 1982, Escobar won his alternate seat in congress, however, his political career 
was short-lived.  It was cut short by the Justice Minister Lara, who publically 
denounced Escobar as a trafficker.   Escobar was deeply humiliated and a year 
later, in 1983, removed from congress.  Although there were many behind closed 
doors who knew the true nature of Escobar’s illicit wealth, it was the first time that 
someone had publicly announced it (Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 
2002).  In 1984, Lara continued his crackdown on traffickers, and in March 1984, 
the state police had a major success in the seizure of Tranquilandia, a cocaine 
processing laboratory in the middle of the Amazon jungle.  At the time, it was the 
largest find in history, seizing 14 metric tons of cocaine worth over US $1 billion, 
together with numerous aircraft (Bowden 2002).  However, as Jorge Ochoa, one of 
the Medellín Cartel’s leaders points out (interview in Frontline 2000d): 
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In	1984,	the	police	took	over	Tranquilandia.		A	lot	of	people	were	working	there…We	could	
have	defended	Tranquilandia	at	the	moment	with	violence.		But	we	said	“No,	no,	there	
should	be	no	violence.”		So	police	took	over	the	place…I	don’t	think	it	affected	the	traffic	
much.		There	were	many	other	labs	all	over	the	country,	in	many	places…		
Fragment	54:	Medellín	Cartel	leader	
Although Jorge Ochoa’s comments were mainly directed at distancing himself and 
his brothers from Escobar’s violence, his comments also highlight the Medellín 
Cartel’s resilience to withstanding significant attacks on its operations.  Given it 
was the mid-1980s, at the height of the Medellín Cartel’s success (Forbes n.d.), 
through a complexity lens, the Medellín Cartel as a complex system, easily 
demonstrated its resilience, through surviving attacks on its constituent parts.   
Lara assassination  
Despite the Medellín Cartel’s ongoing resilience, Escobar was upset by the attack 
on Tranquilandia and still humiliated from Lara’s denunciation, so he responded 
in his signature style.  A month later, in April 1984, he had Lara assassinated 
(Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  At Lara’s funeral, President Betancur, the Colombian 
President at the time, announced the one thing that traffickers feared the most – 
he would restore Colombia’s extradition law (Bowden 2002).  Soon after, leaders 
of the Medellín Cartel, including Escobar, fled the country to Panama, then 
Nicaragua, before returning to Colombia to resume their fight against the state 
(Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  
Los Extraditables  
In 1984, given the cyclical change in the contextual variable of extradition laws, as 
Escobar no longer held political office, a new political strategy and alliance was 
formed to fight extradition. The alliance was once again between the traffickers, 
including the Medellín and Cali Cartels, and called Los Extraditables (The 
Extraditables).  According to the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium 
(TRAC) research database (TRAC 2016), Los Extraditables was: 
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An	organisation	created	by	Colombian	drug	lords	 in	the	early	1980s	for	the	purpose	of	
persuading	 the	 Colombian	 government	 into	 banning	 extradition.	 	 Initially	 the	 group's	
purpose	was	 to	 publish	 newspaper	 ads	 in	 which	 they	 defended	 their	 position	 and	 to	
influence	 political	 parties	 to	 speak	 in	 favour	 of	 their	 goals.	 	 However,	 over	 time	 their	
actions	 escalated	 into	 a	 war	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 mafia,	 with	 violent	 acts	 of	
terrorism	committed	against	politicians	and	members	of	law	enforcement.	Its	members	
were	 largely	 drawn	 from	 the	Medellín	 Cartel	 and	others	 linked	 to	 the	drug	 trafficking	
racket.		
	
Fragment	55:		Scholar	research	database	
 
Based on numerous sources, Los Extraditables was led by Escobar and Gacha, both 
from the Medellín Cartel, and it was essentially a separate terrorist group to serve 
the collective interests of the cartels and other traffickers (Strong 1995; Bowden 
2002).  Its political objective was to overturn Colombia’s 1979 Extradition Treaty, 
first through intimidation and corruption, then increasingly through violence.  It 
launched its first public letter on 15 November 1984 to protest the arrest of Jorge 
Ochoa in Spain.  On its letterhead and many more to follow, was the motto, ‘better 
a grave in Colombia than a prison cell in the US’ (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002; 
Escobar JP 2016).  As history tells us, both Escobar and Gacha did in fact end-up 
having their graves in Colombia, while many other traffickers ended up in a prison 
cell in the US.   
Through a complexity lens, based on Makarenko’s (2011) crime-terror continuum, 
instead of the Medellín Cartel simply adopting the tactics or turning into the other, 
a separate terrorist group evolved to serve the broader interests of the cartels and 
traffickers, and in turn strengthen their fitness landscapes.  Based on the different 
types of terrorism offered by Martin (2016), Los Extraditables fits into criminal 
terrorism, and more specifically into narco-terrorism, as it was created through 
politically inspired violence to change extradition laws.  Although the group in 
and of itself did not make any profit, similar to some of the paramilitary groups 
being seen as a security arm of the traffickers, Los Extraditables may also be seen as 
a terrorist arm.  In the formation of Los Extraditables, the Medellín Cartel also learnt 
from the co-evolution and dissipation of MAS.  Unlike MAS, Los Extraditables had 
clear leadership from the start, rather than assumed, as Escobar’s reputation had 
already been firmly established (Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 
2002).  Los Extraditables was also fully funded, as now there was a compulsory ‘war 
tax’ to pay, to fund the activities, compared to the voluntary contribution of MAS.  
Finally, it was also more organised and disciplined, with only its key leaders 
making political decisions (Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 2002; 
	 195	
Escobar R 2010). As argued by Bibes (2001:255), ‘criminal organisations [become] 
more political in nature, because to protect their long-term positions, they must 
have political influence’.  However, as both of its leaders were violent in nature, 
the group quickly favoured political violence, rather than political influence; this 
included selective political assassinations and kidnappings, to less discriminate 
targets impacting civilian populations, such as car bombings in populated areas, 
and symbolic targets, such as blowing up buildings (Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 
1995; Bowden 2002). Through a complexity lens, given this change in political 
violence, as will be seen later, complex systems that are no longer sensitised to one 
another to form allegiances and alliances will become strained.  As noted in 
Chapter 3, given the nature of complex alliances, this does not mean that all the 
parts are reading from the same page (Kauffman 1993).  According to the Ochoa 
brothers (interviews in Frontline 2000d; 2000e): 
The	violence	was	generated	by	Pablo	Escobar…we	were	never	in	agreement	with	those	
terrorist	acts…It	wouldn’t	point	to	him	personally,	but	“The	Extraditables”	terrorist	group	
was	Pablo	Escobar.		
Fragment	56:	Medellín	Cartel	leaders		
As highlighted in Chapter 2, ‘when it comes to a criminological theorising about 
organised or professional crime, what remains constant is the deployment of 
organised violence and the pursuit of illicit wealth’ (Sheptycki 2008:26).  In 
Escobar’s case, as well as the pursuit of illicit wealth, he deployed a special brand 
of organised violence, which influenced the violent nature of Los Extraditables 
killing thousands of innocent victims.  According to Steve Murphy (‘Murphy’), 
former DEA special agent based in Medellín 1991-94 (‘The True Story of Killing 
Pablo’ 2009): 
 
This	wasn’t	a	normal	criminal…Pablo	Escobar	rates	right	up	there	with	Adolf	Hitler.		This	
is	a	man	that’s	responsible	for	thousands	and	thousands	of	deaths	of	innocent	people.		
	
Fragment	57:	US	law	enforcement		
 
As will be discussed in the next section, it was during the latter part of the 1980s 
and early 1990s, that Escobar and the Los Extraditables drew upon Colombia’s 
violent past and contextual variable, to reap the most damage in their time.  
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M19 Palace of Justice attack  
In 1985, shortly after the formation of Los Extraditables, Escobar exploited his earlier 
connection with the guerrilla group M-19 and allegedly paid them in arms and 
money to invade Colombia’s Palace of Justice (Eddy et al 1988; Gugliotta & Leen 
1989; Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  This was despite the fact that, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, ‘organised criminals, in most cases, will not want to be associated with 
extremists for fear of coming under additional scrutiny’ (UK National Crime 
Agency 2015:3).  However, in Escobar’s case, he was no ‘ordinary’ criminal and 
already under extreme scrutiny.  Moreover, through a crime-terror nexus lens, 
given the nature of both Escobar and the M-19, it is difficult to determine who is 
the criminal and who is the terrorist in this alliance. According to most accounts, 
Escobar’s objective was two-fold – the kidnapping of the entire supreme court and 
the destruction of all the evidence against the Medellín Cartel and other traffickers 
supporting extradition cases ((Eddy et al 1988; Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 1995; 
Bowden 2002).  The attack also happened to be on the same day the supreme court 
was to have ruled on Colombia’s extradition law.  During the attack, 11 of 
Colombia’s 24 supreme judges were murdered and nearly 100 people killed.  More 
importantly, 6,000 case files of evidence had been destroyed (Strong 1995).  
Through a complexity lens, forming an early ally of the guerrilla movement M-19 
certainly influenced and shaped the Medellín Cartel.  However, this event also 
brought the Medellín Cartel and Escobar to the attention of the world’s press 
through their reported connections to the M-19.  Despite the media attention, the 
Medellín Cartel simply continued their lucrative cocaine business, amidst the 
carnage that followed (Strong 1995). 
6.5.4 The fall of the Medellín Cartel – late 1980s to early 1990s  
The Cartel wars  
As mentioned earlier, complex systems must be sensitised to one another to form 
allegiances and alliances, otherwise these relationships will become strained.  As 
also mentioned earlier, one notable difference in the backgrounds of Escobar and 
Gacha, compared to the Ochoa brothers, was the use of violence.  Similar to the 
Ochoa brothers, the Cali Cartel, notably the Rodríguez brothers, also preferred the 
use of influence and discretion instead of violence (Gugliotta & Leen 1989; Strong 
1995).  Compared to the Medellín Cartel, known for its violence, the Cali Cartel’s 
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nickname was ‘Cali’s Gentlemen’, in recognition of their higher socio-economic 
background and respectable business-like manner (Rempel 2011; Chepesiuk 2013).  
As such, the two groups of brothers from each cartel formed an early affinity, as 
evidenced by joint business ventures and investments between them, including 
co-ownership of a bank, the First Inter-America’s Bank, and even vacationing 
together (Chepesiuk 2013).   Unlike Escobar, the two groups of brothers also shared 
a similar view on politics and preferred to remain in the shadows.  Of note, while 
both sets of brothers distanced themselves from Escobar’s Los Extraditables’s 
political violence and terrorist acts, they also supported and benefited from the 
group’s activities (Frontline 2000d; 2000e; Chepesiuk 2013).  This is similar to 
today’s organised criminals, where criminals like to distance themselves from 
terrorists and terrorist groups, for fear of coming under additional scrutiny, while 
also benefiting from the activities between them (UK National Crime Agency 
2015).   
Moreover, according to a number of sources, while Gilberto Rodríguez, the eldest 
and most influential brother of the Cali Cartel, was jailed in Spain in the mid-1980s, 
Escobar ‘stole’ some of the Rodríguez smuggling routes and US markets, imposing 
a tax on other traffickers to use them (Chepesiuk 2007).  While Gacha and many 
traffickers agreed to Escobar’s terms, the Ochoa brothers, and other traffickers 
based in Cali, did not.  Along with some other disagreements at the time, the 
‘Escobar v Cali’ war of the cartels began (Chepesiuk 2013).  Notably, it is largely 
referred to as Escobar’s war and not the Medellín Cartel’s war, due to a mix in 
loyalties of the Ochoa brothers, eventually causing a rift in the Medellín Cartel 
(Strong 1995; Rempel 2011; Chepesiuk 2013).    
The war of the cartels began in January 1988, with the Cali Cartel bombing a 
building where Escobar’s family lived.  In retaliation, Escobar bombed a chain of 
pharmacies owned by the Rodríguez brothers throughout Colombia (Strong 1995; 
Chepesiuk 2007; 2013).  According to William Rodríguez, the son of Miguel 
Rodríguez of the Cali Cartel, in his 2014 autobiography called Yo soy el hijo del cartel 
de Cali (I am the Son of the Cali Cartel), with quotes translated into English by 
journalist Silva-Warren (2014): 
There	are	no	excuses	for	that	war.		Situations	were	presented	at	a	historic	moment	in	the	
country	where	a	man	named	Pablo	Escobar	wanted	supreme	power	and	even	wanted	to	
be	president.		He	completely	lost	his	sanity	and	turned	the	entire	world	into	his	military	
objective.		Pablo	Escobar	blew	up	more	than	50	local	pharmacies	and	killed	many	of	our	
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employees.	 	We	were	 fighting	 against	 the	 greatest	 Latin	 American	 criminal	 in	 history.		
When	 you	 are	 in	 a	war	 and	 conflict,	 unfortunately,	 there	 are	 casualties	 on	both	 sides	
[emphasis	added].	
Fragment	58:	Cali	Cartel,	William	Rodríguez,	son	of	Miguel	Rodríguez	
On numerous occasions, the Ochoa brothers tried to mediate between Escobar and 
the Rodríguez brothers (Gugliotta & Leen 1989).  As Juan Ochoa himself comments 
(interview in Frontline 2000e): 
My	brother	Jorge	was	closer	to	Pablo.		He	tried	to	intervene	so	that	things	would	be	done	
in	a	non-violent	manner.		But	Pablo	didn’t	accept	that	very	much.		My	brother	and	I	were	
not	very	close	to	him.		My	brother	simply	tried	to	mediate	when	there	was	a	war	with	the	
ones	in	Cali,	so	the	war	would	finish	and	there	would	be	no	more	violence	or	any	more	of	
that.		
Fragment	59:	Medellín	Cartel	leader		
Unfortunately, the mediation did not have the desired outcome and the violent 
‘Escobar v Cali’ war continued.  At the same time, Escobar was also continuing a 
violent war against the state in the name of Los Extraditables.  It is ironic that, at the 
same time, the Cali Cartel was benefiting from one war, Escobar’s Los Extraditables, 
whilst also engaging in its own gang war with Escobar.  As noted earlier, ‘unlike 
terrorist organisations…conventional criminal groups may have 
competition…[involving]…aggressive efforts to maintain “market share” and so 
called “gang wars”’ (Grabosky & Stohl 2010:111).  Through a complexity lens, as 
Los Extraditables was a narco-terrorist group, the Cali Cartel were more than happy 
to reap the rewards of its alliance and ‘co-operation’, whilst continuing its war of 
‘competition’ for market share.  The cartel war also caused a major rift, not only 
between the two cartels, but also between the Medellín Cartel’s own associates.  
Over time, the Ochoa brothers formed closer ties to the Rodríguez brothers, and 
so they became less connected to the Medellín Cartel, and some of their key 
associates also weakened their ties.  Essentially, certain associates of the Medellín 
Cartel started to feel the lack of a shared need with Escobar’s wars of competition 
and ongoing violence with the state.  
The violence  
As noted earlier, it was during the latter part of the 1980s and early 1990s, that Los 
Extraditables reaped the most damage, and took its violence to new extremes, 
killing thousands of innocent victims (The Godfather of Cocaine 1997; The True Story 
of Killing Pablo 2002; Killing Pablo 2003).  This period was terrorism at its worst and 
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played out in Colombia’s cities.  There were numerous terrorist acts, including 
countless car bombs of both state and civilian targets, kidnappings of the political 
elite and assassinations of over 500 policemen, 40 judges, an attorney general, the 
director of a major newspaper and a leading presidential candidate (Gugliotta & 
Leen 1989; Strong 1995; Clawson & Lee 1998; Bowden 2002).  In particular, the 
random bombings of civilian targets, including banks, offices, hotels and shopping 
malls, greatly influenced the mood of the people and made them feel very unsafe 
and fearful (Clawson & Lee 1998).  According to Blum, US Senate investigator, 
1987-89 (‘The Godfather of Cocaine’ 1997):	
I	don’t	think	I’ve	ever	been	in	a	place	where	so	many	people	are	so	heavily	armed	and	so	
quick	to	show	you	that	they’re	heavily	armed…Violence	was	a	trademark	of	the	Medellín	
Cartel	and	extraordinary	violence	was	their	special	trademark.	
	
Fragment	60:	US	government	official		
 
As also noted earlier, with the common characteristic of violence, it is important 
to distinguish between organised crime and terrorism.  While organised criminals 
use violence, the motivation is different (i.e. for material gain) and the victim of 
violence is usually the target (Hoffman 2006; Aly 2015; Martin 2016).  In contrast, 
the victims are not usually the target in terrorism, as the motivation and target is 
usually symbolic (e.g. a building) to change ‘the system’ and the victims are 
usually innocent bystanders, mostly civilians (Hoffman 2006; Martin 2016).  As 
described above, given Los Extraditables was a narco-terrorist group, it targeted 
both. Through a complexity lens, as argued earlier, ‘if violence works 
fractally…the more intense the large-scale violence around us, the more intense 
and prevalent violence should become at the interpersonal level through the social 
system’ (Pepinsky 1997:103-104).  Drawing on Colombia’s history and culture of 
violence, it is worth repeating and expanding on an earlier point (Franks 2006:34): 
A	culture	of	 violence	 can	be	propagated	and	prolonged	by	 the	 continuity	provided	by	
historical	and	cultural	memory.		Societies	can	be	sensitised	to	accept	different	levels	of	
violence	depending	on	their	history	and	experience.		Some	environments	are	therefore	
more	 conductive	 then	 others…[including]	 South	 America…where	 a	 culture	 of	 violence	
tends	to	perpetuate	itself.	
Fragment	61:	Peace	&	conflict	studies	scholar		
According to Strong (1995:142), it was the close ‘bond between peasant sons’ – 
Escobar and Gacha – that also perpetuated the violence as the leaders of Los 
Extraditables.  This bond ‘was at the heart of the terrorist machine [Los Extraditables] 
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taking on the Colombian state’ (Stong 1995:142). Equally, at the same time, 
replacing Pepinsky’s argument of violence with the word ‘fear’, it can also be 
argued that if fear works fractally, then the more intense the large-scale fear 
around us, the more intense and prevalent fear should become at the interpersonal 
level through the social system.  As there is a parallel and scaling in place with 
complexity, both individuals and society at large were living in fear of perpetual 
violence and the violence itself. 
Galán’s assassination  
In August 1989, the leading presidential candidate, Luis Carlos Galán Sarmiento 
(‘Galán’) was assassinated.  Like Lara before him, Galán was a vocal supporter of 
extradition and had made it a centre piece of his campaign.  He was also a fierce 
anti-corruption crusader and skilled campaigner.  The only thing he had in 
common with Escobar, was his magnetic personality (‘The True Story of Killing 
Pablo’ 2009).  Following Galán’s assassination, the Colombian president at the 
time, now President Barco, immediately declared war on the Medellín Cartel.  He 
also announced that despite the ongoing legal status of extradition law, he would 
conduct extraditions by executive order (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  Unlike Lara, 
the murder of Galán was a key turning point for the Colombian people.   For the 
first time, society as a collective started to rebel against the Medellín Cartel and 
Escobar, as depicted in the words of Galán’s sons while discussing their father’s 
assassination (interview in Sins of My Father 2009): 
He	denounced	the	infiltration	of	drugs	money…He	didn’t	do	it	because	he	was	a	moralist	
or	because	he	deemed	drugs	or	a	 joint	 immoral,	he	did	not	do	 it	because	of	 that.	 	He	
considered	the	corruptive	power	of	drug	money	immoral…	Galán‘s	goal	was	to	change	the	
mind-set	 of	 Colombia’s	 people	 and	 in	 doing	 so,	 I	 think	 the	 country	 remembers	 Galán	
because	of	that,	because	he	somehow	brought	about	a	change	in	the	way	people	thought	
and	caused	an	impact	in	Colombia’s	collective	consciousness	[emphasis	added].	
Fragment	62:	Assassinated	Colombian	Presidential	Candidate’s	sons	
Through a complexity lens, this change in moral collective consciousness, 
combined with the ongoing exhaustive violence, certainly weakened and 
diminished some of the Medellín Cartel’s criminally exploitable ties and even 
broke some of them completely.  The impact on the Medellín Cartel was 
substantial.   Galán’s assassination had influenced some of the larger populated 
groups of the Medellín Cartel, including its marginalised workers and 
contributory passive supporters.  As with most criminal groups, the Medellín 
	 201	
Cartel emerged from the disenfranchised and marginalised population to provide 
a means for these individuals to achieve their goals.  Weakening or diminishing 
ties of passive supporters is especially important as passive support creates an 
atmosphere of anonymity by which a cartel flourishes.  With a change in 
interconnectivity of these actor groups and the resulting fitness landscape, the 
Medellín Cartel became weaker and more vulnerable to disruption and attacks on 
its constituent parts.   
Search Bloc 1  
In Colombia, outraged by Galán’s assassination and the Medellín Cartel’s 
exhaustive violence, often in the name of Los Extraditables, it had become clear that 
for the ‘Colombian state to survive in any form that resembled a democracy’, the 
Medellín Cartel and Escobar had to be eliminated as they could no longer co-exist 
with the state (MacQuarrie 2015:31). In response, the Colombian government 
created a special elite unit of police and soldiers called Bloque de Busqueda (Search 
Bloc) with the sole aim of capturing Escobar (‘The True Story of Killing Pablo’ 
2009).  Colombia was aided by some of the US top-secret special army units; 
notably, its counter-terrorism unit Delta Force and its secret surveillance unit 
Centra Spike.  Whoever was going to be in-charge of the Search Bloc would 
immediately become Escobar’s number one enemy and target for assassination – 
it was a job that nobody wanted (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  According to Colonel 
Martinez, the one who landed the job (interview in Streatfeild 2000): 
When	Galán and	Franklin	[a	senior	police	officer]	were	killed,	that	was	the	day	that	the	
Search	Bloc	was	created,	with	the	sole	purpose	of	getting	Escobar.		It	wasn’t	a	definitive	
group	regarding	who	would	integrate	it	within	the	state.		It	started	off	as	a	reaction	–		this	
group	had	to	be	made	up	of	a	different	group	to	that	operating	in	Medellín…all	together	
we	had	some	150	men.		This	eventually	went	up	to	about	600.			
Fragment	63:	Colombian	law	enforcement		
Moreover, Colonel Martinez had only accepted the job on the condition that he 
would be periodically rotated out of the ‘hot seat’ every few weeks.  However, as 
Colonel Martinez notes, ‘there was never a change in personnel.  I remained on 
duty the entire time’ (‘The True Story of Killing Pablo’ 2009).  In the words of the 
Colonel’s right-hand man (‘The True Story of Killing Pablo’ 2009): 
We	were	chasing	after	the	most	dangerous	criminal	organisation	in	the	world,	backed	by	
more	than	a	thousand	men	in	uniform	from	a	combination	of	various	Colombian	armed	
forces.	 	As	soon	as	the	Search	Bloc	was	formed,	Pablo	Escobar	announced	that	he	was	
going	to	kill	60	members	of	the	Search	Bloc	in	the	first	month.		And	then	he	proceeded	to	
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make	good	on	his	word…In	the	first	few	weeks	of	the	Search	Bloc’s	efforts,	scores	of	the	
[Search	Bloc’s]	men	were	killed.		
Fragment	64:	Colombian	law	enforcement		
As a result, the state considered disbanding the Search Bloc a number of times, but 
Colonel Martinez asked for and received more men and continued his mission 
(Bowden 2002).  Eventually, the Search Bloc began to make some important in-
roads and started arresting or killing some of Escobar’s inner circle, including one 
of the Medellín Cartel’s leaders, Gacha (in December 1989) and Escobar’s cousin 
and brains behind the Medellín Cartel, Gustavo (in August 1990), both killed in a 
shoot-out (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  When Gacha was killed, the leadership of 
Los Extraditables fell solely to Escobar, and consequently, the activities of Los 
Extraditables became even more violent, with the sicarios carrying out Escobar’s 
orders religiously (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  Through a complexity lens, the 
removal of Gacha and Gustavo from the Medellín Cartel, combined with Escobar’s 
ongoing violent strategy, continued to cause major rifts amongst the traffickers, 
especially those influenced by the Ochoa brothers who preferred negotiation to 
violence.  As these rifts became chasms, it also enabled the Search Bloc to close in 
even closer on Escobar’s inner circle and support network.  
The Avianca bombing  
In November 1989, as the Search Bloc was closing in on Escobar and the Medellín 
Cartel, an assassination attempt was made on the next presidential candidate, 
Cesar Gaviria Trujilo (‘Gaviria’), Galán’s successor and eventual President from 
1990 to 1994.  Whilst attempting to assassinate Gaviria, a domestic airplane, 
Avianca Flight 203, was blown-up during its flight from Bogota, killing 110 people, 
including two US citizens, with no survivors.  Due to security concerns, Gaviria 
had been advised not to board the airplane at the last minute (Strong 1995; Bowden 
2002).  Following the graphic media images broadcast around the world, and the 
death of two US citizens, the US was finally put on a collision course with the 
Medellín Cartel and Escobar.  Following the Avianca bombing, Escobar ‘became 
what the US consider a clear and present danger’ (‘The True Story of Killing Pablo’ 
2009).  As noted earlier in the contextual variables, following the election in 1988 
of US President Bush, while Lara’s assassination in 1984 had placed the Medellín 
Cartel and Escobar at war with Colombia, it was only now that they were 
becoming a target for the US (Bowden 2002).  It was also during this time that the 
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US laws prohibiting assassination of foreign nationals were re-interpreted.  The 
new interpretation was that if the US President determined a foreign national a 
threat to national security or the lives of US citizens, then a person could now be 
targeted for assassination, not just arrest (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  In 1989, 
President Bush made his view on the drug cartels very clear in a live nationwide 
radio and televised speech (Bush 1989): 
And	our	message	to	the	drug	cartels	is	this:		The	rules	have	changed.		We	will	help	any	
government	 that	 wants	 our	 help.	 	 When	 requested,	 we	 will	 for	 the	 first	 time	 make	
available	 the	 appropriate	 resources	 of	 America’s	 Armed	 Forces…And	 for	 the	 drug	
kingpins:	the	death	penalty.			
Fragment	65:	US	former	President	Bush	
Through a complexity lens, this was another key turning point for the Medellín 
Cartel and Escobar, as one of its complex sets of actors just became substantially 
greater and hence a greater threat to its fitness landscape and ultimate survival.    
The negotiations  
In May 1990, the newly elected Colombian President Gaviria declared in a 
nationwide televised speech (Sins of My Father 2009): 
Colombia’s	number	one	enemy	is	the	terrorist	Pablo	Escobar	and	his	criminal	organisation	
which	murders,	mercilessly	and	unceremoniously	innocent	children,	women	and	men.		
Fragment	66:	Colombian	former	President	Gaviria	
What is important to note is President Gaviria’s choice of words.  Escobar was 
considered a terrorist first and foremost, not a trafficker or organised crime 
criminal, and his criminal organisation, Los Extraditables, a terrorist group.  As 
explained in Chapter 2, the use of the word ‘terrorist’ is driven by one’s 
perspective, including political leaders like President Gaviria, whose choice of 
words may be interpreted as a political strategy to illicit an emotional response 
from the public, especially those who still supported Escobar and the cartels. 
Shortly after President Gaviria’s speech, Los Extraditables kidnapped a number of 
high-profile politicians and journalists, including the daughter of a former 
Colombian President, whilst continuing its onslaught of violence in Colombia’s 
cities (Strong 1995).  The high-profile hostages, combined with its ongoing violence 
and more importantly, the amplification of the public’s fear of violence, proved to 
be a powerful bargaining chip for Los Extraditables.  Previously, society had been 
largely indifferent to extradition, especially as in some respects, its national pride 
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had been at stake.  As Strong (1995:140) points out: 
To	 enforce	 extradition	was	 also	 to	 admit	 the	 inadequacies	 of	 its	 own	 criminal	 justice	
system.	 	 The	 act	 was	 politically	 humiliating,	 at	 home	 and	 overseas.	 	 Each	 extradition	
tempered	the	US’s	image	as	a	bearer	of	justice	and	Colombia’s	as	a	country	of	criminals.		
To	rub	salt	into	the	wound,	it	was	the	US	that	was	the	biggest	consumer	of	cocaine.			
Fragment	67:	Investigative	journalist		
However, by targeting the public’s fear and sense of insecurity, largely through its 
sustained random acts of terrorism, Los Extraditables succeeded in magnifying this 
fear and changing public opinion.  Public opinion essentially changed from 
outrage, after the political assassinations of Lara and Galán, to acceptance, after 
the ongoing onslaught and fear of violence, to the traffickers demands (Clawson 
& Lee 1998).   Even though it would not end the international ‘war on drugs’, a 
deal with the traffickers to end extradition and negotiate their terms of surrender 
in Colombia, would at least end the onslaught and fear of violence in Colombia’s 
cities.  The rationale for this deal is not dissimilar to the recent 2016 FARC deal 
with the Colombian government, where ‘an imperfect peace’ is considered better 
than ‘a perfect war’.  During the long drawn-out negotiation period, Los 
Extraditables held its captives and continued its reign of terror until Escobar’s deal 
with the government was done (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  It was also during 
this time, that the Ochoa brothers sought to further distance themselves from the 
violence of Los Extraditables and pursued a separate negotiation process from 
Escobar.  As a result, by February 1991, all three Ochoa brothers had quietly 
surrendered to the government, entering into five-year reduced prison sentences 
to be served in a prison just bordering Medellín (Strong 1995).  Paradoxically, if 
there had been no violence by the Los Extraditables, the government would not have 
been forced to negotiate with the traffickers in the first place; hence the Ochoa 
brothers would not have been in a position to negotiate their reduced prison terms.  
Following the surrender of the Ochoa brothers and mounting pressure on Escobar, 
as a sign of goodwill, Los Extraditables released its remaining captives in May 1991 
(Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  Shortly after, in June 1991, following an acceptable 
deal with the government and on the same day that extradition laws were finally 
prohibited, Escobar and other associates of the Medellín Cartel finally handed 
themselves in.  Similar to the Ochoa brothers, their sentences were lenient and 
short, with Escobar only needing to plead guilty to a single offence of one overseas 
drug deal (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).   
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Through a complexity lens, the Medellín Cartel had evolved significantly over the 
last decade, yet its leaders and key associates had all paid a price for its success. 
Funding Los Extraditables had cost the Medellín Cartel and Escobar a small fortune, 
although it had successfully swayed public opinion in the ongoing repetition and 
onslaught of violence enhancing the public’s fear in a never-ending feedback loop. 
Under increasing pressure between the war of the cartels and war on the state, the 
Medellín Cartel’s fitness landscape and empire had started to collapse.  Of its 
leaders, Gacha had been killed in December 1989, the Ochoa brothers imprisoned 
in February 1991 and now it was Escobar’s turn to be imprisoned in June 1991.  
Other key associates such as Escobar’s cousin Gustavo had been killed in August 
1990, together with scores of others, who had either been killed, arrested or were 
on the run.  Another key associate Lehder, was one of the few who had been 
successfully extradited to the US in 1987 (Strong 1995).  In comparison, the Cali 
Cartel was thriving at the Medellín Cartel’s expense (Bowden 2002; Chepesiuk 
2007; 2013).  
The prison - La Catedral 
As part of the deal with the government, the state built Escobar and the Medellín 
Cartel a custom-built prison on the outskirts of Medellín (Strong 1995; Bowden 
2002).  The prison was called La Catedral (The Cathedral), except it was no ordinary 
prison.  It was more like a resort than a prison, nicknamed ‘Hotel Escobar’, with 
its own jacuzzi, bar and discotheque, and frequent visitors, including family.  
According to Bowden (2002:111):  
It	was	not	 a	normal	prison	 in	other	ways.	 	 Pablo,	 for	 instance,	 did	not	 feel	 obliged	 to	
actually	stay.		He	rarely	missed	an	important	pro	soccer	game	in	Medellín	–	police	would	
block	off	traffic	to	allow	Pablo’s	motorcade	easy	access	to	and	from	the	stadium	he	had	
built	years	before	–	and	he	was	sighted	shopping	in	a	fashionable	Bogota	mall	over	the	
Christmas	holidays.		In	June	1992	he	celebrated	the	first	anniversary	of	his	imprisonment	
[outside	 of	 his	 prison]	 with	 his	 friends	 and	 family	 at	 an	 Envigado	 nightclub.	 	 Pablo	
considered	such	excursions	minor…he	did,	after	all,	always	come	back.		He	had	made	his	
deal	with	the	state	and	intended	to	honour	it…		
Fragment	68:		Investigative	journalist	
Also, as part of the deal, Escobar was to be guarded by his own men and Colonel 
Martinez and his Search Bloc were not allowed within 20 kilometres of the prison 
(Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  Although everyone knew La Catedral was a charade, 
the government turned a blind eye to keep the peace and violence out of the cities, 
and in the first year, it was peaceful in the cities.  Society had started to live again 
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without fear.  Most of Colombia were happy to live with the deal and it was only 
the US that kept pushing for the charade to end (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  As 
Bowden (2002:116) points out: 
Few	 in	 the	US	embassy	understood	how	hard	 it	was	 to	 get	 things	done…In	Colombia,	
everything	was	a	fight.		On	paper,	the	president	had	power	over	all	his	ministries,	but	in	
reality,	as	Gaviria	and	all	Colombian	presidents	before	him	discovered	to	their	frustration,	
his	authority	was	hopelessly	diffuse.		The	army	and	the	police	and	the	secret	police	and	
the	Justice	Ministry	were	all	fiefs,	each	made	up	of	a	multitude	of	smaller	fiefs,	all	of	them	
feuding	and	conspiring	and	plotting	against	one	another.		In	the	case	of	Pablo,	all	were	
united	in	their	unwillingness	to	get	involved.		The	police,	locked	out	by	Pablo’s	deal,	were	
eager	to	see	the	whole	thing	discredited.		The	judiciary	wanted	no	part	of	prosecuting	a	
man	who	had	ordered	the	murder	of	every	cop,	judge	and	jailer	who	had	ever	crossed	
him.		The	army	was	even	worse.	
Fragment	69:	Investigative	journalist		
Meanwhile, Escobar quietly went to work rebuilding his Medellín Cartel empire 
and continuing his drug trafficking from prison (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  As 
time passed, Escobar had to increasingly rely on a few of his key associates outside 
the prison to run the day-to-day hands-on management of the business.  Not long 
after his first year in prison, Escobar suspected a few of his trusted key associates, 
notably the Moncada and Galeano families, of skimming profits from the Medellín 
Cartel.  To set an example to the rest of the Cartel, despite a lack of evidence, 
Escobar summoned the heads of these two families to La Catedral and had them 
tortured and murdered on-site (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).   
In complexity, any actor may influence, and is influenced by another actor or 
actors in a complex system.  More importantly, each actor is ignorant of the system 
as a whole and only responds to its local interactions (Cilliers 1998).  As such, 
through a complexity lens, Escobar’s separation from the day-to-day hands-on 
management of the cartel’s business, with his local interactions confined to those 
inside the prison, resulted in Escobar’s reduced capacity as a leader and enforcer 
of his own associates outside the prison.  Moreover, the word spread quickly of 
Escobar’s torture and murder of his own people while inside the prison, which 
quickly influenced those outside the prison, leading to distrust amongst the 
Medellín Cartel.  From a fitness landscape perspective, many strong and moderate 
ties within the Medellín Cartel became weakened as distrust set in.  As the 
Medellín Cartel tried to self-organise to allow it to adapt and survive, other key 
associates would soon challenge Escobar for control of the cartel and other 
alternatives would bifurcate and open-up such as the stronger Cali Cartel.   
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The escape  
Following the murder of his own men, in his own prison, the government decided 
Escobar had gone too far and that he needed to be removed and placed into a 
‘normal’ prison, or at least normal by Colombian standards (Strong 1995; Bowden 
2002).  In July 1992, after a raid on the prison by state authorities, Escobar escaped.  
However, Escobar had bribed so many guards, that ‘escape’ is not the correct 
word, he had simply walked out (‘The True Story of Killing Pablo’ 2009).  
According to Joe Toft (‘Toft’), former special agent in charge in Colombia at the 
time (‘The True Story of Killing Pablo’ 2009): 
He	walked	out	of	the	prison.		He	controlled	the	guards.		He	controlled	everything.		
Fragment	70:	US	law	enforcement			
In the words of President Gaviria (‘Killing Pablo’ 2003): 
He	escaped	in	an	incredible	way.		He	just	walked	out.		People	were	so	intimidated	because	
of	him.		That	he	was	able	to	go	to	a	military	line	of	people	that	were	very	well	armed	and	
he	was	unarmed.		And	he	was	able	to	walk	out.	
Fragment	71:	Former	Colombian	President	
This time, Escobar had pushed Colombia too far.  Following his escape, and in 
defiance of Colombia’s constitution, President Gaviria accepted President Bush’s 
earlier offer and invited the full force of the US into Colombia (‘The True Story of 
Killing Pablo’ 2009).  As a result, this became another key turning point for Escobar 
and what was left of the Medellín Cartel.  Through a complexity lens, as mentioned 
earlier, the Medellín Cartel and the state military had a common enemy – the 
guerrillas.  As pointed out by Mallory (2007:59), ‘ties among the military, 
paramilitary groups, the police and drug traffickers [are] a routine part of the 
narco-political atmosphere’. According to numerous sources, the military had 
relied on the Medellín Cartel to provide arms, money and training to the 
paramilitaries who were assisting them to fight the guerrillas.  It also happened to 
be this military group that was stationed outside Escobar’s prison at the time of 
his escape (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002; ‘The True Story of Killing Pablo’ 2009).  
Essentially, Escobar and what was left of the Medellín Cartel had drawn upon their 
criminally exploitable ties, to simply walk out of prison.  
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6.5.5 The demise of the Medellín Cartel – early 1990s  
On the run and Search Bloc 2 
Within a week of Escobar’s escape, the Search Bloc was resurrected, however this 
time, it was much stronger, with the full support and co-operation of the US, 
including full training and assistance led by Delta Force and Centra Spike (‘The 
True Story of Killing Pablo’ 2009).  It was also a time when ‘the George Bush 
administration became obsessed with Escobar, who they blamed for 
“industrializing the cocaine trade”’ (Roth 2010:414).  There was one clear choice 
for the commander of the new Search Bloc and that was Colonel Martinez.  Colonel 
Martinez once again accepted the role, but this time, he also returned with his son, 
Hugo Martinez Jr (‘Martinez Jr’), who had also accepted a role within the Search 
Bloc.   With the full backing of the US, the Search Bloc was now more organised 
and focused, and had better intelligence and equipment.  Using a large body of 
intelligence facilitated through Centra Spike and on-the-ground informants, the 
Search Bloc systematically targeted and eliminated the Medellín Cartel’s key 
support mechanisms and infrastructure (‘The True Story of Killing Pablo’ 2009).  
Centra Spike’s state-of-the-art surveillance equipment used radio telemetry to 
locate targets based on telephone radio transmissions.  As a US embassy official 
observes (‘Killing Pablo’ 2003): 
[Centra	 Spike	was	 special	 as	 it	 allowed	 you]	 to	be	 able	 to	 in	 a	 clandestine	manner	 fly	
reconnaissance	 missions	 that	 would	 be	 able	 to	 pinpoint	 with	 extreme	 accuracy	 the	
location	of	Pablo	himself…It	is	the	difference	between	looking	for	a	needle	in	a	haystack	
and	being	able	to	walk	into	somebody’s	front	door.	
Fragment	72:	US	government	official		
However, despite this surveillance equipment, Escobar initially vanished.  Escobar 
knew he could not talk for more than three minutes without his location being 
detected.  Over the next 16 months, the Search Bloc conducted 11,000 search 
warrants and mounted 4,000 roadblocks looking for Escobar (‘The Godfather of 
Cocaine’ 1997).  At the same time, Escobar renewed his war against the state, with 
daily chaos and violence, and random acts of terrorism in Colombia’s cities (‘The 
Godfather of Cocaine’ 1997).  Once again, the public lived in fear.   
Though a complexity lens, just six months after Escobar’s escape, the state of 
Colombia is best summed up in a February 1993 declassified intelligence cable, 
between the US Embassy in Bogota and the US Secretary of State in Washington 
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(US Department of State 1993a): 
Colombian	 violence	 has	 grown	 so	 complex	 that	 it’s	 been	 characterised	 as	 “everyone	
against	everyone”.		Many	of	the	perpetrators,	victims,	tactics	and	motives	change	from	
region	 to	 region.	 	 The	 violent	 in	 Colombia	 tend	 to	 prey	 on	 one	 another,	 making	 the	
country	a	dog-eat-dog	world,	and	the	violence	tends	to	grow	exponentially	as	the	victims	
–	 including	 landowners,	 businessmen	 and	 wealthy	 traffickers	 –	 take	 up	 arms	 in	 self	
defense...A	strong	cause	of	the	violence	is	the	continuing	historical	weakness	of	the	state,	
especially	the	 justice	system	and	the	security	forces…the	state’s	 inability	to	punish	the	
perpetrators	is	a	major	problem.		That	historical	impunity	and	the	country’s	social	ills	are	
a	deadly	combination	[emphasis	added].	
Fragment	73:	US	declassified	government	document	
The cable goes on (US Department of State 1993a): 
The	above	presents	a	truly	frightening	picture	of	the	violence	in	this	country.		A	simple	
reading	could	lead	one	to	conclude	that	the	country	is	out	of	control.		That’s	far	from	true.			
Colombia	is	a	prosperous,	functioning	democracy	that	tragically	seems	to	have	learned	to	
live	 with	 a	 very	 high	 level	 of	mayhem…A	 factor	 marking	 the	 evolution	 of	 Colombian	
violence	since	the	1950s	 is	that	 it	has	become	more	multiple	and	complex…the	violent	
and	their	victims	have	become	so	intertwined,	the	alliances	so	shifting	[emphasis	added].	
Fragment	74:	US	declassified	government	document	
As described in the cable, many of the contextual variables and criminally 
exploitable ties of the Medellín Cartel are clearly depicted in this picture of 
Colombia.  Meanwhile, the tables were about to be turned.  In the same month this 
cable was written, alliances were certainly shifting, as a new group called Los Pepes, 
derived from the Spanish phrase Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar (Persecuted by Pablo 
Escobar), began to emerge (Bowden 2002).  
Los Pepes  
To many, Los Pepes signified the end of the Medellín Cartel. According to 
declassified intelligence (US Department of Defense 1993): 
Los	Pepes	evolved	as	a	result	of	Escobar’s	murder	of	the	Moncada	and	Galeano	brothers,	
his	former	partners.		Los	Pepes	are	best	described	as	a	joint	effort	by	Escobar’s	rivals	with	
a	declared	goal	of	his	complete	demise.			
Fragment	75:	US	declassified	government	document	
The group primarily comprised Medellín Cartel defectors and was led by 
members of the Moncada and Galeano families and paramilitary brothers, Fidel 
and Carlos Castaño, also former associates of the Medellín Cartel.  Sources also 
suggest that Escobar’s key rival, the Cali Cartel, provided financial support to the 
group (US Department of Defense 1993).  Moreover, in another declassified US 
government intelligence assessment (US Department of State 1994): 
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Castaño	probably	was	a	member	of	Escobar’s	“Extraditables”	 terrorist	group…	Castaño	
remained	loyal	to	Escobar	until	a	few	months	after	Pablo	Escobar’s	July	1992	escape	from	
prison.			By	then	it	had	become	apparent	that	Escobar	was	growing	increasingly	weaker,	
largely	owing	to	the	defection	from	his	camp	of	former	Medellín	colleagues	who	wanted	
revenge	for	Escobar’s	murder	of	their	family	members	while	he	was	in	prison.		Ever	the	
opportunist,	Castaño	switched	his	allegiance	to	the	increasingly	powerful	Cali	Cartel.		He	
became	the	principal	leader	of	Los	Pepes.	
Fragment	76:	US	declassified	government	document	
As described in a declassified cable from the US Embassy in Bogota to the US 
Secretary of State in Washington, Los Pepes publicly announced its existence to the 
media on 2 February 1993 (US States Department of State 1993b):  
On	January	30	[1993],	Escobar	detonated	a	100-kiliogram	bomb	in	a	congested	area	of	
downtown	 Bogota,	 killing	 21	 people	 and	 wounding	 over	 70.	 	 The	 following	 day,	 “La	
Cristalina”	 a	 hacienda	 owned	 by	 Escobar’s	 mother,	 was	 burned	 to	 the	 ground.	 	 “Los	
Pepes”	 announced	 its	 existence	 on	 February	 2,	 stating	 that	 it	 would	 conduct	 acts	 of	
violence	against	Pablo	Escobar	and	his	family,	on	a	one-for-one	bases,	in	retaliation	for	
any	 further	 terrorist	 acts	 committed	 by	 Escobar.	 	 Throughout	 February,	 Los	 Pepes	
continued	their	spectacular	attacks	on	Escobar	properties.		Their	operations,	including	the	
burning	of	two	properties	which	housed	members	of	his	immediate	family,	destruction	of	
priceless	 art	 works,	 and	 torching	 a	 prized	 antique	 car	 collection,	 seemed	 designed	 to	
demonstrate	that	the	group	was	capable	of	striking	at	Escobar’s	most	vulnerable	points.		
Fragment	77:	US	declassified	government	document	
Los Pepes also emerged at a time when Escobar’s key associates were either on the 
run, being arrested or turning themselves in for fear of being killed by the Search 
Bloc.  At the same time, Escobar’s assets were dwindling and he was reduced to 
living in safe houses that only a handful of people knew about (Escobar R 2010; 
Escobar JP 2016).  In declassified information released in 2008, officially, there had 
been no relationship between Los Pepes and the Search Bloc, yet unofficially, 
intelligence had been exchanged (US National Security Archive 2008; ‘The True 
Story of Killing Pablo’ 2009).  In Carlos Castaño’s own words (‘The True Story of 
Killing Pablo’ 2009): 
Pablo	Escobar	killed	most	of	his	friends	and	allies	and	his	pals.		But	there	were	relatives	
that	survived	that	lunatic,	and	they	joined	us…I	provided	information	to	the	police	under	
the	 code	 name	 Alekos.	 	 They	 never	 knew	 I	 was	 Carlos	 Castaño,	 leader	 of	 the	
paramilitaries…Los	Pepes	worked	with	the	tacit	cooperation	of	the	US	Government.		The	
Colombian	authorities	did	not	oppose	us	either.			
Fragment	78:	Los	Pepes	paramilitary	leader	
As Murphy, former DEA special agent based in Medellín, points out, ‘we’re not 
afforded the luxury of having informants who are priests’ (‘The True Story of 
Killing Pablo’ 2009).  Similarly, Colonel Martinez notes (interview in Streatfeild 
2000), ‘they weren’t our friends.  They were informants.  And they had become 
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informants for revenge’.  As Los Pepes gruesome murders soon mounted – of 
anyone still remotely loyal to Escobar, including his family and friends – in ‘just a 
few weeks after surfacing, the vigilante group had spooked Pablo more than 
anything the government had been able to do’ in the past decade (Bowden 
2002:188).  It was a controlled bloodbath.  On reflection, given the complex set of 
actors involved, the moral dilemma was not good versus bad, but bad versus evil.  
And, in the case of Los Pepes, they played dirty just like Escobar, without any rules. 
Los Pepes was certainly bad, but it was Escobar who was being portrayed as evil. 
Through a complexity lens, there were multiple complex systems interacting and 
contextual variables at play.  More importantly, the Medellín Cartel’s fitness 
landscape had been reduced almost to Escobar himself.  The criminally exploitable 
ties had either been removed, weakened, diminished or simply defected to the 
other side.  Escobar’s remaining loyalties came from groups divided.  For example, 
some sicarios and other criminal gangs in Medellín remained loyal to Escobar, 
while others followed Los Pepes.  Similarly, some of the people in the barrios, 
especially where he had built homes, provided sanctuary while he was on the run, 
while others turned to become informants against him.  As noted in Chapter 2, in 
‘attacking networks, it is also critical to target the boundaries, either from one 
network to another, or from the criminal world to the upper world’ (Williams 
2001:94).  Of note, is the unofficial connection between Los Pepes (criminal world) 
and the Search Bloc (upper world).  Moreover, as von Lampe (2016:138) argues, ‘it 
is not uncommon to see individuals being involved in two or more illegal firms at 
the same time’.  In the case of Los Pepes that was certainly the case.    
Escobar shot and killed  
As Los Pepes began closing in on Escobar, he became increasingly concerned for 
the safety of his family – his Achilles heel.   According to Busby, US Ambassador 
to Colombia, 1991-1994 (‘The True Story of Killing Pablo’ 2009):  
I	was	always	of	the	opinion	that	we	should	watch	his	family,	track	his	family,	because	he	
had	the	reputation	of	being	an	absolutely	ruthless,	murderous	man	but	a	man	who	really	
had	great	regard	for	his	family,	for	his	wife	and	his	two	children.	
Fragment	79:	US	government	official		
After several failed attempts to get his family out of Colombia, as the state was 
effectively keeping them as bait, just a week before Escobar’s death, his family 
were once again refused entry to another country at the state’s request (‘The True 
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Story of Killing Pablo’ 2009; Escobar JP 2016).  On return, they were placed in a 
state-owned hotel in Bogota, for the dual purpose of keeping them safe from Los 
Pepes, but more importantly, monitoring their calls by the Search Bloc (‘The True 
Story of Killing Pablo’ 2009).  At this point, Escobar was getting desperate, as he 
regarded Los Pepes and the Search Bloc as one (‘The True Story of Killing Pablo’ 
2009; Escobar R 2010; Escobar JP 2016).  Escobar started making mistakes.  He was 
also increasingly living under strained circumstances as most of his empire and 
support network had been taken apart, either by the Search Bloc, Los Pepes, 
Medellín traffickers moving in on his turf or his rivals, the Cali Cartel (‘The True 
Story of Killing Pablo’ 2009; Escobar R 2010).  One of the few remaining links to 
Escobar was his son, Juan Pablo (Escobar JP 2016).  On 3 December 1993, Escobar 
stayed on the telephone for more than three minutes talking to his son.  As Escobar 
was talking, another son, Martinez Jr, was listening in and managed to fix his exact 
location with his mobile surveillance equipment.  During the raid, Escobar was 
shot by the Search Bloc and killed on the rooftop attempting to escape.  The rest is 
history (‘The True Story of Killing Pablo’ 2009).  The location of his death was just 
another house, on just another street, in his beloved Medellín, his other Achilles 
heel.  Despite the Search Bloc’s ultimate success, in the words of Toft, former 
special agent in charge in Colombia at the time (‘The True Story of Killing Pablo’ 
2009): 
In	my	opinion,	the	greatest	damage	caused	to	the	Medellín	Cartel	and	to	Pablo	Escobar	
and	his	organisation	was	done	by	the	Los	Pepes.		
Fragment	80:	US	law	enforcement		
Moreover, when asked about the death of Escobar and the impact on Colombian 
trafficking, the commander of the Search Bloc, Colonel Martinez offered (interview 
in Streatfeild 2000): 
I’ve	always	said	that	the	orders	we	got	to	finish	of	the	Medellín	Cartel	were	not	going	to	
stop	drug	trafficking	in	Medellín	or	anywhere.		We	knew	that.		Everyone	knew	that.		The	
president	knew	it,	the	ministers	knew	it.		 	We	weren’t	going	after	drug	trafficking.		We	
were	going	after	a	guy	who	went	crazy,	killing	people.				
Fragment	81:	Colombian	law	enforcement		
Ultimately, while the death of Escobar marked the end of the Medellín Cartel and 
extreme terror attacks, it did not mark the end of Colombian drug trafficking.    
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6.5.6 Summary of macro-level insights 
In summary, as the new complexity model places emphasis on patterns and 
structures of analysis, it may be argued that the macro-level case study offers fresh 
insights into the multitude of factors that influenced and changed the order or 
patterns inherent in the Medellín Cartel’s complex system, rather than the disorder 
of the system itself.  In doing so, these insights offer a new and different way of 
seeing the Medellín Cartel.   
Of particular note, the analysis places emphasis on the interconnections at and 
across the Medellín Cartel’s system boundaries with other complex systems, in 
forming allegiances and alliances.   As acknowledged earlier, while a key focus of 
the case study surrounds organised crime, the thread of terrorism and the crime-
terror nexus throughout the formation and evolution of allegiances and alliances, 
plays a pivotal role in understanding the fitness landscape and evolution of the 
Medellín Cartel.   
In short, based on the case study analysis, Table 6.2 below summarises the 
multitude of factors that helped shape the Medellín Cartel, including why and 
how it evolved.  Table 6.2 also offers a comparison of the new complexity model 
to other models and/or approaches often used in the study of Escobar and the 
Medellín Cartel. 
	
Table	6.2:		Summary	of	factors	shaping	the	Medellín	Cartel	
	 Factors	 Description		
1.	 Variables	&	
perspectives	
New	model	
As	demonstrated	by	the	data	sets	and	fractal	fragments,	a	large	number	
of	intervening	variables	based	on	perspectives	of	‘others’,	together	with	
the	sum	of	contextual	variables,	including	historical,	geographical,	social,	
economic,	political	and	media,	all	contributed	to	the	emergence	and	
evolution	of	the	Medellín	Cartel.	
Other	models	and/or	approaches	
Other	studies	of	Escobar	and	the	Medellín	Cartel	tend	to focus	on	one	or	
more	aspects	of	the	drug	trade,	or	criminal	structures	and/or	activities,	
rather	than	a	holistic	study	of	the	conditions	that	allowed	them	to	
emerge	in	the	first	place	and/or	a	broad	range	of	perspectives.				
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	 Factors	 Description		
2.		 Nature	&	
strength	
New	model	
The	Medellín	Cartel’s	fitness	landscape	suggests	the	nature	and	strength	
of	the	group	was	greatly	influenced	by	a	broader	set	of	actors,	i.e.	six	
categories	of	criminally	exploitable	ties	comprising	22	types	of	actors.		As	
demonstrated	by	the	analysis,	over	time,	the	nature	and	strength	of	the	
Medellín	Cartel	changed	in	response	to	this	broader	set	of	actors	and	
factors	impacting	their	interconnectivity	strength	(i.e.	affinity	to	the	
Medellín	Cartel),	not	just	factors	impacting	the	core	set	of	actors,	such	as	
its	leaders	and	key	associates.		Of	note,	as	apparent	in	the	visual	
representations	of	the	Medellín	Cartel,	the	contributory	categories	of	
actors,	all	of	which	were	essential	in	enabling	or	facilitating	the	criminal	
conduct	of	the	Medellín	Cartel,	played	a	significant	role	in	its	emergence	
and	evolution.	
Other	models	and/or	approaches	
In	other	studies	of	Escobar	and	the	Medellín	Cartel,	this	broader	set	of	
actors	are	commonly	overlooked	in	more	traditional	analysis.	
3.	 Allegiances	
&	alliances	
New	model	
Throughout	the	operational	period	of	the	Medellín	Cartel,	a	number	of	
allegiances	and	alliances	emerged	due	to	the	changing	goals	and	needs	of	
the	Medellín	Cartel,	including	Escobar.	These	include	guerrillas	(of	note	
M-19),	paramilitaries,	international	criminal	groups	and	individuals,	the	
formation	of	two	vigilante	groups	(MAS	and	Los	Pepes)	and	one	terrorist	
group	(Los	Extraditables).		All	these	interconnections,	involving	organised	
crime	and/or	terrorism	activities,	played	a	pivotal	role	in	the	fitness	
landscape	and	evolution	of	the	Medellín	Cartel.		
Other	models	and/or	approaches		
The	importance	of	allegiances	and	alliances,	and	how	they	evolve,	is	
often	under-developed	or	overlooked	in	other	studies	of	Escobar	and	the	
Medellín	Cartel.	
Source:	Author’s	summary	based	on	macro-level	analysis	and	insights	and	literature	review		
 
On reflection, the strategies and measures that changed, influenced and/or 
disrupted the patterns inherent in the Medellín Cartel’s complex system and 
fitness landscape are best summarised using the new landscape metaphor and 
visual imagery.  As such, Figure 6.13 below depicts the Medellín Cartel’s ‘time-
lapsed’ fitness landscape.  Given the Medellín Cartel’s ultimate demise, it’s 
‘closing’ fitness landscape may be simply visualised as a derelict city, i.e. remnants 
of ‘broken’ buildings where actors within its fitness landscape once stood.  	
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Figure	6.13:		Visual	imagery:		Medellín	Cartel’s	time-lapsed	fitness	landscape	
	 Changing	landscape		 Visual	imagery	
1.	 Strong	interconnections		
Over	the	period,	the	leaders,	including	Escobar,	and	the	key	
associates	were	targeted	and	removed	(either	shot,	
imprisoned	or	defected)	by	state	and	other	forces,	notably	
due	to	changing	goal-alignments	of	Escobar’s	desire	for	
political	power	and	terrorism,	through	the	co-evolution	of	
allegiances	and	alliances	with	other	traffickers,	notably	Los	
Extraditables.			
Metaphor:	The	permanent	removal	of	buildings	weakened	
and	de-stabilised	the	city.		
	
2.	 Moderate	interconnections	
A	number	of	key	events	impacted	the	strength	of	moderate	
ties,	by	weakening	their	ties,	notably	i)	Escobar’s	political	
ambition	and	ensuing	violence,	including	the	war	of	cartels,	
and	ii)	the	mistrust	of	Escobar,	though	torturing	and	
murdering	his	own	men.		Some	of	these	ties	not	only	
weakened	but	shifted	allegiances	to	create	new	alliances	
such	as	Los	Pepes,	new	traffickers	in	Medellín	and	the	Cali	
Cartel.	
Metaphor:	The	weakening	of	buildings	reduced	the	city’s	
core	strength	and	resulted	in	the	co-evolution	of	other	cities.			
	
3.	 Weak	interconnections	
Galán’s assassination	and	the	ensuing	violence	of	the	state	
and	Cali	wars	contributed	to	the	moral	collective	
consciousness	and	fear	in	society	thus	breaking	and	
diminishing	weaker	ties,	including	contributory	passive	ties	of	
Medellín.		
Metaphor:	The	temporary	and	sometimes	permanent	
removal	of	buildings	from	the	city	prevented	adaption,	self-
organisation	and	emergence	of	the	city	to	cope	with	the	
changing	events.		
	
	
Source:	Author’s	adapted	imagery	(using	licensed	images)	
 
Overall, at a macro-level, what brought down Escobar, also brought down the 
Medellín Cartel;  as depicted in Figure 6.13 above, there was no single factor 
involved.  Of note, according to Blum, US Senate investigator 1987-89 (‘The 
Godfather of Cocaine’ 1997): 
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In	the	end,	what	brought	Pablo	Escobar	down	was	a	combination	of	forces	arrayed	against	
him.		He	had	his	own	men,	his	own	lieutenants	who	he	had	turned	on	while	he	was	in	jail,	
so	they	got	together	to	get	him.		Then	you	have	the	government,	which	had	faced	a	reign	
of	terror	and	violence.		And	finally,	you	had	the	Cali	cartel,	which	was	the	competition,	
saying,	“This	is	our	great	chance	to	be	rid	of	a	formidable	force	which	is	competing	with	
us…”	
Fragment	82:	US	government	official		
While the combination of factors described by Blum certainly played a role in 
bringing Escobar down, as the nature and strength of the Medellín Cartel’s fitness 
landscape tells us, there were other factors that contributed to these forces, such as 
contributory actor ties, allegiances and alliances, and underlying factors, such as 
contextual variables, all of which played a role.   
In the next chapter, at the micro-level, the lens will shift to the behaviour of Escobar 
as an individual actor and the behaviour of the Medellín Cartel as the system itself.  
The new focus will aim to better understand Escobar’s nature, his attitudes and 
behaviours, and ultimately his drivers and vulnerabilities that influenced and 
shaped the Medellín Cartel.  A summary will also be presented in the next chapter 
of the overall new complexity model comprising both the macro and micro-level 
case study findings.  
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Chapter 7:  Case study micro-level: Actor behaviour 
 
‘The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men [and women] to do 
nothing’  
Edmund Burke, political theorist (1729-1797) 
 
Chapter 7 sets out the micro-level findings of the application of the new complexity 
model as described in Chapter 5 to the in-depth case study of Escobar and the 
Medellín Cartel.  It begins with an overview and compilation of Escobar’s micro-
level data sets.  An analysis of Escobar’s micro-level contextual variables, together 
with the construction of Escobar’s attractor set and the Medellín Cartel’s follows.  
Based on the data sets, contextual variables and resulting attractor sets, using 
complexity prompts, insights are drawn to better understand Escobar’s 
behaviours, and ultimately his drivers and vulnerabilities, all of which influenced 
and shaped the behaviours of the Medellín Cartel.  A summary of the overall new 
complexity model comprising the macro and micro-level case study findings is 
also presented.  
 
 
 
7.1 Micro-level overview 
In this chapter, the micro-level steps of the new complexity model as described in 
Chapter 5 will be applied to the behaviour of Escobar as an individual actor and 
the behaviour of the Medellín Cartel as the system itself.   While other actors within 
the Medellín Cartel may also be analysed, as the creator and ultimate boss of the 
Medellín Cartel, Escobar is selected due to his pivotal role in influencing the 
Medellín Cartel.  Furthermore, compared to Escobar, on review of available source 
data, limited information exists on other key actors, such as the leaders within the 
Medellín Cartel.   
As explained earlier, an attractor is like a magnet, pulling the behaviour of the 
actors and the system towards it, producing an order within the disorder, and in 
doing so, creates patterns and structures.  In a criminal group, such as the Medellín 
Cartel, identifying the attractor sets of individual actors such as Escobar and the 
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system itself, may ultimately help to better understand what shaped and 
influenced their behaviours, including drivers and vulnerabilities.  To begin, the 
micro-level steps one to four are summarised below and applied in sections 7.2 to 
7.5, followed by a summary of the overall new complexity model in section 7.6: 
1. Data sets: generate the micro-level data sets of Escobar, as a subset of the 
Medellín Cartel’s macro-level, using criminological frames of reference and 
complexity prompts, including fractal fragments. 
 
2. Contextual variables: identify and analyse the micro-level contextual variables 
from the data sets of Escobar, as a subset of the Medellín Cartel’s macro-level 
data sets, using complexity prompts. 
 
3. Attractor set:  construct the attractor sets of Escobar and the Medellín Cartel, 
based on an analysis of the data sets and contextual variables, using the 
mapping of Young’s (1997b) concept of attractors to criminological study, 
together with complexity prompts, to organise, shape and structure the 
information.  
 
4. Insights:  based on the data sets, contextual variables and resulting attractor 
sets, using complexity prompts: 
• draw out and interpret the underlying qualitative patterns and structures 
to gain insights on what guided the behaviours of Escobar and the Medellín 
Cartel, and make inferences about the drivers and vulnerabilities of 
Escobar and the Medellín Cartel as a whole; and 
• on reflection, identify the strategies and measures that changed, influenced 
and/or disrupted their behaviours leading to their ultimate demise.  
7.2  Step 1: Data sets – micro  
Applying step one of the new complexity model, the micro-level data sets of 
Escobar, as a subset of the Medellín Cartel’s macro-level data sets, are compiled 
using criminological frames of reference and complexity prompts, including 
fractal fragments. 
7.2.1  Source data set – micro 
As described in Chapter 5, the micro-level source data set is a subset of the macro-
level source data set, comprising both primary and secondary sources as 
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summarised in Appendix 1.    
7.2.2  Actor data set – micro 
As presented in Table 7.1 below, from an analysis of the source data set at the 
micro-level of Escobar, the source data reveals 10 actor groups within the actor 
data set.  
Table	7.1:	Micro-level	actor	data	set:	Escobar		
	
Actor	groups	
	
1. The	Family	
2. The	Friends		
3. The	Business	Associates		
4. The	Employees	
5. The	Locals	
6. The	Alliances	
7. The	Competitors	
8. The	Enemies	
9. The	State	Authorities	
10. The	Media	
Source:	Source	data	in	Appendix	1	
 
As depicted in Table 7.1 above, the actor data set comprises a variety of ‘others’, 
from friends to enemies, and from locals to state officials, all with a variety of 
perspectives.  A selection of actors within each actor group is contained in 
Appendix 2.  As expected, each actor group contains multiple types of actors 
resulting in scores of perspectives to choose from.  As also seen in Appendix 2, an 
actor may belong to more than one actor group.  For example, the Castaño brothers 
(paramilitary leaders) initially formed an alliance with Escobar, then became 
friends and later enemies and sit in the actor groups 2, 6 and 8 in the Table 7.1 
above.  
As analysed below, there were many sides to Escobar.  In an interview with 
Wagner Moura (‘Moura’), the actor who plays Escobar in the critically acclaimed 
2015-2017 Netflix series Narcos, Moura undertook his own research to portray 
Escobar’s character (Liebman 2015).  Following his research, Moura notes that 
‘everybody wrote a book about him: the waiter, the guy who fixed his car.  So it’s 
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very interesting because you wind up having so many different points of view’ 
(Liebman 2015).  Further, in another interview, when asked ‘does he think of 
Escobar as a wholly bad man?’, Moura offers his own insights (Harvey 2015):  
“Oh,	he	was	a	bad	man.		He	was	a	mean	person,	sure,	I	have	no	doubt	–	but	if	you	ask	his	
wife,	who	 is	 still	 alive	 today,	 she	would	 probably	 say	 something	 different.	What	 I	 like	
about	Pablo…”.		Moura	goes	on	to	compare	the	many	first-hand	accounts	written	about	
Escobar,	including	his	brother,	his	son	and	lover.		Moura	notes,	“in	each	one	you	are	going	
to	see	a	different	Pablo,	see	how	lovely	he	was,	how	charming.		It	is	complex.		My	job	is	
to	portray	the	human	being”.	
Fragment	83:		Actor	portraying	Escobar	
As will be seen below, in constructing Escobar’s attractor set, together with the 
Medellín Cartel’s, his strengths and weaknesses will become readily apparent, 
together with his drivers and vulnerabilities, in shaping and influencing the 
Medellín Cartel. 
7.2.3 Complex data set – micro 
As described in Chapter 5, the micro-level complex data set is a subset of the 
macro-level complex data set comprising a selection of fractal fragments across a 
variety of actors as summarised in Appendix 3.    
7.3 Step 2: Contextual variables – micro 
Applying step two of the new complexity model, contextual variables are 
identified and analysed for Escobar, as a subset of the Medellín Cartel’s macro-
level, within a historical, geographical, social, economic, political and media 
setting, using complexity prompts.  
7.3.1 A time and place – micro 
Escobar was born on 1 December 1949 in Rionegro, a small town just outside 
Medellín.   He initially grew up in the country, on the outskirts of Medellín, before 
moving to the inner city when he was eight years old (Escobar R 2010).  Although 
Escobar often claimed he grew up poor, by Colombian standards, his family 
qualified as lower to middle class.  His father was a farmer and his mother a school 
teacher.  He had two brothers, including Roberto, and four sisters, including Alba 
Marina Escobar (‘Alba Marina’) (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002; Escobar R 2010; 
Escobar JP 2016). According to Roberto, Escobar’s brother (Escobar R 2010:18): 
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Colombia	 is	 a	beautiful	 country	 and	 rich	 in	 the	 gifts	 of	 nature,	 but	 it	 is	 a	place	where	
corruption	has	always	been	an	accepted	part	of	our	lives.		Our	country	has	always	been	
ruled	by	a	class	of	wealthy	families	that	did	very	little	to	help	the	poor.		There	were	very	
few	social	programs	that	assisted	people	in	making	their	lives	better.		We	have	a	system	
of	laws	in	Colombia,	but	we	lived	by	a	different	set	of	rules.		
Fragment	84:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother		
As history tells us, it was by a different set of rules that Escobar did in fact live his 
life and contributed to the conditions that enabled him to create the Medellín 
Cartel.  	
7.3.2 La Violencia – micro 
La Violencia began a year before Escobar was born and had a deep impact on 
Escobar and his family.  When Escobar was still a child, in the words of Escobar’s 
brother, Roberto (Escobar R 2010:6-7): 
I	will	never	forget	the	night	the	guerrillas	came	to	our	house…they	came	to	our	town	in	
the	middle	of	the	night,	dragging	people	out	of	their	houses	and	killing	them.		When	they	
reached	our	house	they	started	banging	on	the	doors	with	their	machetes	and	screaming	
that	they	were	going	to	kill	us…I	held	on	to	Pablo	and	our	sister…telling	them	not	to	cry,	
that	we	would	be	all	right.		I	remember	giving	Pablo	a	baby	bottle	to	calm	him	down…they	
sprayed	 [our	 house]	with	 gasoline	 and	 set	 it	 on	 fire…our	 road	was	 illuminated	by	our	
burning	house.		In	that	strange	light	I	saw	bodies	lying	in	the	gutters	and	hanging	from	the	
lampposts…so	the	killing	in	Colombia	had	started	long	before	my	brother.		Colombia	has	
always	been	a	country	of	violence.		It	was	part	of	our	heritage.		
Fragment	85:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother	
As part of Colombia’s heritage, Escobar inherited his penchant for violence, but it 
was no ordinary violence.  As mentioned earlier in Chapter 6, Escobar had his own 
special brand of violence, which would later become his trademark.   
7.3.3 Society and the economy – micro 
As noted in Chapter 6, from an early age, Escobar wanted to be rich.  What Escobar 
soon found out, was that in the absence of a Colombian moral compass, Colombian 
society and its economy essentially evolved around money.  As Strong (1995:53) 
points out: 
Money	was	buying	him	everything.		Already	the	centrifugal	social	force	in	Colombia,	and	
particularly	Antioquia,	money	was	converted	by	Escobar	and	his	fellow	traffickers	into	an	
over-whelming	moral	 force,	 too.	 	 It	 bought	 people	 as	well	 as	 objects,	 beauty	 queens,	
priests,	 businessmen,	 lawyers	 and	 politicians	 as	 well	 as	 vintage	 cars,	 Ming	 vases,	
helicopters	and	rhinoceroses.		The	pillars	of	Colombian	society	were	turning	a	blind	eye	
to	the	rising	number	of	killings	in	Medellín	as	well	as	nationally	[emphasis	added].	
Fragment	86:	Investigative	journalists		
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Moreover, according to Escobar’s brother, Roberto (Escobar R 2010:57): 
[Escobar]	 knew	 that	 the	 people	 of	 Colombia	 profited	 from	 the	 success	 of	 the	 drug	
traffickers.	 	Many	 thousands	 of	 Colombians	were	 employed	 in	 the	 business,	 from	 the	
workers	 in	the	jungle	to	the	police.	 	And	many	others	benefited	from	the	public	works	
each	of	the	traffickers	did.			
Fragment	87:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother	
Essentially, these conditions enabled Escobar to emerge and flourish and in doing 
so, also enabled him to create the Medellín Cartel.  
7.3.4 Politics – micro 
As explained in Chapter 6, Escobar not only wanted to be rich, he wanted to be 
famous and have political power.  In the recollections of Alba Marina, Escobar’s 
sister, as translated and summarised by Pobutsky (2013:693): 
[Alba	Marina]	lays	out	the	atmosphere	of	state	disorder	that	had	affected	her	family	even	
before	her	brother	rose	to	power…[she]	implicitly	and	explicitly	establishes	a	pattern	of	
inverted	values,	portraying	law	officials	and	the	state	in	general	as	inefficient,	obstructive,	
and	frequently	criminal	[emphasis	added].	
Fragment	88:	Escobar’s	sister		
Essentially, Alba Marina highlights Colombia’s history of state corruption, which 
existed well before Escobar’s rise to power, and inverts Escobar as the good guy 
against the ‘criminal’ state.  What she fails to mention, however, is that it is this 
very history of state corruption that contributed to Escobar’s rise to ‘criminal’ 
power.  Moreover, like all traffickers, Escobar feared extradition.  In 1988, whilst 
Escobar was in hiding, Escobar granted journalist Yolanda Ruiz a rare recorded 
interview.  At the time, the interview never made it to air, until its release 25 years 
later in 2013.  In the interview, Escobar makes his position clear (NTN24 News 
2013): 
My	position	is	the	same	as	the	grand	majority	of	the	Colombian	people,	and	that’s	to	say	
I’m	against	extradition…I’m	sometimes	accused	of	drug	trafficking.		It’s	an	activity	that	for	
the	 time	 being,	 historically,	 shall	 we	 say,	 has	 been	 declared	 illegal.	 	 It’s	 illegal	 at	 the	
moment,	 but	 in	 the	 long	 run	 and	 in	 the	 future,	we’re	 going	 to	 show	 that	 it	will	 head	
towards	legalisation…Dirty	money	is	in	all	economic	sectors	of	the	country.		It’s	when	the	
same	state	and	the	same	government	receive	taxes	paid	by	illicit	drug	traffickers…and	so	
it’s	accepted	what	the	press	and	sometimes	the	people	would	call	‘dirty’	money.	
Fragment	89:	Escobar		
Despite Escobar’s position, he greatly benefited economically from the illegal 
status of drugs, and the inadequate legislation to stymie the flow of ‘dirty’ money.  
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Together with state corruption, these conditions contributed to his rise to power.  	
7.3.5 Media – micro 
Escobar’s thirst for political power and social legitimacy catapulted him firmly into 
the media spotlight.  As Kirk (2003:97) points out, successful criminals ‘do not 
announce themselves like cartoon villains, but are the ordinary faces that circulate 
in human society without arousing suspicion’.  Essentially, it was the media that 
helped fuel Escobar’s social construction of villain versus hero.   As in most 
constructions, each relies on selective perspectives – the perspective of the ‘other’.   
In particular, the US and foreign media painted Escobar as the villain and in the 
context of the war on drugs (Roth 2010:416): 
The	human	face	on	the	formerly	anonymous	enemy.	
Fragment	90:	Historian	&	criminal	justice	scholar	
In contrast, in Colombia, in newspapers controlled by Escobar, Escobar cast 
himself as the hero, as Robin Hood.  In a television media interview (Sins Of My 
Father 2009), when asked a question on whether Escobar sees himself as Robin 
Hood, Escobar responds: 
Not	at	all.		But,	it’s	a	very	interesting	name.		Those	who	know	Robin	Hood’s	story	know	
perfectly	well	that	he	fought	for	and	defended	the	poor.		
	
Fragment	91:	Escobar	
 
While Escobar initially plays down the Robin Hood label, later on in the interview 
he talks specifically about his generosity, effectively manipulating the interviewer.  
Despite Escobar’s early attempts of manipulating certain news outlets, with 
images of him helping the poor, during the violent years, it was also the media’s 
graphic images of his terrorist attacks that turned the people against him. As 
Escobar proved, crime and fame do not mix.  
7.3.6 Summary of micro-level contextual variables  
In summary, similar to the macro-level, it can be argued that in isolation each 
contextual variable provides favourable conditions for the emergence of Escobar 
and his influence on the Medellín Cartel.  Taking each variable in turn: 
• Time and place:  Escobar initially grew up in the country, on the outskirts 
of Medellín, before moving as a child to the inner city of Medellín.  
Growing up in both the country and the city as lower to middle class taught 
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Escobar that corruption can be a way of life, contributing to Escobar’s 
outlook and ability to create the Medellín Cartel.    
 
• Historical event: La Violencia had a deep and personal impact on Escobar 
and his family, as they witnessed first-hand the atrocities of the time.    As 
part of Colombia’s heritage, Escobar also inherited his penchant for 
violence, which would later shape and influence the Medellín Cartel. 
 
• Society and the economy:  From an early age, Escobar wanted to be rich, 
and as he soon found out, in the absence of a Colombian moral compass, 
Colombian society and its economy essentially evolved around money, 
where people could be bought and society turned a blind eye to traffickers. 
These conditions allowed Escobar to emerge and flourish, enabling him to 
create the Medellín Cartel.       
 
• Politics: Escobar also wanted to be famous and have political power.  In 
the beginning, he benefited greatly from the illegal status of drugs and 
inadequate legislation to stymie the flow of ‘dirty’ money, together with 
the state’s ongoing corruption, all of which contributed to his rise to power.  
 
• Media:  Escobar’s thirst for political power and social legitimacy catapulted 
him firmly into the media spotlight.   In the early days, media images of 
Escobar helping the poor greatly influenced his Robin Hood persona and 
acceptance by the people.  However, during the violent years, it was also 
the media images of his terrorist attacks that later turned the people against 
him. 
Similar to the macro-level, however, it can also be argued, that the sum of all 
variables provides more compelling evidence to support a complexity model of 
interconnected conditions influencing Escobar, and thereby enabling his creation 
of the Medellín Cartel.   
7.4 Step 3: Attractor set – micro 
Applying step three of the new complexity model, the attractor sets of Escobar and 
the Medellín Cartel are constructed based on an analysis of the data sets and 
contextual variables, using the criminological concept of Young’s (1997b) 
attractors (economic, social, moral, physical), together with complexity prompts, 
to organise, shape and structure the information.    
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7.4.1 Attractor set overview  
The ultimate aim of an attractor set is to gain insights on what guides the attitudes 
and behaviours of an actor, such as Escobar, and make inferences about the system 
as a whole, such as the Medellín Cartel. In looking for attractors, the aim is to 
identify the values, motivators and issues of concern that guide and shape actor 
behaviour.   
As explained in Chapter 5, an attractor set can be constructed using Young’s 
(1997b) argument that the life of any given individual or group can be mapped to 
one of four attractors and that each form of crime entails some combination of the 
four. As also explained in Chapter 5, to apply the new complexity model to the 
study of organised crime and terrorism, characteristics of a criminal group 
(Richards 1999) can also be mapped to Young’s (1997b) four attractors as 
summarised in Table 7.2 below:  
Table	7.2:	Summary	mapping:	attractor	set	to	criminal	group	characteristics	
	 Attractor	set	 Criminal	group	characteristics	
1.	 Economic	 Corruption,	Diversity,	Infiltration,	Insulation,	Monopoly,	Sophistication,	
Mobility,	Motivation		
2.	 Social	 Bonding,	History,	Motivation		
3.	 Moral	 Subversion,	Continuity,	Bonding,	History,	Motivation		
4.	 Physical	 Violence,	Discipline	
	
Source:	Summary	of	Table	5.6		
 
In a complexity informed world, Escobar’s attitudes and behaviours were 
influenced by those around him, especially actors within the Medellín Cartel, as 
well as Escobar influencing them and the Medellín Cartel. Moreover, in 
determining attractors in a complex data set, it is important to note that attractors 
depend on the frequency, regularity, intensity and priority of an actor’s exposure.  
In a criminal context, the more times an actor is exposed (frequency), the more 
consistently an actor is exposed (regularity), the earlier an actor is exposed 
(priority) and the stronger the factor (intensity), then the more likely a certain 
behaviour will occur. In the following sections, each of the four attractors is 
analysed in turn, using criminological frames of reference and complexity 
prompts.   
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7.4.2 Economic attractor 
The economic attractor is based on economic power and arises from one’s income 
and wealth.  In a criminal group, the characteristics of corruption, diversity, 
infiltration, insulation, monopoly, sophistication, mobility and motivation may be 
mapped to economic power.  Using the new complexity model, based on the 
characteristics of economic power, a summary of Escobar’s and the Medellín 
Cartel’s economic attractor, including references to supporting fractal fragments, 
is presented in Table 7.3 below. 
Table	7.3:		Economic	attractor:	Escobar	and	the	Medellín	Cartel		
	 Economic	power	characteristics	
	 Individual	&	Group	 Escobar	 Medellín	Cartel	
1.	 Individual	
Income	and	wealth:	
material	gain	through	
licit	and	illicit	means.		
	
• Escobar’s	childhood	ambition	
was	to	be	a	millionaire.	
Despite	the	opportunity	to	go	
to	school	and	college,	he	
chose	to	drop	out	and	
followed	the	path	of	illicit	
wealth,	first	becoming	a	petty	
thief	and	later	graduating	to	
the	‘king	of	cocaine’	
(Fragments	14,	86,	92-95,	
132).			
• Money	was	always	the	key	
incentive	and	ultimate	goal	
of	individuals	within	the	
Medellín	Cartel,	however,	
many	did	not	have	the	
opportunity	to	go	to	school	
and	college,	so	their	illicit	
path	to	material	gain	was	
more	easily	chosen	
(Fragments	23,	26-27,	130).		
2.	 Criminal	Group	
Corruption:	use	of	
illicit	influence,	
exploitation	of	
weaknesses,	and	the	
blackmail	of	public	
and	prominent	
figures.	
• Escobar	created	the	‘silver	or	
lead’	policy	early	on	in	his	
criminal	career	to	exploit	
state	officials	and/or	officers	
with	a	choice	of	a	generous	
bribe	or	be	killed	(Fragments	
43,	53).				
• The	Medellín	Cartel	
adopted	Escobar’s	‘silver	or	
lead’	policy	and	bribed	state	
officials	and/or	officers	at	
all	levels,	including	the	
government,	the	judiciary,	
law	enforcement	and	the	
military	(Fragments	28-30,	
38,	53,	118).		
3.	 Criminal	Group	
Diversity:	in	illicit	
activities,	to	further	
insulate	the	
organisation	from	
dependence	on	one	
criminal	activity.	
• As	well	as	the	drug	trade,	
Escobar	always	ran	a	
protection	racket	throughout	
his	criminal	career	(Fragment	
32-33,	43-44,	52).	
• Although	the	Medellín		
Cartel	was	dependent	on	
one	key	activity	–	the	drug	
trade	–	it	developed	
multiple	paths	and	diverse	
ways	to	achieve	the	same	
outcome,	including	
outsourcing	all,	parts	and	
none	of	its	business	
(Fragments	19,	32-33).	
4.	 Criminal	Group	
Infiltration:	continued	
effort	to	gain	a	
foothold	in	legitimate	
• Escobar	either	owned	directly	
or	indirectly	numerous	
legitimate	businesses	to	
launder	money	such	as	
construction	and	real	estate	
• Leaders	and	key	associates	
of	the	Medellín	Cartel	either	
owned	directly	or	indirectly	
legitimate	businesses	to	
launder	money	such	as	cash	
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	 Economic	power	characteristics	
	 Individual	&	Group	 Escobar	 Medellín	Cartel	
institutions	to	further	
profit	or	gain	a	level	
of	protection	from	
detection.	
businesses	(Fragment	97).	 intensive	businesses	and	
the	Ochoa	brothers	even	
co-owned	a	bank	
(Fragments	40,	96).	
5.	 Criminal	Group	
Insulation:	protection	
of	the	organisation’s	
leaders	by	separating	
them	from	the	
soldiers,	cell	from	cell,	
and	function	from	
function.	
• Escobar	was	protected	by	
armed	guards	and	
surveillance	systems	and	
separated	himself	from	
certain	areas	of	the	business,	
but	still	gave	orders	
(Fragment	22).		
• Due	to	the	need	for	secrecy	
and	insulation,	functions	
were	kept	separate	from	
each	other	so	that	each	
function	was	unaware	of	
the	others	business.		As	
such,	if	one	part	of	the	
business	was	discovered,	
the	other	parts	would	not	
be	impacted	(Fragments	22,	
26,	42).			
6.	 Criminal	Group	
Monopoly:	control	
over	certain	criminal	
activities	within	a	
geographic	area	with	
no	tolerance	for	
competition.	
• Escobar	owned	all	the	
criminal	activities	in	Medellín,	
not	just	cocaine,	and	nothing	
went	in	or	out	without	his	
orders.		He	also	became	
known	as	the	‘king	of	cocaine’	
in	Colombia	(Fragments	43-
44,	50).			
• The	Medellín	Cartel	
monopolised	the	cocaine	
business	in	Medellín	and	
other	parts	of	Colombia,	
with	an	initial	strategic	
alliance	with	its	key	
competitor,	the	Cali	Cartel	
(Fragments	49,	59).	
7.	 Criminal	Group	
Sophistication:	in	the	
use	of	advanced	
communication	
systems,	financial	
controls,	and	
operations.	
• Escobar	pioneered	the	
method	of	placing	assassins	
on	the	back	of	motorcycles,	
which	proved	to	be	highly	
effective,	including	the	
assassination	of	Lara	
(Fragment	98).	
• The	Medellín	Cartel	were	
innovators	in	the	use	of	
advanced	communications,	
concealing	drugs	and	
operations	to	facilitate	their	
smuggling	routes	and	hide	
the	cocaine	(Fragments	18,	
37,	48,	99).	
8.	 Criminal	Group	
Mobility:	a	disregard	
for	national	and	
jurisdictional	
boundaries.	
• Escobar	used	his	ability	to	
exploit	corrupt	state	officials	
and/or	officers	in	surrounding	
countries	to	set-up	
production	and	smuggling	
routes	into	the	US	and	other	
places	(Fragment	41,	45,	48).		
• The	US	was	the	Medellín		
Cartel’s	key	market,	but	it	
later	expanded	into	Europe	
and	other	places	(Fragment	
41-2).		
9.	 Criminal	Group	
Motivation:	power	
and	influence	
resulting	from	the	
accumulation	of	
wealth,	political	or	
social	gains.	
• While	Escobar’s	childhood	
ambition	was	to	be	a	
millionaire,	it	was	also	to	be	
Colombia’s	President.	One	of	
Escobar’s	political	objectives	
was	to	prohibit	extradition	so	
he	could	protect	and	continue	
his	illicit	drug	business	
(Fragment	14,	55,	89,	94,	113,	
133).				
• The	ultimate	motivation	of	
the	Medellín	Cartel	was	the	
pursuit	of	material	gain	
through	illicit	wealth	
(Fragments	23,	26-27,	130).			
Source:	Author’s	summary	based	on	analyses	of	the	data	sets	and	contextual	variables			
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As argued in Chapter 5, economic power is the key attractor in organised crime 
(Young 1997b).  Through a complexity lens, the bifurcations between the desire for 
material gain, and the ability to achieve it through legitimate means, is the point 
where economic attractors such as criminal activities come into play.  As depicted 
in Table 7.3 above, Escobar’s economic attractor influenced and shaped the path 
of the Medellín Cartel, but as history tells us, it also led to his downfall.  As noted 
in Chapter 6, Escobar’s childhood ambition was to be a millionaire, but it was also 
to be the President of Colombia (Escobar R 2010).  Unlike many Colombians, 
Escobar had the opportunity to go to school and college, but abandoned his studies 
several times to hang out with the ‘wrong crowd’ and eventually dropped out 
without graduating (Strong 1995; Bowden 2002).  According to Juan Pablo, 
Escobar’s son, Escobar had revealed to him in his later stages of life how his 
criminal career had actually begun (Escobar JP 2016:34): 
[It	was]	the	day	he	figured	out	how	to	forge	his	school’s	high	school	diplomas…they	stole	
blank	diplomas,	which	at	the	time	were	issued	with	the	school’s	seal,	and	had	a	copy	of	
the	seal	made.	 	They	also	 learned	to	 imitate	the	professors’	handwriting	so	they	could	
insert	 the	 final	 grades	 and	 the	 necessary	 signatures.	 	 And	 so	 dozens	 of	 young	 people	
graduated	from	the	Liceo	de	Antioquia	without	ever	having	set	foot	inside	its	walls.			
Fragment	92:	Escobar’s	son	
Essentially, Escobar chose his path early in life, the path of illicit wealth.  As 
Mallory (2007:52) surmises: 
He	chose	the	criminal	life…began	as	a	petty	thief,	became	a	gang	member,	excelled	as	a	
paid	murderer,	and	rose	to	become	boss	of	a	major	organisation.	
 
Fragment	93:	Legal	scholar	
Moreover, as summarised in a drug intelligence brief issued by the DEA (2002): 
He	became	one	of	the	wealthiest	and	most	feared	men	in	the	world.		While	on	the	surface,	
he	was	nothing	more	than	a	street	thug	who	became	successful	by	trafficking	in	cocaine,	
Escobar	 had	 political	 aspirations	 and	 strove	 to	 project	 the	 appearance	 of	 legitimacy,	
claiming	 his	 wealth	 was	 the	 result	 of	 real	 estate	 investments…Escobar	 was	 a	 drug	
trafficker	 who	 used	 drug-related	 violence	 and	 terrorism	 to	 further	 his	 own	 political,	
personal,	and	financial	goals.		Moreover,	he	funded	his	terrorist	activities	with	the	money	
obtained	 from	his	 drug	 trafficking	 endeavours.	 	 He	was	 the	 classic	 narco-terrorist;	 his	
cause	was	simply	himself.		
	
Fragment	94:	US	public	government	report		
Thomas Cash, former DEA special agent in charge, Miami, best sums up Escobar 
in a single sentence (‘The Godfather of Cocaine’ 1997): 
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Escobar	was	to	cocaine	what	Ford	was	to	automobiles.			
Fragment	95:	US	law	enforcement		
Of note, since Escobar, there has been no one like him in the drugs trafficking 
world or narco-terrorism for that matter.  In today’s world, one could similarly 
sum up ‘bin Laden was to jihad what Escobar was to cocaine’. While narco-
terrorism still exists, today’s cause for concern is largely religious terrorism, or 
more specifically radical Islamic terrorism.    
In terms of the business, hiding the money trail was key (Strong 1995:207): 
Businesses	 such	 as	 fast-food	 restaurant	 chains,	 hotels,	 night-clubs	 and	 petrol	 stations	
were	commonly	bought	up	by	the	drugs	traffickers,	through	frontmen,	because	they	were	
high-liquidity	concerns	that	offered	easy	ways	systematically	to	exaggerate	their	income	
or	to	understate	costs	–	and	thereby	launder	money	through	the	hole	in	their	accounts.		
	
Fragment	96:	Investigative	journalist			
Escobar’s brother, Roberto notes (Escobar R 2010:25): 
Pablo	 asked	 me	 to	 manage	 [his]	 money…this	 was	 the	 time	 I	 first	 became	 the	
accountant…we	 eventually	 began	 investing	 the	money	 in	 real	 estate,	 buying	 land	 and	
buildings	and	financing	construction.		This	was	something	Pablo	would	do	for	the	rest	of	
his	life…I	used	the	real	estate	deals	to	protect	Pablo’s	money…so	I	created	a	new	set	of	
books	to	prove	he	had	earned	his	money	from	real	estate.	 	For	example,	 if	we	sold	an	
apartment	for	$50,000,	in	those	books	the	sale	was	recorded	as	$90,000.		
	
Fragment	97:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother		
Accordingly, Escobar either owned directly or indirectly numerous legitimate 
businesses to launder money, such as construction and real estate businesses, to 
further profit or gain a level of protection from detection.  As well as the money 
side, Escobar was also an innovator and pioneered the method of assassins on the 
back of motorcycles.  According to Strong (1995:98): 
The	[Medellín]	Cartel	was	producing	its	own	killers.		Escobar	was	reported	to	have	set	up	
a	school	for	assassins	on	a	ranch	outside	the	small	town	of	Sabaneta,	next	to	Envigado.		
Its	students	were	taught	to	shoot	from	motorbikes,	firing	at	their	victims	with	machine-
guns	as	if	they	were	making	the	sign	of	the	cross.			
Fragment	98:	Investigative	journalist		
As such, this method of placing assassins on the back of motorcycles proved to be 
highly effective, including the assassination of Lara.	 	Moreover, it was Escobar’s 
own brother, Roberto, who helped Escobar and the Medellín Cartel with some of 
the more sophisticated innovative methods, such as the use of electronics.  
According to Roberto (Escobar R 2010:12): 
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I	 attended	 the	 Science	 and	 Electronics	 Academy	 in	 Medellín,	 where	 I	 became	 an	
electronics	engineer.		It	was	there	I	learned	how	to	build	and	repair	almost	any	electronic	
device.			Later,	I	was	able	to	use	those	skills	to	design	sophisticated	security	systems	and	
even	created	the	electronics	for	our	submarines	that	carried	cocaine	to	the	Bahamas.			
Fragment	99:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother		
As seen earlier, it was the use of innovative methods, such as advanced 
communications and security systems, that helped conceal the drugs from 
authorities and facilitate numerous smuggling routes.  
In summary, as depicted in Table 7.3 above, as an economic attractor, the desire 
for material gain through illicit wealth may be seen as a core strength and 
motivating factor of the Medellín Cartel.  For Escobar, however, as an economic 
attractor, his desire for material gain through illicit wealth, combined with his 
political ambition for power and his cause to prohibit extradition, may ultimately 
be seen as a weakness and vulnerability of Escobar, as will be seen in section 7.5 
below.  
 
7.4.3 Social attractor 
The social attractor is based on social power and arises from social relationships, 
be it family, friends, colleagues, recreation or the community.  In a criminal group, 
the characteristics of bonding, history and motivation may be mapped to social 
power.  Using the new complexity model, based on the characteristics of social 
power, a summary of Escobar’s and the Medellín Cartel’s social attractor, 
including references to supporting fractal fragments, is presented in Table 7.4.  
Table	7.4:		Social	attractor:	Escobar	and	the	Medellín	Cartel	
Social	power	characteristics	
	 Individual	&	Group	 Escobar	 Medellín	Cartel	
1.	 Individual		
Social	relationships:	
family,	friends,	
colleagues,	recreation	
or	the	community.	
• Escobar	was	a	devoted	
family	man,	especially	to	
his	wife	and	children,	and	
formed	close	relationships	
with	his	family,	friends	
and	associates.	He	also	
became	a	Robin	Hood	
figure	in	the	poor	barrios	
of	Medellín,	due	to	his	
concern	and	generosity,	
including	the	building	of	
houses	and	facilities	
(Fragments	17,	39,	91,	
100,	103,	106,	138,	140).	
• The	Medellín	Cartel	was	
formed	largely	through	close	
social	relationships,	based	on	
trust	and	shared	values,	
including	recruitment	
overseas	through	Colombian	
immigrants	in	hub	cities	such	
as	Miami,	Los	Angeles	and	
New	York	(Fragments	35-36).			
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Social	power	characteristics	
	 Individual	&	Group	 Escobar	 Medellín	Cartel	
2.	 Criminal	Group	
Bonding:	allows	
entrenchment	and	
refinement	of	criminal	
activities	and	practices.	
• Escobar	often	threw	lavish	
parties	inviting	people	
from	both	licit	and	illicit	
worlds.	(Fragments	111-
112).	
	
• The	Medellín	Cartel	often	
socialised	with	each	other	as	
recruitment	was	primarily	
through	family	and	friends,	or	
other	social	connections.		Of	
note,	strong	bonds	formed	
between	the	sicarios	as	they	
felt	a	sense	of	belonging	and	
significance	and	not	just	the	
money	(Fragments	20-21,	
105,	111-112).	
3.	 Criminal	Group	
History:	individual	to	
individual,	and	
individual	to	
organisation,	for	
solidarity	and	
protection,	often	
through	complex	
initiation	rites.	
• As	the	boss,	Escobar’s	
relationship	with	his	
leaders	and	key	associates	
influenced	the	history	of	
the	Medellín	Cartel	
(Fragments	15-17).	
	
• When	it	came	to	choosing	
allegiances,	the	relationships	
formed	between	individuals	
and	the	organisation	
ultimately	shaped	the	history	
of	the	Medellín	Cartel	
(Fragments	15-17).	
	
4.	 Criminal	Group	
Motivation:	power	and	
influence	resulting	
from	ideological,	
political	or	social	gains.	
• From	a	social	perspective,	
one	of	Escobar’s	
motivating	factors	to	
enter	politics	was	his	
desire	to	have	social	
legitimacy	and	to	be	
beloved	by	the	people	
(Fragments	14,	39,	94,	
103,	106-107,	113,	146).	
• The	Medellín	Cartel	did	not	
share	Escobar’s	desire	for	
social	legitimacy,	as	they	
preferred	to	remain	in	the	
shadows	(Fragments	15,	113,	
135).			
	
Source:	Author’s	summary	based	on	analyses	of	the	data	sets	and	contextual	variables			
 
As depicted in Table 7.4 above, Escobar’s social attractor influenced and shaped 
the path of the Medellín Cartel, but as history tells us, it also led to his downfall.  
His love for his family and Medellín were both his Achilles heel.  Since Escobar’s 
death, there have been numerous personal accounts and memoirs by members of 
his family, friends, key associates and even his lover.  As seen in Appendix 1, these 
include books by his son, Juan Pablo (now called Sebastián Marroquín), his brother 
Roberto, his sister Alba Marina, his key assassin Popeye and his lover Virgina 
Vallejo García (‘Vallejo’).  The books tend to focus on their own personal 
relationship and perspective of Escobar, providing personal insight into his 
private life.  Escobar comes across as a devoted family man, doting father, 
charismatic boss and dashing lover. 
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According to Escobar’s wife, Maria (interview in Sins Of My Father 2009): 
Everybody	 dreams	 of	 going	 to	 Disney.	 	 The	 father	 became	 a	 child	 in	 that	 park	 with	
Sebastian	[Juan	Pablo].		He	went	up	in	every	roller	coaster	even	if	he	was	scared	to	death	
of	 them	because	he	didn’t	 like	 roller	 coasters.	 	 But	he	did	 everything	he	 could	 to	 see	
Sebastian	[Juan	Pablo]	happy.	
Fragment	100:	Escobar’s	wife	
Moreover, in a letter written by Escobar’s wife to Escobar whilst he was on the run 
(cited in Bowden 2002:208-209): 
I	miss	you	so	very	much	I	feel	weak.		Sometimes	I	feel	an	immense	loneliness	takes	over	
my	heart.		Why	does	life	have	to	separate	us	like	this?		My	heart	is	aching.		How	are	you?		
How	do	you	feel?		I	don’t	want	to	leave	you	my	love.		I	need	you	so	very	much,	I	want	to	
cry	with	you.	
Fragment	101:	Escobar’s	wife	
Based on Escobar’s wife’s own words, there is no doubt that his wife Maria, felt 
Escobar’s love in return for her own affection, and that he was devoted to both his 
wife and children.   Furthermore, in his book, Escobar’s son comments (Escobar JP 
2016:1, 4): 
From	 the	day	 I	was	born	 till	 the	day	he	died,	my	 father	was	my	 friend,	my	guide,	my	
teacher,	 and	 my	 trusted	 adviser…in	 all	 of	 people’s	 wide-ranging	 opinions	 about	 my	
father’s	 life,	 everybody	 agrees	 on	 one	 thing:	 	 his	 unconditional	 love	 for	 this,	 his	 only	
family.		
Fragment	102:	Escobar’s	son	
In his memoirs, Escobar’s son Juan Pablo, reveals the close bond that existed 
between father and son and the utter devotion of Escobar to his family.  And in a 
book written by Escobar’s brother Roberto, he notes (Escobar R 2010:4): 
I	think	about	my	brother	every	day.		Pablo	Escobar	was	an	extraordinarily	simple	man.		He	
was	brilliant	and	kind-hearted,	passionate	and	violent.		He	was	a	man	of	both	poetry	and	
guns.		To	many	he	was	a	saint,	to	others	he	was	a	monster...I	think	about	the	good	things	
he	 did	 with	 that	money	 for	 so	many	 people,	 the	 neighbourhoods	 he	 built,	 the	many	
thousands	of	people	he	fed	and	educated.		And,	less	often,	I	think	about	the	terrible	things	
for	which	he	was	responsible,	the	killings	and	the	bombings,	the	deaths	of	the	innocents	
as	well	as	his	enemies	and	the	days	of	terror	that	shocked	nations.			
Fragment	103:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother	
Roberto’s recollections, while more balanced than most, still attempt to highlight 
Escobar’s Robin Hood persona.  In particular, despite Escobar’s motivations, 
Roberto emphasises the building of houses and facilities, and the provision of 
education by Escobar in the poor barrios of Medellín.  Shortly after Escobar’s death, 
Escobar’s mother, Hermilda Gaviria de Escobar, said in an interview (‘The 
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Godfather of Cocaine’ 1997):	
I	think	of	the	ingratitude	of	people.		I	think	of	the	brutal	persecution	that	was	inflicted	on	
him.		He	was	just	a	man…I	felt	something	I	have	never	felt	in	my	life.		It	was	terrible.		Since	
then,	my	soul	has	been	destroyed	because	there	will	never	be	anyone	like	Pablo	again.			
Fragment	104:	Escobar’s	family,	his	mother	
While the angst of a grieving mother is evident in her comments, her comments 
were also directed to those who had once been loyal to Escobar, including some of 
his key associates and some of the people of Medellín to whom he had been 
generous to.  According to Escobar’s head sicario Popeye, his 2015 book 
Sobreviviendo a Pablo Escobar (Surviving Pablo Escobar) as translated and 
summarised by Pobutsky (2013:688-689): 
Attests	to	the	allure	of	a	criminal	[Escobar]	whose	limitless	power	and	charisma	were	the	
glue	 that	 held	 the	 organisation	 together…Popeye	 assuages	 his	 boss’s	 criminality	 by	
blurring	the	difference	between	the	mafia,	corrupt	Colombian	politicians,	and	the	shady	
police.	 	 In	his	version	of	events,	good	and	evil	are	substituted	by	mere	competitors	for	
power,	 who	 mediate	 their	 influence	 via	 lawful	 and	 illegitimate	 measures	 alike…his	
account	is	a	testimony	of	an	unwavering	admiration	and	loyalty	for	the	patron	[boss]…a	
man’s	man,	a	cool-headed	and	charismatic	leader	who	mesmerised	the	multitudes	with	
his	 infinite	 self-confidence…Popeye	also	 romanticises	 the	camaraderie	within	 the	gang	
highlighting	 the	 unbreakable	 bond	 between	 Escobar	 and	 his	 hitmen	 [sicarios],	
relationships	allegedly	stronger	than	the	capo’s	connection	with	the	real	key	players	of	
the	Medellín	Cartel	[emphasis	added].	
Fragment	105:	Medellín	Cartel	associate		
Unlike Escobar’s brother Roberto, Popeye moderates Escobar’s criminality by 
blurring the lines of state corruption and competitors for power.  In Popeye’s eyes, 
Escobar was the ultimate leader and boss with ‘unbreakable’ bonds.  As Popeye 
puts it, Escobar was ‘the glue’ that held the Medellín Cartel together, and without 
Escobar, the Medellín Cartel subsequently became unstuck.   
Today, in Barrio Pablo Escobar, Medellín, where Escobar built many homes for the 
poor, other bonds of loyalty still hold as Escobar’s image and memory as a modern 
Robin Hood still lingers.  In the words of one of its residents (‘Killing Pablo’ 2003): 
We	sincerely	cared	a	lot	for	him	and	his	death	hurt	us.		He	was	a	person	who	would	help	
poor	 communities	 on	 a	 daily	 basis.	 	 He	 didn’t	 take	 notice	 of	 rich	 people,	 only	 of	
poverty…We	lived	in	Moravia,	the	town’s	dump	site.		We	had	a	hut,	but	then	there	was	a	
fire.		He	was	moved	by	the	whole	thing.		Then	several	families	were	chosen	and	we	were	
given	homes.	
Fragment	106:		Medellín	local	from	Barrio	Pablo	Escobar	
To the poor, Escobar’s generosity and compassion represented a symbol of justice 
against the government and rich elite, who they felt had abandoned them.   It was 
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their social construction of Escobar the myth, rather than Escobar the man.  To 
them, he represented the common people and simply took advantage of the 
wealthy drug addicted societies and corrupt state officials and/or officers to 
redistribute the wealth amongst the poor.  One of those who helped Escobar 
cultivate his Robin Hood persona and present himself to the media, was his former 
lover Vallejo, a Colombian high class socialite, actress and television presenter.  In 
2006, after giving evidence against corrupt Colombian politicians, Vallejo left for 
the safety of the US and recorded a statement broadcast in Colombia shortly 
thereafter.  She stated (‘Pablo’s ex spills beans on Colombia’s corrupt’ 2006): 
I	fell	in	love	with	a	philanthropist,	a	man	loved	by	his	people…he	was	the	only	rich	man	in	
Colombia	who	was	generous	with	the	people,	in	this	country	where	the	rich	have	never	
given	a	sandwich	to	the	poor.		
Fragment	107:	Escobar’s	lover	
In Vallejo’s 2007 book Amando a Pablo, odiando a Escobar (Loving Pablo, Hating 
Escobar) and upcoming movie, Vallejo is one of the few who paints the two sides 
to Escobar.   As translated and summarised by Pobutsky (2013:691): 
The	private	man	she	loved	clashes	with	the	public	figure	she	abhors…she	does	not	shy	
away	from	disclosing	Escobar’s	good	and	bad	qualities,	his	generosity	and	cruelty,	his	logic	
and	arbitrariness…what	becomes	apparent	in	her	personal	insight	into	Escobar’s	mind	is	
his	megalomania	combined	with	his	subsequent	disrespect	 for	others,	his	utter	 lack	of	
fear	tied	to	a	blind	self-confidence,	and	his	ruthlessness	and	an	unquenchable	thirst	for	
control	[emphasis	added].	
Fragment	108:	Escobar’s	lover	
In contrast to his family and friends, Escobar’s enemies, notably the Cali Cartel, 
characterised Escobar as (Gilberto Rodríguez cited in Rempel 2011:80): 
[A]	sick…psycho…lunatic.		
Fragment	109:	Cali	Cartel,	Gilberto	Rodríguez	
Moving on to Escobar’s social scene and connections, even in Escobar’s youth, he 
knew the importance of social connections.  As Strong (1995:20) comments:  
Escobar	had	quickly	won	a	reputation	for	keeping	bad	company.		While	still	at	school,	he	
was	 known	 for	 hanging	 out	 at	 the	 Dos	 Tortugas	 bar	 in	Medellín’s	 Jesus	 de	 Nazareno	
district,	a	fashionable	haunt	of	petty	extortionists,	car	thieves	and	bank	robbers.			
Fragment	110:		Investigative	journalist		
According to Kenney (2007:61-62), as the business grew, similar to legitimate 
businesses, ‘communities of practice’ emerged: 
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Typically	members	from	a	trafficking	group	meet	in	casual	settings	such	as	restaurants,	
bars,	 and	 dance	 clubs	 to	 discuss	 business	 problems,	 impending	 activities,	 and	 local	
smuggling	conditions…Birthday	parties,	baptisms,	weddings,	and	other	social	gatherings	
provide	 additional	 opportunities	 for	 swapping	 stories	 and	 exchanging	 professional	
gossip…In	this	manner	veterans	socialise	with	their	newer	colleagues	to	the	norms	and	
practices	of	their	enterprise	and	of	drug	trafficking	more	generally,	creating	“communities	
of	practice”.		
Fragment	111:	Political	science	&	public	policy	scholar		
Moreover, the nexus between the licit and illicit worlds continued to prosper.  As 
one local Medellín artist, who benefited financially from the traffickers’ expensive 
taste in décor, puts it (cited in Strong 1995:69): 
Art	prices	went	mad.		The	mafia	were	mostly	ignorant	people	and	liked	to	leave	it	up	to	
their	decorators	to	advise	them.		They	wanted	anything	that	was	big	and	extravagant…We	
all	used	to	go	to	their	parties.		They	were	our	friends,	linked	to	us	bohemians.		And	their	
women	were	upper	class	and	beautiful.		It	all	seemed	so	innocent.			
Fragment	112:	Local	Medellín	artist		
Above all, despite the business and parties, what Escobar craved the most was 
respect, status and recognition.  According to one of the leaders of the Medellín 
Cartel, Juan Ochoa (interview in Frontline 2000e): 
He	was	a	person	that	was	so	ambitious.		He	wanted	to	dominate	and	have	the	power	of	
all	 the	business.	 	Apart	 from	 the	business,	he	wanted	 to	be	 involved	 in	politics	and	 in	
managing	political	[and	social]	issues	in	the	country	[emphasis	added].	
Fragment	113:	Medellín	Cartel	leader	
As MacQuarrie (2015:28) puts it: 
Escobar	possessed	a	fatal	flaw	in	his	suite	of	criminal	characteristics	that,	until	now,	had	
lifted	him	from	complete	obscurity	up	into	the	very	stratosphere	of	the	criminal	elite.		A	
man	whose	very	profession	required	anonymity	and	whose	business	by	necessity	had	to	
be	 carried	 out	 in	 the	 shadows,	 gradually	 revealed	 that	 he	 lusted	 after	 not	 only	 great	
wealth	and	power,	but	also	fame	and	renown.			
Fragment	114:	Anthropologist	scholar				
And in the words of Colonel Martinez (interview in MacQuarrie 2015:29): 
Escobar	wanted	 it	both	ways.	 	He	wanted	the	criminal	world	to	fear	him	and	not	dare	
cross	him	in	any	way,	yet	he	wanted	the	public	not	to	know	anything	about	his	criminal	
enterprises.		He	tried	to	pass	himself	off	as	a	‘businessman’.		Here	was	the	biggest	criminal	
in	the	world	–	and	he	was	telling	everyone	that	he	had	made	his	fortune	in	real	estate.		
And	many	people	believed	him!	
Fragment	115:	Colombian	law	enforcement	 
Overall, Escobar’s desire for social legitimacy and attempt to downplay and hide 
the source of his wealth, was certainly in conflict with his equal desire for fame 
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and renown.     
In summary, as depicted in Table 7.4 above, as a social attractor, the close social 
ties of family and friends, and the unbreakable bond between the sicarios and the 
cartel, may be seen as a core strength and motivating factor of the Medellín Cartel.   
For Escobar, however, as a social attractor, his devotion to his family, especially 
his wife and children, combined with his desire for social legitimacy and to be 
beloved by the people as part of his political ambition, may ultimately be seen as 
a weakness and vulnerability of Escobar, as will be seen in section 7.5 below.  
7.4.4 Moral attractor 
The moral attractor is based on moral power and arises from shared values, such 
as ideology or religion, and integrity, such as professional or legal ethics.  In a 
criminal group, the characteristics of subversion, continuity, bonding, history and 
motivation may be mapped to moral power.  Using the new complexity model, 
based on the characteristics of moral power, a summary of Escobar’s and the 
Medellín Cartel’s moral attractor, including references to supporting fractal 
fragments, is presented in Table 7.5 below.  
Table	7.5:		Moral	attractor:	Escobar	and	the	Medellín	Cartel	
Moral	power	characteristics	
	 Individual	&	Group	 Escobar	 Medellín	Cartel	
1.	 Individual	
Shared	values:	such	as	
ideology	or	religion,	
and	integrity,	such	as	
professional	or	legal	
ethics.	
• Escobar	lacked	a	‘normal’	
moral	compass	creating	the	
‘silver	or	lead’	policy	and	
lived	without	rules	or	
remorse	(Fragments	86,	
118-120,	137).	
• Most	of	the	individuals	
shared	similar	values	to	
Escobar	and	readily	
adopted	his	signature	‘silver	
or	lead’	policy	within	the	
cartel	(Fragment	53).	
2.	 Criminal	Group	
Subversion:	of	
society’s	institutions	
and	legal	and	moral	
value	systems.	
• Escobar	became	so	
powerful,	that	he	was	able	
to	dictate	his	own	terms	of	
imprisonment	to	the	
government	and	continue	
his	business	while	in	his	so-
called	prison	La	Catedral	
(Fragments	68-71).	
• The	Medellín	Cartel	had	
no	respect	for	the	
government	or	legal	
system	and	played	by	
their	own	rules,	including	
the	use	of	M-19	to	
overthrow	the	judiciary	
(Fragments	49,	53).		
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Moral	power	characteristics	
	 Individual	&	Group	 Escobar	 Medellín	Cartel	
3.	 Criminal	Group	
Continuity:	like	a	
corporation,	the	
organisation	survives	
the	individuals	who	
created	and	run	it.	
• While	it	was	well-known	
that	Escobar	lacked	a	
‘normal’	moral	compass,	
the	torture	and	murder	of	
his	own	men	while	in	
prison,	resulted	in	a	deep	
divide	within	the	cartel	
(Fragments	75-76).			
• Sparked	by	Escobar’s	killing	
while	in	prison,	allegiances	
shifted	and	a	range	of	new	
groups	emerged,	as	his	
death	signalled	the	end	of	
the	Medellín	Cartel	
(Fragments	75,	76,	82).	
4.	 Criminal	Group	
Bonding:	allows	
entrenchment	and	
refinement	of	criminal	
activities	and	practices.	
• Escobar	formed	a	closer	
bond	with	Gacha	than	with	
the	Ochoa	brothers	and	also	
with	the	sicarios,	due	to	
their	closer	aligned	values	
and	violent	practices	
(Fragments	15-17,	20-21,	
138).	
• Recruitment	was	primarily	
through	family	and	friends,	
or	connections,	such	as	
those	met	in	prison	or	from	
the	same	neighbourhood,	
all	with	similar	values	
(Fragments	15-17).		
5.	 Criminal	Group	
History:	individual	to	
individual,	and	
individual	to	
organisation,	for	
solidarity	and	
protection,	often	
through	complex	
initiation	rites.	
• As	the	boss,	Escobar’s	
values	ultimately	defined	
and	destroyed	the	Medellín	
Cartel	(Fragments	82,	146).			
	
• Most	recruits	were	hired	
based	on	trust,	through	a	
system	where	several	
people	vouched	for	you	and	
if	you	did	not	follow	
through,	then	you	would	
not	only	pay	with	your	own	
life,	but	with	the	lives	of	
those	who	vouched	for	you	
(Fragments	17,	124).	
6.	 Criminal	Group	
Motivation:	power	and	
influence	resulting	
from	ideological,	
political	or	social	gains.	
• From	a	moral	perspective,	
Escobar’s	motivation	to	
prohibit	extradition,	lay	in	
his	total	disregard	for	
political	or	legal	justice	
(Fragments	55,	58,	89,	116).	
• While	the	Medellín	Cartel	
all	shared	Escobar’s	
motivation	to	prohibit	
extradition,	they	did	not	all	
agree	with	his	violent	
methods	(Fragments	54-56).			
	
Source:	Author’s	summary	based	on	analyses	of	the	data	sets	and	contextual	variables			
As depicted in Table 7.5 above, it is apparent that Escobar’s moral attractor 
influenced and shaped the path of the Medellín Cartel, specifically his silver or 
lead policy.  According to a note found by the police in one of Escobar’s hideouts 
and believed to be written by Escobar, Escobar attempts to justify his moral 
philosophy of enforcing his own justice and calls the state “morally timid” (cited 
in Bowden 2002:48): 
If	you	are	robbed,	what	do	you	do?		Who	do	you	turn	to?		The	police?		If	someone	crashes	
your	car,	do	you	expect	the	traffic	police	to	solve	your	problem	and	to	compensate	you	
for	your	damages	by	forcing	your	aggressor…to	pay	damages?		If	you	are	not	paid	what	
you	are	owed,	do	you	believe	that	Colombian	tribunals	will	force	your	creditor…to	pay	the	
debt?		If	members	of	the	police	and	armed	forces	assault	and	abuse	you,	whom	do	you	
go	to?		I	don’t	think	one	single	person	has	mentally	considered	the	above	questionnaire	
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anything	other	than	a	useless	exercise	of	hope,	which	we	all	lost	many	years	ago,	faced	
with	the	criminal	ineptitude	of	our	police	and	judicial	systems.		
Fragment	116:	Escobar			
Essentially, Escobar was suggesting that his philosophy was the only alternative 
to the state’s lawlessness.  Of note, is the extent of Escobar’s moral influence in 
academia and scholars alike.  As one former law student from the University of 
Medellín notes (cited in Strong 1995:54): 
The	faculty	was	famed	for	its	speciality	in	penal	law.		There	were	no	classes	in	ethics:		the	
most	talented	and	applauded	lawyers	were	those	who	succeeded	in	freeing	delinquents	
from	prison.		Most	lecturers	were	practising	lawyers	and	we	knew	which	were	bribeable	
and	that	many	were	close	to	the	smugglers.			
Fragment	117:	Local	Medellín	former	law	student	
According to Strong (1995:55), the University of Medellín later acted as Escobar’s 
springboard into politics, with the person who Escobar successfully won an 
alternate seat for in congress, also being the university’s former dean of the law 
faculty.  Moreover, despite the saying, ‘honour amongst thieves’, Escobar was not 
generally known for his honour or keeping his word.  For example, as pointed out 
by General Maza, former Chief of Colombia’s Intelligence Agency (‘The Godfather 
of Cocaine’ 1997): 
Pablo	Escobar	was	a	paranoid	with	delusions	of	grandeur.		He	was	a	man	without	scruples.		
He	 fought	 just	as	hard	against	 friends	and	enemies.	 	Pablo	Escobar	 sent	a	message	 to	
[Colonel]	Jaime	Ramirez	that	he’d	cancelled	the	contract	on	his	life	because	he	said	Jaime	
was	no	longer	 in	anti-narcotics	and	he	knew	he	was	only	doing	his	 job.	 	Jaime	thought	
he’d	keep	his	word.		
Fragment	118:	Colombian	law	enforcement		
Not surprisingly, Escobar did not keep his word and the Colonel was killed in 
front of his family.  It had been Colonel Ramirez who had led numerous raids 
against the Medellín Cartel, including the Tranquilandia laboratory as mentioned 
in Chapter 6.  Essentially Escobar had no integrity.  Further, General Maza (‘The 
True Story of Killing Pablo’ 2009) observes: 
You	could	not	negotiate	with	Pablo	Escobar.		Pablo	Escobar	was	a	psychopath,	a	mentally	
sick	individual.		And	he	proved	it.			
Fragment	119:		Colombia	law	enforcement		
In contrast, in the award-winning documentary The Two Escobars 2010, which 
chronicles the unprecedented rise and fall of Colombian football, as a result of 
narco-dollars by the likes of the Medellín and Cali Cartels, the story focuses on 
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Andres (Colombian footballer) and Pablo, two people with the same surname, but 
unrelated. Although the documentary depicts their separate, but often 
interconnected paths, one thing binds them and another keeps them apart.  Both 
had a deep passion for football, but Andreas had moral integrity, Pablo did not.  
In Andrea’s own words (The Two Escobars 2010):  
It’s	our	choice.	
Fragment	120:	Colombian	football	player	
In summary, as depicted in Table 7.5 above, as a moral attractor, the shared values 
of both the Medellín Cartel and Escobar, including the adoption of Escobar’s ‘silver 
or lead’ policy, may be seen a core strength and motivating factor of both Escobar 
and the Medellín Cartel, as will be seen in section 7.5 below.  
7.4.5 Physical attractor 
The physical attractor is based on physical power and arises from the use or threat 
of violence.  In a criminal group, the characteristics of violence and discipline may 
be mapped to physical power.  Using the new complexity model, based on the 
characteristics of physical power, a summary of Escobar’s and the Medellín 
Cartel’s physical attractor, including references to supporting fractal fragments, is 
presented in Table 7.6 below.    
Table	7.6:		Physical	attractor:	Escobar	and	the	Medellín	Cartel		
Physical	power	characteristics	
	 Individual	&	Group	 Escobar	 Medellín	Cartel	
1.	 Individual	
Violence:	use	or	threat	
of	violence.	
• Escobar	was	trained	as	a	
gunman,	and	cultivated	a	
fear	of	violence,	to	protect	
himself,	his	family	and	his	
criminal	lifestyle	
(Fragments	77,	121,	
125,126,	128).	
• In	conducting	its	operations,	
individuals	of	the	Medellín		
Cartel	regularly	used	violence	
and	the	threat	of	violence	
(Fragments	60,	123,	124).	
2.	 Criminal	Group		
Violence:	used	without	
hesitation	to	further	
the	criminal	aims	of	
the	organisation.	
• Escobar	had	a	penchant	
for	violence	and	being	
excessively	ruthless	and	
cruel	(Fragments	57,	77-
79,	122,	136).	
• The	Medellín	Cartel	had	the	
reputation	of	being	one	of	
the	most	violent	criminal	
groups	in	the	world	
(Fragments	50,	60).	
3.	 Criminal	Group		
Discipline:	the	
enforcement	of	
• Escobar	attained	an	
elevated	status	amongst	
his	peers	by	promoting	a	
violent	and	ruthless	
• Violence	was	the	primary	
tool	for	dealing	with	
discord	in	the	
Medellín	Cartel	to	enforce	
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Physical	power	characteristics	
	 Individual	&	Group	 Escobar	 Medellín	Cartel	
obedience	to	the	
organisation	through	
fear	and	violence.	
reputation	(Fragments	78-
79,	121,	123).	
	
obedience	and	loyalties	
(Fragments	50,	122-124).	
	
Source:	Author’s	summary	based	on	analyses	of	the	data	sets	and	contextual	variables			
As depicted in Table 7.6 above, it is readily apparent that Escobar’s physical 
attractor influenced and shaped the path of the Medellín Cartel, as not all of its 
individuals shared his penchant for extreme violence.  Escobar’s physical attractor 
may also be seen as a catalyst in forming and shaping Los Extraditables,  the terrorist 
group purposely formed and led by Escobar and Gacha to serve the interests of 
the cartels and traffickers, including the Medellín Cartel.  According to Jorge 
Ochoa, one of the leaders of the Medellín Cartel (interview in Frontline 2000d): 
Pablo	was	 a	 very	 violent	man.	 	 Pablo	was	 a	 rebel,	 and	 Pablo	 did	what	 he	wanted	 to	
do…Everybody	 knows	 that	 the	 violence	 in	 Colombia	 was	 Pablo	 Escobar.	 	 He	 was	 the	
violence	 in	the	business.	 	When	he	died,	the	violence	 in	the	business	was	finished…He	
would	intimidate	you.		He	killed	a	lot	of	his	friends.	 	He	killed	everyone,	even	the	ones	
that	helped	him…You	couldn’t	 confront	Pablo	Escobar,	because	you	knew	what	would	
happen:	you	would	die.			
Fragment	121:	Medellín	Cartel	leader	
Similarly, Jung, a key associate of the Medellín Cartel reflected on his first-hand 
experience with Escobar (interview in Frontline 2000c): 
Over	the	few	days	that	 I	was	there,	an	 individual	was	brought	to	the	ranch	 in	a	Chevy	
Blazer	and	he	was	taken	out	by	two	of	Pablo’s	bodyguards	and	we	were	sitting	at	a	table	
on	the	patio	in	the	back	and	he	simply	said,	“Excuse	me.”		He	walked	over	and	executed	
the	man	and	then	he	came	back	to	the	table.		He	simply	looked	at	me	and	he	said.		“He	
betrayed	me.”			They	took	him	away	and	then	he	asked	me	what	I’d	like	for	dinner	that	
night.		
Fragment	122:	Medellín	Cartel	associate		
Jung further reflected, ‘I knew one thing for sure, that I was never going to betray 
him’.  Moreover, in another interview, Colonel Martinez offered his opinion 
(Streatfeild 2000): 
Escobar	became	 important,	not	because	he	was	 the	 richest	or	 the	most	powerful,	but	
because	he	had	the	army	of	sicarios	and	he	used	them	to	intimidate	everyone…and	the	
fact	that	he	was	willing	to	use	so	much	violence.		
Fragment	123:	Colombian	law	enforcement		
As Escobar’s brother, Roberto points out (Escobar R 2010:127): 
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The	sicarios	originally	were	formed	to	be	the	police	of	the	cartel.		Much	of	the	power	of	
the	cartel	came	from	the	threat	of	violence	as	much	as	actual	violence.	 	People	heard	
stories	about	what	happened	to	men	who	cheated	or	betrayed	the	drug	traffickers,	and	
so	they	took	great	care	for	themselves.	
Fragment	124:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother	
Accordingly, it was as a result of the sicarios reputation that the Medellín Cartel 
itself had the reputation of being one of the most violent criminal groups in the 
world.	 Essentially, what set Escobar apart from the other traffickers was his 
strategic use of violence, and more importantly, his use of intimidation and fear to 
get what he wanted.   In the words of Colonel Martinez’s son (‘Killing Pablo’ 2003): 
He	didn’t	know	specifically	that	I	was	listening,	but	he	knew	my	father	was.		So,	once	Pablo	
said,	Colonel,	if	you’re	listening	I’ll	even	do	away	with	your	family’s	third	generation.		If	
your	grandmother	is	dead,	I	will	dig	her	up,	kill	her	and	bury	her	again.		
Fragment	125:	Colombian	law	enforcement	 	
As Kirk (2003:177) points out: 
Escobar	erased	limits	on	violence	[emphasis	added].	
	
Fragment	126:	Human	rights	advocate				
As one of the leaders of Los Extraditables, it was the erasing of these limits, that 
earned Escobar the reputation of being a terrorist first and a criminal second (Sins 
of My Father 2009).  At the same time, as analysed earlier, he was a devoted family 
man, and would even interrupt his violent behaviour if his family demanded his 
attention. According to Murphy, former DEA special agent based in Medellín 
(‘The Godfather of Cocaine’ 1997): 
An	 intercepted	 conversation	was	 obtained	 by	 the	 Colombian	 national	 police	 between	
Pablo	Escobar,	and	I	believe	it	was	his	wife.		And	in	the	background,	while	he	was	talking	
to	 his	 wife	 about	 family	 matters	 and	 things	 like	 that,	 everyday	 living	 type-matters,	
screaming	could	be	heard	in	the	background.		And	during	this	conversation,	Pablo	put	his	
hand	 over	 the	 receiver	 and	 turned	 around	 and	 asked	 whoever	 was	 committing	 this	
torture	to	please	keep	the	guy	quiet,	that	he	was	trying	to	talk	to	his	family	on	the	phone.		
Fragment	127:	US	law	enforcement		
As Escobar’s brother, Roberto attempts to justify (Escobar R 2010:56-57): 
…the	violence	for	which	Pablo	was	blamed…I	won’t	say	Pablo	was	right	in	the	things	that	
he	did,	but	he	believed	he	was	protecting	himself	and	his	family	and	his	business.			
Fragment	128:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother		
This justification, whilst obviously biased, is supported in part by Escobar’s own 
actions, especially in relation to the protection of his family as described earlier in 
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Chapter 6.   
In summary, as depicted in Table 7.6 above, as a physical attractor, the threat and 
use of violence, including Escobar’s penchant for violence, may be seen as a core 
strength and motivating factor of both Escobar and the Medellín Cartel, as will be 
seen in section 7.5 below.  
7.4.6 Summary of attractor sets   
A high-level summary of Escobar’s and the Medellín Cartel’s attractor set is 
presented in Table 7.7 below:  
Table	7.7:	Attractor	set:	Escobar	and	the	Medellín	Cartel		
	 Attractor		 Escobar				 Medellín	Cartel			
1.	 Economic	 • Desire	for	material	gain	
through	illicit	wealth	and	a	
political	ambition	for	power	
and	to	prohibit	extradition.	
	
• Desire	for	material	gain	through	
illicit	wealth.	
	
2.	 Social	 • Devoted	family	man	with	close	
ties	to	family,	friends	and	
associates.		Desire	for	social	
legitimacy	and	to	be	beloved	by	
the	people	was	also	part	of	his	
political	ambition.	
	
• Close	ties,	including	family	and	
friends,	and	a	close	bond	between	
the	sicarios	as	they	felt	a	sense	of	
belonging	and	significance	to	the	
cartel.	
3.	 Moral	 • Lacked	a	‘normal’	moral	
compass	creating	the	‘silver	or	
lead’	policy	and	lived	without	
rules	or	remorse.	
	
• Shared	similar	values	and	adopted	
Escobar’s	‘silver	or	lead’	policy.			
4.	 Physical		 • Penchant	for	violence,	
excessively	ruthless	and	cruel.				
• Reputation	of	being	one	of	the	most	
violent	criminal	group	in	the	world.	
	
Source:	Author’s	summary	of	Tables	7.3	to	7.6				
 
In summary, from a criminal perspective, Escobar’s key strengths were guided by 
his moral and physical attractors, and his key weaknesses and vulnerabilities by 
his economic and social attractors.  In contrast, while being influenced and shaped 
by Escobar, the Medellín Cartel’s attractor set relates to their core strength.  Based 
on this analysis and resulting attractor sets, the final step of the new complexity 
model is next applied.  
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7.5 Step 4: Insights – micro 
Applying step four of the new complexity model, using complexity prompts, 
insights are drawn from the data sets, contextual variables and attractor sets of 
Escobar and the Medellín Cartel, to better understand what shaped their 
behaviours, and make inferences about the drivers and vulnerabilities of Escobar 
and the Medellín Cartel as a whole.  On reflection, strategies and measures are also 
identified that changed, influenced and/or disrupted their behaviours resulting in 
their ultimate demise. 
7.5.1 Insights micro-level overview  
In the words of Escobar’s son, Juan Pablo (interview in Doherty et al 2010): 
[It	 is]	 the	 joint	 responsibility	 of	 many	 sectors	 of	 society,	 which	 created	 a	 suitable	
atmosphere	for	someone	like	my	father	to	be	able	to	go	so	far.		Without	the	corruption	
and	complicity	of	so	many	states,	my	father	would	not	have	progressed	an	inch.	
Fragment	129:	Escobar’s	son	
As explained in Chapter 5, as attractors gain momentum, they provide structure 
and coherence to a system, drawing people into it and influencing their behaviours 
(Uhl-Bien & Marion 2009).   Moreover, social histories play a key role in ‘differing 
sets of attractors, for differing sectors of a given society’ (Young 1997c).  As such, 
interpreting the attractor sets within the contextual variables of Escobar and the 
Medellín Cartel is critically important to understanding Escobar’s nature, attitudes 
and behaviours, and ultimately his drivers and vulnerabilities that influenced and 
shaped the Medellín Cartel.  In examining the attractor sets, the same four 
chronological time periods at the macro-level will also be considered in sections 
7.5.2 to 7.5.5 below.  
• The rise of the Medellín Cartel – late 1970s to early 1980s 
• The height of the Medellín Cartel – 1980s 
• The fall of the Medellín Cartel – late 1980s to early 1990s 
• The demise of the Medellín Cartel – early 1990s 
Of note, as also explained earlier, through a complexity lens, the basic argument 
for an actor’s actions is that ‘when power inequalities increase beyond given limits, 
entirely new forms of social behaviour may emerge’ (Young 1998b).   In other 
words, beyond given limits, actors make mistakes.   
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7.5.2 The rise of the Medellín Cartel – late 1970s to early 1980s 
In the early days, during the rise of the Medellín Cartel, Escobar’s economic 
attractor and desire for material gain through illicit wealth were closely aligned 
with the Medellín Cartel’s ultimate goal.  As noted earlier, the Medellín Cartel was 
not a cartel in the economic sense (Escobar R 2010:50): 
The	Medellín	Cartel	was	actually	many	independent	drug	dealers	who	got	close	together	
for	 their	 mutual	 profit	 and	 protection,	 but	 each	 of	 them	 continued	 to	 run	 his	 own	
operation…often	 they	would	 use	 each	 other’s	manufacturing,	 supply,	 and	 distribution	
capabilities…but	the	person	at	the	top	of	this	loose	structure	was	Pablo,	because	he	had	
started	the	business	and	had	the	best	way	of	shipping	the	drugs	and	the	most	people	loyal	
to	him.	 	The	others	have	said	that	they	were	afraid	of	him.	 	But	they	all	made	a	 lot	of	
money	with	him.		
Fragment	130:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother		
According to his brother Roberto, while Escobar was not addicted to the use of 
cocaine, he was certainly addicted to its economic power.  In a conversation 
between Roberto and Escobar during the late 1970s, his brother questioned Pablo 
(Escobar R 2010:40): 
	“You	have	enough	money	now,”	I	said.		“You	can	buy	what	you	need.		Why	don’t	you	just	
focus	on	the	real	estate	business?”		[Pablo]	smiled	to	himself.		As	we	were	to	learn,	there	
are	different	ways	to	be	addicted	to	drugs.		Once	Pablo	was	in	the	middle	of	the	business,	
once	he	had	tasted	the	power	and	the	money	and	the	renown,	there	was	no	way	he	could	
ever	get	out	of	it	[emphasis	added].	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Fragment	131:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother		
Essentially, Escobar became addicted to power and not just economic power.  As 
depicted in Table 7.6 above, it is readily apparent that Escobar’s physical attractor 
significantly influenced and shaped the path of the Medellín Cartel to become one 
of the most violent criminal groups in the world.  In contrast, despite being leaders 
of the Medellín Cartel, the Ochoa brothers were not of a violent nature.  As noted 
in Chapter 2, it is important to understand that the study of terrorism with the key 
characteristic of violence is first and foremost a study of human behaviour (Martin 
2016).  In the context of Escobar’s early childhood experience of La Violencia, 
combined with his early apprenticeship of being a gunman, Escobar’s early and 
consistent exposure to violence, combined with its frequency and intensity, 
contributed to his penchant for violence, and increasingly so over the years.  
However, it is important to recognise that given a similar set of circumstances, 
why one person chooses the path of violence, and another does not, is also due to 
a range of other factors, such as psychotic tendencies.  For example, Escobar has 
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been described, amongst other things, as a psychopath, mentally sick, a lunatic, 
crazy and paranoid, and compared to the likes of Adolf Hitler (see Fragments 57, 
81, 109, 118, 119).  Moreover, as also depicted in Table 7.6 above, Escobar’s moral 
attractor also influenced the ‘silver or lead’ policy of the Medellín Cartel, becoming 
a trademark of the criminal group.  As Escobar also found out, in the light of the 
contextual variables, it was not just himself that lacked a ‘normal’ moral compass, 
but Colombia itself, through state corruption and a society and economy corrupt 
by money.  Through a complexity lens, as argued in Chapter 6 (see Fragments 43, 
44), Escobar himself became an attractor as he formed a sense of order, amongst 
the chaos, with his protection rackets.  He essentially organised the local 
neighbourhoods and traffickers with his protection and through Escobar, they self-
organised into much stronger actors.  Providing protection became a repeating 
pattern of Escobar, much like his ‘silver or lead’ trademark, all of which 
contributed to the rise of the Medellín Cartel.  
7.5.3 The height of the Medellín Cartel – 1980s 
At the height of the Medellín Cartel, Escobar, its leaders and key associates had 
fulfilled their ultimate goal of illicit wealth.  According to Escobar’s brother, 
Roberto (Escobar R 2010:81): 
The	question	I	am	asked	most	often	is	how	much	money	did	Pablo	have.		The	answer	is	
billions…He	owned	property	all	over	the	world,	he	owned	as	many	as	four	hundred	farms	
in	 Colombia	 and	buildings	 in	Medellín,	 he	 owned	 an	 $8	million	 apartment	 complex	 in	
Florida,	 he	 owned	 property	 in	 Spain,	 he	 owned	 famous	 paintings	 and	 a	 very	 valuable	
collection	of	antique	cars.		
Fragment	132:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother	
However, as explained in Chapter 6, Escobar was not content with just economic 
power, he wanted political power and social legitimacy through the respect of the 
people.  As Escobar himself puts it, according to his son, Juan Pablo (Escobar JP 
2016:111): 
By	 late	1981,	my	father	had	become	the	world’s	 top	cocaine	trafficker.	 	But	he	wasn’t	
willing	to	be	just	another	drug	trafficker.		That	became	clear	to	Gustavo	when	he	went	to	
my	father	one	day,	smiling,	to	tell	him	that	three	cocaine-laden	planes	had	made	its	safely	
to	their	destination.		“Pablo,	the	three	shipments	made	it	with	no	problem.”		“Excellent,	
so	we	 have	economic	 power,”	my	 father	 said.	 	 “Now	we’re	 going	 to	 go	 after	political	
power”	[emphasis	added].	
Fragment	133:	Escobar	
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As mentioned in Chapter 6, what Escobar wanted contributed to the beginning of 
the end of the Medellín Cartel, as well as himself.  His thirst for power and social 
legitimacy proved to be a huge miscalculation on his part and part of his undoing.  
Escobar’s crucial mistake, was not that he went after political power, but that he 
went after it so openly.  He was not content to remain in the shadows and control 
the political purse strings, he wanted to be famous and to be adored by the people.  
Of note, as mentioned earlier in the context of the US and foreign media, he became 
‘the human face on the formerly anonymous enemy’ (see Fragment 90).   He 
became a known figure and as described earlier, following several high-profile 
events, including terrorist attacks in the name of Los Extraditables, was placed 
firmly on both the Colombian and US radar.  To illustrate this point, in response 
to how the cocaine business is different today, Juan Ochoa, one of the Medellín 
Cartel leaders highlights (interview in Frontline 2000e): 
It	is	a	lot	more	complex…it	is	more	difficult	to	detect	who	traffics,	because	nowadays,	the	
people	that	are	involved	in	this	they	don’t	have	a	profile.		They	are	not	known	by	anyone,	
so	it’s	more	difficult	to	know	who	is	involved	or	not	than	before.		
Fragment	134:	Medellín	Cartel	leader	
As depicted in Figure 7.6 above, driven by his economic and social attractors, 
Escobar’s high profile and political ambition was not shared by the Medellín 
Cartel.  Due to his ambition, Escobar became visible, and today, traffickers, like 
most ordinary criminals prefer to remain in the shadows, like the Ochoa brothers.   
As Arenas, a former Medellín Cartel pilot, points out (interview in Frontline 2000b): 
The	people	who	were	more	exposed	to	the	public	became	the	people	that	were	feared	
by	the	society	 in	general.	 	But	 let	me	give	you	an	example.	 	The	Ochoas	were	not	that	
open	as	Pablo	in	politics.		The	Ochoas	were	very	settled.		A	nice	family,	very	gentle	people.		
They	are	very	family-orientated.		So	they	were	not	as	feared	as	the	others…Fabio	Senior	
is	the	clear	image	of	a	grandfather	that	is	very	good	person,	an	excellent	talker,	very	kind,	
very	gentle.		So	this	kind	of	image	is	the	one	that	we	[get]	from	the	Ochoas,	[but]	they	
could	be	as	dangerous	as	anybody.		
Fragment	135:	Medellín	Cartel	associate		
In other words, is despite their public image and distancing themselves from 
Escobar’s overt violence, the Ochoas could equally be as dangerous behind closed 
doors.  	
7.5.4 The fall of the Medellín Cartel – late 1980s to early 1990s 
Over time, Escobar’s behaviour became increasingly violent, especially as some of 
the aims of the Medellín Cartel were being furthered through the formation and 
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subsequent activities of the terrorist group Los Extraditables. Although violence 
was the primary tool for dealing with discord by the Medellín Cartel, much of the 
violence was engineered by Escobar, in particular the acts of terrorism carried out 
by Los Extraditables.  As Kirk (2003:97) points out: 
He	made	extreme	violence	a	Colombian	dialect.	
	
Fragment	136:	Human	rights	advocate			
At the same time, Escobar made Colonel Martinez his trademark ‘silver or lead’ 
offer.  According to Colonel Martinez, Escobar’s messenger, a former police officer 
and colleague, informed him (interview in MacQuarrie 2015:6):  
Escobar’s	sent	me	to	offer	you	six	million	dollars.		The	only	thing	he	asks	is	that	you	keep	
on	working,	that	you	continue	your	 job,	that	you	keep	carrying	out	operations.	 	But,	 if	
you’re	sending	an	operation	to	capture	him	–	then	you	must	first	make	a	phone	call.		To	
let	us	know.		If	you	agree,	then	the	money	will	be	delivered	to	any	account	you	want.	
Fragment	137:	Medellín	Cartel,	corrupt	Colombian	law	enforcement	officer		
Colonel Martinez further notes that he interpreted the timing of the offer as a sign 
of Escobar’s growing weakness, and not his strength, and flatly refused the offer 
(interview in MacQuarrie 2015:6).  Furthermore, as Escobar continued to fight two 
wars, one with the state and one with the Cali Cartel, while all traffickers benefited 
from Escobar’s war with the state in fighting extradition, not all benefited from his 
war with the Cali Cartel.  As mentioned earlier, this led to mixed loyalties within 
the Medellín Cartel, notably the Ochoa brothers, whose attractors were more 
closely aligned with the Rodríguez brothers than Escobar.  The rift in the Medellín 
Cartel was further heightened following Gacha’s death and Escobar’s eventual 
‘imprisonment’ in La Catedral.  According to Escobar’s son, Juan Pablo (Escobar JP 
2016:185): 
My	 father	 deeply	mourned	 the	 loss	 of	 the	Mexican	 [Gacha].	 	He	 considered	his	 ally	 a	
warrior	 who’d	 been	 there	 for	 him	 in	 good	 times	 and	 bad.	 	 My	 father	 was	 even	 the	
godfather	of	one	of	the	Mexican’s	children.	 	
Fragment	138:	Escobar’s	son 
As Escobar’s attractor set started to diverge from the Medellín Cartel’s, as depicted 
in Table 7.5 above, the continuity of the Medellín Cartel became intertwined with 
the fate of Escobar himself.  Sparked by Escobar’s murder and torture of his own 
people while in prison, allegiances shifted and a range of new groups soon 
emerged, including Los Pepes.    
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7.5.5 The demise of the Medellín Cartel – early 1990s 
Following Escobar’s escape from La Catedral and the resurrected Search Bloc team, 
as described in Chapter 6, the emergence of Los Pepes certainly contributed to 
Escobar’s growing weakness.  In the context of the ethical issues surrounding Los 
Pepes, Bowden questions (‘The True Story of Killing Pablo’ 2009): 
How	far	are	you	willing	to	go	to	succeed?	 	When	you	make	the	decision	to	go	to	war,	
you’ve	 essentially	 decided	 that	 the	 situation	 is	 beyond	 the	bounds	of	 normal	 law	and	
order.	 	 You’re	 facing	 an	 enemy	who’s	 trying	 to	 kill	 you.	 	 In	 those	 circumstances,	 the	
ultimate	 goal	 is	 to	 succeed,	 is	 to	 win,	 not	 to	 necessarily	 play	 by	 the	 rules.	 In	 fact,	
sometimes	circumstances	will	 force	you	 to	play	by	 the	 same	kinds	of	 tactics	 that	your	
enemy	is	using	in	order	to	prevail.			
	
Fragment	139:	Investigative	journalist		
As pointed out in Chapter 3, Young (1997b:82) argues that in all complex systems, 
some people, even well regarded citizens, will ‘skirt the borders of criminal 
behaviour now and again’ as a way to accomplish their goals.  It can be argued 
that in order to accomplish their goal and succeed, Los Pepes and its links to the 
Search Bloc, adopted the same rules and moral attractor as Escobar, i.e. there were 
no rules.  Although the Search Bloc ultimately found and killed Escobar, as offered 
earlier by Toft (see Fragment 80), if it had not been for Los Pepes, Escobar would 
probably not have been as vulnerable. As clearly depicted from the analysis of 
Escobar’s social attractor, Escobar had a fatal weakness and blind spot – his love 
for his family.  According to Escobar’s brother, Roberto (Escobar R 2010:41):	
…there	was	not	one	day	that	he	stopped	loving	his	wife,	his	children,	and	his	family…it	
was	this	love	for	his	family	and	his	fear	for	their	safety	that	caused	him	to	change	his	usual	
behaviour	and	allow	himself	to	be	found	and	killed	[emphasis	added].	
Fragment	140:	Medellín	Cartel	associate	&	Escobar’s	brother		
In fearing for the safety of his family, due to the escalating violence of Los Pepes, 
Escobar changed his usual behaviour and started to make mistakes.  As Escobar’s 
son points out, his father used to say to him (Sins of My Father 2009):   
Don’t	stay	on	the	phone,	the	phone	is	death.	
Fragment	141:	Escobar	
As described in Chapter 6, Escobar made a mistake and broke his golden rule and 
stayed on the telephone for more than three minutes talking to his son.  As Escobar 
was talking, another son, Martinez Jr, was listening in and managed to fix his exact 
location with his mobile surveillance equipment.  Soon after, Escobar was located 
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and shot by the Search Bloc attempting to escape.  In the above analysis, parallels 
may be drawn between Escobar and Colonel Martinez.   Alike in some respects, 
their division was a crucial one. They were divided by a moral attractor.  While 
both Escobar and Colonel Martinez were close to their sons and grew up in lower 
to middle class families, in contrast, Escobar’s grandfather was a well-known 
bootlegger, while Colonel Martinez’s family had a long military history 
(MacQuarrie 2015).  Also, while Escobar dropped-out of school and turned to 
crime, Colonel Martinez became a police cadet and completed a law degree.  He 
also received a scholarship to study criminology in Spain (MacQuarrie 2015).  The 
eventual struggle against Escobar become a personal one.  Of note, according to 
MacQuarrie (2015:50), the real legend of Colombia was not Escobar, but Colonel 
Martinez who: 
Remained	untarnished	and	 incorruptible…a	man	who	could	not	be	neither	bought	nor	
sold,	who	was	motivated	by	neither	plata	o	plomo,	but	by	principle.			
Fragment	142:	Anthropologist	scholar		
Even today, how many would turn down a six million dollar bribe?  Following 
Escobar’s death, in Colonel Martinez’s own words (interview in Streatfeild 2000): 
 
The	 first	 feeling	was	one	of	 relief	–	 that	he	hadn’t	escaped	again…we	had	suffered	 so	
much	because	we	had	failed	so	much.		It	was	like	having	a	piano	lifted	off	you.		I’m	not	
very	expressive.		I	didn’t	shout	for	joy	or	laugh	out	loud.		I	just	got	a	video	camera,	called	
the	police	director,	gave	him	the	news.		[Finally]	I	began	to	feel	what	I	hadn’t	originally.		
Emotion.		I	wanted	to	get	there	fast	to	embrace	my	son	and	to	congratulate	the	team.			
Fragment	143:	Colombian	law	enforcement		
At the end, while one son embraced his father, the other son lost his.  Following 
his father’s death, Escobar’s son concludes (Sins of My Father 2009): 
There	were	only	two	paths;	one	of	them	was	repeating	history,	the	other	peace	[emphasis	
added].	
	
Fragment	144:	Escobar’s	son		
As history tells us, Escobar’s son did not follow in his father’s footsteps or attractor 
set, and to date, he still chooses peace.  In contrast, it can be said that it was the 
‘ferocity’ of Escobar’s physical attractor and penchant for violence that defined his 
legacy and labelling as both a terrorist and a criminal, similar to the ‘ferocity’ of 
the French Revolution that defined its place in history.  As foreshadowed shortly 
before Escobar’s demise, in a declassified US document (US Department of State 
1993a):	
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Escobar’s	particular	violence,	however	horrific,	will	pass	with	his	passing	from	the	scene,	
and	in	any	event,	tends	to	be	focused	in	Medellín	and	Bogota	and	intended	to	make	the	
Government	of	Colombia	reduce	its	pressure	on	him	and	his	organisation.		Other	types	of	
violence	will	remain.			
	
Fragment	145:	US	declassified	government	document	
	
Since Escobar’s death, his particular brand of violence and narco-terrorism has 
passed, but other types of violence and narco-terrorism remain.  
7.5.6 Summary of micro-level insights   
In summary, as the new complexity model places emphasis on patterns and 
structures of analysis, it may be argued that the micro-level case study offers fresh 
insights into Escobar’s nature, his attitudes and behaviours, and ultimately his 
drivers and vulnerabilities, as driven by his attractor set (summarised in Table 7.7 
above) and in turn, his influence on the Medellín Cartel.  In doing so, a new and 
different way of seeing Escobar’s behaviours, including departures from such 
behaviours, is offered to further understand certain phenomena or events 
surrounding Escobar and the Medellín Cartel.   
On reflection, given Escobar’s ultimate demise, together with the Medellín 
Cartel’s, over the period of its rise and fall, the strategies and measures that 
changed, influenced and/or disrupted Escobar and the Medellín Cartel’s 
behaviours are best summarised by the time-lapsed attractor set as depicted in 
Figure 7.1 below: 
	
Figure	7.1:	Visual	imagery:	Escobar	and	the	Medellín	Cartel	time-lapsed	attractor	set	
	
Attractor		 		Influencing	factors		
1. Economic	
	
• Over	the	period,	the	changing	goal-alignment	
of	Escobar,	compared	to	the	Medellín	Cartel	
for	political	power	was	the	beginning	of	the	
end	for	many	and	proved	to	be	a	
miscalculation	on	Escobar’s	part.			
2. Social	
	
• Escobar’s	devotion	to	his	family	and	desire	
for	social	legitimacy,	through	his	political	
ambition	and	to	be	loved	by	the	people	also	
proved	to	be	his	downfall.		Being	visible	and	
adored	by	the	people	was	not	in	alignment	
with	the	Medellín	Cartel.	
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Attractor		 		Influencing	factors		
3. Moral	
	
• While	Escobar	and	the	Medellín	Cartel	shared	
similar	values,	it	was	Escobar’s	torture	and	
murder	of	his	own	men	that	turned	his	men	
against	him	and	shifted	allegiances	and	
alliances	to	Los	Pepes,	who	ultimately	played	
by	the	same	rules	as	Escobar	striking	at	his	
vulnerabilities.	
4. Physical	
	
• Escobar’s	special	brand	of	violence,	including	
Los	Extraditables,	resulted	in	Los	Pepes	and	
the	Cali	Cartel	fighting	‘like	with	like’,	
instigating	fear	into	Escobar	himself	for	the	
safety	of	his	family,	which	ultimately	led	to	
his	mistake.		
	
Source:	Author’s	summary		
 
Overall, as depicted in Figure 7.1 above, at a micro-level, what brought down 
Escobar, also brought down the Medellín Cartel.  According to Bowden (2002:15): 
[Escobar]…was	a	creature	of	his	time	and	place.		He	was	a	complex,	contradictory,	and	
ultimately	very	dangerous	man,	in	large	part	because	of	his	genius	for	manipulating	public	
opinion.	 	 But	 this	 same	 crowd-pleasing	 quality	 was	 also	 his	 weakness,	 the	 thing	 that	
eventually	brought	him	down.		A	man	of	lesser	ambition	might	still	be	alive,	rich,	powerful,	
and	 living	well	 and	 openly	 in	Medellín.	 	 But	 Pablo	wasn’t	 content	 to	 be	 just	 rich	 and	
powerful.		He	wanted	to	be	admired.		He	wanted	to	be	respected.		He	wanted	to	be	loved.			
Fragment	146:	Investigative	journalist	
While Escobar was certainly a creature of his time and place, as his attractor set 
tells us, he had more than one weakness and vulnerability, all of which played a 
role in bringing him down, i.e. there was no single factor.   
Of note, of the remaining Medellín Cartel leaders, in 1996, Jorge and Juan Ochoa 
completed their five-year reduced sentences in Colombia, while in 2003, their 
younger brother Fabio was eventually extradited to the US and is currently serving 
a 30 year sentence.   In 2013, while living in Medellín, Juan died of natural causes.  
To date, Jorge continues to live well and openly in Medellín (Yardley 2013).   
7.6 Overall case study model 
Overall, using the new complexity model, it may be argued that the micro and 
macro-level findings of the case study of Escobar and the Medellín Cartel provide 
fresh and novel insights, based on a different way of seeing things, and perhaps a 
more sophisticated and nuanced reading of the events, against a backdrop of 
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contextual variables, a fitness landscape of criminally exploitable ties and attractor 
sets.   
With the new complexity model, it is important to note that the focus is on the 
interactions, not the analysis, of the actors involved.  In other words, emphasis is 
placed on why and how the actors interconnect and influence each other, including 
the formation of allegiances and alliances, within their given environments, rather 
than isolated analysis of the actors themselves.  Moreover, the new complexity 
model also places emphasis on the order or patterns inherent in the system.  To 
illustrate this point, following Escobar’s death, in the words of Jaime Gaviria 
Gomez, Escobar’s first cousin (interview in The Two Escobars 2010): 
When	Pablo	died,	the	city	spun	out	of	control.		The	boss	was	dead,	so	everyone	became	
their	own	boss.		He	ran	the	underworld	with	complete	order.		Anything	illegal,	you	asked	
for	Pablo’s	permission	[emphasis	added].	
Fragment	147:	Escobar’s	cousin		
Where Escobar, as an individual actor, had created order or patterns in the city of 
Medellín, on his death, the broader interactions of the Medellín Cartel’s complex 
system dissolved.  Moreover, on reflection of the broader armed conflict in 
Colombia, between the guerrillas, the paramilitaries and the corrupt state, the 
allegiances and alliances formed between the drug trade of the Medellín Cartel 
and these actors certainly added fuel to the fire of this broader conflict.   
Emerging from the Medellín Cartel and driven largely by Escobar and his violent 
tendencies, Los Extraditables was essentially a narco-terrorist group, a form of 
criminal terrorism, but different from most groups, as it was created as a separate 
group supporting more than one cartel, including the Cali Cartel, and traffickers 
more broadly.  When asked today about violent tendencies in Colombia, a local 
notes ‘genes…we were conquered by murderers, our ancestors were thieves and 
barbarians.  Violence is in our genes’ (local cited in MacQuarrie 2015:18).  Another 
local notes, ‘inequality…a few people have everything, a lot of people have 
nothing.  That’s the root cause’ (local cited in MacQuarrie 2015:19).    
In relation to why and how Escobar and the Medellín Cartel came to be, together 
with the war on drugs, according to Jung, a key associate of the Medellín Cartel 
(interview in Frontline 2000c): 
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The	war	on	drugs	was	an	ideology	the	government	came	up	with,	and	there	never	really	
was	a	war	on	drugs.		I	mean,	to	stop	the	importation	of	drugs	into	the	US	of	America	is	an	
impossibility…we	have	to	come	to	the	pool	of	self-reflection	and	therein	lies	the	monster	
of	reason	and	we	ask	ourselves:	was	it	the	fact	that	Carlos	[Lehder]	and	I	[had]	the	courage	
to	be	bad	or	why	did	millions	of	Americans	not	have	the	courage	to	be	good?		
Fragment	148:	Medellín	Cartel	associate		
This argument supports the contributory actor role of the Medellín Cartel’s fitness 
landscape and the US end-users of cocaine.  On the other hand, in relation to the 
trajectory of Escobar and the Medellín Cartel, perhaps the answer is the courage 
of individuals like Colonel Martinez to be good and not accept six million dollar 
bribes.  As Bowden (2002:69) points out: 
Sometimes	the	fate	of	an	entire	nation	can	hinge	on	the	integrity	of	one	man.	
Fragment	149:	Investigative	journalist	
If this is true, then this argument supports chaos theory.  So do the words of the 
chapter’s opening quote.   Whatever the reason, it appears to be a ‘losing war’ in 
the ongoing war against drugs (Rosen 2014). Moreover, according to Thoumi 
(2014:190-191), the war on drugs was not due to a number of causes, it was due to 
a number of factors that evolved: 
Illegal	economic	activities	are	not	Newtonian	phenomena	that	have	a	cause	such	that	“if	
X	then	Y”.		They	are	the	result	of	evolutionary	processes	in	which	factors	such	as	social	
exclusion,	poverty,	inequality,	unemployment,	economic	crisis,	and	corruption	contribute	
to	their	development.		None	of	those	factors,	however,	are	causes:		there	are	innumerable	
examples	of	the	existence	of	all	of	those	factors	in	countries	where	there	is	no	organised	
crime	or	large	criminal	economic…the	challenge	of	Colombia	is	not	to	legalise	drugs,	but	
to	“legalise	Colombia”,	that	is,	to	build	a	nation	under	the	rule	of	law.	
Fragment	150:	Economics	scholar		
In reality, the answer to why and how Escobar and the Medellín Cartel came to be 
is not causal, it is evolutionary, and there is no one simple answer.  As the new 
complexity model reveals, the answer is complex.  
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PART 4:  DISCUSSION 
Chapter 8:  Can complexity be successfully applied? 
 
‘What we see depends mainly on what we look for’  
John Lubbock, polymath (1834-1913) 
 
Chapter 8 discusses the findings and considers the thesis question:  can complexity 
be successfully applied with criminological frames of reference to analyse 
organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus?  It considers whether the 
findings shed light on furthering our understanding and knowledge of these 
complex phenomena, including practical and policy implications.  It also considers 
the contribution of the new complexity model and whether this adds a new tool to 
the criminologist’s toolbox.  
 
 
8.1 Understanding complex phenomena 
This thesis comprised an over-arching yet simple hypothesis relating to complex 
phenomena:  that complexity can be successfully applied with criminological 
frames of reference to analyse organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror 
nexus.  To operationalise this hypothesis, a new complexity model was developed 
in Chapter 5, using the approach in Chapter 4, and two research questions, where 
the phenomena under study are organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror 
nexus:  
i) On application of the new model, are the themes arising from the analysis 
of the phenomena consistent with the concepts and constructs of 
complexity? 
ii) Can complexity help to improve our understanding of the phenomena, 
including their nature and strength, why and how they evolve, and what 
shapes actor behaviour?  
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In consideration of these questions, the new complexity model was developed, 
tested and applied in Chapters 6 and 7 using the case study method, to the in-
depth case study of Escobar and the Medellín Cartel.  Based on the case study 
findings, answers to these questions are considered in turn. 
i) on application of the new model, are the themes arising from the analysis of the 
phenomena consistent with the concepts and constructs of complexity? 
As discussed in Chapter 4, this question refers to the success of developing a new 
model ‘to apply’ in the first place, complexity with criminological frames of 
reference to the phenomena under study, where success may be measured on the 
extent of the fit of the application.  Of note, it is important to recognise that this 
question considers the construct and fit of the new model ‘to apply’ complexity, 
not complexity in and of itself, i.e. while it is acknowledged that concepts and 
constructs of complexity were used in the design of the model, it is the design of 
the complexity tools (i.e. fitness landscape and attractor set) within the model that 
give rise to the analysis, not complexity in and of itself.  Moreover, the themes 
arising may not necessarily be consistent with a concept or construct of 
complexity; where the word consistent means logical, i.e. the themes do not 
contain any logical contradictions.  If most of the themes are not consistent, 
especially important themes, the design and application of the new model would 
not be considered a sufficient or satisfactory fit.  
Based on the case study analysis in Chapters 6 and 7, a number of themes emerge 
that are consistent with the concepts and constructs of complexity.  To better reflect 
and discuss these themes, Table 8.1 below compares and contrasts each theme to 
a concept or construct of complexity:  
Table	8.1:		Case	study	findings:	comparison	of	themes	to	complexity		
	
	 Theme	 Complexity		
1.	 Licit	and	illicit	worlds	
For	the	Medellín	Cartel	to	flourish,	it	needed	
enablers	from	the	outside	world	to	provide	or	
facilitate	certain	services	in	the	licit	environment	
and	also	needed	roles	that	were	similar	to	the	
legitimate	business	world.	At	the	micro-level,	
Escobar	owned	all	the	criminal	activities	in	
Medellín,	not	just	the	cocaine	trade,	and	nothing	
went	in	or	out	without	his	orders.			
Integrated	whole		
Instead	of	conceptualising	micro	and	
macro-levels,	and	upper	and	
underworlds	as	mutually	exclusive	
objects	of	study,	in	the	world	of	
complexity,	they	co-exist	and	
viewing	them	together	produces	a	
more	complementary	and	integrated	
view.		
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	 Theme	 Complexity		
2.	 History	and	context		
In	Colombia,	the	deep	roots	and	divide	of	its	
urban	and	rural	communities,	its	history	as	a	
weak	state,	armed	conflict	and	undeclared	civil	
war,	and	long	history	of	corruption	and	
smuggling	across	its	porous	borders,	all	play	
deciding	factors	in	its	problems	contributing	to	
the	emergence	of	Escobar	and	the	Medellín	
Cartel.	
Contextual	variables	
In	complexity,	history	matters,	as	
social	conditions,	the	economic	
system,	political	players	and	state	
and	legal	regimes	are	a	product	of	a	
country’s	history.		Geography	is	also	
a	factor	in	complexity,	a	factor	often	
overlooked	in	more	traditional	
studies.			
3.	 Beginning	of	the	end		
The	Medellín	Cartel	was	initially	formed	to	
accomplish	a	specific	goal	and	shared	needs,	and	
evolved	and	developed	in	line	with	the	
achievement	of	this	goal	and	setting	of	new	
goals,	as	well	as	its	ongoing	requisite	shared	
needs.	When	goals	shifted	and	shared	needs	
were	not	felt,	largely	due	to	Escobar’s	political	
ambition	and	desire	to	be	beloved	by	the	
people,	this	led	to	the	beginning	of	the	end	of	
Escobar	and	the	Medellín	Cartel.				
Fitness	landscape	
A	fitness	landscape	is	a	complexity	
tool	to	better	understand	the	nature	
and	strength	of	the	complex	system	
under	study,	based	on	goal	
alignment	and	shared	needs,	
including	drivers	and	vulnerabilities,	
and	why	and	how	the	system	
evolved	or	evolves,	together	with	
the	role	of	individual	actors	in	
forming,	shaping	and	influencing	the	
system’s	fitness.				
4.	 Strength	of	a	group		
At	the	height	of	the	Medellín	Cartel,	its	
operations	were	extensive,	with	multiple	
methods	and	channels	for	completing	the	same	
activity	or	task,	allowing	it	to	absorb	operational	
shocks	and	setbacks,	and	more	importantly,	
staying	one	step	ahead	of	the	authorities.  The	
group	also	became	less	directed	and	more	
enabled,	due	to	the	extent	of	its	operations	and	
its	core	strength	of	dependable,	yet	diverse	and	
fluid	actors.	
	
Edge	of	chaos		
Optimal	fitness	exists	on	the	‘edge	of	
chaos’	where	complex	systems	are	
moderately	interconnected	with	
some	weak	and	strongly	
interconnected	actors.		The	system	is	
sufficiently	ordered	to	serve	the	
interest	of	conformity,	regularity,	
dependability	and	planning,	but	also	
sufficiently	disordered	to	harness	the	
interest	in	change	and	renewal,	
through	variability,	creativity	and	
innovation.			
5.	 Multiple	factors		
Escobar	was	driven	and	influenced	by	multiple	
factors,	with	some	factors	not	necessarily	
relating	to	his	criminal	endeavours,	such	as	his	
devotion	to	his	family	and	his	desire	to	be	
beloved	by	the	people	as	part	of	his	political	
ambition.	It	was	Escobar’s	expected	behaviour	in	
ensuring	the	safety	of	his	family	that	led	to	Los	
Pepes	concerted	efforts	on	attacking	his	family	
and	the	Search	Bloc	monitoring	his	calls.		
Ultimately,	concerned	for	the	safety	of	his	
family,	Escobar	broke	one	of	his	golden	rules	and	
made	a	mistake	in	staying	on	the	telephone	too	
long.					
Attractor	sets		
Complexity	places	emphasis	on	the	
order	or	patterns	inherent	in	the	
system,	not	on	the	disorder	of	the	
system.		Identification	of	such	
patterns	and	structures	may	lead	to	
insights	into	the	nature,	drivers	and	
vulnerabilities	of	actor	behaviour,	
including	strengths	and	weaknesses,	
and	departures	from	such	behaviour,	
such	as	mistakes.		
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	 Theme	 Complexity		
6.	 A	slight	change	
In	the	case	study	analysis,	a	slight	change	in	the	
legalisation	of	cocaine,	extradition	laws	and	
money	laundering,	may	have	greatly	influenced	
the	emergence	and	outcome	of	the	Medellín	
Cartel.		In	relation	to	extradition	laws,	the	
cyclical	change	in	the	status	of	these	laws	did	in	
fact	impact	the	actions	undertaken	by	Escobar	
and	the	Medellín	Cartel.	
Sensitivity	to	initial	conditions	
One	slight	change	in	a	variable	can	
give	rise	to	a	significantly	different	
outcome	and	draws	attention	to	the	
history	of	a	system.		It	provides	
insights	on	how	to	detect	and	either	
encourage	or	prevent	these	changes	
depending	on	the	nature	of	the	
system.		
7.	 A	choice	of	two	paths	
There	are	numerous	examples	in	the	case	study	
of	choices	made.		The	case	study	reveals	that	
Escobar	chose	his	criminal	path	early	in	life,	
despite	having	the	opportunity	of	choosing	
another.		Moreover,	Colonel	Martinez	flatly	
refused	Escobar’s	six	million	dollar	bribe,	which	
could	have	led	to	a	very	different	outcome	of	
the	Search	Bloc’s	eventual	locating	of	Escobar’s	
hiding	place,	capture	and	demise.		
Bifurcation		
Considered	metaphorically	as	a	
choice	of	two	paths	or	a	fork	in	the	
evolution	of	a	system.		In	the	world	
of	complexity,	free	will	and	
determinism	not	only	coexist,	but	
complement	one	another;	
determinism	plays	a	role	in	the	
evolution	of	criminal	behaviour,	but	
there	are	points	where	free	will	
chooses	behaviour.			
8.	 Trademark	violence	
Escobar’s	trademark	‘silver	or	lead’	policy	was	
readily	adopted	by	the	Medellín	Cartel.		While	
Escobar	may	have	been	socially	dangerous,	the	
Medellín	Cartel	benefited	from	its	greater	
reputation,	as	well	as	economies	of	scale,	
creating	a	cumulatively	greater	social	threat.		
Moreover,	Escobar’s	penchant	for	violence	and	
excessive	cruelty,	certainly	shaped	and	
influenced	the	nature	of	the	Medellín	Cartel,	
leading	to	its	reputation	of	being	one	of	the	
most	violent	criminal	groups	in	the	world.		
Fractals		
Fractals	allow	the	patterns	and	
structures	that	are	easy	to	see	at	one	
scale,	but	not	at	another,	for	
example	at	the	micro	and	macro-
levels	in	the	study	of	individual	
actors	within	a	group.		Moreover,	
fractal	fragments	of	self-similarity	
over	the	life	and	history	of	
individuals,	also	allows	the	
generalisation	of	certain	events	and	
behaviours	of	the	group	itself.		
9.	 Contributory	actors		
A	key	theme	emerging	from	the	case	study	
analysis	is	the	role	played	by	contributory	actors	
of	criminally	exploitable	ties	in	a	criminal	group.		
Of	note,	the	passive	local	neighbourhood	
supporters	and	consumers	of	the	Medellín	
Cartel’s	illicit	goods	and	services,	including	the	
US	end-users	of	cocaine.		In	simple	terms,	
without	demand,	there	is	no	supply.		Although	
the	Medellín	Cartel	may	still	have	emerged,	its	
shape	and	form	would	certainly	have	been	
different.		
Interconnectivity	
Actors	interact	to	accomplish	a	
shared	need	such	as	a	task,	goal,	
objective	or	vision.	The	identification	
of	actor	ties,	strengths,	drivers	and	
conditions	that	promote	actors	to	
interact	may	provide	insights	on	
what	enriches	these	interactions	and	
thus	information	on	how	to	change	
these	ties	depending	on	the	system	
under	study.	
10.	 Fear	of	violence	
Colombian	society	had	been	indifferent	to	
extradition,	yet	with	the	never-ending	repetition	
Feedback	
Feedback	is	repetition	or	iteration,	
and	can	be	direct	or	indirect.		It	can	
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	 Theme	 Complexity		
and	onslaught	of	violence,	through	sustained	
random	acts	of	terrorism,	the	public’s	fear	and	
sense	of	insecurity	changed	its	opinion,	
ultimately	leading	to	the	government’s	
negotiation	with	the	traffickers.		
also	be	positive	(enhancing,	
stimulating)	or	negative	(detracting,	
inhibiting)	either	amplifying	or	
constraining	criminal	behaviour.		
Feedback	may	provide	useful	
insights	on	where	and	how	to	break	
the	cycles.			
11.	 Order	within	the	disorder	
Escobar	offered	the	Medellín	traffickers	
insurance	on	their	drug	shipments,	and	also	
offered	the	safety	of	the	Medellín	people	
through	his	protection	rackets.		Essentially,	
Escobar	was	organising	the	security	of	both	the	
Medellín	traffickers’	and	local	neighbourhoods,	
resulting	in	both	the	traffickers	and	the	local	
neighbourhoods	self-organising	into	stronger	
actors.				
Self-organisation	
A	system	spontaneously	self-
organises	from	a	disordered	to	an	
ordered	and	much	stronger	system,	
in	responding	to	the	changes	in	the	
environment	and	to	cope	with	those	
changes.		
12.	 Lessons	learned			
In	the	formation	of	Los	Extraditables,	the	
Medellín	Cartel	learnt	from	the	co-evolution	and	
dissipation	of	MAS.		Unlike	MAS,	Los	
Extraditables	had	clear	leadership	from	the	start,	
rather	than	assumed,	was	fully	funded	
compared	to	the	voluntary	contribution	of	MAS,	
and	more	organised	and	disciplined,	with	only	its	
key	leaders	making	decisions.	
Dissipation	
Structures	that	form	momentarily	
and	appear	stable,	but	are	quick	to	
dissipate	at	the	slightest	
perturbation	may	provide	useful	
insights	into	why	and	how	these	
structures	dissipate,	together	with	
lessons	learned	from	such	
phenomenon.	
13.	 Innovation		
The	Medellín	Cartel	were	innovators	in	the	use	
of	advanced	communications,	concealing	drugs	
and	operations	to	facilitate	their	smuggling	
routes	and	hide	the	cocaine.	Escobar	also	
pioneered	the	method	of	placing	assassins	on	
the	back	of	motorcycles,	which	proved	to	be	
highly	effective	for	the	Medellín	Cartel.	
Emergence	
The	whole	is	greater	than	the	sum	of	
its	parts,	and	may	provide	useful	
insights	into	why	and	how	a	system	
evolves,	and	the	outcomes	of	certain	
phenomenon	such	as	learning,	
creativity	and	innovation.	
14.	 Crime-terror	nexus	and	alliances	
While	MAS	was	short-lived,	it	brought	together	a	
range	of	autonomous	complex	actors,	through	
their	joint	vulnerability	to	extortion,	and	shared	
need	of	ceasing	the	kidnappings	and	releasing	
the	captives.		It	also	led	to	the	co-evolution	of	
broader	co-operation	between	traffickers,	
realising	that	at	certain	times,	it	is	better	to	work	
in	cooperation,	rather	than	in	competition	with	
each	other,	such	as	the	formation	of	the	narco-
terrorist	group	Los	Extraditables.	
Co-evolution	
The	outcome	when	two	or	more	
complex	systems	reciprocally	affect	
each	other’s	evolution	may	be	useful	
for	identifying	dependencies	on	how	
a	system	evolves	and	operates	at	its	
boundaries.		Co-evolution	may	also	
help	to	determine	alliance	formation	
where	the	complex	systems	must	be	
sensitised	to	one	another	and	feel	
some	sense	of	common	identity	or	
purpose	to	form	the	alliance.	
	
Source:	Findings	in	Chapters	6	and	7	based	on	the	application	of	the	new	model	in	Chapter	5			
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As depicted in Table 8.1 above, in response to the first question, on application of 
the new complexity model, several important themes emerge from the case study 
findings, all of which are consistent with the concepts and constructs of 
complexity.   Accordingly, it may be argued that the development of a new model 
‘to apply’ complexity with criminological frames of reference to the phenomena 
under study has been sufficiently and satisfactorily achieved.  
ii) can complexity help to improve our understanding of the phenomena, including 
their nature and strength, why and how they evolve, and what shapes actor 
behaviour?  
The second question, as also discussed in Chapter 4, refers to the success of using 
the new model ‘to analyse’ the phenomena under study, and in doing so improve 
our understanding, where success may be measured on the extent of the 
improvement of our knowledge.  As explained earlier, a fundamental aspect of 
complexity is that it provides a holistic view and integrated approach, including 
points of view by ‘others’, and locates the subject of study within a contextual 
setting.  More importantly, it also relocates the subject of study into a new 
conceptual space, helping us to think differently.  
At times, criminological research focuses on the lives of actors (e.g. Escobar), 
almost biographical accounts, where the proper due care and attention to the 
contextual variables that gave rise to these actors in the first place or group 
structures and dynamics involved may be overlooked.  This limited perspective 
reduces the capacity to understand how these actors evolve or evolved and the 
nature and strength of a group’s dynamics within its environment.  Conversely, in 
the studies that focus on contextual variables, group structures and dynamics (e.g. 
Medellín Cartel), a deeper analysis of actors may also be overlooked, resulting in 
a lack of understanding of actor behaviours, strengths and vulnerabilities, 
impacting both the actor and the group itself.  Moreover, where criminological 
research does embrace these perspectives, the micro and macro-analysis of the 
problem, as an integrated whole, can sometimes fall short.   
Based on the case study findings in Chapters 6 and 7, it may be argued that our 
understanding of Escobar and the Medellín Cartel has improved, and 
consequently our understanding of the complex phenomena of organised crime, 
terrorism and the crime-terror nexus, due to the ability of the new complexity 
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model to offer an approach that collectively: 
i) allows a more holistic and broader set of actors and intervening variables, 
comprising perspectives of ‘others’ and distinct categories of contextual 
variables, including historical, geographical, society, the economy, political 
and the media, to be considered within its data sets and individual and 
group dynamics;   
 
ii) offers a new complexity tool with criminological frames of reference to 
identify the nature and strength of a criminal group, based on goal 
alignment and shared needs, including insights into the drivers and 
conditions that promote actors to interact, thus providing information on 
how to change these interactions depending on the system under study; 
 
iii) introduces and extends the criminological concept of criminally exploitable 
ties to ensure a more complete set of broader actors are considered in 
determining a group’s nature and strength;   
 
iv) attempts to better conceptualise and, more importantly, visualise the 
shape, form and dynamics of a criminal group, using graphical 
representations and new imagery, promoting a patterned style of thinking 
and a better understanding of the opportunities to change, influence 
and/or disrupt the criminal group; 
 
v) encompasses the analysis of allegiances and alliances, between individuals 
and/or criminal groups, based on co-evolution, with enhanced reasoning 
of why and how these nexuses evolve within a given fitness landscape;  
 
vi) offers a new complexity tool with criminological frames of reference to 
identify patterns and structures within the data sets and provide insights 
into the nature, drivers and vulnerabilities of actor behaviour, including 
strengths and weaknesses, and departures from such behaviour, to help 
understand certain phenomena or events; and  
 
vii) comprises two distinct yet complementary components at the micro and 
macro-levels, allowing the study of a criminological phenomenon, within 
a new conceptual space, as an integrated whole.   
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While other models and/or approaches may offer elements of the above, none of 
them offer the complete set.  Moreover, by promoting a novel and innovative way 
of thinking about the problem, the complexity tools (i.e. fitness landscape and 
attractor set) offer something new and different to existing models.   However, it 
is important to recognise, that the complexity model does not aim to replace, but 
merely supplement and complement existing models and/or approaches in 
organised crime and terrorism, including the nexus.  For example, other models 
and/or approaches may provide a deeper analysis and insight into certain aspects, 
such as networks, environmental factors or preventive measures.   
In summary, based on the above analysis, in response to the second question, it 
may be argued that the new complexity model helps to further our understanding 
and knowledge of the complex phenomena under study, by offering an approach 
that collectively combines a number of elements of existing models and/or 
approaches into a single model, including new tools of complexity (i.e. fitness 
landscapes and attractor set) with a different way of seeing things and novel 
explanatory power, that other models do not offer.  As demonstrated in Chapters 
6 and 7, the new model achieves an improvement in understanding by offering a 
different, and perhaps a more sophisticated and nuanced reading of the events, 
actors and variables involved in the case study, leading to a more complete 
understanding and explanation of the phenomena under study.   
8.2 Practical application   
The practical significance of this thesis, is that the new complexity model offers a 
novel and innovative way of thinking about organised crime, terrorism and the 
crime-terror nexus, which in turn may contribute to a novel and innovative way 
of dealing with them. Perhaps more importantly, the new complexity model offers 
the ability to reflect and learn from the past, interpret and respond to the present 
and predict and prepare for the future.  In preparing for the future, the new 
complexity tools offer practical insights into the attitudes and behaviours of actors, 
and the drivers and conditions that promote actors to interact, thus are able to 
provide information and knowledge on how to change, influence and/or disrupt 
these behaviours and interactions to change future events.  One must recognise, 
however, that this knowledge is only a mere guide to the future, it does not fix the 
future.   
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Multi-dimensional and comprehensive  
Practically, the new model offers a multifaceted understanding and response 
strategy based on the model’s collective ability to analyse and offer insights and 
enhanced reasoning into group dynamics and individuals, within their given 
environments. As Smith (2014:8) argues, organised crime as ‘a multifaceted, 
complex phenomenon…requires a multifaceted response strategy’ and ‘initiatives 
need to be flexible and dynamic…to meet changes in the nature of organised 
crime’.  As a dynamic theory capturing movement and change, it may also be 
argued that the new complexity model offers a more useful approach than some 
of the more traditional ones.  Moreover, offering the ability to reshape existing 
data, rather than necessarily bringing in new data, is also of great practical value 
in terms of accessibility, timeliness and cost savings. 
In relation to other models and/or approaches, including some of the more 
traditional ones, specifically to organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror 
nexus, as a multi-dimensional model, the new model may also be of practical 
assistance, either as a supplement and/or a complement to these.  More 
specifically, it may help to:  
i) enhance the management of disparate data into structured data sets; 
and/or  
ii) pinpoint specific actors and enhance intelligence based on behaviours and 
interconnectivity strengths to change, influence and/or disrupt.   
To illustrate this point, as discussed in Chapter 2, watch points and reference lists 
in prevention and detection are offered by leading scholars, including: i) Levi and 
Maguire (2004) in organised crime; ii) Schmid (2013a) in terrorism; and iii) Shelley 
et al (2005) in the crime-terror nexus.  Of relevance to the case study findings, Levi 
and Maguire’s (2004) list includes community approaches, such as passive citizen 
participation in the provision of information about harms and risks and hotlines 
for reporting.  Also of relevance is addressing underlying conflict issues and 
maintaining the moral high ground, such as matching deeds with words, in 
Schmid’s (2013a) terrorism list.  Furthermore, Shelley et al’s (2005) watch points of 
the nexus include shifting goals, common causes and shared activities of power, 
also of relevance.  Based on the case study findings, while the new model manages 
disparate data into structured data sets and, in hindsight, pinpoints specific actors 
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and groups of actors in the Medellín Cartel’s fitness landscape and enhanced 
intelligence for change or disruption, based on their behaviours and 
interconnectivity strengths, the new model does not offer an array of prevention 
and detection techniques to change or disrupt the behaviour, such as passive 
citizen participation in hotlines for reporting.  Hence practically, as a supplement 
and/or a complement to an existing array of prevention and detection techniques, 
in the case of a particular criminal group, the new model may help to manage the 
disparate data of the criminal group and/or pinpoint specific actors and enhance 
intelligence for change or disruption, and vice-versa, where prevention and 
detection techniques may supplement and/or complement a case being analysed 
using the new model.    
Problem visualisation  
Also of practical value is the offering of a new fitness landscape metaphor in the 
way of urban geographies and visual imagery, to better grasp some of the 
underlying concepts of complexity.  The graphical and visual depiction of complex 
phenomena, such as a criminal group, in why and how it evolves or evolved, 
including its nature and strength, may aid practitioners in sense-making.  
Moreover, in determining strategies and measures offered by the new metaphor 
to change, influence and/or disrupt the criminal group or actor behaviours, the 
new visual imagery may improve conceptual understanding of the shape, form 
and dynamics of the criminal group involved.  To illustrate this point, in Chapter 
2, in attempting to conceptualise the shape, form and dynamics of organised crime, 
Edwards (1999:80) argues:  
Illicit firearms trafficking is not conducted in parallel to licit firearms 
trafficking but is enabled by the complex network of relationships between 
firearms producers, distributors, wholesalers and users.  The structure of 
relationships provides opportunities for the establishment and 
reproduction of criminal enterprise.  Through a focus on such structures of 
interdependent relations it is also possible to discern both the opportunities 
for organised crime and the opportunities for disturbing its reproduction 
[emphasis added]. 
Based on Edward’s argument, it is apparent that illicit firearms trafficking might 
benefit from the new complexity model, by attempting to better conceptualise and, 
more importantly, visualise the shape, form and dynamics of the illicit firearms 
industry, either generically or more specifically for a criminal group under study.  
In particular, the new fitness landscape complexity tool, encompassing the concept 
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of criminally exploitable ties, may aid actor completeness and understanding of 
the nature and strength of the illicit firearms industry or a specific criminal group.  
Combined with enhanced intelligence and reasoning on why and how illicit 
firearms trafficking or a specific criminal group evolves or evolved, together with 
strategies and measures to change, influence and/or disrupt specific actors, the 
new model may be of great practical value.  Moreover, as the acquisition of 
firearms is often seen as a nexus point between criminality and terrorism (Shelley 
et al 2005; Grobosky & Stohl 2010), in identifying allegiances and alliances of 
broader criminal activities, the new model may also provide practical value in 
broadening the scope of the problem.  
Broadening the scope  
Practically, complexity studies the interrelatedness and interdependence of actors, 
as well as their freedom to interact, align and organise.  The more actors and more 
ways to interact, align and organise, the higher the complexity, such as the 
increasing nexus of criminality and terrorism.  As Chris Dawson, Chief Executive 
Officer of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (‘ACIC’) notes 
(interview in Hickey 2016): 
We are increasingly seeing a nexus between criminality and 
terrorism…whether that be through financing or through acquiring 
weapons…it’s not to say all criminals become terrorists and all terrorists 
have a criminal history, but there is definitely a strong connection there 
that we just need to continually better understand.   
Moreover, Andrew Parker, Director General of the UK M15 intelligence agency 
observes (interview in Wheatstone 2016): 
The link we see between terrorism and criminals is in the local 
communities which they come from, often in low level organised crime 
activity.  We have got those who are vulnerable people who just get hooked 
on an ideology…there are those who fully subscribe and are determined to 
act…others are just angry and are criminals and are given a way to express 
that through the streets or in prison.  It’s a complex picture.  
In the disruption of a criminal group, while understanding network structures and 
operations through traditional network analysis is critically important, exploring 
a group’s wider criminally exploitable ties, such as contributory and potential 
actors in its fitness landscape, may further help concentrate efforts on less obvious, 
and perhaps in some cases more important or easier, targets to disrupt.  For 
example, in Smith’s (2014) recent work, potential interventions to recruitment 
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pathways in organised crime are considered, including convergence settings such 
as prison.  As noted earlier, recruitment pools of criminals and terrorists are also 
often from the same marginalised sectors of society.  In today’s new world of 
extreme terrorism, addressing potential and contributory actor groups such as 
new recruits, passive supporters and sympathisers is not becoming optional, it is 
becoming essential.  Practically, the new model assists in identifying allegiances 
and alliances between individuals and/or criminal groups, together with 
enhanced reasoning of why and how the nexus evolved or evolves.     
Managing financial intelligence   
Equally important in today’s world, are the new ways of policing in following the 
money trail.  The increased scrutiny and pressure on the financial sector to monitor 
and report suspicious activity of money laundering and terrorism financing is 
apparent in the billion dollar fines levied by regulators, notably in the US, where 
banks have either failed to act or comply.  At their best, criminal financiers are 
becoming more sophisticated, ranging from the most basic (e.g. physical 
movement of cash across borders) to the most sophisticated (e.g. multi-
jurisdictional complex company structures, accounts and transactions) (Lilley 
2006).  As also pointed out by Lilley (2006:199):  
Yes the final truth is the most unacceptable one:  for every terrorist outrage 
that kills and maims innocent victims, for each woman and child trafficked 
to be sexually exploited, for any victim of organised criminal activity 
somewhere in the process that led to these outcomes, dirty money was 
washed clean. 
In a changing world, the author Julie Beesley, also the former Chief Financial 
Crime Officer of a major Australian bank, observes, that following the money trail 
and ‘data, and more importantly that related to financial intelligence, is simply 
becoming the weapon of choice for law enforcement’ (interview in Olding 2015).  
Supporting this observation, the Chief Executive Officer, Paul Jevtovic, of the 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (‘AUSTRAC’), Australia’s 
anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing regulator, notes in 
AUSTRAC’s annual report 2015-16 (AUSTRAC 2016:7): 
Our intelligence has played an important role in identifying new suspects 
in Australia and overseas, and has improved Australia’s understanding of 
high-risk funds flows to Syria, Iraq and surrounding countries…We are 
also working closely with the financial sector to study and understand the 
movement of suspicious funds that are indicators of a range of financial 
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crimes.  
Moreover, from a practical application, the increasing complexity of data and 
intelligence more broadly, lends itself well to the new complexity model and 
conceptual way of thinking.   
Lessons learned 
Also of practical significance, is dealing with the multitude of actors and localities 
in criminal and terrorist endeavours.  While organised crime and/or terrorist 
groups come in all shapes and sizes, with different types of networks and levels of 
sophistication, one factor remains, their use and threat of violence.  In a broader 
conflict, as noted in Chapter 2, there are two factors that are closely associated with 
terrorist activity:  i) political violence committed by the state; and ii) the existence 
of a broader armed conflict (IEP 2015).  As noted earlier, Johnson (2007:160) 
suggests, ‘the way in which wars evolve has less to do with their original causes 
and more to do with the way in which humans act in groups’.  Furthermore, 
Johnson (2007:160) also suggests that it is often reported ‘that many of the people 
doing the fighting do not actually know why the war started in the first 
place…they simply want to “beat the others”’.  Practically, the ‘war on drugs’ is 
very much like the ‘war on terror’, and in reality, these wars actually benefit the 
‘others’, i.e. organised crime and terrorist organisations, as well as the multitude 
of actors, including arms dealers, private military firms, state agencies and 
organisations that exist to respond to the war industry.  If one compares bin Laden 
with Escobar, there are certainly differences, but also similarities, in that both were 
terrorists and the ‘human face’ on their former anonymous crimes.  These 
similarities also led to the culpability being placed almost solely onto each man’s 
head, without unpacking the complex web of contextual variables and multitude 
of actors that created the circumstances for each man to rise and act in the first 
place.  In the words of former Colombian President Gaviria, ‘[Escobar was] a kind 
of bin Laden of those times.  Only that was in relation to narco-trafficking, not of 
religion or fundamentalism, but narco-terrorism’ (‘The Two Escobars’ 2010).   As 
argued earlier, none of the factors that make terrorism ‘can be discussed in 
isolation from one another’ (Martin 2016:xix).  
To date, latest figures from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre’s (‘IDMC’) 
Global Annual Report show that Colombia has over 6 million people internally 
	 267	
displaced by ongoing armed conflict and violence (IDMC 2016).  This equates to 
12% of its total population.  Until recently, Colombia had consistently held the top 
spot for the highest number of displaced people in the world, largely due to its five 
decades of conflict (IDMC 2016).  In 2015, Colombia was replaced by Syria for the 
top spot when Syria’s tally exceeded 7 million people displaced world-wide 
(IDMC 2016).   While the world focuses on Syria and ISIS, there are practical 
lessons to be learned from Colombia.  For example, IDMC’s (2016:13) report 
suggests, there are ‘growing numbers of	people trapped in protracted and chronic 
patterns of displacement’	 and a need ‘to address the underlying issues that 
create and sustain this phenomenon’.  As Jonathan Marcus (2016), a diplomatic 
correspondent points out, ‘Syria is an appallingly complex problem, and no single 
party can be blamed for the continuation of the war’.   
ISIS  
In one of the first serious attempts to analyse ISIS, Stern and Berger (2015:13) argue, 
‘the world awakened to the threat of ISIS in the summer of 2014, but that is not 
where the story begins…many diverse factors contributed to the rise of ISIS’.  
Moreover, in another attempt, Bennis (2016:9) points out: 
When ISIS swept across northern Syria and northwestern Iraq in June 2014, 
occupying cities and towns and imposing its draconian version of Islam on 
terrified populations, to many around the world it looked like something 
that had popped up out of nowhere.  This was not the case, but the 
complicated interweaving of players, places, and alliances make 
understanding ISIS seem almost impossible.  Yet ISIS has a traceable past, 
a history and a political trajectory grounded in movements, organisations, 
governments, and political moments that form a long story in the Middle 
East…It’s a mess.  
The specific origins of ISIS may be traced through Al-Qaeda, and more specifically, 
through Al-Qaeda in Iraq (‘AQI’), which subsequently changed its name to the 
Islamic State of Iraq (‘ISI’), and then finally to ISIS (Stern & Berger 2015; Bennis 
2016).   A major difference between ISIS and Al-Qaeda, and also between other 
militias in history, is that a key goal of ISIS was (and still is) to seize territory to 
govern (Stern & Berger 2015; Bennis 2016).  The rational being that in doing so, ‘it 
was not only asserting the theoretical goal of creating a future “caliphate”, it was 
actually doing so by occupying, holding, and governing’ land, and thereby 
establishing its control (Bennis 2016:19).  Although earlier Islamic groups, 
including Al-Qaeda had advocated the idea of a caliphate – a term used for 
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territory ruled by an Islamic leader – unlike earlier groups, ISIS actually went 
ahead with it.  Another point of note, is that once ISIS had actually captured large 
areas of Iraq and Syria, including cities with millions of people, it had to figure out 
how to actually govern it and bring its own religious law and order to the land.   
More importantly, it needed to figure out how to keep the people under control, 
especially ordinary people caught up in its holy war, with no desire for ISIS to be 
there.  Equally, ISIS needed (and needs) money to govern, including the basic 
requirements of life, i.e.  water, food, electricity, hospitals, schools and jobs (Stern 
& Berger 2015; Bennis 2016).  Unlike its predecessors and other types of terrorists, 
while funding is still important,  it may be argued that ISIS ‘represents a new form 
of terrorist organisation where funding is central and critical to its activities’ (FATF 
2015:5).  As such, this also represents a major vulnerability.  Although ISIS’s 
primary source of funding is derived from its illegal occupation of territory, 
including bank looting and control of oil fields and refineries, other sources 
include kidnapping and extortion payments and donations transacted through the 
global banking system (FATF 2015).  Accordingly, cutting of ISIS’s funding is ‘both 
a challenge and opportunity for the global community’ (2015:5).   Of equal note, is 
ISIS’s reported connections with organised crime groups, individuals and/or 
activities, given the history of crime-terror connections of its Al-Qaeda 
predecessors, notably AQI (Congressional Research Report 2013; FATF 2015; Stern 
& Berger 2015; Bennis 2016).   
In short, without any in-depth analysis, including the i) long history of wars and 
conflicts in the region; ii) history of Islam; and iii) key social, economic and political 
events, especially with broader actors in the Middle East, notably the US, through 
a complexity lens, patterns and structures already begin to emerge.  For example, 
the importance of territorial control and the criticality of funding, which 
respectively contain patterns and structures of operational control and funding 
flows, both of which may be changed or disrupted.   Practically, applying the new 
complexity model to a case study of ISIS may contribute to a better understanding 
and knowledge of ISIS and in turn, the practical ways we deal with it;  for example, 
a better understanding of its origins, nature and strength, why and how it evolved 
and continues to evolve, including the behaviour, strengths and vulnerabilities of 
individual actors, and more importantly, the nature and strength of its allegiances 
and alliances.   
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8.3 Policy implications  
To date, application of complexity and non-linear dynamics in policy studies is 
limited, however, examples include US environmental policy, international arms 
races and urban growth (Elliot & Kiel 1997).  In the example of urban growth, Peter 
Allen developed a complexity model, albeit mathematical in nature, that ‘no 
longer searches for the one correct answer, but instead presents multiple possible 
outcomes that change with each iteration of the model’ (cited in Elliot & Kiel 
1997:69).  In other words, Allen presents a raft of multiple choices and possibilities 
for policymakers to consider.   Of relevance, in crime prevention, Young (1991) 
argues:  
The point of policy is not to eliminate the parameters, but rather to decide 
at what level one wishes those parameters set in order to retain a given 
configuration of crime or a given configuration of prosocial behaviour.  In 
this paradigm, both crime and prosocial behaviour are located in the way 
the whole system is organised. 
Examples of such parameters, as discussed in Chapter 3, include a slight change 
in legislation, such as criminalisation levels in the quantity of drugs to deem a 
dealing level; and in the thesis case study, the legalisation of drugs themselves.  
From a policy point of view, determining these parameters and how to evaluate 
their impact is the real challenge.   
In exploring policy implications of the new complexity model, similar to other 
perspectives, the findings suggest that success in crime prevention and detection, 
notably in the ‘war on drugs’ and ‘war on terror’, depends less on fighting and 
more on addressing the multitude of factors and actors, rather than causes, that 
evolve over time.   A central question in policy studies is the extent we are capable 
of both prediction and control (Casti 1990).  Moreover, as Elliot and Kiel (1997a:68) 
suggest: 
Complexity teach[es] us that social evolution is produced by both 
deterministic historical factors and chance events that may push social 
phenomena to new regimes of behaviour.  By better understanding the 
confluence of chance and determinism in social systems evolution, we may 
better learn when and how to direct policy response.  
Although this thesis is not suggesting prediction and control in social systems is 
by any means easy to assess, especially in organised crime and terrorism, the 
recognition and appreciation of contextual variables and the consideration of a 
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broader range of actors, such as potential and contributory actors, may better 
inform and prepare policymakers.  Of note, a variable which is often overlooked 
is geography.  As Farah (2012:67) points out, ‘however expansive in global terms, 
a strategy based on geopolitics – the fundamental understanding of how human 
behaviour relates to geographic space – must always be rooted in the local’.   
In summary, despite the acknowledged challenges, policy implications of the new 
complexity model may help to better prepare policymakers for a multifaceted 
approach and response to policy making in a complexity informed world.  
8.4 New tool for criminologists 
In a world that is constantly changing and increasingly complex, the new 
complexity model is perhaps a timely offering to criminologists of an alternative 
tool, or set of lenses, to view the world we now live in, and the whole 
interconnected ‘eco-system’ of crime.  Essentially, as explained below, the new set 
of lenses also contributes to a new way of knowing and sense of reality in 
criminological study.  
Nature of reality  
According to Williams and Arrigo (2006:9), ‘historically, philosophers have 
written very little about the subject of crime.  Similarly, criminologists have written 
very little about the subject of philosophy’.  Given the fact that the model relocates 
the subject of study into a new conceptual space and reality – by seeing the world 
in terms of complex systems and offering new definitions (or more accurately 
ways of knowing) to understand the subject of study – the new model may also be 
described through the philosophical lens of ontology and epistemology.   
As noted earlier, complexity may also be described as ‘an ontological frame of 
reference’ (Byrne & Callaghan 2014:57).  As such, it offers the criminologist a new 
prism to explore and define the very nature and social reality of crime and perhaps 
contribute to the broader ‘questions that philosophy more directly confronts’ 
(Williams & Arrigo 2006:19).  Specifically, if we want to understand a 
criminological phenomenon or problem through the new model, we need to 
understand it in complexity terms, i.e. through complex systems.  In other words, 
ontologically, the new model understands the nature of a problem as a complex 
system, i.e. as a construction of reality.  However, this does not mean the 
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construction of the problem has no link to reality – it is just how we perceive the 
reality.   The new model commits us to believing in a certain kind of reality, where 
we can interpret and make sense of criminological phenomena, through the nature 
of complex systems.  In other words, it is the very nature of a complex system, with 
its patterns and structures of relationships and interactions that brings an 
ontological depth and explanatory power to the new model.  Put simply, 
complexity at its core is research on pattern formation.  It basically offers a way of 
discerning and understanding patterns that are not predictable by traditional 
methods, which, in turn, leads us to new ontological thought and enhanced 
reasoning.   
For example, the new model lends itself to criminological phenomena that are not 
easily measured or observed using traditional definitions, which tend to want to 
categorise and construct ontological truths, and hence by their very nature may 
limit the framing of the subject of study.  From an ontological and epistemological 
perspective, the model rejects traditional definitions in favour of new ones, that re-
specify and re-imagine the nature and reality of a phenomenon as a number of 
interacting, self-organising, dynamic and emergent properties, in any given 
environment, all of which are mutually influencing.  By engaging the new 
vocabulary of complex systems, the model also engages new thought processes, 
and in doing so, may contribute to a different way of framing research questions 
in criminological study.  For example, using concepts such as: i) ‘fractals’ that 
identify patterns that are easy to see at one scale, but not at another, such as micro 
and macro-levels, or in one portion of a study, but not in another; ii) ‘attractors’ 
that produce an order within the disorder of a system, creating patterns and 
structures that may lead to insights into actor behaviour; and iii) ‘co-evolution’ 
when two or more complex systems reciprocally affect each other’s evolution, 
leading to co-dependencies and alliance formations, such as nexus points.  In 
engaging this new vocabulary, it is important to recognise that much of the new 
model is based on concepts and metaphors derived from mathematics.  However, 
as noted earlier, Byrne and Callaghan (2014:6) argue, ‘metaphors are what we live 
by’ and that ‘a model is a metaphor’ and ‘any description of reality is 
metaphorical’.   
As the new complexity model is also theory-driven, with criminological frames of 
reference relevant to the objects of study, this design feature lends itself well to 
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broader criminological phenomena that are implicated by the nature of complexity 
and how studying these might provide fresh insights. As an analytical tool, it also 
offers criminologists the ability to organise, shape and structure information and 
make conceptual distinctions to capture something that is easy to understand.  
Moreover, the model also emphasises patterned thinking, a key to understanding 
the nature of complexity.  Essentially, it balances the need for complexity with the 
need for simplicity, i.e. the need to improve the conceptualisation of the complex 
problem, with the need for simplicity in understanding the problem.  Overall, 
perhaps it is this balance of complexity with simplicity, i.e.  in the way it goes about 
knowing and understanding a problem, that ultimately sets the new model apart 
from others.  
Multi-dimensional and comprehensive  
Within criminology, the application of a model which reconciles polar-opposites 
(order and disorder) may also provide criminologists with a useful tool to 
reconcile and integrate several long-standing opposites such as the classical-
positivist view (free will versus determinism) and the micro-macro view 
(individuals versus wider social influences).  In the world of complexity, free will 
and determinism not only coexist, but complement one another; determinism 
plays a role in the evolution of criminal behaviour, but there are points where free 
will chooses behaviour. In relation to the micro-macro view, instead of 
conceptualising them as mutually exclusive objects of study, in the world of 
complexity, viewing them together as an integrated whole produces a more 
complementary perspective.  Moreover, without any in-depth analysis, it appears 
that criminological theories and perspectives have a place within the new 
complexity model, such as strain theory, control theory, techniques of 
neutralisation and labelling perspectives, to name a few.  Supporting this 
assertion, Byrne & Callaghan (2014:79) argue that ‘a considerable body of social 
theory has dealt with the problems that complexity seeks to deal with in ways that 
would be recognisable to it’.  They further argue, ‘indeed the very language of 
systems, structures context, mechanism, and process transformation, regularities, 
conflicts and continuities suggest this common ground’ (Byrne & Callaghan 
2014:79).  For an in-depth analysis on how ‘key axes of discussion in social theory’ 
fit in with complexity, including prominent and influential scholarly work such as 
Émile Durkheim and Robert Merton, refer to ‘complexity theory meets social 
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science’ in Byrne & Callaghan (2014:79).  In addition, as noted earlier, the new 
complexity model does not aim to replace, but merely supplement and/or 
complement existing theories, perspectives and approaches, and vice-versa, some 
of which lend themselves well to the notion of ‘common ground’.   
To illustrate this point within the context of criminology, brief examples of 
criminological theories and perspectives based on the new complexity model and 
thesis case study are offered below; where the examples are from a selection of 
mainstream (strain theory, control theory, techniques of neutralisation and 
labelling perspectives) and relatively new (environmental criminology) 
criminological theories and perspectives.  As a short recap, in relation to fitness 
landscapes, a fundamental element of the new model is determining 
interconnectivity strength and goal alignment or in other words, ‘what’s in it for 
me question’.  In terms of attractor sets, a fundamental element of the new model 
is determining what influences and shapes actor behaviour, including attitudes, 
values and issues of concern.  Taking each example in turn:  
i) strain theory: using the basic proposition of strain theory, where strains 
are social in nature, rather than individual, and located in ‘social structures 
and/or value systems’ where individuals have ‘inadequate or 
inappropriate means of opportunities to achieve certain goals relative to 
other people in society’ (White et al 2012:71), it appears strain theory lends 
itself to a deeper analysis behind specific goals of actors in the new model 
and vice-versa by assisting in understanding how these goals impact 
group dynamics and the affinity to a particular group.  In the thesis case 
study for example, refer to Fragments 20 and 21 supporting the analysis 
of the goals of the sicarios where most of them came from marginal sectors 
limiting viable alternatives to achieving their goals; 
 
ii) control theory: as control theory centres its concern on conformity based 
social ‘ties’ or ‘bonds’ and an individual’s ability (learnt or otherwise) of 
self-control (Rankin & Kern 2013), it appears control theory provides 
common ground with the new model in determining the nature and 
strength of ties and bonds of actors in a particular complex system, 
together with social influences.  In the thesis case study for example, refer 
to Fragment 106 supporting the analysis of Escobar’s social attractor and 
the bonds of loyalty of the poor barrios to Escobar, whose generosity 
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represented a symbol of social justice against the government and rich 
elite, who they felt had abandoned them;    
 
iii) techniques of neutralisation: using the distinctive set of justifications that 
enable an individual to ‘justify’ their delinquent behaviour (Tierney 2006), 
it appears these techniques fit in well with the moral attractor of actor 
behaviour.  In the thesis case study for example, refer to Fragment 116 
supporting the analysis of Escobar’s moral attractor, where Escobar 
considers ‘the criminal ineptitude’ of the police and judicial systems as a 
justification for his actions;  
 
iv) labelling perspectives:  as an approach based on how people come to be 
categorised and defined and implications thereof, the very nature of this 
labelling by ‘social action and reaction’ (White et al 2012:97) provides 
common ground with the new model in the ‘relationship’ between a 
labelled individual and a set of actors within a complex system with the 
power to label.  In the thesis case study for example, refer to Fragment 90 
supporting the analysis of the US and foreign media labelling Escobar as 
‘the villain’ in the context of the war on drugs compared with Fragment 
91 supporting the local media labelling Escobar as ‘the hero’ and 
implications thereof; and   
 
v) environmental criminology: as a relatively new theory compared to the 
above selection, ‘environmental criminologists look for crime patterns and 
seek to explain them in terms of environmental influences’ (Wortley & 
Mazerolle (2008:1).  It appears that the detection of environmental 
influences through environmental design lends itself well to the concept 
of an ‘environmental’ attractor, a useful addition to the existing attractor 
set.  Equally, the complexity model’s attractor set may also play a 
supplementary and/or complementary role in the studies of 
environmental design by detecting broader crime patterns and behaviours 
of the actors involved.  In the thesis case study for example, refer to 
Fragments 32 and 33 where operational control of certain environments 
(e.g. to grow crops) played a key role in the formation of a nexus between 
the guerrillas (often labelled terrorists) and the drug traffickers.   
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Problem visualisation  
 
Complexity also offers several descriptive metaphors – the butterfly effect, 
attractors, fractal fragments, edge of chaos, landscapes – which are easily 
accessible by criminologists as meaningful descriptors of patterns that emerge in 
criminological research.  In particular, the graphical and visual depiction of such 
metaphors and complex phenomena allows the reader to better visualise and 
grasp the complexity concepts being used to frame the new approach and model.   
As Wheeldon and Harris (2015:141) observe, there is much potential ‘for visual 
criminology to better present complex research findings’.  To date, however, 
‘although data visualisation has thrived in many areas of social inquiry, 
criminology has been comparatively slow to adopt these techniques’ (Wheeldon 
& Harris 2015:143).  As such, perhaps the new complexity model may contribute 
more broadly in criminology to an increase in appetite of the use of these 
techniques.   
Broadening the scope 
On a review of recent criminological work, criminologists are increasingly looking 
to better understand their problem by broadening the scope.  To provide an 
example, in the opening argument of the recent 2016 book Tackling Correctional 
Corruption, Goldsmith et al (2016:2) argue: 
A focus on corruption alone was too narrow in scope. Many of the key 
drivers that explain how corruption arises and how it is sustained are to be 
found within the missions given to correctional institutions, in the ways in 
which these institutions are resourced and managed overall, in the kinds 
of settings in which they occur, and in the sets of dynamic relationships in 
which correctional officers are enmeshed, including with managers, 
prisoners and other clientele, families of clients, the media, the public and 
politicians.  In order to tackle correctional corruption, we argue, we must 
first understand it properly by examining it in context [emphasis added].  
Based on this argument, it appears the new complexity model might lend itself 
well to tackling correctional corruption, and perhaps help in conceptualising and 
visualising the shape, form and dynamics of the broader problem.   
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 1, in criminology there is a multitude of theories, 
each with a different perspective or approach, and each theory may be categorised 
as locating its key explanation for criminal behaviour or criminality at one of three 
broad levels of analysis: the individual, the situational and the social structural 
	 276	
(White et al 2012).  On occasion, a theory may combine more than one of these 
levels to provide a broader and more comprehensive, and perhaps a more 
sophisticated, perspective of crime and criminal behaviour.  In Agnew’s 2011 book 
Towards a Unified Criminology:  Integrating Assumptions about Crime, People, and 
Society, Agnew (2011) sets out a critical examination of the underlying assumptions 
of theories criminologists use.  Agnew then proposes a new set of underlying 
assumptions to lay the foundation for a unified criminology, that is better able to 
explain a broader range of crimes.  Included in Agnew’s new set of underlying 
assumptions are: the nature of crime, determinism and agency, human nature, 
consensus and conflict and the nature of reality.  Moreover, in the context of new 
assumptions, according to Milovanovic (2015:49), ‘much of critical criminology 
(and social sciences generally) often rests on core assumptions that need to be re-
assessed’.   
As demonstrated in this thesis, the new complexity model embraces both the need 
for new assumptions and re-assessments in our increasingly complex and 
changing world, and in doing so, may contribute to furthering a unified 
criminology and a more integrated and holistic approach, including the 
broadening of the scope of criminological problems.    
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Chapter 9:  Conclusion 
 
‘Every new beginning comes from some other beginning’s end’ 
Seneca, Roman philosopher (4BC- 65AD) 
 
Chapter 9 sets out the conclusion to the thesis and resultant contribution, including 
key outcomes of the research in i) furthering our understanding and knowledge of 
organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus; and ii) developing a new 
complexity model and knowledge with criminological frames of reference to apply 
complexity in criminology.   
 
 
9.1 Thesis overview 
This thesis commenced with the real-world problem and challenges of organised 
crime, terrorism and the crime-terror nexus, followed by a premise that these 
phenomena are complex, multi-layered and driven by a multitude of factors.  
Given the complex nature of these phenomena, one may infer that complexity 
science, which studies complex phenomena, may lend itself to furthering our 
understanding and knowledge of these phenomena.   Based on a literature review, 
with the knowledge that the application of complexity in criminology is marginal, 
and the application to organised crime and terrorism is sparse, this revealed an 
academic gap, which this thesis attempted to address.  Drawing on both the 
natural and social sciences, the thesis brought together complexity and the case 
study method to explore new ways of studying criminological problems.  The 
thesis comprised an over-arching yet simple hypothesis relating to complex 
phenomena: that complexity can be successfully applied with criminological 
frames of reference to analyse organised crime, terrorism and the crime-terror 
nexus.  A literature review was performed of organised crime, terrorism and the 
crime-terror nexus, together with a review of the science of complexity and its core 
concepts and principles.  In considering the research approach, a new complexity 
model, with criminological frames of reference, was developed, tested and 
applied, using the case study method. The case study selected was an in-depth 
case study of Escobar and the Medellín Cartel.  Based on the case study findings, 
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themes arising were found to be consistent with the concepts and constructs of 
complexity.  In turn, the resulting analysis led to a more complete understanding 
and explanation of the case study.  The thesis also considered whether the findings 
shed light on furthering our understanding and knowledge of organised crime, 
terrorism and the crime-terror nexus, including practical and policy implications.  
It also considered the contribution of the new complexity model as a new tool for 
criminologists. 
9.2 Contribution  
The primary objective of this thesis was to provide a meaningful contribution to 
our understanding and knowledge of organised crime, terrorism and the crime-
terror nexus.  The research is significant as it not only advances our understanding 
of these real-world problems (Millennium Project 2017), but also uses borrowed 
science to open-up new ways of thinking within the broader areas of 
criminological research.  Expected outcomes of the research were major original 
contributions to: 
i) furthering our understanding and knowledge of organised crime, 
terrorism and the crime-terror nexus; and  
ii) developing a new complexity model and knowledge with criminological 
frames of reference to apply complexity in criminology.   
Taking each objective in turn, this thesis offers a novel, more complete and perhaps 
a more sophisticated analysis of criminal groups, including structures and 
activities, as well as behaviour of individuals, all within a contextual setting;  and 
as a result, it furthers our understanding and knowledge of organised crime, 
terrorism and the crime-terror nexus. The practical significance of this thesis, is 
that the new complexity model offers a new way of thinking about these complex 
phenomena, and in turn, may contribute to the practical ways we deal with them.   
Moreover, adopting the new complexity model leads us to a more integrated and 
complementary view of the world.  As a new tool in criminology, it offers an 
intellectual toolkit, including the ability to reflect and learn from the past, interpret 
and respond to the present and predict and prepare for the future. Although 
prediction is not always easy, difficulty in prediction does not necessarily mean 
unintelligible or inaccessible to knowledge and understanding.   In doing so, it 
offers a suitably sophisticated framework of complex differentiation and 
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understanding to study complex criminological phenomena which are 
unpredictable, yet patterned, random, yet governed.  Importantly, the new 
complexity model does not aim to overthrow existing theories, perspectives or 
knowledge in criminology, it merely aims to supplement and complement.  
Moreover, given the ongoing challenges in understanding complex phenomena in 
criminology, the new complexity model may add to the contribution of a more 
integrated, unified and holistic approach.  Ultimately, the new complexity model 
offers a new tool in the criminologist’s toolbox, to provide fresh and novel insights 
into complex problems, and in doing so, perhaps shine light on some old ones.  
Overall, the value and significance of these contributions are based on the 
difficulties in combating organised crime and terrorism to date, and the increasing 
nexus between the two. Moreover, the value and significance of the new 
complexity model may also stimulate a much-needed interest, discussion and 
debate by criminologists on how to better conceptualise complex problems using 
the new science of complexity.  
9.3 Future research   
As discussed in Chapter 8, future research may benefit by conducting in-depth 
case studies in the areas of: 
i) Organised crime, terrorism, and the crime-terror nexus.  Of note, given 
the acute real-world problem, a case study of ISIS may benefit from the 
insights offered by the new complexity model; and   
ii) Criminology more generally, where criminologists are increasingly 
looking to better understand problems by broadening the scope of the 
problem under study. 
9.4 Summary    
In conclusion, this thesis argues that complexity can be successfully applied with 
criminological frames of reference to analyse organised crime, terrorism and the 
crime-terror nexus.  In short, the complexity model promotes a patterned style of 
thinking and offers a means of discerning and identifying underlying patterns of 
order, that extends our understanding and knowledge from the known to the 
unknown.  It essentially balances the need for complexity, with the need for 
simplicity, i.e. the need to improve the conceptualisation of the complex problem, 
with the need for simplicity in understanding the problem.   
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Reflecting the opening quote of this thesis (Ki-moon 2015), it may be argued that 
it is the complexities of our time that ‘we must adapt to’.  Given the changing and 
increasingly complex world we live in, perhaps a shift in mind-set and thinking to 
more closely match the complexities of our time and the very nature of our reality, 
is a step that more scholars will need to take. 
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Appendix 1:  Case study - source data set 
 
Table	1:	Primary	sources		
	 Source		 Content	 Reference		
	 A.	The	US	National	Security	Archive	 	
1.	 1990:	Department	of	State,	
Cable	from	US	Embassy	
Bogota	to	US	Secretary	of	
State	
Escobar	&	Medellín	Cartel,	
declassified	US	government	
intelligence	
US	Department	
of	State	1990	
2.	 1991:	Department	of	Defense,	
Intelligence	Report:	Colombian	
Narco-Trafficker	Profiles		
Escobar	&	Medellín	Cartel,	
declassified	US	government	
intelligence	
US	Department	
of	Defense	1991	
3.	 1992:	CIA,	Intelligence	
memorandum:	Narco-
Insurgent	Links	in	the	Andes	
Escobar	&	Medellín	Cartel,	
declassified	US	government	
intelligence	
CIA	1992	
4.	 1993:	Department	of	Defense,	
Intelligence	Paper	on	“Los	
Pepes”	
Escobar	&	Medellín	Cartel,	
declassified	US	government	
intelligence	
US	Department	
of	Defense	1993	
5.	 1993a:	Department	of	State,	
Cable	from	US	Embassy	
Bogota	to	US	Secretary	of	
State	
Escobar	&	Medellín	Cartel,	
declassified	US	government	
intelligence	
US	Department	
of	State	1993a	
6.	 1993b:	Department	of	State,	
Cable	from	US	Embassy	
Bogota	to	US	Secretary	of	
State	
Escobar	&	Medellín	Cartel,	
declassified	US	government	
intelligence	
US	Department	
of	State	1993b	
7.	 1994:	DEA,	Drug	Intelligence	
report:	Insurgent	Involvement	
in	the	Colombian	Drug	Trade	
Escobar	&	Medellín	Cartel,	
declassified	US	government	
intelligence	
DEA	1994	
8.	 1994:	Department	of	State,	
Intelligence	Assessment:	
Profile	of	Fidel	Castaño	
Escobar	&	Medellín	Cartel,	
declassified	US	government	
intelligence	
US	Department	
of	State	1994	
9.	 2008:	National	Security	
Archive:	Government	
Information	Electronic	Briefing	
Book	No.	243:	Colombian	
Paramilitaries	and	the	United	
States:	“Unravelling	the	Pepes	
Tangled	Web	
	
	
Escobar	&	Medellín	Cartel,	
declassified	US	government	
intelligence	
US	National	
Security	Archive	
2008	
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	 Source		 Content	 Reference		
	 B.	Other	government	documents		 	
1.	 1999:	US	Office	of	National	
Drug	Control	Policy		
US	public	report:	America’s	Drug	
Use	Profile			
US	Office	of	
National	Drug	
Control	Policy	
1999	
2.	 2002:	US	DEA	Drug,	
Intelligence	Brief:	Drugs	and	
Terrorism:	A	New	Perspective	
US	public	information	on	drugs	and	
terrorism	
DEA	2002	
	 C.	Speeches	(*with	transcript)	
1.	 1989:		US	President	Bush*	 US	President	public	speech	with	
transcript		
Bush	1989	
2.		 1990:		Colombian	President	
Gaviria		
Colombian	President	public	speech	
recorded		
Sins	of	My	Father	
2009	
	
	
Table	2:	Secondary	sources		
	 Source		 Content	 Reference		
	 A.	Interviews:	First-hand	accounts	(*with	transcript)	
1.	 1988:	Recorded	interview	
with	Escobar	by	Yolanda	Ruiz		
Escobar,	recorded	interview,	
televised	with	sub-titles	
NTN24	News	
2013	
2.	 2000:	Interview	with	Colonel	
Hugo	Martinez	by	Streatfeild*	
Colonel	Martinez,	Head	of	Search	
Bloc,	written	interview	with	
transcript	
Streatfeild	2000	
3.	 2000:	Televised	interview	
with	Carlos	Toro	by	Frontline*	
Medellín	Cartel,	professional	public	
relations	officer,	televised	
interview	with	transcript	
Frontline	2000a	
4.	 2000:	Televised	interview	
with	Fernando	Arenas	by	
Frontline*	
Medellín	Cartel,	professional	pilot,	
televised	interview	with	transcript	
Frontline	2000b	
5.	 2000:	Televised	interview	
with	George	Jung	by	
Frontline*	
Medellín	Cartel,	key	associate,	
televised	interview	with	transcript	
Frontline	2000c	
6.	 2000:	Televised	interview	
with	Jorge	Ochoa	by	
Frontline*	
Medellín	Cartel,	leader,	televised	
interview	with	transcript	
Frontline	2000d	
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	 Source		 Content	 Reference		
7.	 2000:	Televised	interview	
with	Juan	Ochoa	by	Frontline*	
Medellín	Cartel,	leader,	televised	
interview	with	transcript	
Frontline	2000e	
8.	 2010:	Interview	with	
Escobar’s	son	by	Doherty	et	
al*	
	
Escobar’s	son,	Juan	Pablo,	written	
interview	with	transcript	
Doherty	et	al	
2010	
	 B.	Documentaries:		Televised	first-hand	accounts	(*with	transcript)	
1.	 1997:	The	Godfather	of	
Cocaine*	
	
	
Frontline	documentary	chronicling	
the	rise	and	fall	of	Escobar	and	the	
Medellín	Cartel,	including	
interviews	with	US	and	Colombian	
state	officials/officers,	Escobar’s	
brother	Roberto	and	Escobar’s	
mother	
The	Godfather	of	
Cocaine	1997	
‘The	Godfather	of	
Cocaine’	1997	
2.	 2002:	The	True	Story	of	Killing	
Pablo*	
	
History	Channel	documentary	
chronicling	the	true	story	of	the	
hunt	for	and	killing	of	Escobar	
based	on	Bowden’s	critically	
acclaimed	book,	including	televised	
interviews	with	US	and	Colombian	
state	officials/officers	and	Bowden	
himself	
The	True	Story	of	
Killing	Pablo	2002	
‘The	True	Story	
of	Killing	Pablo’	
2009	
	
3.	 2003:	Killing	Pablo*	
	
CNN	version	of	the	true	story	of	
the	hunt	for	and	killing	of	Escobar	
based	on	Bowden’s	book	including	
televised	interviews	with	other	US	
and	Colombian	state	
officials/officers	from	those	
interviewed	in	The	True	Story	of	
Killing	Pablo	2002	version	
Killing	Pablo	2003	
‘Killing	Pablo’	
2003	
	
4.	 2006:	Cocaine	Cowboys		
	
Chronicles	the	drug	influx	into	
Miami	of	the	1970s	and	1980s	and	
the	resulting	gang	wars	and	
violence,	including	televised	
interviews	with	former	drug	
dealers/smugglers	and	state	
officials/law	enforcement	
Cocaine	Cowboys	
2006	
5.	 2009:	Sins	of	My	Father		
	
Chronicles	childhood	of	Juan	Pablo,	
Escobar’s	son	and	his	memories	of	
his	father,	including	a	
reconciliation	with	the	sons	of	
Galán	and	Lara,	Escobar’s	victims,	
and	televised	interviews	with	
them,	including	Escobar’s	son,	
Escobar’s	wife	and	archived	
recording	of	a	televised	interview	
with	Escobar	himself	
Sins	of	My	father	
2009	
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	 Source		 Content	 Reference		
6.	 2010:	The	Two	Escobars*		
	
Award	winning	documentary	
chronicling	the	lives	of	Pablo	
Escobar	and	Andreas	Escobar	
(unrelated)	and	the	unprecedented	
rise	and	fall	of	Colombian	football,	
as	a	result	of	narco-dollars	by	the	
likes	of	the	Medellín	and	Cali	
Cartels,	including	televised	
interviews	with	Andreas	Escobar	
and	Escobar’s	cousin	Jaime	Gaviria	
Gomez	
The	Two	Escobars	
2010	
‘The	Two	
Escobars’	2010	
7.	 2014:	Cocaine	Cowboys	
Reloaded		
Revised	and	extended	version	of	
Cocaine	Cowboys	2006	
	
Cocaine	Cowboys	
Reloaded	2014	
	 C.	Books:	First-hand	accounts	and/or	autobiographies	
1	 2007:	Amando	a	Pablo	
odiando	a	Escobar	(Loving	
Pablo	Hating	Escobar)	
Escobar’s	lover,	Virginia	Vallejo,	
personal	account	(published	in	
Spanish)	
Vallejo	2007	
2.	 2009:	The	Infiltrator		 DEA	undercover	agent	personal	
account		
Mazur	2009	
3.	 2010:	Escobar	Drugs,	Guns,	
Money,	Power			
Escobar’s	brother	and	Medellín		
Cartel	key	associate,	Roberto,	
personal	account	
Escobar	R	2010	
4.	 2011:	At	the	Devils’	Table		 Cali	Cartel	Security	Chief,	Jorge	
Salcedo,	personal	account	
Rempel	2011	
5.	 2014:	Yo	soy	el	hijo	del	cartel	
de	Cali	(I	am	the	Son	of	the	
Cali	Cartel)		
Son	of	Miguel	Rodríguez,	Cali	
Cartel,	William	Rodríguez,	
autobiography	(published	in	
Spanish)	
Rodríguez	2014	
6.	 2015:	Blow		 Medellín	Cartel	key	associate,	
George	Jung,	autobiography	
Porter	2015	
7.	 2015:	Sobreviviendo	a	Pablo	
Escobar	(Surviving	Pablo	
Escobar)		
Medellín	Cartel	head	sicario,	John	
Jairo	Velásquez,	aka	Popeye,	
personal	account	(published	in	
Spanish)	
Velásquez	2015	
8.	 2016:	Pablo	Escobar	My	
Father		
	
	
	
Escobar’s	son,	Juan	Pablo,	personal	
account	
Escobar	JP	2016	
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	 Source		 Content	 Reference		
	 D.	Books:	Investigative	journalists	based	on	extensive	research	and	accounts	
1.	 1988:	The	Cocaine	Wars	 Escobar	&	the	Medellín	Cartel,	
based	on	extensive	sources,	
including	first-hand	personal	
accounts	
Eddy	et	al	1988	
2.	 1989:	Kings	of	Cocaine:		Inside	
the	Medellín	Cartel	–	An	
Astonishing	True	Story	of	
Murder,	Money,	And	
International	Corruption	
Escobar	&	the	Medellín	Cartel,	
based	on	extensive	sources,	
including	first-hand	personal	
accounts	
Gugliotta	&	Leen	
1989	
3.	 1995:	Whitewash:	Pablo	
Escobar	and	the	Cocaine	Wars	
	
Escobar	&	the	Medellín	Cartel,	
based	on	extensive	sources,	
including	first-hand	personal	
accounts	and	c.	350	interviews	
Strong	1995	
4.	 2002:	Killing	Pablo:		The	Hunt	
for	the	World’s	Greatest	
Outlaw	
Escobar	&	the	Medellín	Cartel,	
based	on	extensive	sources,	
including	classified	documents	and	
first-hand	personal	accounts	of	US	
&	Colombian	state	
officials/officers,	Medellín	locals,	
letter	written	by	Escobar’s	wife	and	
note	written	by	Escobar		
Bowden	2002	
5.	 2003:	Drug	Lords:	The	rise	and	
fall	of	the	Cali	Cartel		
Cali	Cartel,	based	on	numerous	
sources	
Chepesiuk	2003	
6.	 2013:	Escobar	vs	Cali:	The	
War	of	the	Cartels		
Escobar	v	Cali	cartel	war	based	on	
numerous	sources	
	
Chepesiuk	2013	
	 E.	Books:	Scholars	with	expertise	in	the	drug	trade	and/or	Colombia	
1.	 1998:	The	Andean	Cocaine	
Industry		
Economic	&	political	examination	
of	the	Andean	cocaine	industry	
based	on	extensive	research	and	
sources	by	an	economist	and	
political	scholar	
Clawson	&	Lee	
1998	
2.	 2003:	More	Terrible	Than	
Death:	Violence,	Drugs,	and	
America’s	War	in	Colombia		
	
Human	rights	perspective	of	
US/Colombian	relationship	based	
on	personal	accounts	and	
experience	working	in	Colombia	in	
human	rights		
Kirk	2003	
3.	 2003:	Illegal	Drugs,	Economy	
and	Society	in	the	Andes	
	
In-depth	examination	of	multiple	
factors	impacting	the	illegal	drugs	
economy	and	society	in	the	Andes,	
based	on	extensive	research	and	
sources	by	an	economist	
Thoumi	2003	
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	 Source		 Content	 Reference		
4.	 2006:	Rethinking	the	Roots	of	
Terrorism	
Examination	of	terrorism	seeking	
to	explain	why	terrorism	occurs	by	
a	peace	and	conflict	scholar	
Franks	2006	
5.	 2007:	Understanding	
Organised	crime	
Examination	of	organised	crime,	
including	a	chapter	on	Colombian	
Drug	Cartels,	by	a	legal	scholar	
Mallory	2007	
6.	 2007:	From	Pablo	to	Osama:	
Trafficking	and	Terrorist	
Networks,	Government	
Bureaucracies,	and	
Competitive	Adaptation	
Examination	of	Escobar	&	the	
Medellín	Cartel	using	
organisational	learning	theory	&	
network	analysis,	based	on	
extensive	research	in	Colombia	and	
sources	by	a	political	science	and	
public	policy	scholar	
Kenney	2007	
7.	 2010:	Organized	Crime	 Examination	of	organised	crime,	
including	a	chapter	on	Latin	
America,	including	Colombian	Drug	
Cartels,	by	a	trained	historian	and	
criminal	justice	scholar	
Roth	2010	
8.	 2011:	The	FARC:	The	longest	
insurgency	
Examination	of	the	FARC	and	nexus	
with	the	drug	trade	
Leech	2011	
9.	 2012:	Transnational	
Organised	Crime,	Terrorism,	
and	Criminalised	States	in	
Latin	America:	An	Emerging	
Tier	One	National	Security	
Priority	
Examination	of	crime-nexus	in	
Latin	America	and	emerging	trends	
Farah	2012	
10.	 2014:	The	Losing	War:	Plan	
Colombia	and	Beyond	
Examination	of	Colombia’s	war	and	
Plan	Colombia	
Rosen	2014	
11.	 2015:	Life	and	Death	in	the	
Andes:	On	the	Trail	of	Bandits,	
Heroes,	and	Revolutionaries		
	
Examination	of	the	history	and	
evolution	of	the	Andean	culture,	
based	on	extensive	research	and	
sources	travelling	through	the	
Andes,	including	interview	with	
Colonel	Martinez,	by	an	
anthropologist		
MacQuarrie	2015	
	 F.	Chapter/Paper:	Scholars	with	expertise	in	the	drug	trade	and/or	Colombia	
1.	 2003:	‘The	War	on	Drugs	and	
the	Military:	The	Case	of	
Colombia’	in	Critical	
Reflections	on	Transnational	
Organized	Crime,	Money	
Laundering	and	Corruption	
Book	Chapter:	Examination	of	the	
war	on	drugs	in	Colombia	by	legal	
expert	and	former	law	
enforcement	officer	in	Colombia	
Ronderos	2003	
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	 Source		 Content	 Reference		
2.	 2011:	‘The	evolution	of	the	
international	drugs	trade:	The	
case	of	Colombia,	1930-2000’	
in	Routledge	Handbook	of	
Transnational	Organized	
Crime		
Book	Chapter:	Examination	of	the	
drugs	trade	in	Colombia	by	a	
political	science	and	public	policy	
scholar	
Kenney	2011	
3.	 2013:	‘Peddling	Pablo:	
Escobar’s	Cultural	
Renaissance’,	Hispania,	vol.	
96,	no.	4,	pp.	684-99	
Journal	Paper:	Examination	of	the	
resurgence	and	significance	of	
interest	in	Escobar	in	Colombia.		
Contains	English	summarised	
extracts	from	Spanish	personal	
accounts	of	Popeye	(2015	book),	
Escobar’s	lover,	Vallejo	(2007	
book)	and	his	sister,	Alba	Marina	
Pobutsky	2013	
4.	 2014:	‘Drug	Markets	and	
Organised	Crime’	in,	The	
Oxford	Handbook	of	
Organized	Crime	
Book	Chapter:	Examination	of	the	
drug	markets	in	organised	crime,	
including	Colombia	by	a	
criminologist		
Reuter	2014	
5.	 2014:	‘Organised	Crime	in	
Colombia:	The	Actors	Running	
the	Illegal	Drug	Industry’	in	
The	Oxford	Handbook	of	
Organised	Crime	
	
Book	Chapter:	Examination	of	
actors	impacting	the	illegal	drug	
industry	in	Colombia	by	an	
economist	
Thoumi	2014	
	 G.	Scholarly	databases		
1.	 2016:	Terrorism	Research	&	
Analysis	Consortium	database		
Public	research	terrorism	database	
for	scholars	and	researchers		
TRAC	2016	
2.	 2016:	Encyclopedia	Britannica	
online	
Colombia	country	profile,	including	
extensive	history,	culture,	
population	statistics,	geography,	
society	and	the	economy	
	
Encyclopedia	
Britannica	2016	
3.	 2016:	Encyclopedia	online		 Colombia	country	profile,	including	
extensive	history,	culture,	
population	statistics,	geography,	
society	and	the	economy	
Encyclopedia	
2016	
4.	 2016:	Encyclopedia	of	the	
Nations	
Colombia	country	demographics	
and	penal	system	population	
statistics		
Encyclopedia	of	
the	Nations	2016	
5.	 2016:	Mongabay	 Public	research	information	
including	Colombia	country	and	
cities	demographics		
Mongabay	2016	
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	 Source		 Content	 Reference		
	 H.	Media	articles	
1.	 1977:	Newsweek	magazine		 News	magazine	article	describing	
the	early	cocaine	scene	and	social	
trend	in	the	US	
Cited	in	
MacQuarrie	2015	
2.	 2006:	‘Pablo’s	ex	spills	beans	
on	Colombia’s	corrupt’	2006,	
The	Age	
Newspaper	article	containing	
English	translated	extracts	of	the	
Spanish	2006	recorded	televised	
statement	broadcast	in	Colombia	
by	Escobar’s	lover,	Virginia	Vallejo	
‘Pablo’s	ex	spills	
beans	on	
Colombia’s	
corrupt’	2006		
3.	 2014:	‘Son	of	Cali	Cartel’	
exposes	world’s	biggest	
cocaine	ring’,	Tampa	Bay	
Times	
Newspaper	article	containing	
English	translated	extracts	from	
the	Spanish	2014	autobiography	by	
William	Rodríguez,	son	of	Miguel	
Rodríguez,	Cali	Cartel	
Silva-Warren	
2014	
4.	 2015:	‘Narcos’s	Wagner	
Moura	on	Playing	Pablo	
Escobar	and	Why	He	Learned	
Spanish	Before	He	Got	the	
Part’,	Vulture	
Media	article	containing	an	
interview	with	Wagner	Moura,	
actor	who	plays	Escobar	in	2015-
2017	Netflix	series	Narcos	
Liebman	2015	
5.	 2015:	‘The	terrible	reign	of	
cocaine	king	Pablo	Escobar’,	
The	Telegraph	UK	
Newspaper	article	containing	an	
interview	with	Wagner	Moura,	
actor	who	plays	Escobar	in	2015-
2017	Netflix	series	Narcos	
Harvey	2015	
6.	 2015:	The	Economist	
magazine	
Magazine	article:	‘Special	Report	
Colombia:	The	promise	of	peace’	
Reid	2015	
7.	 n.d.	Forbes	magazine	 Online	media	magazine	summary:	
Pablo	Escobar	in	Forbes’	
Billionaires	issues	
Forbes	n.d.	
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Appendix 2:  Case study - actor data set   
 
Table	1:		Macro-level:	actor	data	set	
Medellín	Cartel:		Selection	of	actors	within	each	actor	group	
1.	 The	Boss		
• Pablo	Escobar	
2.	 The	Leaders	
• Ochoa	brothers	(Juan,	Jorge	&	Fabio)	
• Jose	Gacha		
3.	 The	Key	Associates		
Selection	of	actors	
• Gustavo	Gaviria	
• Roberto	Escobar	
• Fernando	Galeano	
• Kiko	Moncado	
• John	Velásquez	(aka	‘Popeye’)	
• Carlos	Lehder	
• George	Jung	
4.	 The	Professionals	
• Pilots	
• Military	advisers	
• Chemists		
• Accountants	
• Financial	and	tax	advisors	
• Lawyers	
• Bankers	
• Forgers		
• Brokers	
• Realtors	
• Other	‘legitimate’	businesses	
5.	 The	Semi-Professionals	
• Assassins	(sicarios)		
• Security	operators			
• Surveillance	operators	
• Radio	operators	
• Bodyguards	(for	cartel	leaders	and	key	associates)	
• Guards	(for	kidnapped)	
6.	 The	Unskilled		
• Runners	(messengers)	
• Mules	(individuals	who	transport	drugs)	
	 291	
Medellín	Cartel:		Selection	of	actors	within	each	actor	group	
• Smurfs	(individuals	who	deposit	cash	in	banks	below	reporting	limits)	
• Couriers	
• Labourers	
7.	 The	Growers	
• Farmers	(coca	growers)	
• Labour	(auxiliary	agricultural	workers)	
8.	 The	Movers	
• Drivers	(cars,	trucks,	boats,	submarines)	
• Heavy	equipment	operators	
9.	 The	Dealers	
• Wholesale	dealers	
• Mid-level	dealers	
• Retail/street	dealers	
10.	 The	Consumers		
• US	cocaine	users	-	celebrity	parties	
• US	cocaine	users	-	student	culture	and	street-level				
• Consumers	of	illicit	goods	and	services		
11.	 The	Locals	
• Medellín	society	
• Colombian	society	
12.	 The	Enablers	
• Transport	&	shipping	companies	
• Chemical	suppliers	
• Financial	institutions	
13.	 The	Guerrillas	
• FARC	(Revolutionary	Armed	Forces	of	Colombia)	–	1964	to	present		
• ELN	(The	National	Liberation	Army)	–	1964	to	present	
• EPL	(Popular	Liberation	Army)	–	1965	-	present		
• M-19	(The	19	April	Movement)	–	1970	to	1990	
14.	 The	Paramilitaries	and	Vigilantes		
• MAS	(Death	to	Kidnappers)	–	1981	to	1983		
• Los	Pepes	(People	Persecuted	by	Pablo	Escobar)	–	1993	
15.	 The	Terrorists		
• Los	Extraditables	(The	Extraditables)	–	1984	to	1993	
16.	 The	International	Criminals	
• ETA	(Basque	Fatherland	and	Liberty)	
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17.	 The	Competitors		
• The	Cali	Cartel	
18.	 The	Colombian	State	Authorities		
• Colombian	Government	and	Politicians		
• Colombian	Law	Enforcement	
• Colombian	Military		
• Colombian	Search	Bloc	
• Other	Colombian	Agencies	(e.g.	Customs,	Coast	Guard)	
19.	 The	US	State	Authorities		
• US	Government	and	Politicians		
• US	Law	Enforcement	
• US	Army:	Delta	Force	
• US	Army:	Centra	Spike	
• US	Drug	Enforcement	Administration	(DEA)	
• US	Central	Intelligence	Agency	(CIA))	
• Other	US	Agencies	(e.g.	Customs,	Coast	Guard)	
20.	 The	Media	
• Colombian	journalists,	newspapers	and	news	programs			
• US	journalists,	newspapers	and	news	programs			
• International	journalists,	newspapers	and	news	programs			
Source:	Analysis	of	source	data	set	in	Appendix	1	
 
Table	2:	Micro-level:	actor	data	set	
Escobar:	Selection	of	actors	within	each	actor	group		
1.	 The	Family	
• Hermilda	Gaviria	de	Escobar,	mother	
• Roberto	Escobar,	brother	
• Alba	Marina	Escobar,	sister	
• Maria	Victoria	Henao	Vellejo,	wife		
• Juan	Pablo	Escobar,	son	
• Gustavo	Gaviria,	cousin	
2.	 The	Friends	
• Gustavo	Gaviria	
• Jose	Gacha		
• Paramilitary	leaders:	Castaño	bothers	
3.	 The	Business	Associates		
• Ochoa	brothers	(Juan,	Fabio	&	Jorge)	
• Jose	Gacha		
• Gustavo	Gaviria	
• Roberto	Escobar	
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Escobar:	Selection	of	actors	within	each	actor	group		
• Carlos	Lehder		
• George	Jung	
• John	Velásquez	(aka	Popeye)	
• Kiko	Moncado	
• Fernando	Galeano	
4.	 The	Employees	
• Barry	Seal,	professional	pilot	
• Fernando	Arenas,	professional	pilot			
	
5.	 The	Locals	
• Barrio	Pablo	Escobar			
	
6.	 The	Alliances	
• Vigilante	group:	MAS	(Death	to	Kidnappers)		
• Paramilitary	groups:	led	by	Castaño	bothers	
• Guerrilla	groups:		M-19	
• Terrorist	groups:	Los	Extraditables	
• International	groups:		ETA	(Basque	Fatherland	and	Liberty)	
7.	 The	Competitors	
• Cali	Cartel	Rodríguez	brothers		
8.	 The	Enemies	
• Guerrilla	groups:	M-19		
• Competitors:	Cali	Cartel	
• Paramilitary	leaders:	Castaño	bothers	
• Vigilante	group:	Los	Pepes	
9.	 The	State	Authorities			
Colombian	
• Colonel	Hugo	Martinez,	Colombian	National	Police	&	Head	of	Search	Bloc		
• Hugo	Martinez	Jr,	Search	Bloc	surveillance	operator	and	son	of	Colonel	Martinez		
• General	Miguel	Mazu,	Chief	of	Colombia’s	Intelligence	Agency	1984-1991		
US	
• Joe	Toft,	DEA	special	agent	in	charge,	Colombia		
• Thomas	Cash,	DEA	special	agent	in	charge,	Miami		
• Steve	Murphy,	DEA	special	agent,	Medellín	1991-1994		
• Lewis	Tambs,	US	Ambassador	to	Colombia,	1983-1985	
• Morris	Busby,	US	Ambassador	to	Colombia	1991-1994	
• Jack	Blum,	US	Senate	investigator	1987-1989	
10.		 The	Media	
• Colombian	journalists,	newspapers	and	news	programs			
• US	journalists,	newspapers	and	news	programs			
• International	journalists,	newspapers	and	news	programs			
Source:	Analysis	of	source	data	set	in	Appendix	1 	
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Appendix 3:  Case Study - complex data set composition 
 
Table:	Composition	of	the	complex	data	set		
	 	 Number	of	fractal	fragments	
	 Actor	type		 Macro-level	 Micro-level	 Total	
1.	 Medellín	Cartel	 	 	 	
	 				Leaders	 7	 3	 10	
	 				Associates	 7	 5	 12	
	 				Associate	&	Escobar’s	brother*	 8	 12	 20	
	 	 22	 20	 42	
2.	 Enemies	of	Medellín	Cartel	 	 	 	
	 				Cali	Cartel	 1	 1	 2	
	 				Los	Pepes	paramilitary	leader	 1	 -	 1	
	 	 2	 1	 3	
3.	 Escobar	&	family	 	 	 	
	 					Escobar	 -	 5	 5	
	 					Family	(*brother	counted	in	Associates)	 -	 10	 10	
	 					Lover	 -	 2	 2	
	 	 -	 17	 17	
4.	 Colombia	 	 	 	
	 				Government	officials	 3	 -	 3	
	 				Law	enforcement		 9	 6	 15	
	 				Locals	 1	 4	 5	
	 	 13	 10	 23	
5.	 US	 	 	 	
	 				Government	officials	 9	 -	 9	
	 				Law	enforcement	 4	 2	 6	
	 				Government	declassified	documents		 12	 1	 13	
	 				Government	public	document		 -	 1	 1	
	 	 25	 4	 29	
6.	 Others	 	 	 	
	 				Scholars	&	scholarly	databases	 7	 9	 16	
	 				Investigative	journalists	 12	 6	 18	
	 				Consumers	(in	a	media	report)	 1	 -	 1	
	 				Actor	portraying	Escobar	 -	 1	 1	
	 	 20	 16	 36	
	 	 	 	 	
	 Total	 82	 68	 150	
	
Source:	Analysis	of	fractal	fragments	by	actor	based	on	information	in	Appendices	1	and	2 
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